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TEXT CUT OFF IN THE 
ORIGINAL 
ABS'I'RACT 
It is widely appreciated thrll-_ redundilflCY and tlle guc~-,ti.on of job 
security remClill Clmong the most centr<ll issues confrontiny 
contemporary industrial societies. In pnrticulilr, redundClncy is 
possibly the most important single issue that an individual worker 
is likely to face, ilnd more espccially mcmual workers, in the course 
of their working life. Therefore, the control over redundancy 
decisions j s,' of considerable importance to individuals and their 
organisations, which seek to defend their position in industry. 
Though redundancy, and redunda.ncy provision as part of manpO'.vcr 
policies has been widely viewed as being a cornerstone of plililic 
policy, the orientation of redundancy re~e~rch has largely focused 
upon its implicCltions for the workings of the lilbour mi1rket. Even 
though public policy lws d(!fincci worker re!";i~-,t.:'l'nce, a:::-i5ing out of 
fears of job insecurity, as bej lJg a centra] source for oppo~;.i U on to 
managerial change, redundancy n!senrch in the UK has ~;hown Ii ttle 
interest in the impact of redundancy upon workplace relations, und 
more particularly, workplace orgunisation. The object of this study 
is to attempt to draw iltten1:ion to the ilOPClct which redundancy, 
(and recessions) have had upon the exercise of power in the workplace. 
The study is based upon the hist.orical experiences of reduncloncy in 
the British motor industry. Tho approach has been to present 
redundancy as a 'key issue ' in the determination of pOYler in 
workplace organisation. The research is introduced by an ar.count 
of the contemporary evidence of the affect of rednndancy, job loss 
and unemployment, upon the status of the manual worker in modern 
society. It is maintained that this condition is underpinned by 
decisions over the exercise of power. In the first part of the study, 
the review of redundancy literature reveals a general failure 1:0 
consider redundancy either in terms of workplace relations or as a 
question of povler. '1'he remaindC'T of the research, therefore, 
undertakes an exarniTlation of redundancy as a central issue in power 
relations. 'rhe approach adopted has been to mail~tain that while 
pov:er remains a central concept in \.,orkplace relations, an apprcach 
which seeks to analyse the concept of pm1er needs to explore the 
interactions of the princip~} parties engaged in power struggles, 
Ulough the selection of a key issue over which there exists a clear 
division of int.erest. It is in this resp8ct that the study e;-:.plores 
the ways in which the handljng of redundancy has been of major 
importance in the strategies adopted"by management, to the changing power of 
workplace organisation. It is conclud .. )d that the transformatiol1 
of the redundancy question in the British motor industry is 
indicati ve of the changing alleginnccs tOlvarcls workplace leaderships 
within the increasingly elaborate framework of indu:::;trial rclcttions 
practices. 
PHEFl\C.E 
This study could not have been undertaken without the support and 
co-operation of a large number of individuals and organisations. 
In particular, I would like t.o register my thanks to the staff 
of the Engineering Employers F'ederation, the Coventry Engineering 
Employers Association, the 'l'ransport and General \'lorkcrs Union, 
the Amalgamated Engineering Union, as well as the Department of 
Employment, the Public Record Office, the Modern Records Centre, 
at \'larwick Uni versi ty, and the Archive of Eddie and Ruth Frm'l, 
in Manchester. I would especially like to thank Jack Jones, Bill 
Lapworth, Phil Pavey, Nalcolm Young and Eric Bone, among the 
union officials who have been of considerable help. I would also 
like to pay a very special th~nks to Dick Etheridge, Les Gurl, 
Bill Warman, for providing m~ with so much of their time and 
experiences, and also for the access to the invaluable collection 
of documentary records of the BHC Combine Committee. 
Finally I would like to express my thank~ to Richard Hyman for 
the support and supervision in regard to this work, and a ver.y very 
special thanks to Joyce Royle for typing the manuscript. And nut 
forgetting the contributions of Jill, Salma, and Alistair • 
• 
To John E Salmon 
GMWU Senior Shop Steward 
PREFACE 
ABBREVIATIONS 
LIST OF TABLES 
CONTENTS 
LIST OF DIAGRAMS AND GRAPHS 
INTRODUCTION 
1 
Job-Security and Wage Labour 
Redundancy, Unemployment and the Labour 
market. 
PART I 
PART 2 
2 
3 
1 
2 
3 
4 
The Control over Jobs 
Job Security and Worker Interests 
The Question of Power 
The Study of Redundancy 
Appraoches to the Concept of Power 
Pluralism and the Problem of Power 
Social Classes, 'Interests' and Power 
5 Redundancy and Workplace Organisation : a 
study of power relations 
6 
1 
Research strategy, methods and sources 
The British Motor Industry and Wage Labour 
in the Formative Period 1900-1920. 
The Origins of the British Motor Industry 
2 Workplace Independence : The Question of 
Recognition 
3 Organised wage labour and the Motor Industry 
PAGE 
i 
ii 
iv 
vi 
1 
3 
7 
16 
28 
32 
41 
45 
60 
79 
93 
105 
107 
119 
124 
PART 3 
PART 4 
PART 5 
PART 6 
PART 7 
1 
2 
3 
1 
2 
3 
4 
1 
2 
3 
1 
2 
3 
1 
2 
3 
Unemployment, The Labour Market and 
Workplace Power, 1921-1938. 
The Labour Market and Employer Power 
Unemployment and workplace Organisation 
From unorganised power conflict to 
organised Wage Labour 
The New Stability, 1938-1945 
The State and the Labour Market 
'Constitutional' Shop Stewards Organisations 
Redundancy and Workplace Relations 
The War Economy and the Motor Industry 
Post War Reconstruction and the Motor Industry 
Post war expansion and the Labour Market 
Workplace Organisation and Federation Policy 
The Defence of Workplace gains 
Redundancy and the Rise of Workplace Power 
The Development of Workplace Bargaining 
The emergence of Redundancy as an issue 
of Power Conflict 
Early Post-war Workplace Organisation 
The Struggle for the Control of Redundancy 
Redundancy Policy and the Defence of 
Managerial Prerogative 
Workplace Conflict and Control 
Redundancy and the origin of the BMC Combine 
Committee 
137 
140 
148 
160 
200 
203 
211 
224 
242 
259 
261 
265 
288 
309 
312 
328 
369 
404 
407 
423 
478 
PART 8 
1 
2 
3 
CONCLUSIONS 
FOOTNOTES 
Post War Crisis and Mass Redundancy 
The 1956 Recession and the Motor Industry 
Mass Redundancy and Mass Strikes 
Workplace Recognition and Redundancy 
Agreements 
515 
518 
523 
609 
624 
646 
APPENDIX I 
APPENDIX 2 
APPENDIX 3 
APPENDIX 4 
APPENDIX 5 
Procedure for future redundancy in 
BMC, 26 September 1956. 
The British Motor Corporation Joint Shop 
Stewards Committee, Constitution, Objects 
and Standing Orders, 1952. 
Procedure for the Protection of Shop 
Stewards - Austin Motor Co., January 1960. 
Draft Proposals for Works Committee at 
The Austin Motor Company. 
Wage Labour and Worker Insecurity in the 
Motor Industry. 
Graph I - Annual Job Loss in the 
UK Vehicle Industry (1950-1980). 
Graph 2 - Annual Production of cars 
and highest monthly registered 
unemployed MLH 381. (1948-1980). 
Graph 3 - Highest monthly estimate of 
employees on short-time working in motor 
vehicle manufacturing and all manufacturing 
industries (1955-1980). 
Graph 4 - Motor industry index employment 
and production, 1950-1980. 
APPENDIX 6 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Graph 5 - Index of average weeks wage rates 
in manufacturing with average wage rates in 
Coventry, 1940-1970. 
(adult males) • 
BL cars Redundancy ex gratia payment in lieu of 
Redundancy Payments. 
766 
TABLE 2.1 
TABLE 2.2 
TABLE 2.3 
TABLE 2.4 
TABLE 2.5 
TABLE 3.1 
TABLE 4.1 
TABLE 4.2 
TABLE 4.3 
TABLE 4.4 
TABLE 4.5 
TABLE 4.6 
LIST OF TABLES 
Density of trade union membership in the 
west Midlands, 1891-2 
Estimated density of trade union membership 
in the Northern Counties 1891-2 
Estimated density of trade union membership 
in industrial urban towns. 
Total membership and numbers of branches of 
the ASE in the West and South Midlands 
Composition of the Labour Force in 
general engineering 1911 (percentage). 
Monthly average unemployed in vehicle 
construction (1920-1939). 
Annual average hourly wage rates 
(September-October) in British Motor 
firms, 1945-1955. 
Proportion of increases in annual wage 
rates due to plant bargaining in British 
motor firms, 1945-1955. 
An analysis of monthly movements in the 
average Coventry wage rate 1945-1955. 
The affect of national wage agreements upon 
the yearly increases in Coventry wage 
rates, 1946-1955. 
Average monthly wage rates paid in 
Federated firms in Coventry, 1948-1956. 
Redundancy strikes in the motor industry 
(MLH 381) : causal analysis of primary 
issues, 1947-1956. 
PAGE 
131 
131 
132 
132 
133 
146 
315 
318 
320 
322 
324 
336 
TABLE 4.7 Redundancy striker-days in the motor 338 
industry (MLH 381) : causal analysis 
of primary issues, 1947-1956. 
TABLE 4.8 The employment of skilled workers in 382 
the British motor industry, 1946. 
DIAGRAM 2.1 
GRAPH 3.1 
GRAPH 3.2 
GRAPH 3.3 
GRAPH 3.4 
GRAPH 3.5 
LIST OF GRAPHS AND DIAGRAMS 
Power determination and human agency 
Unemployed in vehicle construction 
1920-1929 (percentage) 
Unemployed in vehicle construction 
1930-1939 (percentage) 
Monthly mean unemployment in 
vehicle construction 1920-1939. 
Annual car production and yearly 
average unemployment 1920-1939. 
AEU membership (West Midlands) 
1860-1940. 
PAGE 
74 
142 
142 
144 
145 
153 
AEU 
ASE 
AWA 
BC 
BEC 
BL 
BLSP 
BMC 
BSMW 
BW EEA 
CEJC 
COV EEA 
CP 
CSEU 
CTR 
DC 
DE 
00 
DS 
EC 
EEF 
ETU 
EWO 
JPC 
JSSC 
MOL 
MOS 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
Amalgamated Engineering Union 
Amalgamated Society of Engineers 
Armstrong Whitworth Aircraft 
Branch Committee 
British Employers Confederation 
British Leyland 
British Light Steel Pressings 
British Motor Corporation 
Birmingham and Midland Sheet Metal Workers Union 
Birmingham and Wolverhampton Engineering Employers 
Association 
Coventry Engineering Employers Association 
Communist Party of Great Britain 
Confederation of Shipbuilding and Engineering Unions 
Consolidated Time Rate 
District Committee 
Department of Employment 
District Organiser 
District Secretary 
Executive Council/Committee 
Engineering Employers Federation 
Electrical Trades Union 
Essential Works Order 
Joint Production Committee 
Joint Shop Stewards Committee 
Ministry of Labour 
Ministry of Supply 
MSSC 
NC 
NE 
NEDC 
NJAC 
NSMW 
NSO 
NSSNC 
NUVB 
S~T 
TGWU 
TUC 
UPA 
Motor Shop Stewards Committee 
National Committee 
National Executive Committee 
National Economic Development Council 
National Joint Advisory Council 
National Sheet Metal Workers Union 
National Service Officer 
National Shop Stewards National Council 
National Union of Vehicle Builders 
Society of Motor Manufacturers and Trading 
Transport and General Workers Union 
Trades Union Congress 
United Patternmakers Association. 
INTRODUCTION 
JOB SECURITY AND WAGE LABOUR 
1 
INTRODUCTION 
Abstract 
The position of wage-labour in the market economies of advanced 
capitalist societies appears characterised by an apparent 
ambivalence in worker attitudes arising out of the conditions 
under which labour power is exchanged. On the one hand, especially 
in regard to manual work-forces, deprivation in work is often 
accompanied by strong attachments to jobs. However, with the 
increasingly fragile status of job-security, attention has 
re-focusod upon the issue of redundancy, unemployment, and the 
'right to work'. The process of job-loss, in a market economy, 
engenders considerable social divisions in the position of collective 
wage-labour. The powerful forces of market rationality, public 
policy, and managerial decision-making, appear as divisive 
determinations in both job-loss, and in the experience of being 
unemployed, in the market for labour. While the distribution of 
power and inequality may give rise to forms of collectivism in 
the workplace, on the question of redundancy it poses particular 
difficulties for the collective opposition of wage-labour. 
This introductory chapter will seek to locate the ambiguous status 
of wage-labour in the structure of a market economy. Drawing 
particularly upon recent evidence of redundancy and unemployment 
in Britain, it will seek to identify the divisive nature of the 
labour market. 
The chapter concludes by maintaining that though the industrial 
worker remains largely powerless in relation to the causes of 
redundancy, and possesses little control over the actual redundancy 
2 
decision itself, despite the experience of job deprivation, manual 
workforces are far from disinterested in issues of job security. 
Although the market ideologies of self help and individualism 
influence much of public social policy in Britain, in the work 
situation, public policy over redundancy has had to confront worker 
interests in the preservation of his job. Regardless of the low 
level of moral attachment to work ,wage labour retains a high level 
of job dependence. It is the ambiguous position of wage labour 
in a market economy that forms the basis of worker interest in 
jobs, and which makes redundancy and the fear of unemployment/issues 
of job control. 
3 
I REDUNDANCY, UNEMPLOYMENT, AND THE LABOUR MARKET 
In their conclusion of three studies of redundancy published in 
1959 for the Acton Society Trust, the authors remarked, 
"In general, redundancy emerges as a serious matter, 
not to be dismissed, even in conditions of general 
high employment ruling at the time of these inquiries, 
as a trivial incident about which no sensible worker 
should worry". 1 
Though much has happened in the state of the labour market since 
the end of the 1950's, redundancy, and the related question of 
unemployment, have, if anything, acquired a far greater significance 
as issues in the histories of modern industrial societies. In 
the period since the mid-1970's,the spectre of unemployment has 
emerged as a central question, not just for manpower policy, but 
for the wider issue which the 'right to work' poses for wage-labour 
in the market economies of advanced capitalism. At the first 
meeting of the Manpower and Social Affairs Committee of the 
o E C D,matter~ conducted at ministerial level, in March 1976, 
the Committee Chairman identified the dilemmas raised by the operation 
of the labour market. 
"To conclude, and to sum up in one word, we must adjust 
the economic dynamic, without discouraging it, to the 
social demand, thus responding to the crucial question 
of our time: are our free societies still able to 
guarantee everyone the most important element of liberty 
and dignity for each individual, the chance to work?" 2 
In Britain the question of redundancy has been a cornerstone of 
manpower policy, and, since the early 1960's it has been an integral 
l ' 3 part of public po ~cy. The effects of redundancy and unemployment 
however, can hardly be claimed to have been ameliorated by the 
experience of time. Comparing methods for handling redundancies 
in Britain, France, and Germany, MUkerjee writes, 
"Redundancy is a man-made phenomenon. It is not some 
spontaneous act of nature with a trail of disaster 
marking its passage. Yet in Britain, at least, that is 
how redundancies seem to appear to those who are 
affected as to the spectator" 4 
4 
Since Mukerjee's remark, the the incidence of redundancy as 
a cause of unemployment, has increased tlramatically. The General 
Household Survey for 1978 reveals that 48 per cent of workers who 
5 had lost their jobs had done so because of a redundancy. During 
1980, the number of workers receiving a statutory redundancy payment 
6 
rose to a record 490,000 , an increase of 178 per cent above the 
level recorded at the time of Mukerjee~ comment, and 45 per cent 
above the previous peak for statutory redundancies established in 
1975. Even this figure, represents a serious under-estimate of 
the absolute level of r~dundancy. Workers with less than two years 
service with an employer, and those under the age of 20; or above 
retiring age, or part-time employees engaged for less than 16 hours 
per week, are not eligible for payment under the statutory provisions. 
As a result large numbers of 'redundant' workers do not appear in 
the official figures. The Institute of Manpower Studies, for 
example, estimate that during the early part of 1981 actual 
redundancies were occurring in Britain at a projected annual rate 
of over 1.4 million: 7 
Redundancies, however, are only one method for calculating job-loss. 
Firms may reduce the number of jobs by lowering the retirement age, 
ceasing to fill vacancies, or halting recruitment. 8 Policier 
which, without resulting in the actual redundancies of employees, 
may directly affect levels of unemployment and the stock of jobs 
available in the labour market. Average uncmploYIn(mt has progressively 
increased during the post war period. In the first 20 post war 
years average annual unemployment stood at 1.8 per cent. By 1972 
it had risen to 3 per cent, while male unemployment in 1980 had 
9 
reached 7 per cent. Similarly, the figures for registered 
unemployment has shown a dramatic increase. Between 1966 and 1975 
5 
there was a four fold increase in unemployment, as the registered 
unemployed exceeded one million. lO In 1978 it reached 1.5 million, 
and by January 1982,it exceeded 3 million. ll 
This pattern of growth in redundancies and unemployment has 
intensified competition in the labour market. In 1963 there were 
four unemployed workers for every notified vacancy. By 1972, this 
had reached a ratio of 7:1; 1977,8.5:1; and 1982, 15.5:1. 
This deterioration in the net market position for labour has been 
very unequally distributed. It has been estimated by Metcalf 
that only 3 per cent of the labour force bears 70 per cent of the 
12 
annual weeks of unemployment. But it is across the social class 
structure that the inequality of unemployment has its severest 
impact. Sinfield sums up the evidence for male workers, 
"Men in unskilled and semi-skilled manual work were 
twice as likely as skilled to have had some time 
unemployed; men in manual work as a whole were twice 
as vulnerable as the non-manual; and among those in the 
intermediate and junior, or routine non-manual, had 
twice as gr~at a risk as professionals, employers 
and managers".13 
The unskilled in particular experience the highest levels of 
unemployment. They comprise only 9 per cent of the male labour 
force with no period of unemployment during 1978,but 17 per cent 
of those with one to nine weeks of unemployment, and, 39 per cent 
14 
of those with 10 or more weeks of unemployment. Only 4 per cent 
of employers or managers are likely to experience unemployment, 
compared to 18 per cent for the unskilled, who are three times as 
prone to periods of unemployment during a year than are semi-
skilled workers. 15 Even during periods of relatively low unemployment, 
manual workers are not likely to be immune from the insecurities 
associated with the exchange of their labour-power in a market 
economy. Between 1953 and 1963, 31.5 per cent of male skilled 
6 
workers, 39.4 per cent of semi-skilled, and 57.7 per cent of 
unskilled male manual workers, endured periods of unemployment. 16 
Although the experience of unemployment is a burden most directly 
related to manual workers, divisions based upon sex and age also 
fragment the impact of unemployment among labour forces. During 
the 1950's~despite the relatively lower proportion of women in 
employment and the generally low levels of unemployment, the 
incidence of female unemployment remained higher than that for 
most male workers, with the exception of the unskilled. 17 In 
the period since, the growth in the female workforce has to some 
extent been shielded from some of the full effects of recessions. 
During the 1970's, the severe decline in manufacturing and 
construction, as opposed to the expansion in the service sector, 
18 favoured the protection of large areas of female employment. 
Nevertheless, during the economic recession of 1974-75, unemployment 
among women in the UK began to rise more sharply than that of 
19 
men. 
Unemployment is also likely to divide work forces by age. Between 
1971 and 1976 the unemployment rate among youths more than doubled. 
In January 1980 almost half of all males who had been out of work 
for a week or less were aged under 25, compared to only 14 per cent 
for those over 50 years. However, whereas 42 per cent of those 
aged 50 and over had been out of work for 6 months or more, this 
20 
compared to less than 18 per cent of those under 25 years of age. 
7 
2 THE CONTROL OVER JOBS 
Although the classical theory of labour market behaviour sees the 
unfettered operation of markets producing movements towards 
equilibrium, in which both the price and sale of labour power will 
be maximised to a point of full utilisation, the practice of market 
economies reveals that far from a sustained position of equilibrium 
being maintained, wage-labour remains constantly vulnerable to 
f d o °lob ° 21 positions 0 1s-equ1 1 r1um. In employment, workforces appear 
frequently vulnerable to the managerial power of labour discharge 
and redundancy. The effects of market distributions produces wide 
variations, and sharp differences within wage-labour, in terms of 
proneness to unemployment. The labour market in Britain, however, 
is not just characterised by the current rapid increases in 
unemployment, or the record levels of statutory redundancy payments 
to wage labour. The structured inequality of social class exists 
not just among the labour market for the unemployed, but it enters 
. 
into the levels of worker security in jobs. The competitive forces 
of the labour market and the power of management practices impose 
a particularly divisive categorisation upon the process of job-loss. 
This is especially apparent in the case of a redundancy. 
In a redundancy the subjection of wage-labour to the rationale of 
the market and the power of management control is almost entirely 
involuntary. While it is possible for workforces to submit themselves 
for 'voluntary' redundancy, the fact that a management decision had 
already been arrived at for the actual number of workers to be 
dispossessed, renders the redundancy decision, as opposed to the 
selection process, an involuntary action. In this sense redundancy 
would come under Keynes' concept of "involuntary-unemployment" ,22 in 
which dispossession occurs through no fault of the worker. In practice 
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10 
public attitudes towards job-loss, and unemployment. 32 
The power over redundancy decisions, and the treatment experienced 
by the redundant, however, both reveal considerable social and 
economiC divisions which differentiate within the collective 
position of wage-labour. The unequal experience of job-loss and 
insecurity in jobs, displays wide variations in regard to age, 
sex, occupation, skill, industry, and employer policies and practices. 
While these divisions are in themselves also manifestations of the 
unequal distributions of life-chances and class position, it is in 
the labour market itself that the dispossessed worker faces the 
severest forms of unequal treatment. In Britain the evidence 
available suggests that market decline rather than industrial 
modernisation has been the principal force generating redundancy 
and worker insecurity. 
Although public manpower policY in Britain originated with a desire 
to promote industrial modernisation to increase the international 
competitiveness of domestic industry, the major causes of redundancy 
have appeared as the results of industrial failure and market 
decline. In the Parker, et aI, Government survey,only 8 per cent 
of redundancies where workers received compensation, and, in only 
2 per cent of uncompensated redundancies, was the job-loss due to 
the reorganisation of work. 33 Redundancies owing to automation 
accounted for only 3 per cent of paid redundants and 1 per cent 
of uncompensated redundants. Whereas 71 per cent of all paid 
redundants were due to firms closing, falls in the product market and 
the closure of uneconomic parts of firms, the remaining 13 
per cent were due to amalgamations, or financial difficulties. 34 
Daniel and Stilgoe, in their study of redundancies in 300 establishments 
11 
carried out in 1978, reported that 60 per cent of all redundancies 
35 had been due to deficient demand in the product market. 
The general vulnerability of wage-labour to the workings of market 
competition in terms of redundancy, has, like unemployment itself, 
been greatest among older workers, the less skilled, and the young 
and the low paid. Daniel found that among the redundant-unemployed, 
40 per cent had been employed in particularly insecure jobs -
seasonal, contract, or short, fixed-term employment! jobs, in the 
main, most likely to be offered to younger workers. Only 1 per cent 
of workers under 25 were made redundant owing to factory closures, 
shortages of work and reorganisations. 36 But among those aged 
55 and over, 26 per cent of the redundant-unemployed were dismissed 
37 for these causes. 
The general incidence of redundancy has increasingly been placed 
upon sections of the labour force least able to adapt to the demands 
of the labour market: In a recent surveY,3 out of 5 workers made 
redundant, were in manual jobs, mostly unskilled, and earning 
38 below the national average wage. Age has increasingly become an 
important factor in employer~ redundancy decisions. Before 1965 
only 19 per cent of employers reported to the Government Social Survey 
that age was being a factor in their decision of making workers 
redundant, but by 1969 this had become a factor mentioned by 38 per 
39 
cent of employers. By 1974 a study conducted by the BIM concluded 
that age had become the most single important determinant of the 
, d .. 40 
employers redundancy selection eC1S10n. About 70 per cent of 
company provisions which exceed statutory requirements for compensation 
41 
are for older workers. It is among the larger firms that age 
discrimination in redundancy policies is most apparent, whereas 
12 
among small employer~ an employees work record is more likely to be 
the main basis for redundancy selection. 
, 
The workers dependence upon employment is constantly undermined 
by the threats of job insecurities. The experienc~ differs 
according to industr~ In mining and quarrying, for example, 
employer redundancy policies in their programmes for colliery 
closures are weighted towards encouraging older workers to leave 
the industry,42 while younger workers tend to be offered alternative 
work at other collieries. In instrument engineering, where a high 
premium is placed upon worker skill, experience and physical 
standards of manual dexterity and good eyesight, redundancy remains 
lightest between the 35-44 age group, but rises sharply among those 
55 h th ab 'l't' b' d l' 43 over years, were ese ~ ~ ~es may e ~n ec ~ne. It is among 
manual workers that older aged groups appear most dispensable to 
employers. In mining,83 per cent of all redundancies were among 
44 those aged 55 and above, a quarter of the redundancies in the 
motor industry during 1976, and a fifth of all redundancies in 
transport and communications, which includes the docks, took 
45 place among those aged 60 and above. 
By contrast, among the predominantly white collar employees, in 
banking, insurance and finance, almost a quarter of redundancies 
occurred amongst workers in their 20's compared to only 8 per cent 
for those above the age of 60 years, while in the 9rofessional and 
~cientific services sector of employment, nearly a third of all 
redundancies were amongst those under the age of 30. Experience 
and qualification among those white collar46 occupations has tended 
to favour the retention of older workers. In manual employment 
the value of long service in redundancy situations is invariably 
13 
associated with an insistence from well organised trade unions. 
In industries like shipbuilding the widespread application of 
'Last in - first out' has preserved the position of the older 
worker, but the decline in jobs in the industry has been placed 
47 
upon the 20-24 age group. 
Although clearly marked divisions can be identified which reveal 
the propensity for particular sections of the labour force to be 
more prone to the ~ffects of unemployment and redundancy, employer 
practices, operating within specific industries, and framed within 
the overall context of public policy provision, have combined to 
locate the unequal burden of redundancy. This inequality and 
social division has been/perhaps,most apparent in the process of 
job-loss itself. In the main, the practices of employers, through 
the provision of compensation, and through the control of the 
redundancy process, has beg~n to establish a structure of differential 
entitlement. The social divisions arising among workforces in the 
labour market have entered into policies for the handling of 
redundant workers. The principal mechanism for social division in 
the workplace has been the application , of financial arrangements 
to encourage job-loss. Statutory compensation has itself been 
supplemented and reinforced by additional ex-gratia payments and 
other employer supported policy inducements. 
The calculation of statutory compensation based upon length of 
service and earnings, while reinforcing differences between the 
position of male and female, also opens up an age differential. 
Despite their significance in employment, women workers, because of 
their predominance in part-time, or generally shorter periods of 
employment with a single employer, are more likely to be prone to 
14 
redundancies, but less likely to be eligible for compensation, or, 
be in receipt of much lower levels of compensation, either because 
of their shorter duration of employment or owing to low wage 
48 levels. Daniel found that less than a quarter of the workers 
49 paid compensation for redundancy were women. In regard to age 
the social divisions are even more apparent. A study of a 10 
per cent sample of the redundant in 1976 concluded. 
"The fact that the older redundant workers tend to have 
had longer service and been more highly paid (and 
therefore been in receipt of the largest redundancy 
payments) is consistent with redundancy acting as a 
social mechanism to remove from the labour force older 
persons nearing retirement, after long service, by 
means of comparatively generous compensation". 50 
"comparatively generous compensation", is however, confined to 
very few of those made redundant. Daniel revealed 
"Our findings showed that the role of redundancy 
payments in relation to the unemployed can be greatly 
exaggerated. Only 7 per cent of our respondents had 
received payments under the Redundancy Payments Act 
on leaving their last job, and these tended to be among 
the higher o~cupational levels. Thus while having 
received substantial lump sums did reduce concern about 
being out of work and did reduce the sense of urgency 
in seeking a new job, particularly among the older 
workers, only a small proportion had received substantial 
sums under the Redundancy Payments Act". 51 
This picture has since been confirmed by the Manpower Services 
Study of 2,000 establishments which had made claims for rebate in 
January 1981. Although the bases of the sample would tend to 
understate the number of workers without entitlements to compensation 
it discovered that a third of all workers got no compensation; 
t'hat among those eligible, the average statutory payment was £1,050, 
but half the sample received under £500. Only 4 per cent of those 
redundant received more than £5,000. 52 While some 40 per cent of 
employers made some kind of extra-statutory payment, for example, 
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ex gratia payments, closure bonuses, payment in lieu of notice, 
and payments in kind, the distribution of these payments tended 
to widen the social division within the workforces, already 
imposed by statutory schemes. 
"Clearly the determinants of the statutory scheme -
especially service - also tend to be those of the extra-
statutory lump sum payments. That explains the progressive 
differences in redundancy payments made, both between 
ineligibles and eligibles: and between eligibles without, 
and with, access to extra-statutory schemes •.•.• these 
provisions can significantly supplement the lump sum 
payments, while further widening the gulf between the 
haves and have nots". 53 
The labour market in Britain operates not merely as a device for 
the 'rational' distribution of the supply of labour to the needs 
of employers. Labour markets, in themselves, sustain, and reinforce, 
and even introduce, wide social, as well as economic divisions, in 
the condition of the collective worker. Redundancy, unemployment, 
and the process of job-loss, impose particularly severe inequalities 
in the experiences of manual labour forces. This sectionalising 
of wage-labour, by skill, age, and sex, combined with the overall 
state of the market, considerably affects an individuals 'life-
chances' for maintaining a level of economic security. For the 
majority of manual workers the power of employer decisions and the 
permanent subjection to the 'impersonal' economic 'laws', appear 
as formidable obstacles to worker security and dependence in 
market economies. It is the insecurity of wage-labour, with its 
universal dependence upon the employment relationship which forms 
the basis for a worker interest.in job security. 
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3 JOB SECURITY AND WORKER 'INTERESTS' 
The now considerable evidence available from studies conducted by 
industrial sociologists and industrial psychologists presents a 
broad consensus of the view that for manual workers in particular, 
industrial life imposes substantial levels of deprivation upon 
the condition of wage-labour. Among large sections of the labour 
force/it is suggested that work itself provides little in the form 
of 'intrinsic satisfaction' for the industrial worker. 54 Life 
on the shop floor is characterised by the varying degrees of 
55 
'powerlessness'; a lack of 'worker autonomy'. Work itself is 
viewed as no longer forming a 'central life interest,56; wage-
labour has become increasing orientated towards 'extrinsic interests', 
becoming 'calculatingly involved', in which the 'cash-nexus' and 
the 'instrumental-worker' attitudes have accompanied the growth of 
mass assembly industries;57 worker 'de-skilling', and the steady 
decline of the traditional class-community based industries, such 
58 
as coalmining, fishing, steel-making, the docks, etc. Although 
there have been a number of important challenges, either to the 
59 
conclusions being drawn from such studies, or to the assumptions 
which appear to underlie some of the research findings and methods 
employed, a factor which generally remains constant throughout such 
studies, has been that workers possess an interest in the security 
of their employment. Deprivation in work, in other words, does 
not appear to substantially diminish worker attachment or dependence 
upon work. In a number of notable instances it appears to actually 
strengthen it. 
Insecurity for wage-labour is not confined to experiences in the 
labour market. The insecurity of labour is a feature of work itself. 
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Wedderburn asks, 
"Is security a more important consideration 
or not people find their work interesting? 
it is, although little attention is paid to 
of such a preference". 60 
She goes on to elaborate, 
than whether 
Almost certainly 
the implications 
"Not having a job is the basic insecurity, but if we 
also take into account the reduction of overtime working 
and the increases in short-time working we are bound to 
accept that there is widespread anxiety, particularly 
for manual workers. It is a remarkable fact that the 
great majority of manual workers cannot rely upon 
knowing what will be in their wage packet from week 
to week". 61 
It is, consequently, not surprising that much of the available 
evidence of worker attitudes reveals their high priority towards 
their interests in job security. Security of income and security 
of employment, to some extent are interdependent states/ 
are highly valued expectations from a work situation. The "predominantly 
instrumental way" in which the Affluent Worker Studies caricatured 
. 
worker attachment/disclosed that while only 29 per cent of craftsmen 
and setters, and only 14 per cent of process workers, machinists 
and assemblers, were attached to their present employment for 
62 
reasons associated to the nature of their work, 87 per cent of 
the former group and 82 per cent of the latter explained their 
attachment to economic considerations - "level of pay, degree of 
security, or the extent of fringe benefits". Next to pay, "good 
security" remained the strongest reason for job attachment and 
substantially above reasons related to the "fairness of the 
63 
employer". In an account of white collar workers behaviour, 
Crozier argued that the workers involvement in the promotion 
system was essentially an expression of worker interest in security. 
A congruence emerged among those who most closely identified with 
formation between the values held by the worker and the values which 
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d f th " 64 stemme rom e organ~sat~on. 
Theorists of dual labour markets have maintained that prolonged 
worker attachment to an employer may produce a mutual state of 
65 joint worker and employer dependence ,an outcome of which may be 
the increased protection of the worker against the general 
66 insecurities of employment. Increased dependence, however, where 
it is based upon worker 'de-skilling' or the engagement upon routine 
tasks, can itself be a source of worker insecurity. Wyatt and 
Marriott write of the attitudes of mass production workers, 
"The desire for security was intensified by a belief that 
the market value of the men employed on mass production 
methods was very limited". 67 
Redundancy, or ill health, can still pose a threat to workers who 
have possession of an hitherto long term secure job .. Once such a 
job is los~not only are the workers involved separated from the 
relative protections of the internal labour market, but they fall 
back into the weaknesses of their "key individual characteristics" 
68 for their future employment prospects. If, for example, they 
are in ill-health, possess a disability, or are from an older age 
group, or are not suitable for retraining, they are likely to enter 
what Norris defines as the "subemployed" - a strata of the labour 
69 force most prone to recurrent unemployment. 
worker insecurity, however, can still be a feature of the work 
situation even where the threat of redundancy has been removed. 
Research among the high technology industries, in addition to 
emphasising more job involvement has also stressed the attractions 
for greater job security. The absence of compulsory redundancy, 
however, has not in itself removed the quest for job security from 
within the work situation. Gallie reveals that-worker interests 
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in security became developed at different levels. He writes, 
"People were now primarily concerned about security 
in their particular job within the organisation, about 
the security of their hierarchical rank, and about 
security in the way of work to which they had become 
accustomed". 70 
'No redundancy' and a reliance upon 'natural wastage' affected 
manning levels, increased the intensity of work, threatened 
'predictable'work patterns; increased job mobilit~ changed the 
composition of established workgroups, and social networks, and 
extended the content of job tasks, uhile de-manning produced a 
71 
social isolation among workers. In ~~e study of ~lienation and 
technology undertaken by Blauner, insecurity of employment in the 
mass production industry appeared as an aspect of worker powerlessness, 
and lack of intergration in the work situation. Although at an 
institutional level, a degree of formal inte'gration existed 
between management and trade union organisations, in his example 
of the car industry, little sense of worker loyalty to either 
-
occupation, or the company, existed on the shop floor. The severe 
states of job deprivation and job insecurity intensified the 
workers' loss of control, and encouraged a reified perception 
of his circumstances. 
"The insecurity of employment in the industry is another 
factor which contributes to the overall lack of normative 
integration. When a worker is temporarily laid off or 
required to work short weeks several times a year, he is 
likely to feel that management views him only as a number, 
an instrument of production, and not as a human being".73 
Chin~, drawing upon his observation of American car workers 
pointed to the moral ambiguity inherent in worker attachment and 
conditions of job deprivation. 
"Holding a job remains a moral obligation for most people, 
now considerable moral ambiguity surrounds the actual 
performance of a job". 74 
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In Britain, insecurity of labour has long been recognised as a 
major characteristic of ~~e motor industry, huring the post war 
period it has been regarded in a number of quarters, as a major 
background factor in the generation of manifest conflict within 
the industry. The climate of industrial relations has been strongly 
associated with the inability of the industry to create a stable 
working environment based on a regular level of earnings and a 
degree of certainty in employment. Turner, et ale study of the 
industry commented, 
" •.•.. that relatively high earnings and relatively 
great insecurity are an explosive combination" 75 
The study claimed that this form of worker insecurity led to 
earnings opportunism, a situation where workgroups would exploit 
any possible circumstance to enhance earnings, which, for a variety 
76 
of reasons were likely to fluctuate sharply. Beynon, in his 
study of Ford, wrote of the shop stewards high rating to job 
security as the most important factor in an 'ideal job', in terms 
J 
of the workers lack of control over events shaping his livelihood. 
"The significance attached to job security becomes all 
the more important when placed alongside the fact that the 
production of motor cars has been characterised, almost 
above all else, by instability. The interdependence of 
the car plants, the proliferation of small, independent 
suppliers and market fluctuations have synthesised in the 
layoff and short time working. All of the Halewood 
workers I talked to had experienced a period of lay 
off •.••••• " 77 
These impressions confirm earlier evidence produced in America 
of endemic worker insecurity among car workers and corroborate 
with more recent investigations undertaken in Britain. The House 
of Commons Select Committee reported, 
"A highly successful industry which is able to offer 
secure and well paid employment is less likely to face 
industrial relations problems, and fluctuations in demand 
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followed by the general depression which the motor 
industry has experienced have in our view, compounded the 
difficulties". 78 
The Ryder report on British Leyland published in 1975 pointed to 
the forces creating worker insecurity, and highlighted the lack 
of worker control over such events. It said 
"We do not subscribe to the view that all the ills of 
BL can be laid at the door of the strike prone and 
workshy labour force. While BL has suffered seriously 
from interruptions to production, these have often been 
the result of factors outside the control of BL workforce 
- breakdowns in plant and equipment faulty scheduling, 
shortages of materials and components, and external 
industrial disputes". 79 
Despite the considerable evidence of insecurity and 'powerlessness', 
British car workers demonstrate a remarkable propensity to seek 
re-employment, often with their former employer, after being 
discarded through redundancy. Though their conditions of labour 
have appeared as a cycle of excessive overtime working, periods of 
short-time, bouts of lay off_ and frequent redundancies, car 
80 workers have remained an exceptionally stable group of workers. 
An NEDC report commented,in 1973 
"A significant feature of manpower in the UK motor 
manufacturing industry is the high degree of stability 
of the workforce". 81 
Labour turnover in the industry was reported in 1970-71 to be 
lower than any other sector of UK manufacturing. For male workers 
it was less than half the rate of several other sectors of 
manufacturing. Labour turnover in the British motor industry of 
9.6 per cent compared with 75 per cent for the Swedish car industry, 
some 20 per cent among the Japanese. Absenteeism,at 7 per cent ana 
in the British industry,is half the level recorded for Italian car 
manufacturing, and less than a third of the levels found in the 
. d t 82 German motor ~n us rYe 
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83 In Britain, a high dependence upon employment for wage-labour, 
in an economy of low job security/has been reinforced by the ideology 
of the market. There remains a continued dominance of the 'work-
ethic', 'self-help', and 'laissez-faire' values,84 which has not 
only entered into public attitudes towards those without a job, 
but which have also underpinned the values underlying public 
provision for the redundant and the unemployed. The existence of 
such a market ideology suggests that the prime responsibility for 
the dispossessed status of wage-labour, is more the result of 
personal inadequacies, rather than the consequence of the workings 
of the economic system, over which labour generally remains 
powerless. By placing the emphasis away from explanations based 
upon the structure of the labour market, and the conditions under 
which power is exchanged, the ideology of the market place reduces 
accounts for unemp~oyment to states of individual motivation. 
Thus workers are, or remain, unemployed because of their 'idleness', 
'malingering', or because they are 'lazy' or 'work-shy'. In a more 
sophisticated presentation of this approach, unemployment is partly 
explained by personal choice, what economists describe as 'voluntary-
85 
unemployment'. 
Despite the existence and the objectives of the welfare state, 
thjsindividualism, associated with a market perspective, has 
continued to co-exist in British public social policy. Even with 
the establishment of collectivist provision and universal entitlement, 
the operation and administration of the welfare state has not,in 
practice, offended the ideologies of individualism. Quite the 
contrary, Pinker states 
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"In Britain there remain, deep value conflicts regarding 
the proper rela~ionship between the individual and the 
community. Our legally extensive range of public social 
services derives from collectivist ideOlogies. At the 
same time, the ideology of self-help and individualism 
receives powerful support from the continuing dominance 
of market values in our lives".86 
It is not just that market values are confined to the operation 
of the labour market but that they are brought to directly bea~ 
upon those denied employment, through the determination and 
administration of state welfare itself. 
"The development of social policy", argue Wilding and 
George, "may seem like a victory for socialist views of 
freedom over classical liberal thinking. This is clearly 
an over-simplified view. Classical liberal freedom remains 
a strong continuing element, explicitly and implicitly 
in social policy legislation". 87 
The collectivist goal of community support established by the 
formation of a welfare state, can itself, through the values 
underlying the construction of public policy, as well as the rules 
and regulations actually governing the practical administration 
of social welfare, be based upon the ideologies of individualism. 
The continuing stress upon the individuals responsibility is an 
endorsement of the ideology of the free market. The Beveridge 
report, itself a foundation piece of the welfare state, sought 
to combine the 'work ethic',enshrined in the philosophy of 
individualism, with a universal, though limited claim to welfare, 
as the basis of the policy towards the unemployed. The state 
possesses responsibility only for the maintenance of a minimum 
subsistence standard, Above this level, the responsibility for 
survival lay with what Beveridge described as " •••• the duty and 
pleasure of thrift".88 The administration of benefit entitlement 
and the application of the 'misconduct role' 89 can all act to 
reinforce, rather than counter,market individualism and work discipline, 
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regardless of the existing economy's ability to provide jobs. A 
market ideology, however, may appear not only through the exercise 
of policy values, it can also be endorsed by those to whom the 
welfare benefits have been designed to assist. Administrative 
procedures, and welfare 'rights' can not just become the object 
of social stigma,but the acceptance of market values of self-help 
itself/by those in most need,can result in their foregoing their 
. i l' 90 leg1t mate caLms. The ideology of the market, consequently, 
can exist in what otherwise might be considered as primarily 
non-market institutions, emerging in the way the issues and 
objectives of public policy towards the unemployed become defined 
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and executed. 
In the case of redundancy, however, public policy has had to 
, 
confront the reconciliation of the workers attachment to jobs, and 
his interest in security, with the forces of the market. In 1961, 
the then Minister for Labour, Mr John Hare, wrote of redundancy; 
"The essence of the problem is how to reconcile the 
workers natural desire for security in his job with the 
variations in the demand for labour caused by trading 
conditions and technical change. The worker cannot 
be expected to develop a sense of corporate loyalty 
to the firm for which he works without some assurance 
that the firm accepts responsibility towards him in 
changing as well as in stable times". 92 
On the question of worker security,the enforcement of the rationality 
of the market in the work-situation, as opposed to the market-
situation, remains prone to the possible opposition of the collective 
worker. Workers, attitudes, values and interests, arising from 
job-attachment and job-dependence, may present a profound conflict 
of interest to the management of market economies. It has been upon 
a recognition of the strong attachments to jobs, and the workers' 
interest in job security in Britain that public policy over 
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redundancy has been developed. For despite tr.e high job dependence 
of wage-labour combined with low job security, and a lack of worker 
power over the economic forces which shape the insecurity of 
labour, the insecurity of wage labour has not prevented a struggle 
for control developing in the workplace. On the contrary, 
Goodrich, for example, argued that insecurity of labour was a 
considerable impetus to the early shop floor movements for workplace 
control, in Britain. He wrote in 1920 that, 
"The demand for high pay may strengthen the demand for 
control. The desire for sure pay - for security against 
unemployment is even nearer the surface of contral 
schemes". 93 
Flanders, in his study at Fawley, in the early 1960's, saw the 
issue of worker insecurity as being the basis for workplace 
resistance to managerial initiatives for increased productivity. 
Although he described how worker apprehension was expressed because 
of age, work ability, the preservation of established workgroups, 
the different physical and mental demands confronting ~~e worker, 
or because of a possible loss in job satisfaction, these causes, 
he maintained/were essentially feelings of basic insecurity. 
"That from all accounts" wrote Flanders, "the common 
ground in these different reactions was a feeling of 
insecurity about the individuals future". 94 
On the issue of redundancy Flanders describes an incident in which 
a trade union official was challenged by the rank and file over the 
absence of a "no redundancy" pledge in a productivity agreement. 
Flanders quoted the official as saying; 
"That could be taken for granted. No employer in his 
senses would expect to win consent by such changes 
without such a pledge". 95 
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Meyers, in his comparative study of worker security and job rights, 
considered/that in Britain/the 'right to work' slogan, possessed 
two distinct levels of meaning for British workers. At one level 
it endorsed a view that access to employment should be guaranteed 
through the exercise of public policy. 
II In Britain'; he maintained, "it carries the meaning that 
people inherently have the right to make a living and 
that public policies ought to guarantee this right by 
providing full employment". 96 
It also holds that workers conceive of rights of security in 
their existing jobs. 
" •..• that they should have some security in their jobs 
which they happen to hold. Right to work must mean to 
them not only access to a new job after having lost or 
quit an old, but also the right to continue in the old".97 
Worker expectations and values, and worker interest in job security 
in the work situation/ appear as integral parts of job control 
issues and the 'right to work'. Such issues can appear as a cohesive 
force for the organisation of collective worker power. Clegg says 
of the issue of redundancy, 
"For a group of workers, however, the likelihood that 
redundancy will bring serious hardship to a few is enough 
to justify·resistence ••.•• solidarity is a potent 
sentiment among British trade unionists". 98 
The exercise of employer power in the workplace on an issue like 
redundancy invariably is contingent upon the likely/or anticipated, 
responses of collective wage labour. Meyers reveals an instance 
in which the issue of redundancy provides differing opportunities 
to the two-sides of a power relation. 
"When discussing the problem involved in reductions in 
workforces, many British employers indicated that they 
selected for separation at such times as these workers who 
had poor records of absenteeism, offences against company 
rules, incompetence, and the like. When they were asked 
why they had not been dismissed earlier at the time of 
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committing the offence, the replies inducted a fear of 
collective action. At the time of the lay-off, however, 
the workers were in a much weaker position to protest, 
since the protection of one worker meant the loss of a 
job for another". 99 
In Britain/the approach of public policy towards the question of 
redundancy has been developed upon a contradictory basis of seeking 
to encourage Ita sense of corporate loyalty", yet simultaneously, 
devising means which weaken the strongly held attachment to jobs, 
the "well established and deeply held fears of workers for the 
future of their jobs". Public policy, in other words, has not 
lainin increasing the level of worker security in jobs, as the 
basis for initiating change in technology and working practices, 
rather the contrary, public policy has sought to provide methods 
. lex) des~gned to shed labour. Consequently the security aspect of 
public policy lies in compensation for job loss, and not in the 
merits, rewards, and security in jobs resulting from the sale 6f 
labour power. Policy has been based upon what Daniel has described 
as the "cash solution approach to all problems that bedevils the 
management of manpower and labour relations in Britain'! 101 More 
recently it has been suggested by a section of the Employment Appeal 
Tribunal, that redundancy policy in a period of mass unemployment 
amounts to little more than a "bribe to go qUietly".102 Fryer, in 
his critique of public policy has argued, 
"where redundancy is concerned public policy defined 
the problem largely in managerial terms, that is to 
say, the 'threat' that has been discerned is the threat 
of economic and technological stagnation caused by undue 
restriction of management initiative and the unwillingness 
of workers to adapt to change". 103 
Rejecting any matter that redundancy can be viewed as a "central 
national problem" or an issue in which shared interests prevail 
Fryer maintains that redundancy remains an explicit conflict of 
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interest. In challenging a consensus approach he states, 
Presented in (that) way, it is relatively easy to ignore 
or avoid an explicit recognition of a conflict of interests 
as the distinguishing characteristic of both the 
employment relationship itself and, more especially of 
its termination, redundancy". 104 
Over one hundred and thirty four years ago, John stuart Mill, 
after observing the chartist movement in England wrote, in his 
work on political Economy, 
"The working classes have taken their interests into their 
own hands, and are perpetually showing that they think 
the interests of their employers are not identical with 
their own, but opposite to them". 105 
During the present era/Hyman and Brough maintain that, 
"Conflict and change are central to the processes 
involved in industrial relations". 106 
I The workers current powerlessness over the events that shape his 
insecurity in advanced capitalism, does not imply that wage labour 
entirely accedes to the forces of the market or the power of employer 
decisions. Workforces, despite levels of deprivation experienced 
in work situations, possess a dependence upon work, and retain strong 
attachment. and interest in the security of their jobs. Redundancy 
and job security remain fundamental issues for organised labour in 
a market economy. This study will proceed to examine the issue of 
redundancy i~ the British motor industry, as an issue of power-
conflict in workplace industrial relations. It will be maintained 
that the issue of power has to be approached both as a question of 
conflict in decision-making, and through a recognition that a 
substantial conflict of interest exists over questions of redundancy 
and job security. The study begins with an examination of approaches 
to the concept of power. 
PART I 
THE QUESTION OF POWER 
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Abstract 
The question of power, though generally acknowledged in political and 
sociological thought to be a major concept in the understanding of 
industrial society, has often proved to be an intractable concept to 
operationalise for the purpose of either analytical or empirical 
investigation. In the study of industrial relations, power is viewed 
as an essential feature in workplace relations. This section will 
attempt to confront a number of problems associated with the question 
of power by exploring the ways in which the concept of power has been 
developed in a selection of theoretical and empirical studies conducted 
by sociologists, political theorists, and writers in industrial relations. 
Following an identification of a number of usages by which power has been 
conceived among the classical scholars of industrial society it is 
contended that both consensus and coercion are not necessarily 
incompatible states by which to characterise societies where the 
exercise of power is present. However by examining in some detail the 
political pluralist-view of power, being the outcome of a 'key issue' 
in the decision making process, and the Marxist approach of seeing 
power being deduced from interests, a number of uncertainties surrounding 
power remain. In particular the coercive view of power where A has 
power over B raises a number of difficulties when the application of 
this equation is applied to institutionalised relationships, be they 
class relations, or workplace relations. It is authority, as opposed 
to power relations, within an organised framework which directs 
attention to the problems of power being exercised through positions 
within hierarchies, and raises questions of objective power existing 
in structures as opposed to a subjective notion of power being tied 
to personality. Neither the political pluralists, nor the Marxists 
appear satisfactorily to resolve the problem of subject and object, 
structure and human agency, in the question of power. In general, 
within both apprpaches, though they begin F5S? f'ff 
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surrounding the nature of society, they retain within each approach a 
mutually exclusive view of seeing either power being tied to the 
person, or structure. 
In the main it is the political pluralis~who defend the notion of 
power being tied to personality, but who find themselves unable to 
account for the possibility that personality itself may be influenced 
by institutional and ideological frameworks. Marxists, on the other 
hand, though they appear to appreciate that power cannot be 'free 
floating' and indeterminate, appear unable to resolve whether the 
interests deduced from class positions are expressed in the behaviour 
of those who occupy class positions, or, whether power resides in the 
determination of structured production relations. It is concluded 
that the concept of power ultimately resides in human action. Human 
action, however, is subject to a number of constraints. Structure 
in itself, possesses no power. It is only when identifiable structures, 
or structural variables are acted upon by human agents, in an interaction 
with others, that power is exercised and structure shapes power. The 
exercise of power, therefore,is in essence, action. Consequently, the 
concept of power remains problematical, requiring empirical verification 
of human behaviour. It is maintained that power should be seen as an 
explanatory variable, the study of which should proceed from an 
identification of the structure of organisations and structural 
variables. The exercise of power must be seen as an outcome of action. 
Attention must consequently focus' upon how structures influence attitudes, 
motivations, ideologies, and behaviour, and how action shapes strategies, 
policies, and'politics', in decision making. 
The section begins by reviewing the study of redundancy and claims 
that power and worker interest in job dependence in the work situation 
have generally been ignored from the 'social problem', 'economic 
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efficiency' and • self-esteem' , perspectives which have underpinned 
the case study treatment of single redundancy situations. Such 
perspectives have, consequently, largely excluded how the interests 
of wage labour have organised or responded to managerial power, 
control, and strategy over job dependence and redundancy in the 
workplace. The section concludes by maintaining that industrial 
relations pluralism has inadequately conceptualised the problem of 
power in workplace relations, and ends by proposing 3 areas by 
which to approach an empirical investigation into redundancy and 
workplace relations in the British Motor industry as an issue of 
the process of power. This part closes with an outline of research 
strategy methods and sources, and a brief outline of the framework 
of the remainder of the study. 
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I THE STUDY OF REDUNDANCY 
A major focus in the study of redundancy in Britain has centred upon 
a concern with the dispossessed workers position in the labour 
market. The method most commonly adopted in this approach has been 
empirical investigations of large scale redundancies through a 
case study. Early examples of this approach were carried out by 
the Acton Society Trust, following a questionnaire survey of redundant 
manual workers in three industries, published in 1957. 1 A more 
detailed study of this kind was undertaken by Kahn, in her investigations 
of the responses of a sample of west Midland Car workers to the 
2 
experiences of a redundancy in 1956. During the 1960's, Wedderburn 
published the results of her case study of a redundancy among non-
manual workers at two plants from the Aviation Industry in the South 
3 East of England, and a year later, 1965, she produced the results 
of a case study of closure at two railway workshops, Gorton and 
4 Faverdale, in the North of England. In 1972 Daniel accounted for 
5 the movements of redundant workers at Woolwich, in the job market, 
while Herron, in 1975 published his study of a sample of 400 workers 
from Upper Clyde Shipbui1ders. 6 
Examples of this kind have provided a diverse body of empirical 
knowledge of the affects of large scale redundancies upon the 
condition of wage labour. In general, such studies have sought to 
measure the human costs of job loss, caused by redundancy through 
evidence drawn from dispossessed workers experiences in the labour 
market. Through questionnaires and interviews of the redundant, 
accounts have been established of the particular difficulties faced 
by redundant workers in their search for new employment. This 
accumulated knowledge has produced insights into what job search 
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strategies were adopted by redundant workers; what particular 
personal characteristics, possessed by the redundant, were significant 
in their finding new employment, or contributed to the duration of 
time spent unemployed; how the new jobs of the redundant compare 
with their redundant jobs; and, what financial and domestic 'costs' 
were incurred as a result of their redundancy and unemployment 
, 7 
exper~ence. 
Case studies of this type, which have considered the question of 
redundancy in terms of the labour market situatio~ have viewed the 
8 issue of redundancy as comprising a 'social problem', to be understood 
through a fuller knowledge based around the evidence of individual 
experiences. These studies have differed from those conducted by 
labour economists whose concern has been to utilise case studies for 
the purposes of exploring redundancy as an issue of manpower policy. 
Here the emphasis has been upon defining the redundant worker as 
an economic resource, their behaviour in the labour market is 
consequently assessed in terms of its effectiveness in relation to 
public manpower requirements. 9 Examples of this approach can be 
seen in the study by Reid,lO of the role of employment institutions 
in the redeployment of redundant workers, and in the two articles by 
McKay examining the effects of government economic policy upon 
redeployment in the West l>1idlands, 11 as well as the more extensive 
study undertaken with Reid of the redundancy experiences of a sample 
of West Midland engineering workers from 23 factories between 1966-68. 12 
Other examples of economists concerns for redundancy has been the work 
of Mukherjee, who has questioned the methods for handling redundancies 
i th t t f lab k t li ' 13 h'1 1 n e con ex 0 our mar e po c~es, w ~ e more recent y 
Jenness, has provided a comparative account of the forms of 
interventionist policies enacted by various states to pmDD.te 
redeployment of manpower.14 
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15 Greenwood and Pearson, on the other hand, have directed attention 
within the framework of public policy by suggesting that an impact 
of a redundancy may produce a displacement effect in the existing 
labour market which may alter hiring standards employed by firms to 
the disadvantage of those already unemployed in the labour market. 
Their emphasis is not just upon the personal characteristics of the 
redundant, and the unemployed, but in a shift towards a recognition 
that the labour market itself may also be a factor. 
Both the 'social problem' approach, and the 'economic efficiency' 
approach to the study of redundancy centre upon the labour market 
experiences of redundant workers. Both approaches have relied upon 
questionnaires and interview schedules of selected samples drawn from 
among the redundant. Although the objectives of these studies have 
differed, both approaches have placed considerable emphasis upon the 
identification of 'personal characteristics' of the redundant, to 
illustrate the particular social hardship and readjustment involved 
in redundancy, or, as a feature in the success or failure of economic 
policy. From the analysis of collated data drawn for the individual 
experiences in the labour market general summaries of the magnitude 
of redundancy, either as a 'social problem', or as an aid to the 
16 
effectiveness of increased 'economic efficiency' have been made. 
Psychologists have contributed a further dimension in the analysis 
of the market situation of the redundant worker. In their perspective 
the question of redundancy has been measured in terms of its impact 
upon the individual worker. Psychologists have sought to quantify 
the individual's redundancy experience primarily by accounting for the 
manner in which the redundant worker comes to terms with his 
unemployed status. Tausky and Pie mount 17 18 and Kahn and French, 
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have examined the loss of status and the fall in self-esteem, associated 
with an individuals loss of employment. Strange, in an American 
study of pl~~t closure, observed that redundancy in a South 
Appalachian company town led to increased levels of 'fatigue', 
a 'loss of interest', and, 'inability to sleep', as well as 
'difficulties in concentrating' and increased consumption of alcohol 
19 
among those declared redundant. 
A common approach among psychologists in their analysis of redundancy 
and unemployment, has been to place these individua:s responses within 
20 
a staged process. The individual's self esteem alters primarily 
as a result of involuntary job loss. For example, Harrison,2l 
Hill,22 and Briar,23 have all followed a variation of this approach, 
first developed by Eisenberg and Lazarsfield;4 during their studies 
of inter-war unemployment. Harrison, for instance, presents the 
pattern of phrases through which individuals proceed as being from 
initial, shock to optimism - pessimism - fatalism. 25 Another variant 
in the psychological perspective, has been to follow Durkheim's 
f OOd 26 classical study 0 su~c~ e. Case studies conducted by sainsbury,27 
28 0 29 30 31 Powell, Marv~s et al, Breed, and Shepherd and Barraclough, 
have all tried to identify unemployment, or redundancy, as a causal 
factor in suicide rates. Hepworth has recently attempted to correlate 
occupational skilled differences and duration of unemployment with 
the state of mental health, and well-being in individuals, who have 
lost their jObS. 32 
The common theme which can be isolated in these three general 
perspectives on the study of redundancy and unemployment - the 'social 
problem', 'economic efficiency', and 'self-esteem' - is that they 
largely centre upon the labour market situation of individuals. 
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A concern with the labour market situation is essentially a concern 
with post-redundancy situations. These perspectives consequently 
generally ignore the influence of the work situation upon the 
individuals response to the circumstances in the labour market. 
The value of work to the worker remains non-assessed, work values are 
assumed rather than explored, while the influence of work experience, 
the values of work groups, and the impact of workplace organisation 
remain absent in the accounts of the individual redundant workers 
response to both his position in the labour market and in his 
attitude towards being made redundant. 33 Thus the labour market 
situation provides only a partial view of the redundancy experience, 
it perceives the redundant worker in social isolation, and treats 
him as a malLeble entity, which either through a minimum level of 
public support, or through the possession of particular personal 
characteristics, will be able to make the necessary individual 
adjustments to a given market situation. 
This emphasis upon the redundant individual gives inadequate 
consideration to the fact that it is employers, as a result of their 
hiring policies andpractices who ultimately decide new job selections, 
as it is employers who ultimately declare workers redundant. 34 
The perspectives of the market situation consequently provides 
no analysis of the complete redundancy process and experience. It 
fails also to provide an account either of the structure of power 
and authority exercised in the redundancy decision, or the influence that 
the structure of the labour market has upon the subjective responses, both 
of which restrict the opportunities for wage labour in their labour 
market and work situations. 35 This atomisation of wage labour into 
market and work situations prevents the possibility that workers in 
a market economy may, as has already been argued, actually possess 
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an interest in retaining employment. The undue emphasis upon the 
market situation, in other words, not only prevents an account of 
the entire process of redundancy bU4 in so dOing, is unable to assess 
whether redundancy decisions; and the values of workers towards their 
jobs, or the prospects of job loss, actually enter into workers 
responses in ways which materially affect the redundancy process. 
In the absence of such an analysis, the study of redundancy which 
ignores questions of worker reSistance or acquiescence to managerial 
power in the decision making of a redundancy, is unable to say 
whether such a factor influences not just worker attitudes to the 
value of work itself, but also the shaping of their expectations 
and aspirations in the labour market. As much of the available 
evidence suggests that redundant workers are invariably downwardly 
mobile , the redundancy experience perhaps cannot be entirely 
divorced from labour market behaviour. 37 
Despite these omissions. in the labour market perspectives, the 
influence of work and the work ethic as a value remains quite 
crucial in the underlying values held by the researchers. As Hartley 
and Cooper point out: 
"It is interesting that most studies of redundancy 
have looked at the period of unemployment in terms of 
how the individual prepares to get himself back into 
employment. The period is seen as lacking something 
(eg. work, status, self-esteem) rather than being 
perceived as a complete, albeit different way of 
'being' in itself". 38 
The labour market perspective, in other words, in the study of 
redundancy assumes an ontological work orientated individual, yet 
excludes from analysis the way in which worker values and attitudes 
derived from within the workplace, could influence the issue of 
redundancy. This lack of consideration of workplace influence, 
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foregoes an analysis of how the basis of worker attachment and 
job dependence in a market economy, helps both to shape and define 
worker definitions and attitudes towards the redundancy event. 
Redundancy research which centres upon the dispossessed individual, 
isolates the worker from an essential feature of his existence; 
the value of job security within the prevailing vulnerabilities of 
the wage labour employment relationship. 
Furthermore, the case study approach,with its concentration upon 
a single issue and event, isolates explanations of this particular 
incident from the wider experience of workplace relations and issues. 
This, a~historic approach, precludes worker attitudes, values and 
expectations. developed in the work situation, and previous market 
situations, entering into the analysis of redundancy. For the study 
of redundancy to take account of such experiences, raises questions 
not just surrounding the condition of the individual dispossessed 
worker, but more fundamentally of the process of redundancy itself, 
within determinations of the wage labour relationship. It has been 
where redundancy research has taken account of the work situation 
that redundancy has appeared not just as a 'problem' for the individual 
worker, but more fundamentally, as the empirical evidence of the 
incidence of redundancy and unemployment already suggest, an integral 
issue of conflicting interests confronting wage labour in a market 
economy. Martin and Fryer claim, that their study of redundancy 
at Casterton Mill could not be understood in the absence of the 
historic development of work-based experiences. 
" ••••• work was a central concern of Casterton Mills 
employees, and their interpretations of work experiences, 
and their attitudes toward work, coloured their attitudes 
towards other matters. Understanding work attitudes is 
important for understanding Casterton in general, and the 
redundancy at Casterton Mills in particular: for it is 
impossible to understand the redundancy without understanding 
the significance of what had been lost, the particular job 
with the particular firm". 39 
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By focusing attention upon analysis of the redundancy, as opposed 
to the redundant, the process of redundancy as opposed to the post-
redundancy situation of dispossessed workers, questions of the nature 
of control over redundancy and reactions to that control begin to 
emerge. As Wood has argued, 
"The experience of redundancies reflects the way in which 
the situation is structured and managed, and reactions 
to them cannot be understood without recourse to the 
process by which they occur". 40 
An understanding of the process of redundancy raises the possibility 
of differing interests being exerted. Eldridge, having to forego 
an explanation of a redundancy based around a "generalised belief 
system" concluded that, 
" •••• to do justice to the social processes involved in 
the particular case, it has been necessary to seek to 
understand the ways in which the various groups perceived 
their interests and defined the situation in which they 
found themselves". 41 
Viewing the redundancy event in terms of differing group interests, 
formed from within the position of the collective worker in the work 
situation, on the one hand, and the managerial control in decision 
making activity upon the other, raises the possibility that redundancy 
is an issue which contains a large measure of conflict and power. 
Selgow, for example, describes how a workforce's responses to a 
redundancy were primarily conditioned by the structural characteristics 
of the work situation. 42 The attitudes towards the actual redundancy 
were perceived in terms of a power distribution. He says, 
" .••• the men felt themselves and their union to be largely 
powerless and helpless to alter the situation. Thus there 
was an overall lack of militancy and a belief that regardless 
of the men or the unions' opinions or actions very little 
could be done to influence the situation in which they 
found themselves. Thus, whilst many men felt the union 
should have opposed the redundancy, very few thought that 
they might be successful." 43 
40 
But he goes on to argue that such acceptance did not erase the 
. 
perception that the redundancy was a situation of conflict. 
"This does not imply", he writes, "that the men accepted 
the managements definition of their position. Indeed, 
many of them saw the situation in conflict terms, so 
that what was right and justified for the management was 
wrong and unjustified from the men's point of view". 44 
Redundancy and job loss as issues confronting wage labour are part 
of a dynamic process which affects the workers position not just in 
the labour market situation of market economies, but it also 
possesses considerable repercussions for the work situation. While 
the study of redundancy is to some extent contingent upon facts and 
information concerning individuals, individual workers do not in 
themselves exist in social isolation of workgroups, or workplace 
organisation. Wage labour is located within a particular social 
structure and is subject to power, and relationships of power, which 
are exercised within the institutions which function within that 
society. A study of redundancy, therefore, must go beyond the 
reductionism implicit in the 'social problems', 'economic efficiency' 
and 'self-esteem', perspectives. It must not only account for the 
value of work for wage labour in a market economy it also requires a 
more informed view of redundancy decisions. Such a perspective, 
inquiring into the interests, as well as the objectives of policy, 
and policy making confronts the question of power in decision making. 
The remainder of this part of the study of redundancy will be centred 
upon a theoretical discussion of the question of power. 
41 
2 APPROACHES TO THE CONCEPT OF POWER 
The concept of power has remained a key concept in both sociological 
45 
and political theory. It has nevertheless retained a problematical 
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status. At its sharpest point, the concept in the power debate 
appears to polarise around two completely opposing propositions. 
Firstly, that the basis of power in modern society is largely 
coercive. Secondly, that the basts of power is in fact largely 
consensual. In a number of writings, elements of both propositions 
appear, whereupon the dispute shifts, consequently to a discussion 
of the extent or degree of importance, to be attached to the coercive 
or the consensual basis of power. Differences in conceptualisation 
moreover, has led to different conclusions being drawn about the 
exercise, and distribution of power in actual societies. In order 
to identify a concept of power with which to proceed to examine 
redundancy as a key issue of power in workplace relations, it will 
be necessary to consider a number of conceptual approaches to the 
study of power. 
The traditional approach to power remains embodied in a form of 
coercive power in which one party is able to involuntarily alter 
the behaviour of another. This approach takes a form similar to that 
set dO\OTn by Bertrand Russell. "Power", he claims, "is the production 
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of intended effects".' The exercise of power is seen as an exchange 
involving two or more persons in which the power of A over B can 
produce certain results in B's behaviour. This, a 'zero sum' 
conception of power has been the basis of the coerci\Te view of power. 
It stresses the notion that power is essentially subjective, it 
remains tied to personality, and that the actual exercise of power 
takes place in a relation to another. In contrast, support for the 
42 
consensual view of power appears foremost in the writings of Talcott 
Parsons. For Parson~ power is synonymous with legitimacy. That is, 
the exercise of power meets with a general approval, it is sanctioned 
by the members of a society through an existing common value system. 
consequently, power holders are merely carrying out their allotted 
tasks in the name of a society. Power in decision making is not, 
therefore, undertaken for a particular mutually-exclusive interest, 
but rather to realise the collective goals of society which already 
exist through the large measure of prevailing common agreement. 
Parsons writes, 
" .•••• the power of A over B is, in its legitimised form, 
the right of A, as a decision making unit involved in 
collective process, to make decisions which take precedence 
over those of B, in the interests of the effectiveness 
of the collective operation as a whole". 48 
power in this view is removed from an endemic association with 
conflict. It is the realisation of a-priori sanctioned community 
interest, as witnessed by the operation of the social system. Put 
perhaps more simply, Parsons is accounting for the general absence 
of overt conflict because of the existence of shared common values, 
which enter not only into the role of power holders but also into the 
object of the decisions. This view of power clearly implies different 
images of society. The coercive view places emphasis upon inevitable 
conflict and different material interests. The latter view stresses 
an inherent stability in the workings of social structures; ~~e 
exercise of power consequently reinforces the functional intergration 
49 
of the social order. 
Among the 'classical' sources of sociology, dual tendencies towards 
viewing power as coercive, and power as consensual appear. Max 
Weber, for example, distinguished the aspect of power from the notion 
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of authority. Within this distinction elements of both the previous 
views are contained. Consequently Weber defined power as being, 
"Power (Macht) is the probability that one actor within 
a social relationship will be in a position to carry 
out his own will despite resistance, regardless of the 
basis on which this probability rests". 50 
on the other hand, Weber also talks of authority as being an 
expression of power relations. 
"(Herrschaft) is the probability that a command within 
a given specific context will be obeyed by a given group 
of persons". 51 
What, for Weber, distinguishes the exercise of power from the exercise 
of authority is that power is tied to personality (subjective) 
while authority arises from social position, or role in society, 
or organisation (objective). As Dahrendorf illustrates, 
"The demagogue has power over the masses to whom he speaks 
or whose actions he controls : but the control of the officer 
over his men, the manager over his workers, the civil 
servant over his clientele is authority, because it exists 
as an expectation independent of the specific person 
occupying the position of officer, manager, civil 
servant". 52 
Marx also shares a septration in his use of power. On the one hand 
he sees a society based upon capitalist production relations as 
being essentially a society in conflict, stemming from the inequalities 
in wealth (interests) and power relations (class relations). He 
writes, 
"Even the most favourable situation for the working class, 
the most rapid possible growth of capital, however much it 
may improve the material existence of the worker, does not 
remove the anta~Qnism between his interests and the interests 
of the bourgeoisie, the interests of the capitalists". 53 
But he also accounts for ideologies which seek not only to legitimate 
the prevailing differences in power and wealth, but help also to 
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conceal the material basis of power relations. 
"The class which has the means of material production 
at its disposal, has control at the same time over the 
means of mental production, so that thereby, generally 
speaking the ideas of those who lack the means of mental 
production are subject to it. The ruling ideas are nothing 
more than the ideal expression of the dominant material 
relationships, the dominant material relationships grasped 
as ideas; hence of the relationships which make one class 
the ruling one, therefore, the ideas of its dominance". 54 
Consequently, for Marx, part of the resource of power ideology, 
enables power holders to legitimate the unequal distribution through 
the acquiescence, or compliance, of those subject to power. 
While none of the preceding argument is intended to imply that a 
theoretical convergence can be deduced from these conceptualisations 
of power, what has to be faced is that differing images of society, 
characterised either by states of stability, or, from states of 
conflict, cannot entirely omit that the exercise of power in society, 
coercive and consensual, cannot be seen as mutually exclusive 
features by which to categorise the nature of society, or organisations 
which operate within a society. The features of both tendencies 
may not only be present in society and organisation but must be 
taken into account in any formulation of a theoretical framework 
of power. With this consideration in mind, in the search for a 
theoretical framework. with which to analyse redundancy as a power 
issue in workplace relations, we will proceed from a critical 
examination of the pluralist approach to power. 
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3 PLURALISM P~D THE PROBLEM OF POWER 
While the concept of power might at first sight appear to be an 
essential ingredient in the analysis of industrial relations, 
writers in the industrial relations tradition have displayed a 
remarkable reluctance to base their research explicitly around a 
conception of power. Power has appeared to have been largely implicitly, 
rather than explicitly,involved in the study of industrial relations. 55 
The salience of power, has perhaps been more recently visi~le in 
organisational theory, than with writings more closely associated 
th d f ' d 'l l' 56 with e stu y 0 1n ustr1a re at1ons. There have, however, 
been a number of notable exceptions to this general assertion, 
significantly, these have invariably been drawn from those academics 
sharing a sociological perspective of industrial relalations. 57 
Industrial relations pluralists appear, for the most part, to be 
more concerned with the process of harnessing power, particularly 
the power of workplace organisation, than with exploring the basis 
and sources of power, and viewing power as a central conceptual 
, , If 58 feature 1n 1tse • This focus, perhaps most evident in the 
'oxford School', and among the advocates of industrial relations 
reform, has displayed more concern with containing power through 
procedural reform, rather than exploring ways in which the formation 
of power, and the manifold expressions of power, could be meaningfully 
constructed as a basis for analysis and comprehension in the study 
'1 1 t' 58 of industr1a re a 10ns. This tendency remainsperhaps all the more 
perplexing, given that in the wider arena of pluralist thought the 
whole disputed question of conceptualising power has remained central 
to both theoretical and empirical research proceedings. 
In this section of the study we will consider certain aspects of the 
46 
pluralist debate over power, before entering into an analysis of 
its major critics. It is then intended to formulate a series of 
propositions concerning power for the study of industrial relations. 
The object of this discussion is not to settle the power debate 
but rather to utilise the disputation over power as a heuristic 
device for uncovering possible power approaches in the analysis of 
industrial relations. It is then intended to enlist redundancy 
as a 'key issue' of power in which to proceed to analyse both 
redundancy and the phenomenon of workplace organisation in the 
British Motor Industry. 
The Power Debate - Pluralistic Conceptions 
The existence of power, and the exercise of power, have, despite 
the unsettled conceptual status of power in modern society, remained 
central to the notion of a pluralist society. The question of 
power, and the resolution of power issues, lies at the crux of the 
pluralist perspective. The s~mple test of a pluralist society lies 
in its assertion of the absence of a single source of sovereign 
authority. Arguments for a pluralist society consequently arise in 
opposition to the Hobbesian solution to the problem of order, on the 
one hand, and counter-pose the notion of a single dominant elite, 
found in the Marxist theory of a ruling class. The nub of the pluralist 
argument lies in the contention that in a society that is pluralist, 
power becomes a competitive resource, which appears fragmented and 
diffused, and distributed, though not necessarily equally, throughout 
the society. 
There are, of course, many variants associated with why particular 
societies are, or become, pluralist. The disper.sal of power, however, 
has largely men claimed to be a consequence of the increasing 
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differentiation and complexity of modern society.60 Dahl, a leading 
American theorist of pluralism, for example, stresses not just the 
existence of different interests apparent in society, but maintains 
that their very existence rules out a single interest domination in 
policy. It is their influence in decision making that provides the 
major obstacle to a single dominant ruling elite. He talks of 
61 
"aggregations" of interest being widely spread across society, 
none of which establishes sufficient homogeneity upon all issues, 
and neither of which is capable of achieving universal dominance. 
A f~agmentation of interest groups manifest in decision making, 
characterises the nature of the pluralist view of power in society. 
Dahl states their claim, 
" •••••• that each of them is highly influential over some 
scopes but weak over many others : and the power to reject 
undesired alternatives is more common than the power to 
dominate over outcomes directly". 62 
This idea of the presence of blocking mechanisms, based upon interest 
groups, deterring the otherwise unbridled exercise of a single source 
of dominant power/lies at the centre of Riesmans conception of 
63 
"veto groups". For Riesman power is both "indeterminate and 
64 
amorphous", in which even power holders experience conditions of 
"weakness and dependence", which inhibit. the existence of a single 
hierarchy. He says that, 
"where the issue involves the country as a whole, no 
individual or group leadership is likely to be very effective 
because the entrenched veto groups cannot be budged".65 
In similar vein,Galbraith talks of "countervailing powers" preventing 
1 · d . 66 class ru e ~n mo ern soc~ety. KOrnhauser takes the argument further. 
He stresses organisational independence, integrity and democratic 
control arising out of interest groups. but emphasises their confined 
roles. 
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".1\ wide variety of independent limited-function 
organisations permits democratic control but also insulates 
both elite and non-elite from undue interference in the 
life of the other. This is the situation of pluralist 
society". 67 
The very diversity of organised interest ensures that, in the pluralist 
model, all groups have the right to be heard, and an opportunity to 
exercise power. Pluralism is the open society. As Dahl argues, 
"The independence, penetrality and homogeneity of the 
various segments of the political states all but guarantee 
that any dissatisfied group will find a spokesman in the 
political structure". 68 
In pluralist society, policy emerges from a compromise among the 
various interest groups involved. Policy is the outcome of decision 
making which is subject to pressures and shifts in the balance in 
social and political influence. But given the high degree of interest 
differentiation in a complex society, members of that society owe 
allegence to many organisations and institutions, each of which 
possesses its own, not necessarily compati~le objectives. 69 The 
individual consequently being subject to a wide degree of choices 
and cross pressures inevitably values compromise and reason in 
situations of competing power. 
No single group or interest possesses sufficient power to dictate 
events. The increasing strength of one group is likely to encourage 
the mobilisation of opposing resources by threatened parties. 70 It 
is through the organisations of group interests in which there is a 
plurality of elites, rather than a single elite, which prevents the 
maintenance of a dominant powerful elite. 7l The resolution of 
differences is adjudicated by the State. This overall view of organised 
power is, however, underpinned by a particular concept of power. 
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The concept of power shared by the pluralists, and most pervasive 
in a whole series of community study projects?2 has similarities with 
Webers coercive view of power. Dahl, amongst others, in seeking 
to demonstrate the absence of elite domination in community politics 
applys the test that, "A has power over B to the extent that A 
can get B to do something that B would not otherwise have done". 73 
The test of power to the extent that power is exercised, is based 
upon the evidence that a change must have been produced. Though 
it shares with Russell, the subjective attribution of power, what 
is of significance is that power must produce change. Dahl does 
contemplate a situation of no change in B's behaviour, as a possible 
outcome of power, but only in a situation where if A had not 
behaved as he did, B would have behaved differently to what he did. 74 
The significance of Dahl's view of power is that to have supported 
the winning side, is not in itself sufficient evidence to demonstrate 
the exercise of power. 75 What would have to be proved is that not 
to have supported the winning side would have produced a different 
76 
result. Furthermore, in terms of interest representation, mere 
election to office,though it could conceivably lead to the exercise 
, "If 't' f 77 F Dahl of power, 1snot 1n 1tse a POS1 10n 0 power. or 
potential power is not actual power. It is only when acts change 
behaviour beyond what they would otherwise have been, that the 
exercise of power take place. Therefore the right to initiate a 
policy or initiate an objection to a policy, or present counter 
proposals, is not the exercise of power. Such activities may be 
rejected; a si tua tion of no change. The test of power lies in 
the degree of success measured by change, rather than in the right 
to initiate, or object. 
There are a number of important points which arise from the pluralist 
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definition of power, which centres upon the outcomes of decisions. 
Firstly, potential power needs to be distinguished from actual 
power. For Dahl, exponents of power elites fail to appreciate that 
" .••. a potential for control" ••. is not, •••. " equivalent to actual 
78 
con trol" . Potentiali ty, in otherwords, has to be manifest in 
actual practice. As a potential capacity to exercise power can in 
practice be challenged by veto groups, power, actual power, can 
only be demonstrated by reference to the outcomes of decisions. 79 
Pluralists, in o~~er words, see power in behaviouralist terms, that 
is, it is empirically verifiable by analysis of the decision making 
process. Furthermore, a group with a high potential for power 
also requires a considerable degree of internal political unity 
over its actions to sustain its interests. Consequently/for the 
pluralists/it is not possible to impute power to groups which 
possess potential resources, ther.e needs also to be an effective 
level of organised unity within the group. Dahl maintains, 
...... a group may have a high potential for control 
and a low potential for unity. The actual political 
effectiveness of a group is a function of its potential 
for control and its potential for unity. Thus a group 
with a relatively low potential for control but a high 
potential for unity may be more politically .effective than 
a group with a high potential for control but a low 
potential for unity". 80 
Easton emphasises the necessary sophisticated political discretion 
required by interest group leaderships when faced with power conflicts. 
"The leadership in a large interest group is constantly 
confronted with the need to make a decision which, ultimately 
through the political process, affects authoritive policy. 
In making such a decision, the leadership must take into 
account the threat to itself of the existence of various 
external and internal groups such as parties, other 
interest groups, and semi-organised competing leadership 
groups within its own organisation". 81 
The pluralist argument with its focus upon decision making, and who 
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prevails in the outcomes of power decisions, rejects an approach 
to power which seeks to evaluate power in terms of those who have 
already gained. The starting point in the pluralist analysis of 
power, consequently,is not the structure of inequality. The 
pluralist conception of pcwer in fact,directs attention away from 
the "interests" of the interest groups by centering upon the 
mechanisms through which decisions are arrived at. 82 As a result, 
pluralists appear to endorse a peculiarly contradictory methodology. 
They appear to maintain that while it is not the channels of decision 
making which determines who has power, but rather the ends, -
the concrete outcomes of decision making, - in their research, 
like Dahl's study of power in New Haven, the emphasis 
remains confined to formal decision making. Dahl therefore remains 
less concerned with what power is, and directs his observations and 
analysis to which interest groups have been involved in the procedures 
of decision making. The pluralist approach is to demonstrate their 
conception of power through the analysis of selected "key issues". 
Consequently, pluralists maintain that power is only exercised 
where conflict is present. There are a number of difficulties 
which arise from this power/conflict/key issue, paradigm. 
Firstly, the selection of a key issue necessarily omits some issues. 
Pluralists, however, provide no generally accepted criterion for 
1 . f k' 83 the se ect~on 0 a ey ~ssue. Criticism of the New Haven studies 
has centred more upon issue selection rather than upon the actual 
. di 84 fl.n ngs. Though it is no doubt true that an issue involving a 
conflict of interest is, where this conflict is manifest, likely 
to reveal something of the nature of power over a particular decision, 
it is also of some importance to know the significance of the issue. 
While 1 t is clear that some decisions are more important than others, 
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success in a major decision may be a more significant indication 
f h h 1 ower than a . f . 1 . 85 o w 0 as rea p ser~es 0 successes ~n esser ~ssues. 
Furthermore, the confining of the test of power to a limited 
selection of key issues leaves aside the pervasive nature of powerl 
even in decision making. Janowitz points to the pluralist omission 
of the, "hundreds of decisions", which taken daily,patterns the 
processes of social change in particular ways.86 Partridge maintains 
that this exclusion prevents the disclosure of areas of decision 
making which are more the feature of elite domination. 
" .••• Social change", he suggests, . is not only a matter 
of taking a series of discrete and distinguishable decisions. 
Equally important is the slow, non-delib~rate,unforeseen, 
and unintended change : and in this sort of change the 
influence that is exercised by elites or pace-setting 
minorities on the masses of men may be a crucial factor". 87 
While some form of selection of the key issue remains inevitable 
to the pluralist method, this choice clearly becomes of some 
importance if generalisations concerning the nature of power are 
to be entered into. Decisions over issues, it could be maintained, 
are composed of numerous decisions taken at different levels. 88 The 
question of what level of decision making and the extent to which 
decisionsdetermine other decisions are of crucial importance, as is, 
whether the same issue would reveal the same treatment and outcome 
89 in the same location over time, or, in different locations. Would 
this be a reflection of the selection of the key issue, the selection 
of the location, or a reflection of different structures of power? 
The pluralist approach to power, moreover, operates upon a number 
of assumptions, which have given rise to its most sustained form of 
criticism. Firstly, by concentrating only upon the decision making 
process, any institutional bias encountered in that process is 
viewed as being inconsequential to the outcomes of the exercise of 
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power. Secondly, as the power which the pluralists measure is 
only determined by reference to the decision making process, it is 
assumed that all interests are capable of gaining access to this 
process. Thirdly, that the inherent contradiction between conflicts 
of interest, manifest in the power struggles of interest groups, 
and societal stability is reconcilable.Fourthly, compliance in the 
pluralist model centres around the 'rules of the game', which 
determines the appropriate mode of behaviour. And fifthly, that 
there is sufficient common agreement over the impartiality of 
rules and regulations which strengthens not only a commitment to 
constitutional means for resolving issues, but such a commitment 
prevents defeated parties from questioning the manner of resolving 
conflicts of power. Conflict, in other words, for pluralists, 
exists within a wider framework of agreed consensus. 90 
A major criticism of the pluralist method for testing for. who has 
. th th· t' t 't' 91 power, is the v~ew at e~r power est ~s too res r~c ~ve. 
By confining the examination of power to key issues in the decision 
making process the pluralist approach fails to take proper account 
of the sources of power and the influence they may exercise in 
"confining the scope" of decision making to relatively "safe issues". 
For Bachrach and BAratz,the energies of power may not just be 
spent in the decision making process, but just as importantly 
outside the decision making arena, to the reinforcement of social 
and political values which limit the scope of issues. What they 
refer to as, 'non-decision' making, may restrict the choice of key 
issues, through confining the agenda. Power, of this sort, 
exercised in such a fashion cannot become realised in the pluralist 
framework. As Bachrach and Baratz put it, 
"To measure relative influence solely in terms of the 
ability to initiate and veto proposals is to ignore the 
possible exercise of influence and power in limiting 
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the scope of initiating". 92 
A second major objection is that the pluralist fail to counter what 
Schattschneider describes as the "mobilisation of bias,,93, the 
process by which the values of institutional processes legitimate 
certain kinds of conflicts of issues but suppresses others. 
AS Easton, for example, suggests, 
" .•.••• institutional patterns circumscribe not only the 
decisions of government ••.• but equally the decisions 
of other formal organisations such as interest groups 
themselves".94 
Bachrach and Baratz consider this occurs in a particular way, the 
.-implications of which remain outside the pluralists concept of 
power. 
" a set of predominant values, beliefs, rituals 
and institutional procedures (rules of the game) that 
operate systematically and constantly to the benefit 
of'certain persons and groups at the expense of others".95 
Power exercised through the values and practices of institutions may, 
in other words, prevent certain conflicts of interest becoming 
manifest in the decision making process. Pluralists, furthermore, 
have been charged with not facing up to the distinction between 
power exercised through authority, and power exercised through 
domination. Partridge's critique of Dahl centres upon the failure 
to consider "influence", as a factor of power which could prevent 
the materialisation of conflict. Where A possesses an influence over 
B, B may become socialised by A. Consequently, B may subordinate 
his, "wishes, values, beliefs, or initiatives", to these corresponding 
with A's.96 Power, resulting in a compliance on the part of a 
subordinate, is being exercised, though it is unlikely to either 
appear in manifest conflict, or be raised in the decision making 
process. 
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In an elaboration of this type of objection, Crenson, illustrates 
how, in his study of air pollution, the "reputational power", of 
an interest, the steel corporations, could be exercised without any 
observed intervention on the part of these companies. 97 A potential 
issue of conflict could therefore remain dormant as a result of a 
potential interest group influencing the outcome of the agenda 
through its reputation. In such a fashion, the outcome of the 
decision making process was being shaped in the absence of an 
interest group participating in decisions. 
It has been the insufficient attention to why issues remain 
uncontested, which may result from the exercise of power, which 
has placed a serious limitation upon the pluralist concept of power. 
A challenging group, for example, may well refrain from participation 
in decision making for what Friedrich labels, "anticipated reactions". 98 
A weaker party may remain inactive out of a wish to avoid anticipated 
hostility, which may be a likely result of participation. The fear 
of retribution may appear greater than the rewards of participating, 
the weak interest group may consciously abstain. A powerful group 
may even be able to prevent an issue appearing on the agenda, or a 
challenging group may lack the 'know-how' or the ability to articulate 
an issue in the decision making process. Under these conditions,an 
interest group aware of a conflict of interests remains outside 
the pluralist concept of power, because its interests are not 
manifest in the formal decision making arena. 
There are, however, other instances of this type of "non-issue" which the 
pluralist cannot take account of. Where a party is unaware of its 
own interests or where it does not fully organise to articulate its 
own interest then clearly these interests will fail to materialise 
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either outside or ir. decision making. It is not just that a 
challenging group is inhibited by reputation, or the fear of 
retribution,bothnon-issue conditions which exist within a state of 
conscious se~f-interest, which do not become manifest, but pluralists 
fail to acknowledge, and explain, why certain groups remain unaware 
of their interests. All interests are deemed to be expressed 
behaviourally as manifest conflicts in decision making. Consequently 
there is no account by pluralists of the f~ffect particular 
ideologies, social values, conventions and attitudes, have in 
the process of defining and shaping what is an interest, what is 
an issue, what are the acceptable "scopes" for conflict, and what 
are the unacceptable issues. There is no explanation, no discussion, 
of what, for example, Gramsci describes as social hegemony, the , 
process whereby subaltern groups exist within a dominance determined 
99 by hegemonic groups. In other words the pluralist primary concern 
of seeing power in association with conflict, and being manifest 
in the decision making process, not only detracts attention 
from the analysis of interests, why and how. they are formed, it 
also fails to explain why certain interests and groups never become 
realised. Without explanation to the contrary, the possibility 
that a failure of certain interests to become realised, cannot 
exclude the possibility that this failure may itself be the outcome 
of a power relationship. 
Non-deciSion making, therefore, can be extended from the Bachrach 
and Baratz explanations of conscious, non-decision making being 
the result of an exercise of power, into an unconscious state. Both 
these conditions of non-decision making can discount a conflict 
of interest prevailing, but both are unlikely to be disclosed in 
the decision making process. Pluralist~through excluding non-
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issues,confine power conficts. through their failure to recognise 
that power can still be exercised, but not revealed, in decision 
making. This exercise of power,beyond the reach of the pluralists, 
would affect the intended behaviour of particular groups. Without 
an account of these aspects of non-issu~,pluralists cannot 
comprehensively demonstrate that elite dominance has been eliminated. 
Such an approach to power, however, requires an explanation of 
interests. 
The pluralist approach to power, with too central a focus upon the 
decision making process, fails to give sufficient weight to the 
means by which either the conscious or unconscious exercise of 
power can define certain types of issues worthy of consideration 
but exclude others. The extension of the power framework by 
Bachrach and Baratz, to take account of an aspect of non-decision 
making has largely been concerned with the mechanisms by which 
certain questions become suppressed. This extenSion, shares with 
the pluralists a failure to account for 'unconscious' explanations 
for non-decisions. That is, to what extent particular judgements 
prevail in existing cultures, social values, and agencies of 
socialisation, which prescribe certain kinds of issues as within 
scopes for power conflicts, but inhibit other issues from becoming 
socially conscious. An approach to this sort of question pre-supposes 
f . 100 a notion 0 ~nterests. 
An attempt to partially overcome this difficulty has been put forward 
by Lukes, in his 3-dimensional model of power. Lukes suggests 
that the pluralists objection to the imputation of interests by 
exponents of elite theory, which is not behaviourally present in 
decision making, can be partly resolved by the recognition of a 
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'counter factual', in the exchange of power relations. He argues, 
"Where there is no observable conflict between A and B, 
then we must provide other grounds for asserting the 
relevant counter factual. That is, we must provide 
other, indirect, grounds for asserting that if A had not 
acted (or failed to act) in a certain way - and in the 
case of operative power, if other sufficient conditions 
had not been operative - then B would have thought and 
acted differently from the way he does actually think and 
act. In brief, we need to justify our expectation that 
B would have thought or acted differently : and we also 
need to specify the means or mechanisms by which A has 
prevented, or else acted (or abstained from acting) 
in a manner sufficient to prevent, B from doing so".lOl 
Lukes/in seeking to overcome both the limitations of the initial 
pluralist view of power, confined essentially to the decision 
making process, and the failure to face up to both suppressed 
issues and unconscious interests, is willing to concede that power 
could exist which prevents the articulation of interests becoming 
manifest. But while Lukes, in this way, takes the argument of 
power forward, he nevertheless shares the pluralist retention of 
a subjective conception of power. 
Lukes, consequently, is seeking to establish a means whereby it is 
possible to retain the pluralist view that power remains tied to 
personality, but wishes to allow for the possibility that interests 
may remain suppressed, owing to the exercise of power. Lukes, while 
raising the question of the interest of interest groups, which is 
generally assumed rather than explored by pluralists, retains a 
subjective view of power and rejects the position that a concept 
of interests can be derived from empirical evidence disclosing the 
existence of a power structure. There are, in Lukes conception, no 
.. t 102 object~ve ~nteres s. It is, however, by returning back to 
Russell's view, of power, being "the production of intended effects", 
that a further serious deficiency emerges in the behaviouralist 
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perspective of the pluralist view of power. Because pluralists 
do not pay sufficient attention to the "interest" of interest groups 
they exclude certain "affected" parties. Where interests, in other 
words, are not being Qvertly expressed over an issue,p1ura1ists 
assume that this is because the issue holds no interest. If, 
however, the view of Balbus is accepted, that "interest in", 
is taken to mean, "affected by" then clearly it is likely, if not 
probable, that the interest of others, besides those party to 
decision making, are likely to be implicated, and, as a result, 
interested in decisions and issues. As Balbus argues, 
" •.••• it is certainly possible, indeed likely, that 
political issues or decisions implicate individuals, 
in the sense of altering dramatically their 1ife-
chances, even if they express or hold no preferences with 
respect to them. We' would certainly want to say, for 
example, that individuals who did not have any preferences 
with respect to governmental fiscal policy or monetary 
policies were interested in, ie. affected by, changes in 
these policies which might drastically affect their chances 
for employment". 103 
While such a position does not necessarily pre-suppose imputed 
objective interests, it certainly presents important difficulties 
for a behaviouralist concept of power. "Anticipated reactions" 
and "affected by" interests, remain significant exclusions from the 
pluralist view of power, but where the subjective basis of power 
has been extended for application to power in organisations, social 
groups or social classes, more fundamental limitations appear in 
the pluralist conception of power. We will proceed to consider 
the case for the objective interest basis of power, found in elite 
theory, before framing a number of propositions integral to the 
study of power. 
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4 CLASSES, INTERESTS, AND THE QUESTION OF POWER 
A number of fundamental questions arise in the application of both 
the pluralist view of power, and in the critique established in 
the perspectives of non-decision making, when the essentially 
subjective concepts of power are applied to organisations or 
collectivities, be they institutions, social groups, or social 
classes. The limitations of these conceptions of power are 
particularly apparent in their application to workplace relations. 
Unlike the general abstract proposition of power symbolised by the 
A-B equation, class, and workplace relations do not appear as 
h abl .. 104 interc ange e pos~tions. Power, in other words, being 
exercised by such groups is normally located in an already 
predetermined hierarchy of authority, roles, and values. Furthermore, 
the A-B relationship, portrayed by the pluralist,projects an 
individualised, a - social, and a - historic basis for the measurement 
and analysis of the exercise of power. The pluralists approach 
to power through the analysis of who gains in key issues, not 
only fails to explain the formation of interests of the interest 
groups it considers, but accepts the position of both parties as 
a given. Consequently, not only are interests assumed and not 
accounted for, the relationship between the two parties also 
appears as a given. The pluralists, as a result, take no account 
of the view that not only has the status of the different parties 
to decision making been shaped by their historical development, 
but that the relationship between the parties may itself be a 
f h · t 105 product 0 ~s ory. 
The pluralist approach to power not only poses the status of both 
parties as a given, and not as the product of a- historical 
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relationship, but neglects the extent to which parties are the 
subject of a variety of influences both from the exercise of power 
within; arising from its constituted membership, and from power 
without; the outcome of the interaction with other related power 
groups. The relationship between the two interacting groups,within 
an organised hierarchy of power, cannot be entirely observed by 
reference to a key decision. Both sides, to some extent, are 
victims of their own history, as well as seeking to exercise an 
influence upon their own future. Both of these features may not 
only be interrelated but have a direct bearing upon the existing 
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exercises of power in key decision making. 
In industrial relations, for example, the application of the A-B 
power relationship to management and workforces, is not interchangeable. 
The power relationship is institutionalised and structured upon a 
prescribed allocation of roles and fixed responsibilities. As 
Bendix writes, 
"All economic enterprises have in common a basic social 
relation between the employers who exercise authority 
and the workers who obey". 107 
power, in the form of authority, in workplace relations is both 
universal and omnipresent. Despite the evident structuring of 
roles in industry, differentiation within a hierarchy of decision 
making separates 'power-for', from 'power-over'. Dahrendorf 
maintains, 
"So called hierarchies of authority are in fact hierarchies 
of the 'plus-side' of authority, ie. of the differentiations 
of domination: but there is in every association, also 
a minus side conSisting of those who are subjected to 
authority rather than participate in its exercise". 108 
Dahrendorf, while accepting the view of modern society being a 
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fragmentation, comprising of competing groups, recognises also 
that the appearance of such groups are not entirely a random 
109 phenomena. The presence of a hierarchy and a structure of 
roles, places limits upon the assumed'openness' and 'diversity' 
apparent in the pluralist framework. Though conflict still exists, 
it is confined to the social groups operating within an hierarchical 
structure. For Dahrendorf,interest groups are a derivation of 
power relations, in which ownership in production relations remains 
f th 1 t ' 110 only one aspect 0 e power re a ~on. Consequently, Dahrendorf 
attempts to develop the pluralist perspective into the important 
question of structure, while seeking to retain the pluralist view 
of competing power groups. Lukes, in overcoming the limitations 
of Dahl, and the problems posed by non-decision making, placed 
stress upon interests between power groups, and not just upon the 
pluralist concern for policy preferences. He was, however, reluctant 
to derive the determination of interests from structure, for the 
purposes of power analysis, owing to his retention of a subjective 
view of power tied to personality. Dahl, on the other hand, 
rejected the position that power could be analysed from either 
potential, or imputed, conditions; it had to be seen to be 
exercised to be seen to have taken place. 
Marxists, who maintain that economic power is unequally held, claim 
that it is exercised in the interests of particular minority 
interests, of particular classes. Westergaard and Resler, for 
example, reject the pluralist view that power is fragmented in the 
, l' d 111 way it ~s c a~me • However, they do not exclude that a "dominant 
group" may have to make concessions to organised labour, "in 
order to retain power and privilege",112 but they claim that this 
contested area of power does not actually challenge what they refer 
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to as the "core assumption" of modern society. In placing 
considerable stress upon the non-decision making aspects of power, 
westergaard and Resler maintain, 
"The core assumptions of our society are firmly in line 
with the interests of one small group". 113 
They go on to argue, not unlike Miliband, 114 that the sociological 
and empirical evidence of elite-recruit."llent is "not irrelevant 
to the study of power". They wri te, 
"For such information suggests the extent of ties of 
association and common sympathy within ruling groups 
the experience and perspectives which are likely to 
influence policy, the limits on the capacity of rules 
to influence others".llS 
Both westergaard and Resler, following Miliband, provide a 
sociological class identity of elites while suggesting a sociological 
association of elite interests based upon economic position and 
class membership. As Westergaard and Resler put it, 
"We see interests as the possibilities and potential 
objectives of action which are inherent in economic 
positions regardless of whether the incumbents of these 
positions in fact so define their objectives at any given 
time". 116 
While rejecting the psychological reductionism implicit in the 
. . f 117 W d d 1 plural~st concept~on 0 power , estergaar an Res er present 
an unspecified view of power. It is merely associated with role 
or position and deduced from interests. Miliband, in his somewhat 
similar approach, argues that the first requirement in power 
analysis is, 
...... not to determine whether an economically dominant 
class would wield decisive economic power ...... but ••• 
"rather to determine whether such a class exists at all".ll8 
64 
Miliband's starting point is one stage removed from the pluralists· , 
it is not just who exercises power but what groups hold what kind 
of power. He proceeds to associate the existence and possession 
of unequal economic power, to the exercise of bias and inequality, 
in decision making. Through a sociological identification of 
shared common values, similar class positions, a common "circle 
of relations", "friendship patterns" and "shared acquaintances~ 
119 Miliband holds that "the interests of business" are upheld. 
He considers, 
"As a result of that power, the men - owners and 
controllers - in whose hands it lies enjoy a massive 
preponderance in society, in the political system, and 120 
in the determination of the state~ policies and actions" 
What Miliband, Westergaard and Resler are advocating is that, from 
a SOCiological examination of pOSitions held in society, if it can 
be reasonably established that where those who hold dominant 
positions within an unequal society. or economic organisation, 
are also those who benefit from the unequal basis of that society, 
it can be plausibly accepted thac those who hold positions of 
dominance, do so because they have an interest in the preservation 
of a particular form of unequal society. Therefore, to determine 
who has power, and why power is exercised, it is necessary to reveal 
the interests of the personnel; the powerholders. 
This approach to power is perhaps most clearly expressed by Miliband's 
objection to the pluralist contention of 'managerialism '; the view 
that ownership and control in industry have become divorced, because 
the control of the modern, large-scale firm no longer resides in 
the personality of the legal owner(s), but in the management. He 
counters the pluralist claim by setting out,by way of empirical 
evidence, to establish that an economically dominant class does 
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decisively wield economic power. He rejects the pluralist claim, 
partly on grounds that such an elite does significantly exist and that 
it shares capitalist values, and seeks to establish sociologically 
that managers are "mainly drawn from the propertied and professional 
121 with a large measure of hereditary recruitment to elite 
classes" 
posi tions • Managers, he claims, being large ly "self-recrui ting" , 
possess marked degrees of social cohesion. And that the differences 
that exist are "safely contained within a particular ideological 
spectrum, and do not preclude a basic political consensus in regard 
. 1 . f . d 1 . t' 1 l' f " 122 to the cruc~a ~ssues 0 econom~c an po ~ ~ca ~ e • Miliband 
concedes that differing, competing elites may be present but that 
such differences are within a sphere of commonality, derived from 
agreed interests and objectives. 
"This 'elite pluralism' ", he suggests, "does not, however, 
prevent the separate elites in capitalist society from 
constituting a dominant economic class, possessed of a 
high degree of cohesion and solidarity, with common 
interests and common purposes which far transcend their 
specific differences and disagreements". 123 
For Miliband the undoubted power of an economic elite is not in 
question, it is rather more a matter of demonstrating that this 
cohesive group also exercise considerable power over the apparatus 
of political decision making. That this dominant economic elite 
extends ,y~ power and affluence in the state, power, stems from 
the existence of general agreements over common interests. Whereas 
Miliband, westergaard and Resler, see power originating from 
interests in which the pluralist separation of the ownership and 
control being exercised in decision making in industry is not in 
reality a distinct competing category, because managers largely 
share similar interests with corporate property owners, this challenge 
to the pluralist conception of power is, itself, ultimately based 
upon a subjective account of interests. What is being suggested 
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is that management not only operates within an acceptance of the 
profit motive, but also formulates policies within capitalist 
h ' h th" 124 interests, w ~c are e~r ~nterests. In this approach, to 
the study of power, there is no specified account of capitalist 
interests other than by general association with the existing 
economic inequality. The power derived from interests, in other 
words, is being maintained by reference to the interests of 
individuals who hold positions_in the economic elite. This view 
of power sees social classes as the main basis for differing 
interests and consequently begins from the point of pluralist 
weakness, the unexplored status of the interests of interest groups. 
While it sees class interests as comprising a far broader basis 
for the evaluation of interests than Lukes is willing to allow, it 
shares with Lukes the view that power and interests are to some 
extent subjective, derived from the motivations of individuals. 
This class approach to power moves substantially away from the 
pluralist view of power residing in decision making. It seeks not 
only to acknowledge that power is exercised in decision making, 
but what also is of some consequence, that interests and 
motivations are an important aspect of power. The class arguments 
against the pluraliSts, however, centres very largely not just upon 
the undisclosed interests, but how these interests effect substantial 
areas of non-decision making, that is, how interests operate to 
exclude or suppress certain kinds of interests from becoming realised, 
in decision making. Miliband, Westergaard and Resler's critique of 
pluralism attempts to extend the subjective view of power, from an 
exclusive concentration upon decision making, into a class view of 
interests based around Bachrach and Baratz conception of non-decision 
125 
making. This class analYSis, however, comprises a large measure 
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of causal association of interests and a subjective evaluation of 
actual power. Poulantzas, writing from within the social class 
perspective, and endorsing the view that power is an expression of 
interests,has been a leading critic of the class conception of 
power interests so far presented. Although Poulantzas does not 
disagree over the empirical sociological evidence, he bases his 
objections, and his conception of power,from within a highly 
126 
structured framework. He consequently argues, in opposition to 
organisational theorists,that interests can be derived from just 
f 1 'th' ,,127 h the structure 0 ro es w~ ~n an organ~sat~on, but e further 
opposes the class view presented; that interests can be deduced 
from the subjective motivations of social actors, carrying out 
, '1 1 128 the~r part~cu ar ro es. While he is not denying that a 
sociological account of interests can infer a connection with 
holders of power, his main objection is that a group or organisational 
interests, cannot adequately be comprehended through a reductive 
account, based upon interpersonal relations. For Poulantzas 
interests remain determined by their objective place in production 
relations, and by the objective character of ownership in the means 
of production. Power, for Poulantzas, consequently appears as the 
objective capacity of a class to realise its interests. 
"By power", he argues, "we shall designate the capac~ty 
... 129 
of social classes to realise its specific economic objectives". 
Poulantzas presentation of power is the outcome of his general theory 
of the structural determined character of capitalist society.\i' 
Power appears as 
" •••• an effect of the ensemble of the structures".l30 
This theory of structure provides a determined view of class, 
domination which possesses both a view of objective interests and 
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specific interests of class factions. 
The Poulantzas view of power stems from his theory of social classes. 
It is largely based upon a theory of social structure. Classes 
and class relations appear structurally determined by production 
relations. Social classes remain the outcome of structurally 
determined economic, and to a lesser extent, political and 
, 1 l' 131 ideolog~ca re at~ons. In an important development of the power 
debate, Poulantzas, not only presents structure as determining 
objective interests, but also as determining the role of agent~ 
in the structure of classes and class determined production 
relations. Managers, consequently, like other agents, fulfil an 
objective position.l32 As agents of capital, their roles are 
structurally determined. In their role as agents, managers appear 
,~~~ e~' f t 1 d b' i' 133 as bearers, g 'L , 0 struc ura an 0 Ject ve ~nterests. 
As a result they do not possess roles and practices, which are 
independent of the functions ordinarily undertaken by the owner 
capitalist. Managers as agents, therefore, do not appear as a 
distinct interest group, they do not form a "class ~actionll.134 
The significance of the designation 'agents: in this approach to 
class analysis,is that it is a category which identifies an actors 
position, not so much in terms of the variegation in human behaviour, 
or from an identification of class origin or class motivation, 
nor, in fact from deducements from an organisational objectivej or 
organisational policy; but in terms of the universal structure of 
production relations. The power position of agents, therefore, is 
determined by the position they occupy in the structure of production 
relations. Consequently, the subjective motivations of individuals, 
for poulantzas,remain~ non-essential in the identification of the 
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f t ' 1 1 t ' f 1 ' ti 13 5 II unc ~ona oca ~on 0 c ass posJ. on. Profit" itself, for 
example, appears as an objective category of capital rather than 
, f h d 136 the pursu~t 0 uman en eavour. 
If, as has been earlier outlined, power is associated with personality, 
and acts of the person, in which elements of discretion and choice 
are at stake, a completely determined structure of relations 
negates the view of exercised power. The bearer of structure 
1 - ub' 137 possesses no e ement ot s Ject. Consequently, over-determination 
remains a denial of autonomy. It would discount differences in 
conduct, policy, and strategy, on the part of organisations and 
'fl' 138 classes, 1n con 1ctS over power. As Miliband rema~ks, in regard 
to the position of management, there would, in Poulantzas framework, 
139 be no "political character to managerial control". 
140 poulantzas theory of structure allows only for "relative autonomy" 
to be exercised between the state and class factions, but the 
designation agent can possess some significance in the identification 
of power, role, and interests in production relations. In terms 
of the question of the location of management in large firms, 
141 Renner, for example, maintained that in these circumstances the 
owner of capital became related to the firm merely upon the basis 
of interest; the interest to materially appropriate from his 
investment. He, consequently, distinguished "economic ownership" -
the legal right to benefit - from "technical ownership" - the control 
exercised over the means of production. 142 Actual ownership was 
reduced to a relation of interest, the interest of profitable 
investment. poulantzas, however, in his mora complete theory of 
structure follows Bettelheim's distinction between "legal ownership" 
being a nominal right to benefit, while "economic ownership" is 
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designated with the power of appropriation and control,143 owing 
to its power-over the labour process. A decisive break in this 
f h h . th C h d' 144 line 0 t oug t emerges w~ arc e ~. 
Carchedi makes the point that, from an analysis of social structure, 
legal owners appear more important, but from an analysis of production 
l ' th d t th "f' 145 re at~ons, ey 0 no possess e same s~gn~ ~cance. What is 
important about "managerial capitalism" is that the manager appears 
as a central figure. 
"He" (the manager), states, Carchedi, "rather than the 
rentier is the non-labourer, non-producer, the exploiter. 
Capital personified".146 
Carchedi, bases his theory of capitalism around two concepts, both 
determined by the relations to production. It is the domination 
of the labour process, and of the surplus value production process,147 
which govern the reproduction of social classes. Both of these 
processes rest upon production relations, "which bind together the 
agents of production and the means of production". He claims, 
"The reproduction of social classes depends on the 
reproduction of both pOSitions (in the hierarchy of capitalist 
relations) and agents of production". 148 
An agent of production, for Carchedi, is all embracing. 
"Everybody, simply by taking part in the capitalist 
process, ie. simply by occupying a certain pOSition, 
automatically becomes a carrier of the capitalist 
production relations.". 149 
Carchedi's use of the term agent enables him to establish a 
150 
"correspondence" between capitalist interest and roles. His 
concept of agent, however, appears much broader than that presented 
by poulantzas. For Carchedi, agent, is anyone who performs any 
aspect, no matter of what consequence, of the "global function of 
_~ ....... ';+-.::Ito'" 
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"Agents need not own the means of production and yet 
perform the global function of capital : they perform 
it collectively, and in a hierarchical structure and in 
new forms, what used to be the function of the individual 
capitalist". 151 
Agents, thus, appear as delegated functionaries of capital, their 
global function is not just located in the position of manager, 
but is extended to all states of lower grade supervision. Furthermore, 
this delegated function need not be confined to roles internal to 
the organisation, they can also be delegated to external positions, 
for example, employers federations, Management consultants, or 
152 even, Social scientists promoting particular managerial techniques. 
A designate position of agent, in regard to the internal relations ' 
of the workplace need not be confined to those in roles of exploitation , 
the "global function of capital" can, in certain instances, be 
153 
undertaken by the exploited - wage labour. While a dual function 
of exploited and exploiter can exist within the same role, classically 
in the case of positions of lower supervision, it can also appear 
in the actions of workforces and their representatives. Where 
union officials, and workplace representatives, or wage labourers 
themselves, assume an aspect of managerial responsibility for the 
voluntary subjection of their activities, for example in job-
enlargement, job-enrichment, or schemes of, worker participation. 
Carchedi, from his concept of agent, maintains that such action 
corresponds to the traditional managerial "global function of capital",.ls4 
Both Poulantzas and Carchedi, present a highly structured view of 
social classes in which an identification of interests is derived from 
an objective view of the structure of capital and capitalist social 
relations. Though they both start from the structure of production 
relations,carchedi appears to go much further in his designation of 
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agent, which fulfills the personified "global function of 
capital" in the labour process. The conception of agent, and the 
delegated function of capital, enables Carchedj to maintai~ that 
dual, contradictory purposes can be maintained within the same 
functionary. An agent, the personification of capital, can possess 
a dual function, a double identity. It can both undertake "the 
global function of capital", and the function of the collective 
worker". What Carchedi identifies as the "new middle class" is 
characterised by these contradictory tendencies. It appears in its 
classic form in the role of managers and supervisors, but is capable 
of application to a partial voluntary subordination of the collective 
worker and his elected representatives in the workforce, where they 
undertake responsibility for the delegated functioning of managerial 
capitalism. 
Through his analysis of social classes, based upon both the concept 
of the labour process and the surplus value process, Carchedi, is 
able to ascribe and distinguish in the structure of class and 
production relations, roles determined by the ownership and non-
ownership relation. The distinction between these relations to 
production and relations of function, appears in agents, the 
bearers of the personified function of capital. The interests of 
capital emerge in antagonism between producer and non-producer 
while the pOSition of functions is allocated a specific technical 
155 
content. 
power appears as the realisation of capitalist interest undertaken 
by the functionaries of capital. Certain groups, however, can perform 
both the function of the collective worker and the "global function 
of capital". Antagonism not only reveals itself between the producer 
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and non-producer, but is implicit within the dual function undertaken 
by certain groups within the relations of production. It is at 
this level, that Carchedi introduces "relative autonomy,,156 Agents 
can therefore appear in "correspondence" or in "contradiction" 
with the ownership interest. 
Both Poulantzas and Carchedi seek to demonstrate that power,as an 
organised interest, can be structurally located around relations to 
production. They appear to overcome the limitations of the 
sociological identification of interests approaches, of Miliband, 
and westergaard and Resler, with its imputed notion of power. 
poulantzas, however, appears to deny the association of power to 
personality. His structural view of power and class interests 
appears to prevent allowances for role discretion or. political 
strateg) in power conflicts and power decisions. The relative 
autonomy that exists,operates externally to the internal organisation 
of capital. It is a relation of state hegemony over class factions, 
in order to sustain a balance of ruling class forces. Carchedi, 
on the other hand, is willing to allow relative autonomy within the 
functions of structured roles,on the basis of an overall objective 
determination of capitalist interests. 
In the question of power we have seen that the study of power can 
be approached through an analysis of behaviour in decision making 
following the selection of a key issue over which verifiable overt 
conflict, arising from policy preferences, takes place. The extension 
of this approach in power analysis has retained the decision making 
focus of power but tried to also account for non issues and potential 
issues by identifying who controls the agenda. Instead of just 
concentrating upon actual power in decision making, the widening of 
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the decision making focus has raised questions about potential 
power. It has inquired about institutional bias, reputational 
power, influence, anticipated reactions, fear of retribution, in 
issues which go uncontested. The major objection to this approach 
has centred upon the question of interests, and the mechanism by 
which either subjective or objective real interests become either 
manifest or remain suppressed, due to the exercise of power, outside 
the decision making arena. Running through all these approaches, 
however, there remains an unresolved, and at times ambiguous, 
epistemological question over the status of the human agent in 
the exercise of power. This question becomes particularly acute 
in the study of power within institutional environments. 
Diagram 2.1 presents, in a simplified form, the dilemma of the status 
of the human agent which arises in the question of power. This aspect 
of power has important implications, not only for the definition of 
power, but al~o, for the analysis of power. 
Diagram 2.l:Power Determination and Human Agency 
(outcome variables) (influence variables) 
Structure Human Agency 
Determined 100% NIL 
Autonomous NIL 100% 
Where structural variables possess greatest influence,then behaviour 
is determined, and the influence of human agency is weakest. However, 
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where the influence of human agency is strongest, behaviour is 
more autonomous, and less the result of structural forces. 
In the pluralist approach to power, the difficulties which arose 
were not just problems which required the recognition of the limits 
of the study of decision making, as the appropriate arena for formal 
struggles. Nor, furthermore, was the dispute just a matter of 
settling the important question of issue selection. The criticism 
within the scope of the decision making view of power, was also 
an argument of institutional bias. 50 that while Bachrach and 
Baratz, Lukes, and CreDson, for example, endorse the view of power 
within the decision making framework, and share with Dahl and 
Polsby, that power is tied to personality, they appear, perhaps, 
contradictorily, to concede that institutions of decision making, 
or the bias stemming from institutions, can be an influential 
. th . f 157 5 d . variable ~n e exerc~se 0 power. 0 esp~te an apparent 
objection to a structured view of power, and a rejection of considering 
power as a derivative of interests based upon objective empirical 
evidence of association of interests, the acknowledged limitations 
of the behaviouralist view of power, being exclusively the property 
of human agency, is only overcome through an acceptance of institutional 
bias, as a structural variable in power determination. 
It is, however, when the question of power is considered within an 
institutionalised relationship, either between social classes, or 
within an organisation, interest group, or in terms of relationships 
to production, that the problematic of structure appears more apparent. 
The dispute, is again, not just one of the implications surrounding 
the exclusion o~ interests as a factor in power determination, 
important although that is, it is also the problem that the 
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behaviour of the human agent is not entirely random, but rather, 
it is located within an organised structure of hierarchical 
positions. Structure, in other words, is not just a derivative 
of interests, but also an essential allocator of prescribed roles, 
and a distributor of specific degrees of formal power and authority 
to the holders of those roles, the power holders. 
The pluralist view that power in decision making, and the Marxist 
view of power in interests, not only reveal differing methodologies, 
but pose clear differences in their conception of industrial society. 
But within the Marxist framework, wh'.'f a general agreement 
exists about the nature of society,a disagreement is apparent which 
polarises around mutually exclusive explanations based around either 
subjective frameworks of shared common interests, and the motivations 
of human agents in power positions, like managers in organisations, 
or, the opposing view, that power, and with it the human agent, 
itself, are structurally determined. While Miliband, and Westergaard 
and Resler, appear to sympathise with the former, poulantzas, 
and in a more qualified way, Carchedi, appear to favour the latter. 
The question of power, consequently, in both the pluralist frameworkS 
and the Marxist frameworks, endorses not just different images of 
but 
industrialised societies, there also exists within both approaches 
a dichotomy over structure and human agent. 
The subjective view of power, in which power appears tied to the 
free floating individual,is unable to account for individual behaviour 
itself being patterned by societal norms, values, and ideologies, 
which may themselves be the outcome of particular power interests. 
The structural view of power, which stresses the importance of 
hierarchical positions of authority accepts that the social individual 
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cannot be entirely free floating, but, social man himself cannot be 
completely conditioned either. He is not an automaton responding 
mechanically in structured roles in the organisation. The exercise 
of power, as Allen maintains, ultimately possesses a human dimension. 
"Power", he claims, "is exercised in the last analysis 
by people. Men and women, not guns, bombs or machines, 
make decisions about it". 158 
The concept of power may be seen as an explanatory variable, but it 
cannot be viewed as a variable/independent of human action. Although 
it may be contingent upon a structural variable, it must be mediated 
through the human agent. So that, for example, while the allocated 
roles in the structure of the organisation are the basis for the 
formal distribution of power and authority in an organisation, and, 
for instance, technology can appear as a variable in the work 
situation, and the labour market, product market, or corporations 
budget, may be objective variables identified in redundancies, none 
of these structural variables exercise power in themselves. Power 
is only exercised when action, which mayor may not be constrained 
by structural variables, takes place. Structure, and structural 
variables require that the constraints they establish enter into 
the beliefs, values, consciousness, opinions, or attitudes, of 
the actor, in such a way that the actor chooses to act in a particular 
159 
way. The question of power, therefore, cannot exclude the 
structure of the organisation, or the existence of structural 
variables, but only in so much as they affect beliefs and opinions, 
etc, in such a way that they have outcomes in decision making and 
policy, or induce compliance in human behaviour. Consequently, 
structure and human agency are indispensable forces of power generation 
and power affects. Omission of either retards the understanding of 
power. As Abell, argues, 
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" ..... that in order to understand the determination of 
organisational outcomes, like the nature of the control 
system and ultimately effectiveness, it is initially 
important to understand the effect of constraining 
variables, but it is also important to understand 
organisational partici1ants beliefs and their relative 
influence and power." 60 
constraining variables in the organisation is not power but rather 
a resource. Resources only become transmitted into power when they 
are acted upon by individuals or groups. 
The study of power in other words, requires not only an analysis 
of the constraining variables in the structure of organisations but 
also how the human agent acts. The power of A over B requires 
that we not only examine structure, which may be a resource within 
which A acts,but we need also to focus upon how structural variables 
enter into the beliefs of A, and how combined with the beliefs of 
A, they enter into the formation of policy, strategy and the decision 
making process, so as to affect the behaviour of B. However, we 
also need to examine how the beliefs, expectations, and interests 
of B, affect his behaviour in response to the initiated action of A. 
The exercise of power in industrial societies generally exists. 
, 
within structured relationships, which constrain. , but cannot 
eliminate, discretion and choice, being exercised by the human agent. 
without the possibility of discretionary action by the human agent, 
pOwer could not exist. power consequently, exists within constraints 
which are acted upon, in an interaction comprising individuals, 
groupS, or the representatives of institutions. 
In the final part of the question of power, we take up some of these 
considerations in a critical evaluation of the notion of joint 
regulation found in the institutional approach to power in industrial 
relations. 
79 
5 REDUNDANCY AND WORKPLACE RELATIONS A DIALECTIC OF POWER 
CONFLICT. 
The position of wage labour in the market economies of industrial 
societies/is largely grounded in an ambivalent position of job 
insecurity and job dependence. Insecurity remains a feature both 
of the experience in the labour market situation and the work 
situation. Redundancy and unemployment both appear as issues which 
directly affect the life chances of significant sections of the 
working population and which have not inconsequential economic, 
social, and psychological effects upon the status of the individual 
in a market economy. Although the impact of "a lack of job security 
remains unevenly distributed across class, age, sex, and industrial 
sectors, it is, however, among the manual sections of the workforce, 
especially the lesser skilled that the propensity to both unemployment 
and redundancy experience is greatest. Yet given this high vulnerability 
to job insecurity and high dependence upon employment,the position 
of wage labour in a market economy is profoundly ambiguous. 
In the power structure of an industrial organisation the position 
of the manual worker is characterised by his, or her, lack of formal 
authority. The distinction between 'salaried employee', and 'weekly 
wage earner', 'office' and 'shop floor' worker, 'non manual' and 
'manual', 'black coated', and 'blue collar' worker, are not just 
functions arising out of the division of labour within the 
organisations. Nor are they only variations which emerge from 
ff t k t k d t t " . 161 di eren mar e , wor , an s a us s~tuat~ons. In general/these 
divisions are also associated with differences defining those who 
exercise formal authority from those who hold subordinate positions 
in the organisation. It is this production relationship which is 
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reinforced by an array of differentials, privileges, and amenities. l62 
But while manual wage labour does not possess authority in the formal 
hierarchy of industrial organisations, it is not without power. It 
is power and not authority which characterises the position of manual 
wage labour. Wage labour appears in a dialectical relationship to 
the ownership and control of the organisation, as it does not own 
what it produces, yet does not formally control what it most depends 
upon, employment security. Though the worker remains ~ormally 
powerless, and alienates the product of his labour, he retains 
ultimately a level of control through his capacity to work. The 
contract of employment is therefore a power relationship. For the 
employer the works rules form the basis of his rights over the employee 
in the workplace, but the worker still retains his human capacity to 
labour, so that while he formally submits himself to the authority 
of the employer, in the exchange of his potential to labour, he 
retains a measure of discretion and personal, or collective, autonomy 
over the actual performance of his work tasks. l63 The objective 
function of management is to maximise the workers potential productive 
activity in the interests of capital accumulation. In workplace 
relations/consequentl~ power is a crucial variable which determines 
the outcome of the relationship between management and the worker. 
The formal outline of the relationship embodied in the contract of 
employment is not without considerable complexity and uncertainty. 
In the study of industrial relations, perhaps the most influential 
school of thought, industrial relations pluralism, has developed from 
a critique which has recognised the limitations of managerial control 
being based exclusively upon relations of formal authority. FOX, 
for example, characterises the unitary or traditional view of 
81. 
industrial organisation in terms of a system of authority rather 
than power relations. 
"A unitary system", he suggests, "has one source of 
authority and one focus of loyalty, which is why it 
suggests the team analogy .••.• Each accepts his place 
and his function, gladly, following the leadership of 
the one appointed. There are no oppositional groups 
or fractions, and therefore no rural leaders within the 
team" .164 
Industrial relations pluralism is primarily concerned with power 
rather than authority relations. The question of power, however, 'is 
less a concern with how power is exercised, the main focus is directed 
towards ways of reconciling and restricting the full use of power 
in labour relations. Flanders and Fox define ~~e question of power 
165 
as the existence of a "multiplicity of separative normative systems". 
whose aspirations appear to challenge the prevailing norms which 
regulate behaviour in an industrial relations system. They write, 
"We must thus speak of these groups having normative 
aspirations. Power is the crucial variable determining 
the outcome in such a situation. One group may have been 
able to impose its preferred normati,ve system upon other 
groups, but a subjected group can always mobilise power 
on its own account, formulate normative aspirations, 
challenge the prevailing norms, and force an agreed compromise. 
It may then be able to secure permanent acceptance of a 
process of bilateral regulation, or if it is powerful 
enough, unilaterally impose its own set of norms in 
substitution for the existing set". 166 
This view accepts that conflict is an inevitable aspect of industrial 
relations, and power remains crucial to outcomes between norms and 
aspirations, but it sees consensus as the alternative to resolving 
issues by the exercise of power. 
" ..••. the greater the degree of consensus between the 
normative aspirations of the various groups involved, 
the less the overall tension and the less the invocation 
of power in attempts to reduce that tension". 167 
The approach of industrial relations pluralism, though it accepts a 
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degree of conflict, and acknowledges legitimate differences of 
interest existing in the workplace,seeks to avoid overt expressions 
of power conflicts by establishing institutions whereby jOint 
responsibility exercised by both management and the trade union 
organisations can regulate industrial relations in both the market 
situation and in the work situation. 1G8 The main instrument for 
achieving this is collective bargaining. For industrial relations 
pluralists, collective bargaining not only possesses the possibility 
of institutionalising relations between management and unions at 
a representative level, through agreed bargaining procedures, but 
seeks to regulate behaviour in the workplace through joint agreements 
to regulate jobs; what is termed" job regulation". 1.69 
Collective bargaining consequently transforms the question of power 
from that of A having power over B, relationship, into one of jOint 
regulation whereby A and B both share responsibility for regulating 
behaviour through negotiated agreements. Thus the dependence of 
wage labour upon jobs takes the form of a relationship between 
institutions. Harbison, for instance maintains, 
"Collective bargaining •••• is strictly a relationship 
between organisations and not ••.••• a relationship between 
management and workers". 170 
collective bargaining increases institutional jOint responsibility 
for the regulation of workplace relations by seeking to transform 
what Flanders describes as control by "conjunction", in which either 
side retains unbridled control over a working practice in the work 
situation, to one of "co-operation" in which management and union 
organisation come to recognise the "factual interdependence" of 
1 . hi 171 their re at~ons p. The job dependence of wage labour thus 
becomes transformed into an institutional relation of organisational 
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mutual interdependence. Chamberlain claims that there appears a 
position of dependence in which either side recognise that they can 
achieve their institutional objectives more effectively aided by the 
172 
support of the other. A condition which Kerr terms as "a philosophy 
of mutual survival". 173 
Industrial relations pluralism both rejects the view that formal 
authority can exclusively regulate workplace relations, but equally, 
it rejects the human relations view that personal needs and interests 
of the worker in the work situation can normally be met through more 
1 dmi ' t ti 174 '1 'bl effective personne a n~s ra on, or are necessar~ y compat~ e 
with the objectives of the industrial organisation. Instead collective 
bargaining is seen as a means for institutionalising power conflict 
by confining relationships between management and workforces to 
relations conducted through formally established institutions of 
procedure and bargaining committees which jointly share responsibility 
for establishing the rules by .which a labour forces behaviour will be 
controlled through the joint control over jobs. 
Collective bargaining not only provides a method for the joint 
regulation of jobs, as the basis for establishing an orderly pattern 
which prescribes behaviour, but it does so by accepting that though 
a difference of interest and a basis of conflict still remains, the 
effect of bargaining restricts the scope of the difference. Dubin, 
for example states, 
"Collective bargaining provides the means for systematic 
social change in the working code governing management 
- I.len relations. The means for carrying out and resolving 
industrial conflict become established, limited and defined".l75 
It has been claimed by Ross that collective bargaining absorbs the 
energy of union leaderships, deflecting them away from what might 
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otherwise be activities which pose more serious challenges to the 
176 
status quo. Dunlop sees the maturing of collective bargaining 
reducing the influence of internal political considerations of the 
union in wage settlements, while Flanders, suggests,that collective 
bargaining encourages a more "cautious" view among the union 
leadership of the "continuing relationship within which the parties 
177 have to live together". Waltsn and McKersie mention, that a 
function of negotiations can be attitudinal change, and even the 
f " '1 ' h' ,,178 h 1 ' development 0 co-operat~ve re at~ons ~ps, w i e Hcx~e argues, 
that where unions appear mainly as bargaining institutions they 
become "trade conscious rather than class conscious".179 
For Dubin the institution of collective bargaining places worker 
reactions into an institutional form compatible with the position 
of management. He says, 
"It is the workers personalised reactions to industrial 
disorder that is translated into organisational terms 
to make the workers reaction to disorder comparable to 
that of management". 180 
Institutionalisation , it is argued by Kuhn, introduces rationality: 
procedures of "industrial jurisprudence" replace disorder. 
"A system of 'laws' replace the arbitrary decisions of 
individuals and an orderly approach to reason replaces 
the disruptive use of force and coercion in disputes. 181 
Ross maintains that bargaining not only becomes an institution for 
regulating conflict but it also results in a shift in authority within 
the bargaining institution. In the trade union, for example, the 
authority for bargaining moves from the rank and file into the 
representatives of the union apparatus. 182 This, he argues, not only 
imbues rational calculation in decisions taken by leaderships but 
helps stem more spontaneous outbreaks of protest among the rank and 
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file in the work situation. He states, 
"The first contribution of the business union has been to 
rationalise the conduct of the strike. It has attempted 
with great success to eliminate the irrational emotional 
outburst. Anger and resentment are dampened when the moment 
is inappropriate and accentuated when the time is ripe; 
emotion is stored up and paid out in the light of cold 
strategical requirements ..•.• the strike ••.. is now conducted 
as an integral part of an effort to advance industrial 183 
partnership •••• it is ••• quite dignified, and respectable". 
This emasculation of power through the development of collective 
bargaining institutions, has for some writers become internalised 
into a moral value. Lester suggests that the "commodity concept" 
lS4 
of employment has become replaced by a "welfare concept" of 
employer-employee relations. Charles's contention is that while 
the development of collective bargaining in Britain has not been 
"legally binding", it has been "morally binding" upon the parties 
concerned,lli5 while Fox maintains that the view of industrial relations 
pluralism is that industrial societies are in a state of an 
"approximate", basic "procedural consensus". He argues, 
"that given 'goodwill' and such external stimulus, help 
and structural support as may prove necessary, managements 
and unions will always and everywhere be able ultimately to 
negotiate comprehensive, codified systems of regulation 
which provide a fully adequate and orderly context making 
for the promotion and maintenance of orderly behaviour". 186 
This industrial relations pluralist approach to power, with its 
emphasis upon rule-making and procedural regulation, however, imputes 
a systems based value upon what comprises orderly behaviour. 
Consequently what is viewed as 'disorder' is what is considered to 
be dysfunctional to the operation of an industrial relations system. 
It is perceived as a threat, in other words, to the formal rationality 
embodied in the structure of the system itself, or the industrial 
organisation. Dubin, for instance, defines disorder as, 
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"Disorder in industry can be defined as the breakdown 
of an ordered organisational structure and the human 
relationships that are prescribed by the organisational 
pattern. Every enterprise has a more or less well-
defined structure and a pattern of expected behaviour 
that govern the actions of each individual contributing 
his services to the organisation". 187 
Flanders and Fox see disorder in British industrial relations as 
the breakdown of normative regulation, that is a failure in agreed 
rules to constrain workplace behaviour which results in unpatterned 
behaviour. They say, 
"To the extent that necessary normative regulation is 
lacking or is weakened and threatened with collapse, 
disorder becomes manifest in unpatterned behaviour leading 
to an undermining of integration and predictability in 
social action and events. In more specific terms disorder 
emerges as dislocation, disruption and a variety of 
other symptoms associated with frustrated expectation." 188 
Similarly, the Donovan Commission saw 'unofficial' action, as a 
central 'problem' in workplace relations, being primarily a failure 
to establish appropriate institutions to regulate behaviour, in 
changing social and economic conditions. 
"Unofficial strikes and other types of unofficial action 
in industry are above all a symptom of a failure to 
devise institutions in keeping with changing needs". 189 
Industrial relations pluralism,with its focus upon the institutional 
means to emasculate power conflict in workplace relations,sees 
orderly relations resulting from institutionally established 
relations between management and trade union organisations. Collective 
bargaining appears as the main agency for rule making and remains 
the principle method for ameliorating power conflicts. This approach 
not only accepts a legitimate difference of interests and tolerates 
a right to representation, but, through an institutional framework, 
it seeks to contain power conflicts to jOint agreements arrived at 
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through decision making of collective bargaining. 
A major limitation of the industrial relations pluralist view is 
tha~by confining its analysis largely to the problems of institutional 
regulation.it focuses mainly upon the mechanism of accommodation , 
in a relationship which is initially acknowledged to be one of 
power conflict. It therefore presents the study of industrial 
relations as being, in considerable part, a concern with constraining 
workplace behaviour. Through collective bargaining, it sees the 
possibility for joint agreement~within circumstances of mutual 
organisational dependence, regulating jobs. But rules and negotiated 
agreements to regulate jobs is not quite the same as the control 
over the workers and workgroups in these jobs. In this respect 
industrial relations pluralism shares a common difficulty with 
other rule determined behaviour perspectives/in that actual life 
. 1 f d 190 k . rules are never ent~re y con orme to. In the wor s~tuation, 
moreover, the position of wage labour/owing to its work capacity 
not being inseparable from its human capacity, means that wage labour 
can never be a completely conditioned reflection of institutionally 
determined rules. Rules, jointly arrived at, or not, by management 
and trade union representatives, even upon the most favourable 
grounds for possible mutual acceptance,remain continually subject 
to frequent reinterpretation due to a variety of considerations. 
The very existence of rules makes them open to abuse, manipulation, 
interpretation, partial rejection,as well as a variety of degrees 
and ways of acceptance. Rules, therefore require to be acted upon, 
they are, consequently/subject to choices. Conformity, or deviance, 
from the rules and formal agreements cannot be explained Simply, 
as it is partly tied to the complexities and variegation of human 
essence. To understand workplace relations, consequently, it is 
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insufficient just to possess a knowledge of rule making, it also 
requires a knowledge of the process of deviancy. Therefore the 
study of workplace relations cannot ignore the reasons, attitudes, 
motivation, ideologies and interests and actions from the perspective 
th 'th k 't ' 191 of ose ~n e wor s~ uat~on. 
Undue emphasis upon the process of rule making and imputed system 
values of 'disorder' detracts attention from the difficulties 
di 1 dmi ' ,192 surroun ng ru e a n~strat~on. Furthermore, the over-emphasis 
upon collective bargaining. in the joint creation of rule~ tends 
to undervalue the exten~ to which the persistence of unilateral 
forms of power continue to be exercised within the workplace, job 
control, informality and workgroup authority, and unofficial 
workplace organisations continue to sustain themselves alongside 
1 1 , 193 forma regu at~on. In order to effectively constrain these 
tendencies towards the independent exercise of power in workplace 
relations, a congruence between behaviour at work and rule making 
can only be brought about either through worker compliance or by 
methods of rule enforcement. But even compliance does not necessarily 
imply full acceptance, or consensus. It can occur out of pragmatic 
acceptances; be merely a temporary phenomenon in particular 
circ~~stances. Rule enforcement on the other hand, implies the 
withdrawal of inducement or, the use, or threat, of sanctions. The 
emasculation of power through joint regulation advocated by industrial. 
relations pluralists ultimately must rest upon action. Both 
compliance to rules or the enforcement of rules, cannot be wholly 
understood by reference to the establishment of these rules. It 
requires an analysis of the responses of both management and shop 
floor workers to the presence of these rules in the daily practice of 
the issues which confront workplace relations. Such a perspective 
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not only requires the identification of an issue but must also 
analyse the dynamics of policy formation, the deployment of strategy, 
and the processes of the very political judgements, and ideological 
perspectives operating within both management and union organisations to 
affect the practice of industrial relations. 
Studies of workplace relations provide considerable evidence of the 
continual tendency for forms of unilateral job control to emerge, 
often placated by the actions or non actions, of management, where 
joint rule making has been established. Gouldner, in his study 
of the 'indulgen~l pattern', 194 Lupton's analysis of 'the fiddle,195 
in piecework work determination in the textile industry, and Brown, 
f d ti i . . 196 with his account 0 custom an prac ce n eng~neer~ng, or Kahn, 
with his evaluation of 'frictional bargaining' in the tyre industry,197 
all raise doubts surrounding the extent to which workplace relations 
can become rigorously formalised through institutions of joint 
regulation. This approach to workplace relations, while it cannot 
omit the significance of the effect of institutionalisation/ must 
also take account of the internal processes of conflict and control 
which pattern behaviour both within management and union organisations, 
and in the interaction between them. As Mann explains, 
"However institutionalised industrial relations become, 
strikes reveal the workers pent-up feelings deprivation 
and hostility to the employer" 198 
Industrial relations pluralism,with its emphasis upon emasculating 
• 
power conflict,over states the processes of accommodation at the 
expense of understating the extent to which power conflict continually 
appears in workplace relations. As Hyman states, 
" ••••• in every workplace there exists an invisible frontier 
of control, reducing some of the formal powers of the employer: 
a frontier which is redefined in a continuous proceRs of 
pressure overt and tacit struggle •••• an unceasing power 
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struggle is therefore a central feature of industrial 
relations". 199 
The question of power is a concept which is central to the understanding 
of industrial society. In political and sociological theory the 
question of power has been explored in ways which reveal that the 
view of power is tied to different ideological perspectives 
surrounding the nature of society, and the significance of institutions 
and human agency. in determining the exercise of power. In industrial 
relation~ the view that power can be confined to jointly regulated 
institutions has been explored. In genera~power emerges as a 
possible independent variable, which, though existing within 
hierarchically defined organisations and subject to the environmental 
constraints within which organisations operate, remains ultimately 
an act of human activity. Power does not exist in structures or 
structural variables but is manifest in human action, which may be 
constrained by those forces. As the exercise of power cannot prevail 
independent of the human will,it needs to be explored within how 
men/in the process of historical development,both influence and shape 
that development. The exercise of power is consequently an eternally 
problematical concept which must ultimately be subjected to empirical 
evaluation. 
From this exploration of the study of power three propositions 
present themselves for empirical investigation. These will form 
the basic approach to the analysis of redundancy as a key issue in 
workplace relations, in the British Motor industry. 
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The investigation is primarily concerned with the affect of power 
in the process of redundan~J - the means by which redundancy 
decisions become realised, in both policy and practice - has had 
upon the developments that have taken place in workplace relations. 
The study, therefore, concentrates particularly upon the efforts 
of employer attempts to maintain control of managerial prerogatives 
over redundancy issues, and how the form of this control is influenced 
by managerial strategies towards workplace organisation. In the 
course of the analysis three important areas are questioned. 
1 What has been managerial policy toward redundancy 
in the British Motor industry? Upon what considerations 
has the policy been based, and how, and for what reasons, 
has this policy changed over time? What strategies have 
been pursued by management in the industry to achieve 
these policy ends? 
The study will seek not only to inquire into policy change but 
analyse the consequence of these policy changes upon the response 
of workplace organisation and workplace industrial relations. 
Consequently it will also consider: 
2 What has been the response of workplace organisation 
to the strategies of management over the question of 
redundancy? How important has the issue of redundancy 
been for the stability of workplace organisation? Upon 
what basis have the politics and policies of workplace 
organisation of redundancy been based? Under what 
circumstances have workplace organisations been prepared 
to act independently of their official trade union 
organisations over the question of redundancy? 
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Finally, ~~e study wil~ throughout/consider the more general 
aspect of the influence management actions can exercise over 
workplace organisation. It will therefore consider: 
3 How important has been the question of managerial 
strategy toward workplace organisation, upon the 
tendency for workplace organisation to develop and 
act independently of both trade union leadership and 
managerial authority? And, how important has been the 
influence of managerial strategy in the encouragement 
of workplace organisation to integrate with the 
institutional arrangements of shared, joint decision-
making, over the question of redundancy? 
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6 RESEARCH STRATEGY, METHODS AND SOURCES 
During the post war period/the question of workplace relations 
and redundancy have appeared as central, though generally separate 
issues in public policy. 'Full employment' in Britain,in sharp 
contrast to the mass unemployment of the inter war period, became 
established as a platform for the provision of both continuity in 
public economic policy and the basis for a consensus politics which 
at its peak became known as 'Butskellism'. Until the advent of 
'monetarism' and 'Thatcherism', in the mid and later 1970's, 'full 
employment' in Britain haq since its conception in 1944,retained a 
high priority in public policy and in the ideas and practices of 
central economic and financial management. This condition did not 
arise merely to fulfil party political obligation, but it was also 
an attempt to meet the increasing aspirations and expectations of 
the general populace. No more was this the case than in the workplace, 
where the 'right to work' and 'no redundancy' became slogans which 
for most of the post war period appeared to have replaced the 
unemployment and hunger marches of the inter war period. In more 
recent times, however, a number of developments have taken place 
which have appeared to have profound affects upon public policy 
approaches towards both the question of redundancy and that of 
workplace organisation. 
After 1960,in the wake of a number of periodic economic cris~s 
the state began to move away from its tl:aditional non-interventionist 
role in which issues like redundancy and the related topic of 
manpower were viewed as the exclusive responsibility of industry. 
This change saw not only the state extending its activities into 
welfare, retraining, job creation, regional policy etc., but it was 
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accompanied by a growing concern over developments in industrial 
relations. Changes in both of these fields led not only to changes 
in employer attitudes, policies, and managerial strategies in regard 
to labour recruitment, but it resulted in more specific changes 
occurring over issues like redundancy and workplace organisation. 
Governments of all persuasion, moreover, became more concerned 
about developments in industrial relations. It was primarily the 
impact of shop floor attitudes which appeared to find expression 
in a growing organised workplace in which the role of shop steward 
appeared as a Significant figure that eventually led to the setting-
up of a Royal Commission on Trade Unions and Employers Associations 
in 1965. 200 Conflict in ~~e workplace had become associated with 
explanations surrounding the failures in economic policy, the 
ineffectiveness of incomes policy and the inability to curb wage 
drift. It was out of a fear of terminal industrial decline that a 
pressure for change occurred in public policy towards questions of 
manpower and redundancy and workplace relations. 
The growth of redundancy research is clearly a reflection of an 
apparent disjuncture between the desire for full employment and 
security at work and a concern for industrial modernisation, structural 
change and higher productivity with lower manning levels. A study 
of the affect of redundancy upon action in the workplace is therefore 
of some importance in an evalua,tion of public policy. Furthermore I 
the fear of redundancy to job security appears as a regular aspect 
of job dependence for wage labour/which considerably affects the 'life 
chances' for industrial workers. As the propensity of redundancy has 
increased it has become a more Significant aspect of industrial life. 
Both redundancy and workplace relations are issues within which there 
exists a considerable difference of interest and both of which have 
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proven to be sources of conflict. Consequently, both have been 
defined in public policy as 'problem' questions. But whereas 
redundancy studies have almost wholly neglected the impact of 
redundancy upon workplace relations, the growth in the study of 
workplace industrial relations has not generally been issue orientated. 
The main type of workplace research conducted in Britain has been 
that of large scale ~mpirical investigation~ generally based upon 
the findings of pre-coded questionnaires, which o~ occasions have 
been supplemented by interviews. The most important examples of 
this approach has been L~e extensive work carried out by the Oxford 
and Warwick Schools of Industrial Relations. 201 Though the 
application of sample survey techniques to workplace organisation 
has helped to provide a mass of factual information to previously 
uncharted territory, such research does have limitations. Their 
conclusions are usually based upon summaries of gross statistical 
I 
aggregates, while respondents opinions are based upon an attitude 
at one moment in time, and often subject to limited choice responses. 
Though these research techniques have proved a valuable means for 
estimating the numbers of shop stewards or identify senior stewards 
or the number of 'full time' convenors, these approaches are not as 
successful in taking account of the position of the actor in the work 
situation or to what extent responses may be shaped by the eXistence 
of a particular power relationship. On the other hand, participant 
observation approaches like, for example, the work carried 01.1t by 
202 203 Batstone, Barastcn, and Frenkel , and the study of Clack , or 
204 the insiders account of shop steward organisation undertaken by Beynon, 
have displayed more sensitivity to.the interactive basis of 
workplace relations in the motor industry. Similarly the retrospective 
account of a strike and its implications published by Friedman 
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and Meredeen of Dagenham, have all provided insights into plant 
relation~ but generally share with the survey approach a largely 
a-historic perspective. These studies of the car industry have 
been supplemented in recent years by a virtual growth industry in 
historical literature published on the early British motor industry. 
carr,206 and ZeitLtn207 have both produced studies which have in 
part been based upon the inter war workplace relations in the motor 
industry in Coventry, while Whiting 208 has looked at the 
development of community and workplace organisation in Oxford during 
the same period. There has also been a strong historical interest 
in wartime industrial relations. Kendall,209 pribicevic2lO, and 
Hinton211 have all examined the wartime shop stewards movement 
212 
which arose during the first world war,while,more recently, Croucher 
has provided an account of the experience of workplace organisation 
in the second world war. These have provided inSights into workplace 
relations in some of the motor industry centres which were turned 
over to munitions production. Apart from these attempts to periodise, the 
of the 
studV/ workplace there has also been a growing number of biographical 
accounts of the early motor manufacturers. Richardson, for example, 
devotes a section of his study of Coventry to the early pioneers 
. d 213 in the motor l.n us try • h 214 A . 215 d 216 Lanc ester, ustl.n, an MOrris, 
have all been the subject of biographical works,while in the last 
217 few years,Church has engaged in a series of publications/including 
that of Austin/from the perspective of the business historian, while 
218 
overy has completed a similar study of the Morris organisation. 
All these studies necessarily focus upon the early formative period 
but do not proceed beyond 1945. 219 Graham Turner, in one .of the 
few accounts of management, has eXamined the process of merger and 
takeover in the post war British motor industry, in an account which 
largely relies upon the insights of the journalist rather than that 
of the academic. He, however, says little of the industry I s attitude 
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to workplace organisation. All of these histories of the business 
or management side of the industry have largely neglected labour 
relations or the employer attitude towards workplace organisation. 
None have produced a systematic account of how managerial policy 
attempted to influence the course of workplace relations. In 
general throughout all these studies, the relationship between the 
redundancy issue and workplace organisation has been largely igncred 
in the available literature, or in the case of A Friedman220 and 
H A Turner et al~2klthough it has been identified as an issue,it 
has been given only fleeting consideration in their analysis. 
to 
The purpose of this study is seek to analyse the way in which the 
recurring issue of redundancy in the British motor industry has 
affected the development of workplace organisation. The objective 
is to offer an explanation within an explanatory framework of power 
relations. In so doing, the intention is not to produce a definitive 
history of the motor industry, though clearly some historical context 
will be present, nor a complete knowledge of workplace organisation. 
Rathe~ it is hoped to establish the importance of job defence upon 
the power relations that operate in the workplace. The principle 
method of investigation consequently, is to be based around the 
analysis of redundancy conflicts that have arisen in the industry. 
It is, therefore, largely a study of overt conflict over the question 
of redundancy and how this kind of conflict shapes or has shaped 
employer, trade ~,ion and workforce attitudes towards workplace 
organisation. Though such an approach may be criticised for appearing 
to over-state the level of conflict in industrial relations;22 for 
ii: is j 1\ 
the purpose of a power analysis, situations of conflict over competing 
interests that power is, perhaps,most vividly revealed. The study 
of conflict helps to disclose not only the power structure and how 
it operates, but also discloses the interactive bases of power. 
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Conflict situations, furthermore, not only help to clarify positions but 
help toward overcoming the frequent disjuncture between policy und 
practice, the beliefs held by parties and their actions. In conflict 
situation~ slogans, rhetoric and speeches must confront concrete 
reality expressed in action. What is of interest is not just what 
is being claimed should happen but what actually does happen. 
The study of a conflict situation enables the analysis of why certain 
choices are made and acted upon and what kinds of explanations can 
be put forward to account for inactivity when a conflict of interest 
is at stake. but fails to become manifest. 
In regard to workplace organisation the central concern is to offer 
accounts of the effect redundancy has had upon the power and 
influence of workplace organisation. It will seek to analyse the 
internal basis of power and authority which is exercised by shop 
steward organisation over its membership and constituent unions 
in the workplace, but will also seek to determine how such organisations 
have attempted to exercise policy and action which are dependent or 
independent of the power of employers and national union officials. 
In particular, the study will also try to account both for the 
development of interplant combine committees, both within a single 
organisation and between differing organisations across the motor 
industry how such organisations have defined their policy issues, 
with what strategies and with what kinds of success have they 
had in being able to realise their goals. 
The research perspective, however, will seek to go beyond the 
confines found for example in conventional sociological approaches 
which have governed the analysis of structure and action. 223 It 
will largely follow a social action perspective insofar as it lays 
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stress upon identifying the selection of means for obtaining ends, 
and will therefore attempt to provide an account of why certain 
courses of action were pursued while others were ignored or were 
opposed to. It therefore will be concerned with the study of the 
actors as expressions of conscious rational strategy which becomes 
articulated in decision making and action by the workplace organisation. 
The research strategy however will seek to avoid the tendency towards 
psychological reductionism inherent in some schools of social action. 224 
consequently the method of anlaysis will also seek to go beyond 
2~ 
the merely actor orientated view and seek to identify the actions 
of workplace organisation within an interactive framework which 
involves both the power and authority of management, union officials 
and on occasions, the State. This account of workplace organisation, 
in other words, seeks to take account of the particular set of 
circumstances which define the situation within which action occurs 
but also how strategies and goals arise within an overall framework 
of structure variables and institutional influences which may have 
a bearing upon the choices and strategies in a power relationship. 
The analysis therefore cannot be based upon the interests of any 
single party but rather from a totality of interaction between the 
principle parties in an issue of power conflict. In other words, 
this approach seeks to account for how institutional influences and 
structural variables act to shape the range of choices available 
to those in the workplace situation, and how interested parties at 
workplace level seek to challenge, redefine or act upon these forces. 
The studY,consequentlY,will,throughout.place considerable emphasis 
upon the influence of product markets, the ~ffect of competition and 
fiscal and economic policy upon the discretionary activity an~ 
strategies enacted at workplace level. The analysis will also 
attempt to account for the influence of institutional pressures 
100 
operating externally to the workplace situation, particularly 
the attitude of the State, the policies of the Engineering 
Employers Federation and the positions adopted by union conferences 
in addition to the actions of full-time union officials who all 
interact between works management, the workforce and the workplace 
as 
organisation in such a way to disclose the nature of the power 
relationship. 
The object of the study is to comprehend the variety of interests 
which are revealed in a question of redundancy in the workplace. 
It seeks to establish the limits, determinants and autonomy which 
operate within and upon workplace organisation in a struggle for 
power over a key issue. The primary concern is to establish ho~ in 
particular historical moment~workplace organisations have developed 
in the particular ways in which they have and how it is that they 
function as they do. Central to this approach lies an examination 
of what accounts for the strength and weaknesses of workplace 
organisation, and to what extent institutional inter union conflicts, 
political divisions, skilled categories, and sectional interests 
act/to strengthen or weaken the basis of collective activity organised 
at workplace level. What in other words are the inherent strengths 
and weaknesses for workplace organisation in a period of redundancy 
and recession? 
The study is essentially based upon an empirical investigation of 
how redundancy and workplace organisation have developed in the motor 
industry. The approach adopted towards the search for source material 
has been one of seeking to gain access to the widest possible available 
material from the State, the employers, trade unions and workplace 
organisations. Where access was not permitted, or where time prevents 
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a more thorough examination, a greater reliance has been placed upon 
secondary source material. A full bibliography of primary sources 
is available at the end of the text, but it is perhaps sufficient to 
make a few conunents on the nature of the sources and how these have 
shaped the substantial part of the study. The most important source 
material on redundancy policy and the grievances which arose surrounding 
redundancy, for example, when they were put into the Procedure for 
Avoiding Disputes-were obtained from the EEF. Full access was 
granted for source material up to 1965. At local level the EEA 
at Coventry provided access to documents and reports which covered 
mainly the 1940's, the early 1950's and selected material in the 
1960's. No material was used from the Birmingham and Wolverhampton 
EEA; however, certain relevant correspondents and reports were 
available in the records at Broadway House. 
In regard to trade union sources at National leve~access was granted 
by the TGWU to their GEC minutes for the whole period up to 1970. 
The AEU EC, however, provided only access to their half-yearly 
reports and the unions monthly journal at Peckham, though some NC 
conference reports were available. The NUVB EC minutes for the peried 
1945 until 1966 and some of the records of the CSEU were the other 
main sources for material used in the study. The NUVB minutes were 
at Transport House in Londen while the CSEU records were from the 
deposit in the Modern Records Centre at Warwick University. At 
local level,the most comprehensive trade union records were provided 
by the coventry AEU DC minutes, the NUVB BC, and the SMW BC minutes. 
These were available for most of the post war period. The inter war 
period, however, has relied mostly upon the AEU DO's monthly reports. 
From Oxford the only union material came from the AEU DC records, 
while in Birmingham the AEU were the only local minutes available 
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and these were only selections which appeared in the Dick Etheridge 
Papers. 
At workplace level,the two most important finds were the Les Gurl 
papers and the Dick Etheridge papers which the author arranged 
for deposit at the Modern Records Centre at Warwick University. 
Both provide valuable information on the history of the BMC combine 
committee, while the Etheridge collection contains considerable 
material on workplace relations at the Austin works in Longbridge, 
including shop steward minutes and correspondence. Data and strikes, 
redundancy, manpower and unemployment was obtained centrally from 
the Department of Employment at Watford and Central London, and 
locally from the Regional office in Birmingham and the local office 
in coventry. Documentary sources, particularly covering the second 
world war period, were acquired from the Public Record Office at 
Kew. The study has also relied upon a wide variety of national, 
local and workplace newspapers, while the data for wage rates carne 
from the minutes of the Coventry Toolroom Agreement which covered 
the period 1942-1969. Documentary sources, however, have been 
supplemented by a series of interviews with prominent senior stewards 
in the motor industry, a list of which appears at the end. 
The study proceeds in Part 2 and 3 with an examination of the 
developmen t of the early motor industry up to 1939. Part 2 seeks 
to emphasise the distinctive technological character and geographical 
location of the industry and its general separation from the main 
locations of the established engineering trade union traditions in 
Britain. In Part 3, the inter war labour market and the workplace 
managerial philosophies of Austin and Morris are explored in relation 
to the weak position of organised labour and the particular nature of 
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workplace conflict in conditions of irregular employment. The 
weaknesses of union organisations, the virtual absence of a shop 
floor organisation, in a period when the industry is undergoing a 
substantial transformation/are explored in terms of the particular 
character of power conflict at the point of production. 
Part 4 deals somewhat briefly with the wartime experience, when the 
motor industry is used for the production of munitions. Under the 
influence of the State in industrial relations&workPlace organisation, 
union memberships rapidly expand in conditions of co-operation 
and commitment by the emerging workplace organisation,despite the 
reluctance on the part of the employers. This experience establishes 
the role of a constitutionally based shop stewards movement which 
becomes increasingly involved with the joint management of production 
questions. It is towards the end of the war period that sees the 
* exte~~ion of this involvement into the administration of redundancy. 
Part 5 examines the power struggles in the early post war period 
when employers seek to regain their traditional authority over the 
workplace, while the workplace organisation attemp~ to defend their 
acquired positions in industry in generally favourable trading 
conditions. Part 6 examines the increasing tendency for managements 
in the industry to dismiss shop stewards through redundancy and 
how an~tomised workforce responds to such a challenge. In part 7 
the study examines the emergence of the s~lggle for the control 
over redundancy as being a critical question in the defence of 
workplace organisation. The section examines the transformations 
of isolated workplace opposition and the absence of a unified trade 
union leadership and policy with the attempts to create a unified 
workplace organisation both within firms and across the industry. 
It is from within such a development that the influence of the 
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political workplace leadership of the combine committees seek to 
overcome the problem of unity and the question of redundancy. 
Part 8 deals with how,out of two major confrontations in 1956 
over the question of redundancy and the fear of automation, the 
influence of the combine committees and the changing balance of 
power among the national union leaderships sees a rapid growth 
in union membership and workplace conflict. This part analyses the 
transformation in managerial strategy towards workplace organisation 
in a period of rising workplace conflict and recession. 
The study concludes with an attempt to locate its prinCiple findings 
within a contemporary debate about workplace organisation and calls 
for more focus to be placed upon the construction of models of 
industrial relations in which the concept of power becomes a more 
central consideration. 
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PART 2 
THE BRITISH MOTOR INDUSTRY AND 
WAGE LABOUR IN THE FORMATIVE PERIOD 
106 
Abstract 
Part two provides a brief introduction to the emergence of the 
motor industry in Britain. It emphasises the distinctiveness of 
the industry, not just in terms of pioneering new technologies, 
, 
pay systems, and work methods, but also in its application of the 
interchangeable principle of mass assembly, through which the 
industry developed, largely outside the established structure, 
organisation, und manufacturing methods, upon which Brit.ish (,1l(Jim'C'riIlCJ 
had been established, and from which the Engineering Employers 
Federation based their policy for workplace control. This account 
suggest.s that the particular multitude of small, heterogeneous 
manufacturing concerns, which formed the industrial infra-structure 
of the West Midlands,were not only geographically isolated from 
the indigenous centres of the craft traditions in engineering, but 
that the formation of the motor industry in distric$possessing 
a strong pre-industrial heritag~where labour relations policies 
were characterised by traditions of employer paternalism and labour 
collaboration, gave way, with the rapid growth of large plants, 
to mass trade unionism. It was largely the presence of the motor 
industry, with its utilisation of its work methods, during the 
first world war, which began the transformation in the collective 
power of wage labour in the region. 
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1 THE ORIGINS OF THE BRITISH MOTOR INDUSTRY 
The origin of the British car industry lay outside the prevailing 
traditions of British engineering. The ownership and organisation 
of the industry, the form of technology, the location of assembly 
plants and the use of component supplies were at variance with the 
established character of 19th Century engineering which had been 
based around capital goods and heavy machine tools. The motor 
industry emerged as the outcome of a British application to, 
initially, European inventions and the adoption of American technology. 
The Engineering Tradition 
Few of the British pioneers in the motor industry were drawn from 
the engineering industry. Government producers excepted, no sector 
of established engineering was attracted to the production of cars. l 
The industry arose out of a-series of manufacturing techniques 
associated with products which were alien to British manufacturing. 2 
The Midlands, where the main parts of the motor industry became based, 
had far from completely been transformed by the first phase of the 
industrial revolution. Unlike Glasgow, Newcastle, Liverpoo~ 
Manchester, Bristol or London/it did not possess ready access to sea 
transportation. Despite a canal network/the Midlands largely had to 
await the railways, and later the combustion engine itself, to 
3 
overcome its geographical disadvantages. Its industry was organised 
into a multitude of small independent producers in the brass, screw, 
nut and bolt, tube, and iron and steel trades. 4 These industries 
could relatively easily adapt to the manufacture of standardised parts 
b . 5 upon a mass as~s. 
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Nineteenth Century engineering, had been built around the manufacture 
of textile machinery, steam engines, locomotives, ship building and 
marine engineering, as well as heavy and general engineering 
products. 6 It had co~s~~~e~_ of considerable numbers of small firms 
engaged in the production of a wide range of designs for individual 
7 products. The very heterogeneity of the export market for capital 
goods and the highly differentiated features associated with small 
firm manufacture/discouraged movements towards more homogeneous 
forms of design and manufacturing teChniques. 8 Many of these firms 
produced their own machine tools, as well as spares and replacements 
. d 9 when requ~re . consequently there was little opportunity for large 
batch production and economies of scale in manufacture. The emphasis 
was upon individual products c and technical perfection, there was 
a general absence in the production for stock or a spares market. 
As a result, large sections of British engineering were particularly 
slow and ill placed to move~towards standardisation in products and 
10 
specialisation in manufacturing methods. This encouraged a 
conservatism in manufacture and a resistence towards innovation, 
which reinforced a dependence upon the craft tradition and the all 
round abilities of a highly skilled workforce. ll 
The New Industries 
The motor industry grew from a different engineering tradition 
to that found in heavy or general engineering. It originated from 
the technologies of the new industries developed after the 1880s 
and owed much to American influence. l2 Specialisation was 
increasingly to be part of the process of production rather than 
13 just a feature of the actual product. Through a technological 
convergence resulting in the application of similar methods of 
production, a mass production industry arose based upon the 
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manufacture of interchangeable parts. This enabled a considerable 
degree of specialisation and repetition to take place in the 
production of parts for later assembly. The production of small 
arms, sewing machines, bicycles, and later, motor vehicles and ae~o 
engines all emerged, applying engineering principles largely 
d f th d ' t ' , d" 14 divorce rom e Om1nan eng~neer~ng tra ~t~on. 
Under the umbrella of large government contracts for small arms/ 
sufficient market security was created to encourage the Birmingham 
Small Arms Company to invest in light and medium weight specialist 
machine tools for the production of rifles on the interchangeable 
i 'l 15 pr nc~p e. 
16 
methods. 
Small arms manufacture was at the forefront of new 
Improvements in strength, lightness and resilience of 
stee1,improved accuracy and reliability in components and expanded 
, d 17 the machine tool ~n ustry. The manufacture of specialist machines 
capable of being applied to a relatively small number of precise 
operations in turning, boring, drilling, milling, planning, grinding 
and polishing, reduced the skills required of operators. Stratas 
of semi skilled labour were employed, skilled in limited repetitive 
operations. A workforce emerged/largely isolated from the craft 
customs of traditional areas of engineering. The cycle boom of 
the l880s andear~y 1890s attracted large amounts of capital,., 
resulted in heav1 investment in modern machine tools and enlisted 
the widespread use of cheap, unskilled labour. l8 The highly 
competitive nature of the industry, and the seasonal demand for 
cycles, created a sharpness in enterprise which facilitated the 
adoption of modern techniques, the employment of female labour and 
19 the extensive practice of pieceworking and shift work. 
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The expansion of the machine tool industry in the West Midlands 
contrasted with the more traditional engineering regions. Based 
in large firms, adopting American methods, producing for a market 
rather than individual customer preferences, it emerged as the 
distiller of new methods to light engineering and component 
20 
manufacturers. 
h ' 1 21 mac ~ne too s. 
The cycle boom increased demand for specialist 
The conglomeration of small firms in the West 
22 Midlands quickly adjusted to the production of cycle components. 
Independent producers specialising in springs, hubs, chains, saddles, 
frames etc., created an infrastructure of interdependent firms who 
individually were able to p~rsue technical and production refinements 
for each component, in addition to spreading the liability of risk 
capital, likely to be involved in the production of all components 
in the assembly of the completed cycle. 
,. 
The cycle industry created the embryo of the future motor industry 
the assembly of bought-in parts produced by specialist component 
manufacturers on the interchangeable principle. 23 Manufacturers'of 
sewing machines and small arms began to manufacture and assemble 
cycles. The ease of entering the market and the promise of high 
profits attracted new manufactu~aswith commercial rather than 
24 
engineering backgrounds. The collapse of the cycle boom, the 
large number of contraptions, and the seasonal basis of demand for 
cycles were the underlying causes of unemployment and worker 
insocllrity.25 The more successful cycle manufacturers sought other 
industrial outlets to offset the volatile market for cycles. The 
majority of them moved into the production of cars/the development 
26 
of 'Ilhich coincided with the saturation of the cycle market. 
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The Early Motor Industrj 
The early development of the combustion engine took place in 
27 Germany and France. The first car made in Britain was German, 
the Daimler, built under licence. 28 F W Lanchester and Herbert Austin 
are credited as being the earliest British pioneers of the motor 
industry producing their first cars in 1896. 29 During the experimental 
/ 
stage up to 19l~over 198 makes of car appeared, more than half of 
1 f 't 30 which quick y went out 0 ex~s ence. The industry nevertheless had 
become the fastest growing sector of the British economy with 65 
firms being engaged in car production between 1907 and 1912. 31 By 
1913 nearly 100,000 workers were being employed/while the leading 
32 
companies were amongst the largest employers of labour. Many of 
the more successful manufactuerers had previously been cycle makers, 
but a considerable number of firms entered the industry without 
f ' " ,33 previous manu actur~ng or eng~neer~ng exper~ence. 
The early pioneers and inventors were drawn from wide and diverse 
backgrounds including scientists, mechanics, civil engineers. Only 
two engineering firms took an interest in the early car industry 
and significantly both of these were in the armaments industry. 
/ 
Vickers Maxim having a holding in Wolsely, and Armstrong Whitworths 
held an interest in Armstrong-Siddeley. Both were attracted by 
f 'l't h' 1 34 potential contracts or m~ ~ ary ve ~c es. B S A eventually 
35 
added Daimler to its small arms trade. The industry invested 
heavily in modern machine tools towards 1914 and progressively 
distanced itself from the rest of British industry by its adoption 
36 
of modern methods of manufacture. Despite these advances the 
British industry remained behind the progress in the United States. 
Before the McKenna Duties introduced in 1915, restricting car 
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imports, British cars were even struggling to compete in the 
37 domestic market. 
Despite a commitment to high investment and new technology among 
the leading firms, the proliferation in models, the limited market, 
and emphasis upon individuality, particularly in coachwork, 
38 
restricted the movement towards batch production. While the cycle 
industry had provided the base for the formation of a components 
industry, with the exception of major items like radiators, 
carburettors, wheels, and engines, car makers were having to 
39 produce a considerable number of their own components. As a result 
the cars tended to be expensive, less able to take advantage in 
economi~s of scale and still relied upon large amounts of hand 
finishing despite the use of machine tools. 40 At Wolsely and Sunbeam, 
where the most modern methods were established prior to the first 
world war,specialisation in labour skills was beginning to become 
f ' d 41 re ~ne • The employment of labour in gangs,with each member 
becoming skilled in a particular limited task,reduced the 
dependence upon craft labour and prompted the use of semi-skilled 
labour. 42 At Austin the shortage of skilled labour on the rural site 
at Longbridge was both a spur to utilising new labour saving 
43 
machinery and to the extensive use of semi-skilled labour. 
During the three years before the first world war, the leading car 
makers were emerging from the period when the mechanic as opposed 
to the engineer had the decisive say in production matters. 44 The 
emphasis upon excessive techhical perfection and individuality in 
manufacture was becoming increasingly uneconomic. A movement 
towards small batch production enabled a degree of planning in 
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design and production. Materials could be ordered in advance, 
parts produced for stock. Series output/replacing tailored 
45 
manufacture,enabled more repetition in working methods. The 
advanced sections of the industry stood at the brink of the yearly 
model, the pre-conditions for planned production. 46 The emphasis 
was moving towards the organisation of manufacture. Standardisation 
and the use of specialist machine tools following high investment, 
facilitated the recruitment of semi-skilled labour and reduced a 
dependence upon a short supply of skilled workers. 47 
The experience of the war period when private car assembly halted, 
with the car makers being transformed into producers of munitions, 
dramatically expanded production capacity and compelled a change 
in factory organisation. 48 The volume of orders placed for shells, 
guns, aeroplane engines, military vehicles and other equipment 
required the maximum utilisation of plant and machinery, focused 
attention upon working methods, and required high levels of 
49 
accuracy and quality in standardised parts. The outcome of these 
changes enabled the industry to reduce its dependence upon craft 
workers by enlisting the wholesale employment of lesser skilled 
workers, of whom a considerable proportion were women. The 
knowledge gained through war production prepared the industry for 
inter-war reorganisation for volume production based upon flow and 
hn ' SO mass production tec ~ques. 
In 1919, the beginnings of a post-war boom hit the car industry. 
Car manufactuers adjusted back to production for the private 
market. The pent up demand for vehicles/owing to the abandonment 
of car manufacture during the wa~ attracted 40 new producers to 
th "d t 51 e l.n us rye 
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Between 1921 and 1925 an additional 46 car makers 
entered into production. 52 Output in the motor industry continued 
to increase throughout the 1920s and 1930s. The industry was 
not hit by the same degree of severity of world recession/unlike 
many of the staple sectors of the domestic economy or foreign 
car companies. 53 While car production grew, competition among 
producers intensified. A sharp decline in car prices focused 
54 
attention upon methods of manufacture. The control of the industry 
changed away from a large number of small, or medium, independent 
producers towards a small number of large multi plant organisations. 
In 1920 89 firms were manufacturing cars but in 1938 this was down 
to 33. 55 Three quarters of all domestic production in 1929 was 
produced by Morris, Austin and Singer. By 193~90% of the market 
lay in the hands of the 'Big Six' companies. 56 Four of the six were 
British owned; Morris, ~ustin, Standard, and Rootes. The remaining 
two, Ford and vauxhall, were American controlled. Four fifths of 
the remaining 10% of the market lay in the hands of Rover, Singer, 
57 B S A and Jaguar. Two important British Empires formed in the 
industry during the inter war period. Morris acquired Hollick and 
Pratt, Osberton Radiators, Wolsely Motors, S U Carburettor, and 
"I 58 Rl. eYe He had a large financial stake in Pressed Steel, the body 
59 
making plant. The Morris organisation, accumulating during the 
1920s,was followed in the 1930s by the growth of Rootes. This 
became established through the acquisition of Humber, Hillman, 
60 Clement-Talbot, Sunbeam, and British Light Steel Pressings. 
Although the West Midlands remained the home of the industry 
expansion took place in Oxford in the 19205, and in London with 
the opening of the For~ ~ Plant at Dagenharn in 1932. vauxhall expanded 
in Luton in 1931. 61 
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The concentration of the industry, the high levels of investment 
and the severe competition and price cutting, placed a premium upon 
the organisation of work. Emphasis, arising from a war time 
experience of mass production, was moving towards the organisation 
of manufacture. The logic of an assembly line was superceding 
the engineering tradition of workers being divided up into shops 
based upon particular trades. 62 The use of metal materials replacing 
wood in coach work" began to free the industry from a dependence 
upon coach builders'traditional methods and skills. 63 Pressed steel 
frames and bodies transformed sheet metal working skills. The war 
time development of employing highly skilled operators to work in 
too1rooms and on operations for setting jigs, fixtures and 
specialised machine tools,continued. 64 
For the leading firms the late 19205 and 1930s became the era of 
,. 
the production engineer, as mass production and flow production 
techniques merged with capital investment in technology and factory 
organisation. 65 Detailed production programmes were devised to 
extract the optimum utlilisation of new machinery for semi-skilled 
66 labour. Investment in high technology, combined with a detailed 
division of repetitive work tasks, became the basis for factory 
reorganisation. 67 The spread of specialisation in working methods 
and standardisation in product design were the means for reducing 
production costs and cutting price. In difficult trading pp.riods 
reduction in wage rates were not uncommon sources of economy. 
During the inter war period,the British motor industry increasingly 
adopted the features of American methods, though without the same 
68 level of success. Morris, perhaps the most successful of the 
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British owned firms, changed from being essentially an assembler of 
other manufacturers components into a major component manufacturer 
. . h 69 H with~n his own r~g t. e saw economy not so much in saving,but in 
expenditure on new models, modern equipment, and rigorous planning 
of production. His knowledge of the cycle industry component 
suppliers, and experience in assembly of mine sinkers for the 
admiralty, plus visits to American car plants convinced him of tl1e 
affect of reduced costs if the car assembler insisted upon modern 
production methods, not just in his own plant but in component 
k h ' 70 supplies who undertoo ~s contracts. In 1923/over 200 firms were 
directly linked to Morris production under the special relationship 
whereby Morris personally dictated quality, materials and working methods. 
Where, as with the Hotchkiss engine plant in Coventry, the company 
refused to comply with Morris methods,he bought them out, renamed 
the factory Morris Engines and replanned the factory along his own 
lines. 7l The plant became a pioneer of flow line production and modern 
machine methods, a model of American production technology in 
i ' 72 Br ta~n. The building of the Pressed Steel Works in Oxford further 
demonstrated Morris's willingness to involve high risk capital in 
the pursuit of modern technology for the purpose of mass production 
and reduced costs. The organisation grew from 2 firms in 19l~ to 
10 separate businesses and 2 subsidiaries by 1930. 73 
As car industry empires became established,employment in the industry 
and the size of plants grew. A larger proportion of the market 
fell into fewer hands. This domination in the assembly of cars 
for volume production/promoted high levels of investment in flow 
line techniques of mass production. It initiated an intensity of 
repetition in working methods, a finer division of labour, and a 
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reduction in the proportion of craft workers employed. This 
tendency towards centralisation and domination in the industry 
encouraged the employment in the modern plants of large numbers 
of workers who were increasingly semi-skilled and non-unionised. 
These developments in motor manufacturing provided opportunities 
for the mass recruitment of workforces into trade unions and a 
source for the establishment of organised trade union power in the 
industry. Mass production technology, however, also provided the 
employer with more choice for the location of the new mass assembly 
plants. Of the American companies in Britain, Ford moved from 
Manchester to Dagenham, in 1932, while General Motors became the 
largest single employer in Luton. a Wolverhampton declined as centre 
for car production. The main British companies, Austin, Morris, 
Rootes, in addition to some of the more important smaller concerns, 
standard, Armstrong-Siddeley, Jaguar, Rover, Alvis, Riley, and 
Daimler, centred around Coventry, Birmingham, and Oxford. These 
districts were not only without ninet~enth century experiences 
of large scale factory employment, but until the development of the 
motor car, they were also areas without significant historical ties 
with trade unionism. 
These rapid change~ in an industry prone to intense competition 
in the product market, and subject to considerable financial insecurity 
resulting in investment being largely internally generated, were 
forces which not only reinforced a managerial intention to exclusively 
exercise power and authority in its own workplace, but combined with 
an economy of mass unemployment, and in an industry of seasonal 
working, provided an opportunity for labour relations policies, 
hostile to workplace trade unionism. In the formative period of 
rapid industrial change, an employer strategy in labour relations 
118 
based upon employer paternalism and the prospect of high individual 
earnings, through the exhaustion of pieceworking, resulted in the 
exercise of power in the workplace being expressed through a series 
of crisis based challenges to the exercise of managerial control. 
Job dependence for the car worker, in conditions of severe job 
insecurity, saw the exercise of shop floor power being expressed 
both in independence of management authority and removed from the 
organisational influence of union organisations. The pattern of 
worker insecurity in the labour market combined with employer 
opposition and wage policies, discouraged the developments in 
workplace organisation among the growing numbers of semi-skilled 
workers until after 1934, but it did not remove conflict from the 
workplace. 
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2 WORKPLACE INDEPENDENCE: THE QUEsrION OF RECOGNITION 
Under the 1898 'Terms of Settlement! the Federated Engineering 
Employers formally rejected the traditional control of craft trade 
unionism in the workplace. The Employers 
"would admit no interference with the management of their 
business, and reserve to themselves the right to introduce 
into any federated workshop, at the option of the employer 
concerned, any condition of labour under which any member 
of the trade unions •••• were working at the commencement 
of the dispute". 74 
They reserved the right to employ non union labour, extend piecework 
to all member firms and their employees regardless of union 
applications, present guidelines fo r the operation of overtime 
working and state the right to set wage rates that were mutually 
acceptable to their members. The employers claimed discretion in 
the training and selectfon of employees and the removal of limits 
over apprentices. The 'terms' were a statement of managerial rights 
to control their own establishments in contradiction to the craft 
ethics of unilateral worker control in the workplace. 
Disagreements arising in the workplace were to be dealt with in a 
procedure for the grievance of disputes. This granted a ~~S of 
trade union recognition whereby shop floor grievances could be 
taken up by local trade union officials and representatives of 
employers associations, trade union recognition and bargaining 
rights being the basis for a resolution of issues, pending which, 
75 
no stoppage of work was to take place. In 19l~the York Memorandum 
provided that settlements shouldias far as possible, take place in 
the workS between the management and the worker directly concerned. 
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In the event of a failure to settle management would 
"accept deputations of workmen who may be accompanied by 
their organising district delegate". 76 
Before the Shop Stewards and Works Committees agreements of 1917 
and 191~ no official role was allocated to shop stewards in the 
conduct of industrial relations, other than the rather vague 
references to "deputations of workmen". The operation of the 
provisions for avoiding disputes was essentially a procedure 
endorsing the recognition of local and national trade union 
officials in grievance settlement and collective bargaining, in 
return for an undertaking not to resort to industrial action. 
During the first World War, however, the Ministry of Munitions 
in an attempt to gain workshop co-operation in a speedy application 
of dilution, recommended employers to request the appointment of 
a deputation of workmen, who together with their local trade union 
representatives, if so required, could meet with management and be 
informed of changes to be introduced. While the details of these 
recommendations provided for an element of consultation, it offered 
77 
no clarity surrounding the role of Shop Committees or Shop Stewards. 
In instances, special clauses were written into dilution schemes 
·...rhich made reference to "Shop Coounittees of Workers" 78 but in the 
main, shop steward organisation was not identified nor the activities 
of stewards mentioned, despite their increasing presence and 
involvement in workplace affairs. De facto rights were gained for 
stewards, but without specified rights, the limits and scope of 
recognition remained undefined. A lack of uniformity across 
engineering prevailed in the workplace,while disputes arose where 
shop stewards claimed responsibility and rights beyond those conceded 
79 
by employers. 
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In Coventr~ in 19l~ the question of shop steward recognition 
became the focal point of a strike. As a result the trade unions and 
.~.rnployers undertook to consider the whole question of shop steward 
. lb' 80 recognition on a nat~ona as~s. The A S E and two smaller unions 
refused to sign the agreement on grounds that recognition remained 
inadequate. In May 191~ a Shop Stewards agreement was eventually 
signed which became incorporated into the 1922 Managerial Functions 
Agreements. This provided for recognition of shop stewards and the 
creation of works committees within the prOVision for avoiding 
81 disputes. 
These agreements replaced the ad hoc method which had developed 
before the war and which in some instances had been considerably, 
though unevenly, developed by shop stewards and their committees 
between 1914 and 1918. The agreements/aiming at uniformity were 
providing rights of recognicion for stewards within the procedure~ 
but did so upon a more restrictive basis than had been gained 
through the largely unclear ad hoc developments. The Members of 
a union who were party to the agreements were entitled to elect shop 
stewards, and the trade union organisation would officially inform 
the local management. A Works Committee could be formed compriSing 
of seven management representatives, and seven shop stewards directly 
elected from the shop floor. It had powers to coopt other stewards 
where issues from an unrepresented department were in question. 
A worker with a grievance,which he failed to resolve directly with 
his foreman,could have his case taken up by a shop steward. This 
provided the steward with a legitimate position within the industrial 
relations framework of the firm,while the union issuing his credentials 
ascribed his acceptance within union rules and policy making. 82 
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Recognition of shop stewar~clarified their role, but confined their 
activity within agreed institutional limits determined by both 
employers and trade union leaders. It effectively sought to 
prescribe the power of the independent self governing bod~ which had 
operated outside formally fixed limits during the first world war, 
where legitimacy came from the shop floor and where acceptance arose 
from an appreciation of their influence among shop floor workers. 
Recognition enhancing the role of the shop steward in the 
institutional arrangements of industrial relations, curtailed the 
acceptance of his independent forms of organisation. The Works 
Committee were joint management-union bodies with shop steward 
representation restricted to seven members. There was no role for 
the shop committees or for senior and leading stewards of individual 
unions who did not become elected to the Works Committees. 83 There 
was no position for conv#nor or Joint Shop Stewards Committee. A 
shop stewards movemen~ formed through links between workshop committees, 
would continue to remain outside the channels of collective bargaining 
relationships with management and beyond the rule books of trade 
union organisation. 
The extension of institutional arrangements between 1898 and 1922 
in the Procedure for avoiding disputes in the engineering industry, 
to involve shop stewards in the settlement of workplace issue~ had 
partly been designed to avoid conflict in tile workplace but also to 
cQotain the growing position of power which the war time shop stewards 
movement in engineering had acquired. In particular, its capacity to 
act independently of the influence of Government, Unions, and Employers. 
During the inter war period, however, the conditions upon which 
organised workplace power had been established largely disintegrated, 
due to the general weakness of wage labour in a period of high 
123 
unemployment. Furthermore, the growing opposition of employers to 
trade unionism, and more especially the important national defeats 
of trade union organisations in conflicts with employers, led through 
the exercise of management policies in the workplace to a steep 
decline in workplace representation. Although the use of 
institutional arrangements to control workplace power declined, the 
basis of the antagonism between employer and worker interests did 
not diminish. In the growing motor industry/power conflict within 
the interdependence of employer and worker relationships developed 
outside a framework of institutional constraints. 
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3 ORGANISED WAGE LABOUR AND THE MOTOR INDUSTRY 
Trade Union organisation in the motor industry grew out of the 
conditions associated with the fairly rapid development of modern 
industry in the West Midlands after 1880. In the exp~lsion of the 
new industries in this region, the form of technology,rather than 
the all-round skills of the craftsmen gave engineering labour its , 
distinctive appearance. By the 1920s,following the experience of 
war productions, it was the combined application of technology and 
production management within a sharply competitive product market, 
which gave shape to the labour relations strategies adopted by 
the motor industry employers. The organisation of labour~consequently , 
owed less to the predominance of a craft tradition than was perhaps 
the case in regions of earlier industrialisation. Workplace 
relations emerged as much .s a response to overt managerial contro~ 
presupposed by the adoption of largely American production method~ 
than to the independence of worker power associated with the 
craft tradition. A permanency in workplace organisation remained 
severely impaired by seasonal employment and recurring redundancy 
in the labour market. Until the advent of the second world war , 
organisations in the workplace tended to be spontaneous rather than 
continuous, involving non-unionists as much as trade unionists. 
Among the mass car producers, the shop floor, with a few notable 
exceptions, was less tied to the preservation of a craft tradition 
than with the problem of exacting representation in an industry 
whose growth involved considerable increases in the intensity of 
labour without effectively creating stability of employment or 
I 
earnings. 
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The rapid spread of trade unionism among lesser skilled workers 
before 1914 had signalled the end of an era of trade unionism 
almost wholly dominated by skilled workers. 84 General unions sprang 
up which nominally at least, aspired to organise the mass of 
, 
workers whose potential for creating an organised scarcity was 
85 
considerably more restricted than their skilled counterparts. 
These so-called 'new unions' necessarily had to develop a more open 
policy to organise wholesale among a constant glut of surplus 
labour which if left unorganised continuously threatened to under-
I I 
mine even minimum standards established where unionisation formed. 86 
Given the market conditions for the labour they sought to organise, 
and the initial socialist objectives of many of their founders, 
new unionism introduced different methods of trade unionism to 
hitherto largely unrepresentative labour. These features were/in 
the main/outside the e:~riences of the established traditions of 
the craft societies. 
A rapid revival in trade during the 1880s,was followed by a number 
of spectacular strikes, among which, the most prominent were the 
Match Girls strike of 1888 and the London Dock strike of 1889. 
These events heralded the movement of mass organisation among 
sections of unskilled workers. 87 Union militancy was expressed in 
the conception of a 'fighting union' gea=ed to improvements til rough 
industrial action with less reliunce upon being a benefits 
88 
organisation. Popularly presented as class unionism, they opposed 
the sectionalism which typified the craft societies. 89 They organised 
upon industrial lines,while some attempted to develop general labour 
unions to embrace all classes of labour regardless of skill. 90 Work 
groups not possessing a premium upon skill, were easily replaceable 
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from the ranks of the unskilled. Trade Unions not only aspired to 
organise locally but also nationally.9l They had frequent recourse 
to picketing, pressure used for closed shops and opposition to the use 
of 'black leg' labour. Public confrontation with unorganised 
workers and the police, was more clearly identified with the 
emergence of new unionism than had been the case with the craft 
. 92 
un~ons. 
Many of these early confrontations gave way to more modest objectives 
because seasonal employment, unemployment, employer opposition and 
the pressure to preserve and maintain a stable continuous organisation 
during depressions in trade, gave way to the needs of organisational 
survival. 93 Sharp fluctuations in membership over relatively short 
periods became a distinguishing feature in the early development of 
new unionism. 
The expansion of the light engineering industries across the West 
Midlands, based upon repetitive production techniques and the 
utilisation of modern specialist machine tools, provided a relatively 
regular source of factory employment requiring only short periods of 
training. The defeat of the A S E in 1897 and the spread of these 
modern techniques,which could be operated by semi skilled rather 
than craft labou~ encouraged sections of the A S E leadership to 
promote trade union organisation among lesser skilled workers. 94 
Industrialisation of the West Midlands grew in areas where trade 
unionism was particularly weak. The establishment of pieceworking 
95 invariably pre dated trade unionism. The very structure of industry 
with its plethora of trades and small scale manufacturers in 
I 
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Birmingham and the Black CountrY, discouraged unionisation among 
workers. The multitude of small workshops, the extensive home working 
and sub contracting in a wide variety of manufacturers, prevented 
clear distinctions between employer and employee during the 
mid-Victorian period. An historian of the period, S Timmiss could 
write of Birmingham: 
"In no town in England is comfort more common, or wealth 
more equally diFfused. If millionaires are few, absolute 
poverty and weakness are also rare". 96 
This structure of small scale industrial ownership and extensive 
division of occupations reduced the full effect of trade depressions 
upon owners and workforces. In 1872 T Baker informed the British 
Medical Associations, 
"The trades of the town are numerous and the subdivision 
of labour are unusually great; hence fluctuations in 
commerce rarely falls heavily upon the entire class of 
artisans and famine is of a very rare occurrance".97 
A skilled artisan in late Victorian Birmingham could set up as a 
98 Master. This absence of a wide social gulf within industry was 
reinforced by employer paternalism and worker co-operation. The 
distinctive political character of local government was strongly 
tied to the identity of local industry. In politics as in industry, 
class co-operation became fused with non-conformist values of self 
help, perseverance, and independence. Quakers and Unitarians held 
99 positions of prominence in both business and local government. 
This character of industrial and political independence rose to 
confront the national domination of northern industrialists over 
economic policy, towards the end of the 19th century. The Manchester 
School of Free Trade became challenged by the Midland desire for 
100 trade protection and tariff reform. 
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The early labour movement in Birmingham was not immune either from 
these social and political forces, or the structure of the City's 
industry. In 1884, eighteen years after the formation of the 
Birmingham Trades Council, its affiliated membership comprised a 
mass of trade organisations, each with small memberships. The 
Annual Report reveals a paid-up membership of 3,387 drawn from 22 
organisations. These included, Bakers, Bone and Ivory workers, 
Boot Finishers, Brush Makers, Coach and Iron Workers, Electric 
Platers, Glass Cutters, Glass Makers, Home Painters, Iron Plate 
Workers, Lithographic Machine Toolmakers, Nail Cutters, Packing 
Case Makers, Plumbers, Printers, Railway Servants, Scale Makers, 
Saddlers, Tailors, Wire Weavers, Coopers, and Tin Plate Workers. 
The Tin Plate Workers were the largest affiliated union, with only 
101 360 members. 
Industrialisation in the West Midlands increased the number of 
trades and their organisations. By 1889, 34 trade unions had 
affiliated to the Trades Council, two years later this had leaffto 
52. A general revival in trade and the expansion of manufacturing 
industrie~were factors accounting for the potential of trade union 
organisation. Despite the Citys period of prosperity,the policies 
of the labour movement were characteristically cautious and 
colaborative with the small scale employers. The Trade Council 
Annual Report for 1889 recognises the value of trade unionism but 
encourages the. membership not to make high wage demands. 
"While careful to avoid premature or unreasonable demands 
for increased wages, so thereby to hinder the revival of 
trade, it is right and just that wages should be raised 
with the greater prosperity which is now experienced. 
This can only be sufficiently achieved by combination 
among workmen themselves: and in this respect trade 
unionism has proved itself to be the most effective 
means." 102 
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But the weaknesses of organised labour in Birmingham were also 
acknowledged. 
"Its work is only hindered by the holding aloof of large 
numbers of artisans, who persistently isolate themselves 
from their fellows, and thereby weaken the position and 
hinder the progress of themselves and all others employed 
in their respective trades". 103 
During the last decade of the 19th century, the activity of the 
Trades Council remained one of discouraging strikes and seeking a 
continued reconciliation between employer and union in the workplace. 
Industrial disputes were rare, but when they arose/the view of the 
council, expressed in 1891, was, 
"Where these have occurred it has been, as hitherto, the 
policy of the Trades Council to promote agreement between 
employers and employed and in several instances, this 
intervention has been successful, disputes have been 
satisfactorily adjusted, friendly relations restored and 
the thanks of both parties received". 104 
The policy of the Trades Council was to seek to demonstrate that 
trade unionism did not encourage strikes, rather the potential of 
organised labour would be sufficient to achieve improvements without 
the need to resort to industrial action. 
The Trades Unions that did emerge in Birmingham during the last 
quarter of the century,sought policies of industrial conciliation. 
Brass workers had a joint council to resolve differences with 
employers, while tin plate workers stressed.the importance of 
benefits over industrial action. The Bedstead Workmen's Association 
entered into a closed shop arrangement, initiated by the employers, 
to restrict competition in the trade. It was not uncommon for those 
craft societies to form agreed price lists with their employers. 
In 1898, 79 different trade unions were affiliated to the Trades 
council. Despite this growth in organisations,the size of unions 
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remained small and the proportion of workers in unions remained low, 
but the co-operation with employers was generally sustained. Even 
the 1897 Engineering lock-out failed to disturb the climate of 
Birmingham industrial relations. No Birmingham engineering firm 
could be persuaded by the Employers Federation to join the disput~ 
for the fear of such action upon their relationship with their 
105 
workforce. 
In 1898 the Birmingham Trades Council in an oblique reference to 
the lock out could state: 
"There has been an entire absence of any serious labour 
disputes, a spirit of conciliation having prevailed which 
has enabled organised workmen to meet organised employers 
and thus by reasoning and reciprocity, decisions have been 
arrived at which have maintained an honourable peace, 
beneficial to workmen, employers and the community. 
However, what may be said in this respect of Birmingham 
cannot be said for the whole country". 106 
In Birmingham, prior to the 20th century, labour generally remained 
poorly organised. In those skilled trades where trade unionism had 
developed, it possessed the conservative aspects of craft unionism. 
Although industry in Coventry was not as diverse as that found in 
Birmingham, the heritage of silk weaving and watch making displayed 
close associations with the pre~industrial era. 107 Coventry retained 
many of the features of feudal society well into the second half of 
the 19th century. The weaving, and later, watch making industries 
were dominated by small masters. Pre industrial apprenticeship was 
sustained, industrial development in the city was restricted by the 
108 
close relationship of the small masters with the land. They 
had effectively resisted land enclosure until 1860, preserved "rights 
in Common" to the detriment of modern industrial growth within the 
109 
town. 
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Mass production industries spread largely unhindered by a craft 
. 
tradition. As table 2.1 suggests, in Warwickshire and Staffordshire, 
counties which included Coventry, Birmingham and the Black.Country, 
little more than 1 : 5 adult male workers were likely to have been 
members of a trade union in 1892. 
COUNTY 
Staffordshire 
Warwickshire 
oxford 
TABLE 2.1 
DENSITY OF TRADE UNION MEMBERSHIP 
IN THE WEST MIDLANDS 1891-2 
ADULT MALE MEMBERSHIP OF 
WORKERS * TRADE UNIONS 
(OOOs) (OOOs) 
220.7 49.5 
160.3 33.6 
37.6 1.8 
= 
DENSITY 
22.4 
21. 2 
4.7 
* Figure is calculated at 20% of population figures in 1891 census. 
= Drawn from distribution of trade unionists made by S & B Webb. 
See S & B Webb, The History of Trade Unionism, Longmans, 
London, 1920, p 741-2. 
In Oxford, still a predominant rural county, the figure was less 
than 5%. These estimates compare with Table 2.2 for the Northern 
Counties of Northumberland, Durham, Lancashire and the East Riding 
of Yorkshire,where between 40% to 57% male adults could be reckoned 
to be in a trade union. 
TABLE 2.2 
ESTIMATED DENSITY OF TRADE UNION MEMBERSHIP 
IN THE NORTHERN COUNTIES 1891-2 
COUNTY 
Northumberland 
curham 
Lancashire 
Yorkshire, 
West Riding 
ADULT MALE 
WORKERS '" 
(OOOs) 
101,206 
204,878 
791,581 
63,714 
MEMBERSHIP OF 
TRADE UNIONS == 
(OOOs) 
56.8 
114.8 
331.5 
23.6 
DENSITY 
, 
56.4 
55.6 
41.0 
37.5 
* Figure is calculated at 20% of population figures in 1891 census. 
= Drawn from distribution of trade unionist made by S & B Webb. 
See S & B webb, The History of Trade Unionism, Longmans, 
London, 1920, p 7H-2. 
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Table 2.3 which compares trade unionism in urban populations, 
demonstrates tila~with the exception of London, Birmingham remained 
one of the weakest industrial cities in Britain for trade union 
membership. 
TABLE 2.3 
ESTIMATED DENSITY OF TRADE UNION MEMBERSHIP 
IN INDUSTRIAL URBAN TOWNS 
TOWN 
Oldham 
Glasgow 
Newcastle 
Birmingham 
(London 
ADULT MALE 
WORKERS * 
(0005) 
40.2 
65.6 
124.2 
1,103.5 
MEMBERSHIP OF 
TRADE UNIONS 
(OOOs) 
25 
98 
26.5 
26.0 
194 
DENSITY 
% 
62.1 
40.3 
20.9 
17.5 
* Only 20% of the adult male workforce in Birmingham were union 
members, whereas in Oldham and on Tyneside the membership levels 
stood at more than 66% and 40% respectively. 
The weakness of the craft tradition in engineering can be observed 
from Table 2.4 drawn from membership of the A S E in the principle 
areas where the motor industry became centred. 
YEAR 
1859 
1875 
1885 
1898 
1913 
1918 
TABLE 2.4 
TOTAL MEMBERSHIP AND NUMBER OF BRANCHES 
OF THE A S E IN THE WEST AND SOUTH MIDLANDS 
BIRMINGHAM BRANCHES COVENTRY BRANCHES OXFORD 
& DISTRICT 
292 1 0 0 0 
818 4 80 1 14 
1721 8 240 1 17 
2333 13 581 3 23 
4717 20 2577 8 24 
9986 32 4904 15 62 
Source: A S E 
BRANCHES 
0 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
Before 1859 only one branch of the A S E existed in the West Midlands, 
while membership in Oxford remained small even at the end of the first 
world war. For the Midlands it is significant that the growth in 
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engineering craftsmen develops with the expansion of new industries, 
rather than pre dates it. While in Covent~ A S E membership 
largely takes place in the 20th century with the growth of the motor 
industry. In 188~ only 7% of A S E membership were working 
piecework, by 1906 this had reached 32%.110 In 1891 however, already 
44% of A S E members in the West Midlands were p,e<eworkers, while 
in Coventry the figures was 80%.111 The high proportion of engineering 
workers engaged in piecework is indicative of the modernity of West 
Midlands industry and the policies of modern management and the 
mass basis of its component products. The weakness of a craft 
tradition is illustrated in Table 2.5 which shows that two and a 
half times the percentage in general engineering labour were semi 
skilled workers in Coventr~ compared to the national average for 
engineering in 1911. In the other important centres of engineering, 
Skilled and 
Labourers 
Semi skilled 
TABLE 2.5 
COMPOSITION OF LABOUR FORCE IN 
GENERAL ENGINEERING 1911 (PERCENTAGE) 
SHEFFIELD 
84 
16 
GLASGOW 
81 
19 
COVENTRY 
55 
45 
Source: J Hinton 
NATIONAL 
82 
18 
the composition. of the workforce largely expressed the traditional 
polarisation between skilled and unskilled; there the growth of semi 
skilled employment developed mainly through the dilution of craft 
control during the war period. 
The expansion of employment in the new industries, in many instance~ 
took place among workers without previous engineering backgrounds or 
trade union membership. Craft workers were not~dverse to seeking 
112 
semi skilled work during slack periods. Despite the fluctuation in 
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trade and the seasonal basis of much of the employment in the 
manufacture of bicycles and the early motor cars, the semi skilled 
nature of the employment secured an industrial dependence upon 
particular abilities. It was this reliance upon a stratum of semi 
skilled worker~ rather than the regularity of employmen~ which 
provided an industrial identification and continuity which formed 
the potential for trade union recruitment. Employers invariably 
prefftTed workers experienced in the techniques and discipline of the 
industry. The instability in the product market howeve~ which led 
to sharp changes in the demand for labou~ resulted in instability in 
trade union membership. It was the Workers Unio~. formed just after 
the engineering lockout of 1897 by Tom Mann, a leading member of the 
A S E/which attempted to unionise semi skilled workers employed in 
the small arms, cycle and motor industries. 
Before 19l~ membership of the W U in the West Midlands was largely 
erratic. 113 Depression in trade resulted in rapid decline of members 
and closure of branches. In 190~ one-fifth of its total 5,000 
membership was in the Birmingham area, but following an increase 
in unemployment during 1908-9, a third of this membership was lost. 
The W U did begin to pay a range of benefits, though not on the scale 
of the craft unions, in an attempt to increase revenue and encourage 
membership recruitment and stability. Just before the first world 
war. the unions transformed itself into a powerful force for lesser 
i 
skilled workers in the mass engineering industries. A series of 
strikes to gain a guaranteed minimum piecework wage, resulted in 
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a rapid growth in membership across the West Midlands. The 
pursuit of a universal minimum strengthened the appeal of the union 
beyond the traditional confines of sectional interest~typified by 
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craft unions. Organising all grades among ~~e lesser skilled, 
enabled the weaker sections of workers to gain from the actions 
of the strongest. Youths and female labour thus gained from a 
general as opposed to group improvements. 
Guaranteed minimum wages helped to reduce the volatility in piecework 
earnings. This unified strategy among the semi skilled workers in 
the leading Coventry car plants in 19l~ succeeded in establishing 
common minimum levels and overtime rates tied to those paid to craft 
115 
workers. The organised strength of the W U resulted in the local 
employers association granting recognition of the union in its 
Disputes Procedure. A largely successful strike wave across 
Birmingham and the Black CountrY, resulting in the payment of a 
minimum rate produced a massive growth in W U membership. By 1914, 
the W U became the largest union in the modern industries of the 
west Midlands. Its membership had increased from 5,000 to over 
50,000,or more than five times the membership of the A S E. Its 
membership in Coventry stood at 3,000 at the beginning of the first 
world war. This compared with 2,500 in the A S E., 800 in the NUVB, 
400 in the Steam Engine Makers, 590 Brass and Metal Mechanics, 400 
united Machine Workers Association and 400 Birmingham Tinplate and 
k . 116 Sheet Metal Wor ers Un10n. 
It was largely the result of the rapid expansion of engineering 
employment in munitions production and the adoption of the new 
industries, of which the motor industry was the most important, 
during the first world war/which brought about mass trade unionism 
in the west Midlands. Before 1914, despite the active presence of 
the workers Union, trade unionism in Birmingham, Coventry, and 
Wolverhampton was still largely confined to an excessive number of 
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small craft organisations. In 191~ the total trade union membership 
in engineering in those town~numbered just 8,111 or only 4.3% 
h 1 ' 1 ' , d ' mb h' 117 of t e tota nat~ona eng~neer~ng tra e un~on me ers ~p. 
By the end of 1914, the West Midlands accounted for just under one-
third of the total engineering trade union membership. Its total of 
71,842 union members more than doubled by 1917. 118 The vast 
expansion of the plant and technology of the motor industry for 
munitions production, had dramatically increased the importance of the 
new industries, and resulted in considerable increases in union 
membership particularly among the lesser skilled workforces. 
I 
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.PART 3 
UNEMPLOYMENT, THE LABOUR MARKET 
AND WORKPLACE POWER 
138 
Abstract 
Part three provides an account of how, during the inter war depressio~ 
the leading British motor manufacturers pioneered labour relations. 
strategie~with the objective of gaining a managerial compliance 
of individual workers in the work situation. Through policies of 
"open shop" recruitment, and with the application of incentive wage 
policies designed to secure a close identification of the worker to 
the detailed objectives of production management techniques, 
the motor manufacturers, in the main assembly plant~ combined a 
traditional employer paternalism with a promise of relatively high 
wages, in a labour market which held a fear of unemployment. 
The section begins by providing an outline of a volatile labour 
market on the patterns of job insecurity in the motor industry. 
It demonstrates how national defect~ experienced by organised labour 
in 1922 and 192~ had direct· consequences for the dramatic decline 
in trade union membership and the loss of workplace power in the 
West Midland car factories. The final section examines how the 
effects of employer strategy towards workplace relations and the 
consequent demise of organised wage labour, in a highly competitive 
product market, exploded into mass power conflicts between unorganised 
work forces and managements, following attempts to intensify the 
productivity of semi-skilled labour, while seeking a reduction in 
wage rates. In the conditions of the labour market· and through 
labour insecurity in the workplace, a managerial strategy which 
I 
successfully overcome the presence of an organised workplac~ had 
to confront a spontaneous exercise of power by non unionised workforces 
outside the decision making process. When faced with strike 
committees and workplace demands,based upon the direct militancy 
of the shop floo~ the motor manufacturers prefe~d to deal with 
trade union officials within the industrial relations framework 
of the employers federation. 'fhe growth of trade unionism .i n the 
motor industry followed workplace militancy. While union mpmbership 
provided the possibility for continuous organisation, the spontaneous 
nature of workplace conflict sustained a capacity for workplace 
autonomy. Towards the end of the 1930's, particularly in the shadow 
factories built by the motor manufacturers for the product.ion of 
aero-engines, the autonomy of workplace initiatives of shop floor 
organisations co-existed under an umbrella of mass trade union 
organisation. 
140 
1 THE LABOUR MARKET AND EMPLOYER POWER 
The Shop Stewards movement, which had been built up during the first 
world wa~ collapsed dramatically during the early 1920s. The 
recession in the British economy, the employers lockout in 
engineering, and the aftermath of the 1926 General Strike, had a 
demoralising and retarding effect upon workplace organisation. In 
the motor industry, the shop stewards movement,. which had operated 
across the Birmingham and Coventry plants converted to munitions, had 
disintegrated with the re-establishment of vehicle production in the 
inter war period. Trade Union membership/itself, declined in these 
districts, between 1918 and 1934. Output, employment and job dependence 
in motor vehicles expanded but within a framework of a high level 
of job insecurity. This was a combination of a cycle of excessive 
overtime, nightshift working, short-time working, layoff and 
unemployment. As the industry moved towards large scale organisation, 
the domination of the market by fewer companies, the technology, 
working methods and payments system changed. The absence of trade 
unionism was most marked among the semi skilled workers, recruited 
to the new mass production centres of car assembly. A significant 
decline, however, also occurred among workers whose occupations had 
a craft heritage. This erosion of trade union power, and, in many 
instances,a virtual elimination of workplace organisation, enhanced 
formal managerial power and authority but did so upon a basis which 
was to provide the pre conditions for the development of future 
workplace trade unionism. 
Employment in the construction and manufacture of vehicles grew 
throughout the inter war period. In a four year period from 1923 to 
1927, 39,000 new jobs emerged,while in the twelve year period from 
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1 1927 to 1939, the workforce in vehicle construction grew by 220,000. 
Employment in the motor industry virtually doubled during the inter 
war period. Compared to ~~e position in 1923/ a further quarter of 
a million workers were recruited to the industry before the outbreak 
of the second world war. 
Unemployment in the vehicle industry fell during the first half of 
1920. In June of that year it reached just over 3,000 or 1.4% of the 
2 
workforce. This early post war boom quickly began to collapse 
during 1921 and 1922. In Graph 3.1 the monthly recorded figures for 
the percentage unemployed for workers in vehicle construction can be 
seen to rise sharply from mid-1920 until mid-1921. Within 18 
months, unemployment had risen from its lowest point during the whole 
inter war period to its highest recorded level in the 19209, reaching 
a figure of 44,000, or 18% of those employed in the industry by 
December 1921. For the 12 ~onths of 1922, more than one in three of 
the workforce remained unemployed. It was not until the beginning 
of 1923, that the industry's unemployment began to fall below 15%. 
Throughout the 20 year inter war period to 1939; in 90 single months, 
or 37.5% of the time, unemployment among car workers was above 10%. 
During 54 single months it stood above 15% and in only 25 months did 
it fall below 5%,10f these months appeared in a single year, 1920. 
The peak of the inter war unemployment was reached during the first 
half of the 1<)]0!J. Graph 3.2 illustra.tes that, between 1930 and 1932, 
monthly unemployment was above 20%, more than one in five of the 
workforce being unemployed for 14 monthly figures. In the crisis 
year of 1931,unemployment peaked at 60,300, virtually a quarter of 
the workforce. Moreover, throughout the whole period the job 
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dependence of wage labour in the inter war motor industr~ remained 
based upon sharp fluctuations in the product market. Despite the 
overall expansion of this sector of the economy, the position of 
the individual worker was frequently prone to short time working 
and layoff. The manpower policy's practiced by managemen~provided 
no assurances of employment continuity for those in possession of 
a job. Graph 3.3 presents the monthly mean unemployment percentage 
for all workers engaged in vehicle construction between 1920-1939. 
The graph demonstrates the annual tendency for unemployment to rise 
through the mid-summer months from June to September, and decline 
in the period after the new car models had entered into production 
following the London motor show, held in November each year. While 
just under an average of 8% could still remain unemployed in 
November, in July and August the average for the 19 year period 
rose to just under 12%. For those employed in the mass assembly 
plants, this pattern of monthly fluctuations is likely to have been 
even sharper. Employment, particularly for the semi skilled batch 
worker would take on almost a casual dimension. 
I 
The general pattern of development in the industry, however, was 
towards an overall increase in production. Graph 3.4 illustrates 
the tendency of increases in production to be related to an annual 
average per centage fall in the level of unemployment. With the 
exception of 1926, the year of the General Strike, the expansion 
of the industry between 1923 and 192~ correlates with a significant 
fall in the average annual percentage figure for unemployment. The 
much faster growth of production in the industry after 1932, though 
it results in a greater percentage fall in the annual level of 
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unemployment, the rate of production level and percentage 
unemployment between the two periods suggests that the effects of 
reorganisation during the depression, and the fall in the dependence 
of craft labour in mass assembly, was increasing both employment 
and productivity in the industry for wage labour, but without a 
corresponding improvement in employment continuity or job security. 
Table 3.1 reveals that the yearly monthly average for unemployment 
in vehicle construction only falls below 5\ after 1938. 
YEAR 
1920 
1921 
1922 
1923 
1924 
1925 
1926 
1927 
1928 
1929 
TABLE 3.1 
MONTHLY AVERAGE UNEMPLOYED IN 
VEHICLE CONSTRUCTION (1920-1939) 
(PER CENT) YEAR (PER CENT) 
2.8 1930 13 .1 
13 .5 1931 20.5 
16.4 1932 20.5 
10.8 1933 15.8 
8.9 1934 9.9 
7.0 1935 8.5 
9.2 1936 6.1 
7.5 1937 5.0 
7.6 1938 6.9 
6.9 1939 4.3 
Source: D E 
The effect of unemployment and the particular cycle of job insecurity 
experienced by workforces within the motor industr~ may have enhanced 
the potential position of power exercised by employers over wage 
labour. The fear of unemployment may have provided employers 
with opportunities for maintaining labour discipline upon their 
terms in the workplace~uaespite the weaknesses in organised labour, 
these conditions were to prove insufficient grounds whereby employers 
could entirely gain worker compliance. The employer strategy to 
continually increase the productivity and job deprivation of wage 
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labourl through a policy of price cutting and speed up, came under 
severe challenge on a number of occasions. In an industry engaged 
in a ruthless competition in the product market, the practices of 
management in the implementation of these policies began to 
increasingly erode a paternalistic basis of common interest and 
the anti-union basis upon which employer strategy in labour relations 
was based. It was from the particular experiences of unorganised 
action outside the institutional decision making process, that 
gave rise to the form of power exercised by wage labour in this 
formative period. Unemployment, however, was to deal a severe blow 
to workplace recognition, but without entirely diminishing workplace 
independence. It was the pursuit of managerial strategy, within 
the period of transformation in the motor industry which was to 
clarify the independent interest of wage labour. 
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2 UNEMPLOYMENT AND WORKPLACE ORGANISATION 
The high and irregular patterns of unemployment within the motor 
industry between 1921 and 1939, had a considerable bearing upon the 
level of trade unionism and the form of workplace power. The 
weakened position of workforces in the labour market, enhanced the 
potential of management to maximise their interests. For engineering 
workers in general, the sharp increase in unemployment at the beginning 
of the 1920s met with an immediate response on the part of employers. 
In the year prece ';ding the Engineering Employers Lockout, 27 of 
the 56 strikes in engineering arose in opposition to management 
3 
attempts to reduce piecework prices and bonus payments. The 
'Lockout', which lasted 3 months and involved 260,000 workers, 
including car workers from some federated establishments, incurred 
the loss of over thirteen and a half million working days. It 
was followed by a fall in engineering strikes particularly after 
the 1926 General Strike. A revival of strikes did not occur until 
just prior to the second world war. In the motor industry a 
similar decline of conflict emerges. The sharp rise in unemployment 
in the closing weeks of 1920,was met by an immediate response from 
employers. The Coventry District Organiser for the A E U could 
report at the end of 1920 that: 
"For the past 20 years our members have never experienced 
such times. The unemployed have held meetings to solve 
the problem, but the present regime cannot make the state 
of thill<)8 any better. Some are endeavouring to 8UppOr.t 
lmlustrLll unionism". 4 
As the severity of the recession set in, in early February 1921 
the same observer could state: 
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"Men in many factories are working no more than two days 
per week notwithstanding the fact that close on 3,000 
of our members are totally unemployed. These factors are -
to my mind - the reason why employers are having a vamp 
on wages. Their impression must be that the lash of 
hunger will drive our men to work at lower rates".5 
As more than two thirds of the membership of the engineering union 
alone, were unemployed in the second month of 1921, the Coventry 
motor employers used ~~e opportunity to attempt to reduce wage 
levels by attacking piecework prices. Employers argued that they 
could only increase employment through lower wages. Throughout 
1921, in line with a general movement in reductions in wages and 
changes in working conditions across engineering, the Coventry 
employers considerably eroded the influence of trade union 
organisation. The District organiser claimed in his report for 
May, 1921, 
and, 
"The employers are unduly taking advantage of their 
economic power - and make no mistake - they intend to 
lower our standards of living unless we show a bold 
front".6 
" ..... Many firms discharging our members ••• making it 
obvious to me that some employers are paving the way for 
our members to accept withdrawal of Churchill awards 
through semi-starvation".7 
By November 1921,in Coventry/the realisation of this employer 
offensive appeared all but complete. Again the District Organiser 
wrote, 
"The employers as a whole tire taking advantage of their 
economic power and using it with vengeance against us on 
every occasion. Under duress we are having to accept many 
things we would not have given consideration to some twelve 
months ago. It cannot last much longer and it is to be 
expected that our members will not allow the malpractices 
of some employers to slip from their memories when a change 
in conditions does arise". 8 
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The change in conditions/to 1920 levels of 1.4% unemployment did not 
occur until 1941. The 1920s remained a declining defensive struggle 
against the lowering of conditions and changes in working methods. 
Pieceworking systems facilitated the possibility of regular price 
reductions with changes in work content. Between 1921 and 1930, 16 
of the 40 disputes which arose in the vehicle industry were in 
. f' k 9 opposition to lower~ng 0 p~ecewor rates. The seasonal layoff of 
car workers during ~~e period prior to the increased demand for 
cars which followed the annual November motor show, provided ideal 
circumstances for employers to enter into alterations in rates. New 
models, or general changes in models, necessitated changes in work 
content. Negotiation within the plants at the outset of new 
production invariably meant that employers were negotiating with 
men freshly recruited from "the lash of hunger". This undoubtedly 
affected workplace organi~ation and the allegiance toward trade 
unionism, though the general defeats of organised labour clearly 
had an impact. 
Although unionisation among less skilled workers had far surpassed 
craft unionists in the motor plants producing munitions, by 1918,in 
the West Midlands, the organisation of the shop steward movement in 
both Coventry and Birmingham was largely sustained by the craft 
representatives. 10 This arose from the fact that the major issues 
which confronted the workplace were invariably craft questions. Not 
only did craft unionism promote a wider representation of interests 
on the shop floor .. through shop stewards, but the unilateral effects 
of government policies affecting the status of craft workers 
encouraged a more widely organised response. The implications of 
the embargo imposed under provisions of the Defense of the Realm 
Act during July 1918,was seen to violate a basic principle of wage 
labour. The response of tne war time shop stewards mpycment bad 
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been to defend, 
"The principle that every man should have the right to 
dispose of his own labour as he wishes".ll 
Its application, which restricted the movement of skilled labour, 
met with widespread strikes beyond the immediate factories concerned. 
In Coventry 12,OOO,A S E and A T S workers struck independently 
of the general view of the Coventry Engineering Joint Committee, 
which comprised of shop stewards mainly drawn from the skilled 
trades. The spread of the strike to Birmingham met with even wider 
support. Again,the majority of unions associated with the Birmingham 
Joint Committee were drawn from the skilled unions. Over 60,000 
skilled workers became involved, up to 100,000 workers were affected, 
with 89% of all munitions workers being out. 12 It was the fear of 
an extension of government 'interference with "rights" of craft 
workers in the labour marKet,that lay behind such widespread protest. 
The fact that the dispute had been conducted against the wishes and 
sympathies of local trade union officials, and in the case of 
Coventry, in opposition to many of the craft delegated shop stewards 
on the C E J C,was indicative of the level of organisation and the 
will of certain craft unions to act independently of wider 
organisations when their perceived basic interests appeared to be 
threatened. 
The power of orrJanised labour,which had accumulated undQr wartime 
conditions by 1918,in the West Midlands was altered by the restoration 
of car production. Craft workers still possessed an advantage, as 
large sections of semi skilled labour, specifically recruited for 
munitions work, were dismissed with the decline in armaments. This 
change-over,plus the sharp recession in the motor industry1had an 
t d ' mb h' 13 impact upon ra e un~on me ers ~p. The fall was most marked among 
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the less skilled. During the severe unemployment of 1921,rnembershi.p 
of the Workers Union fell by one half. Between 1920 and 1923,it had 
lost over 70% of its half million membership. The 50,000 members it 
possessed in 1920, in the West Midlands,was down to 4,000 by 1929. In 
the A E U,membership fell by a half during the 1920s. Graph 3.5 
presents the movement of membership in the principle districts of 
motor manufacture. By 1930,membership in Birmingham was less than a 
half of the 1920 figure,while in Coventry it was about a third. 
A E U membership in Oxford was almost without significance until 
1938. The important loss in membership took place during the rapid 
unemployment prior to the Engineering Employers Lockout, although 
production continues to generally increase from 1922 until the 
economic crisis of 1931-33. Also the average yearly level of 
unemployment, despite seasonal fluctuations, falls between 1922 
and 1929 with the exception of 1925 in Coventry. A E U skilled 
membership, while not as devastated as that of the less skilled 
workers,does not begin to revive until 1934. 
The exercise of overt power conflict/measured by strikes reflects 
the level of trade union organisation. In particular/it represents 
the transformation of the role of craft labour within the industry. 
Between 1921 and 1930,of the 31 disputes which took place in the 
14 industry,27 concerned craft workers. Only 4 disputes involved 
less skilled workers. Although 22 of the strikes which took place 
in this period occurred at the main assembly plants, 11 involved 
coach builders: 3 included sheet metal workers; 3 took place among 
woodworkers; and 1 arose in a toolroom. In the supply industry all 
eight strikes which took place involved coach builders. 1S Only 
four disputes took place before 1930 among semi skilled workers and 
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all of these were in 1929 and 1930. The dependence upon craft 
skills of workers in wood1at the beginning of the decade and the 
later increasing work in metal, still involved high levels of skills 
being applied to hand finishing jobs. This provided a limited 
security for workers possessing a craft tradition. Although these 
skilled sections were only a minority of the workforce, they were 
able to preserve a trade union presence in some sections of assembly 
plants. Their actions were generally in defia,ce of their 
societies craft interests and consequently, were sectional in kind. 
The basis of trade unionism which survived during the 1920s was 
therefore largely isolated from the vast majority of workers 
employed in the industry. The impact of craft unionism in the 19209 
was effected by alterations or variations to the demand for thase 
workers, while its removal from the wiQer body of unorganised 
workers restricted support for its activities, particularly 
where managements were attempting changes in production methods 
which could dispense with a dependence upon these particular skills. 
Apart from the exception of a prolonged strike in 192~ involving 
sheet metal workers at Austins, members of craft unions were able to 
resist attempts to employ semi skilled labour in their area of work; 
at Armstrong Siddeley and Austin in 1924; Jowett, and Motor Bodies 
in 1925; Rover in 1926 and Morris Motors in Coventry in 1928; while 
at Rover in 1924; Singer in 1927; Morris Commercial 1929; and 
vulcan in 1930; the craft unions were able to successfully oppose 
16 
non union labour. Where skilled labour was employed upon piecework, 
their ability to resist reductions or gain increases through 
industrial action were far more mixed. Coach builders at Austin 
in 1921 and Morris Motors in 192a sheet metal workers at Vulcan 
in 1922 and woodcutters at Humber, all conceded reductions in 
prices following strikes. Only among coach builders at Sunbeam in 
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1923 , Guy Motors, 1924 and Motor Bodies in 1925,did strikes among 
f k It " .. 17 era t wor ers resu ~n ~ncreases ~n pr~ces. 
The general decline in the organised power of trade unionism during 
the 1920s, was visibly demonstrated in the motor industry. Membership 
of trade unions was confined to small pockets of skilled workers. 
A premium upon their skills, plus a collective will in particular 
instances to resist changes in working methods which would undermine 
employer dependence upon their labour, formed the character of 
limited trade union activity in the 1920s. Craft worker interests 
were largely sectional. The development of pieceworking and use 
of price fixers, further encouraged sectional work groups responses 
to management regulations. Pieceworking facilitated the possibility 
of regular changes in the price of labour which could enable 
managements to gain advantages of the employment relation in a 
market economy possessing a high level of job insecurity. The 
dependence upon unionised skills meant that the managements advantage 
could never be total. The severity of the effect of unemployment 
however can hardly be overestimated. Observing the experience of 
sharp increases in unemployment, in 1921, the A E U District Organiser 
wrote, in his March report, 
"No improvement. Less working short time but more 
unemployed ••• The worst feature of it is that employers 
say they could employ more if wages were lowered. When 
they are challenged as to the true position we find that 
in some shops employment could not be provided if men agreed 
to work for no wages whatsoever. Many of our members at 
the present time would rather believe the employer than 
believe those who are appOinted to look after their interest. 
It is questionable if ever there was such panic among our 
members at any former time n • IS 
An outcome of the weakness of organised labour was an 
increasing acceptence by sections of workforces of a managerial 
view of their interests~ However, in the same year, Armstrong Siddeley, 
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attempting to introduce changes in working methods, were consulting 
19 
shop stewards, while at Singer in Coventry the introduction of 
a nightshift to meet seasonal demand was negotiated by the District 
secretary of the A E U., upon the basis of national union rates. 
It was the District Secretary who would supply the labour, the 
implications of which ~~e District Organiswer was not slow to state. 
"This would evidently be nauseating to non-union labour".20 
Although the District Organiser praised the loyalty of sections 
of the membership during the 11 weeks of the Employers lOCKout, 
the dispute had a major impact upon the position of organised 
labour in the Engineering Union. 
"Give credit to our members", declared the organisers 
report, for the determination displayed especially so 
since the employers opened the gates of their workshops".2l 
and speaking of unemployed engineering members the organiser could 
remark of Coventry: 
"I believe that I voice the aspiration of the divison when 
I say that our very best thanks are due to these people for 
not only refusing to accept employment, but for the splendid 
services rendered by them by way of picketing during the 
whole time the lockout lasted".22 
Beyond the employer dependence upon skills, and the level of 
vulnerability in the labour market, the toll of the lockout was felt 
at the level of union organisation. In Coventry, membership of the 
A E U fell by 52 per cent in the first twelve months after the 
lockout, in Birmingham the loss was 42 per cent. At Austins:a 
reduction in rates took place, while in Coventry numbers of A E U 
I 
members were reported still not re-employed in January 1923. The 
President of the District COmmittee, following 16 months unemployment 
was forced to emigrate to Australia, largely on account of his trade 
i i · 23 I f union act v t~es. n Ox ord,l9 workers who had formed a lockout 
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24 
committee were not offered their jobs back. The A E U DC only 
met twice in the next 12 months. 25 
During 1924 and 1925 the demand for cars picked up. At the prospect 
of recovering lost membership,a campaign of factory gate meetings 
was organised jointly by the District Committee of the A E U and 
the Trade Council in Coventry, under the slogan "Back to the 
unions".26 Weaknesses in organisation,plus the extent of non union 
labou~ were viewed as the main reasons for acceptance of reductions 
in piecework prices. The General Strike of 1926,which came at the 
end of the season for car production,had widespread consequences for 
recruitment. The strike appears to have been fairly widely supported 
27 in Coventry motor firms,but the response in Birmingham was much 
less impressive. In Oxford it was totally ignored. 
Industrial life in Birmingham was virtually unaffected by the strike, 
In the large car plants, though Wolesley Motors stopped, less than 50 
workers withdrew labour at Lanchester works. Of the 8,000 workers 
28 
at Austins,only a few hundred craft unionists struck. Their action 
was typically in isolation. The vehicle builders who carne ou~ were 
ordered back by the local officials. 29 Meanwhile, 30 wood machinists 
were on strike for a day, while a number of toolroom workers came 
out independently of the activity of the other crafts. Production 
30 
was little affected. Austin management w~8 able to draw upon the 
loyalty of sections of its workforoe,not only to refrain from 
31 
striking,but also to ensure the safety of the works. Non-union 
labour vastly out numbered trade unionists and the fear of possible 
reprisals, through layoff and possible loss of future employment 
opportunities, led to little sympathetic strike action taking place on the 
part of non-union labour. In Oxfor~where A E U membership had 
fallen from 120 in 1918 to 50, there is no evidence that any trade 
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lJnioni~lt SUpr')rtcd the general ~>trike. 32 Once again the DC \V(~nt 
into decline, failing to meet for over two years. 
The conclusion of the General Strike,during a period of rising 
unemployment in the motor industry,aided employer influence over 
their workforces. coventry and Birmingham firms, particularly 
non-federated ones,were refusing to hold works conferences and 
were rejecting interviews with trade union officials. 33 At Sunbeam 
in Birmingham, piecework prices were being altered without mutual 
agreement The works committee was being ignored management 
taking the view that it had no need to function. 34 Wolesley 
, d ,,35 d i i were discharg~ng tra e un~on~sts. The motor tra e was n ts 
worst state for 3 years, 6,000 unemployed were walking the streets 
36 
of Coventry by November. In the following two years, the season 
for employment grew shorter, unemployment lasted longer and apathy 
became firmer during the height of the depression at the beginning 
of the 1930s. The Birmingham Information Bureau,in its publicity 
brochure designed to attract industry to the city,informed prospective 
employers, 
"Birmingham labour is good, plentiful and cheap; lower 
wages are paid here compared with London" •••• Labour unrest 
is practically unknown. Birmingham is an ideal centre 
for speeded-up production". 3 7 
It claimed that the majority of engineering fitters were being paid 
8 per cent less than their counterparts in the South East of England. 
The reorganisation of the production of cars upon a much larger 
scale,as a result of heavy investment in new plant and equipment. 
significantly reduced a dependence on craft working, encouraged the 
employment of migrant labour on semi skilled tasks and installed 
American methods of f'low line production techniques, which altered 
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the shape of British car assembly. This led to a rapid 
transformation in labour relations. It was the very" .•.. ideal 
centre for speeded-up production •••. " which gave rise to the spread 
of early forms of worker protest among the almost totally unorganised 
mass of semi skilled workers. New technology and economic depression 
removing much of the contribution of the crafts, was paving the way 
for the organised domination of the semi skilled worker. 
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3 FROM UNORGANISED POWER CONFLICT TO ORGANISED WAGE LABOUR 
Between 1930 and 1939, no disputes took place in the supplier 
industries. Twenty strikes took place in the plants of main 
assembly. Of these, 8 involved semi skilled workers, while 12 
concerned craft workers, of which 4 were vehicle builders and 4 
38 included sheet metal workers. By the 1930~ the largest section 
of workers drawn into power conflict were the semi skilled. This 
change in the nature of conflict during the inter-war period, mirrors 
the transition of the industry from the small independent producer 
assembling vehicles or sections of vehicles, with a high dependence 
upon the skills of craft labour,to large scale assembly plants. 
This change altered the strategic power location of the semi 
skilled worker within a technologically inter dependent production 
flow, which at one moment made him far more expendable than the 
previous status of the craft worker, but whose collective position 
considerably increased his power to cease production. Large scale 
stoppages in car production were brought about through the actions 
of the semi skilled worke~ challenging management attempts to 
intensify the utilisation of his labour. 
At the Austin plant in Longbridge, a strike in 1929 arose directly 
from an attempt by management to make universal changes in basic 
rates and work levels, in a period of intense competition, following 
the application of flow line technology. In 1924,a comprehensive 
reorganisation of the plant had taken place under the guidance of 
C R E Engelbach, a production engineer, who had executive responsibility 
for the Longbridge. He claimed that the works were changed to meet 
production principles. 
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" ...... that the work should proceed from machine to 
machine and from process to process, without any 
backward movement and that it should flow directly on 
the assembly line naturally as part of the system ... " 39 
These principles of integration provided the basis for a higher 
degree of interdependence in the production process, but combined 
with a wage policy,formed the basis of a labour relations policy 
which aimed to rapidly increase productivity. such an approach 
was in sharp contrast to the prevailing employer practices in 
engineering as a whole. Firstly, the reorganisation was tied 
to an extensive use of piecework which provided the potential for 
earnings, through individual worker effort, to reach the most 
favourable level paid anywhere in the district. Secondly, the 
objective of such a policy was a higher productivity through 
strengthening the dependence of the worker upon management, and to 
seek to create a common p~pose based around the success of Austin. 
Such an approach left no room for trade unionism. Engelbach claimed 
that the effect of reorganisation was to, 
" .•... increase earnings of operatives not only by the 
extra skill gained by them owing to larger production, 
extra facilities for handling machinery etc., but by the 
confidence shown by these operatives in management, and 
by what might fairly be termed the insistence by the 
management on greater earnings" .40 
An objection to trade unionism developed in conjunction with a high 
wage reputation in an era of high unemployment. Although the earlier 
development of the motor car had been based upon a dependence of 
craft skills for certain aspects of work, which in turn led to 
tolerance, trough not a complete acceptance of union membership 
among the skilled workers, the adoption of an "open shop" labour 
policy considerably discouraged union activity among the less 
skilled worker. The response of the Austin management to the mass 
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labour unrest across the countryin 1926, provides a good .illustration 
of the way in which the motor industry employers were, through 
reorganisation, also seeking to pioneer a new strategy towards 
labour. 
The Times had claimed that, "the demand for unlimited action is 
imperious", in its condemnation of the General Strike. During May, 
however, an exchange took place surrounding the m.atlll~r upon whi ch 
employers sought to react to the crisis in labour relations. For 
Henry Bertick M P, it provided both a challenge and a warning to 
employers to face up to the basic insecurity of wage labour. 
He wrote, 
" .... the recent industrial crisis is at once a warning 
and a challenge. A warning that the working class would, 
haunted by anxiety, lest its meagre standard of life 
should be debased, is liable to be thrown into violent 
alarming volcanic upheav'ils".41 
He called upon the Government to institute a conference between 
the representatives of both employers and organised labour,to discuss 
the prevention of increasing hours of work, the reduction of wages, 
and the basis for establishing a partnership for policy and profits 
in industry. The centre of his proposal was a call to recognise, 
"theneed to change workers psychology from one of fear 
and indifference to one of hope and interest".42 
A letter of reply was printed in The Times, on 31 May by Percy Keane, 
the editor of the Austin Advocate/on behalf of the Austin Motor Co, 
at Longbridge. It argued that the resolution of worker interest 
could be overcome by adopting the practices of restructuring pay 
systems, but made no mention of an industrial partnership with the 
unions. Keane wrote, 
163 
" .... the awakening of the workers interest can be 
brought about most effectively if such interest is bound 
up with that of the business of which he is employed 
in such a manner that a result of increased effort is 
immediately apparent. In other words, that it is clearly 
reflected in the next forthcoming pay week with a 
statement showing the case". 43 
Worker interests were to be compelled by managerial pay policies, 
rather than scheme for partnership with organised labour or profit 
sharing. 
"The production force of an undertaking should be 
rewarded directly upon quantity results and a comnercial 
force upon sales accomplished. Individual payments 
against results in an effective driving force that compels 
the interest by all parties and leads towards united 
action in one direction only, that is maximum efficiency. 
Extra payment upon ascertained profit has certain virtues, 
but can never owing to inevitable delays in such a system, 
attain such a concentration of attention on the part of 
the workers".44 
The letter went on to cla~m that the result of those practices at 
Longbridge had increased output by 52%, reduced car prices by 38%, 
raised the distribution of wages by 64.9%, while individual earnings 
rose by 108%, and profit by 93%.45 
Though Lord Austin was a member of the Engineering Employers 
Federation and 46 later took part in the M~d-Turner talks, he 
publicly opposed trade unions. Austin combined his obligations 
towards national agreements established through the Employers 
Federation, with a capacity to, as far as possible, discourage 
or ignore the presence of trade unionism in the workplace. He 
held to some of the strong paternalistic traditions of Birmingham 
Employers towards industrial relations. Such an approach appeared 
to be reciprocated by the labour force itself during the General 
Strike. Some 400 of the 8,000 workforce at Longbridge became 
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'volunteers' or special constables, in order to maintain vital 
supplies to the workers and preserve continued production. 47 Of 
the small number of craft trade unionists who actually took part 
in the strike they were only offered their jobs back, 
" .... as conditions allowed and when the company required 
them".48 
Although the initial success of the labour relations strategy, which 
accompanied the programme of reorganisation, could be seen in the 
threefold increase which took place in sales turnover at Austin-
while the expansion of their share in British car production rose 
from 16% to 24.2% in the three years following the General Strike -
it also resulted in a sharp increase in the number of employees. 
The Longbridge labour force grew from 5,300 in 1924 to 13,500 by 
1929. The universal changes ,in basic rates by management and the 
inten~ied competition in~the product market was being confronted 
by a different workforce. A policy of wage reduction amongst 
predominantly unorganised semi skilled workers, where renumeration 
was so closely tied to affect, the control of work, and not least 
the level of the.piecework price, became an issue for the semi 
skilled. At Austin,an autocratic style of management combined 
with the changes which took place as a result of plant reorganisation, 
came under challenge as the plant grew in size and management sought 
wage reductions. 
In June 1928, the District Organiser of the A E U reported attending 
a Local Conference at Austin, arising out of management methods 
at reducing piecework times. His report claimed, 
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" ..•. the method adopted being that they notified the men 
concerned that their engagement must terminate bllt they can 
continue if they agree to a reduction in rates".49 
On the 29 september, the organiser reported that a "marked improvement" 
had taken place in shop steward organisation inside the engineering 
shops. During the autumn of 1928, an improvement took place in the 
motor trade which encouraged the unions to engage in an active 
recruiting campaign/in both Coventry and Birmingham. But despite 
a number of factory gate meetings the response was poor. In 
November, at the height of car production, the report of the 
engineers National Officer claimed, 
"There is still great apathy and indifference being 
displayed and after the experience we have had I am 
strongly of the opinion that it is personal contact 
that is required to bring back in the organisation those 
men who are reaping the advantages of trade union without 
payment contributions".SO 
In January 1929, however, the Austin management announced further 
proposals to introduce a new set of lower piecework times Just 
over a month after the acknowledged failure of the unions to 
encourage ex-members to rejoin the unions. It was these proposals 
by theAustin managemen~ to intensify the speed-up of labour on 
the reorganised flow line production, that abruptly stemmed workplace 
apathy and indifference. But leadership and action, when it cam~ 
arose largely outside the scope of trade union influence. It came 
directly from among the unorganised rank and file. 
A meeting in January 192~ attended by 250 workers who were mainly 
trade unionists, and addressed by local trade union offiCials, 
considered what action ought to be taken over the Austin managements 
intention to introduce new conditions. The view was presented that, 
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owing to the weak state of organisatio~ it would be " ••. impossible 
to take any drastic action with the firm".5l The meeting decided that 
the union officials should approach management with the objective 
of gaining the most favourable terms possible and then set about 
establishing organisation among those employed. It appears that 
recruitment of workers did increase. The A E U could claim in 
January, 
""Several hundreds becoming members of our SOCiety during 
the past few weeks".52 
Though union officials achieved a degree of success in increasing 
the membership of their unions, they were not as affective in 
preventing the installation of the new working arrangements. 
Furthermore, the plant still remained largely unorganised; vast 
sections of semi skilled workers being without representation 
through the lengthy perio~ in which the changes were being implemented. 
Inevitable grievances occurred across the plant,yet the vast majority 
of workers were prepared to be outside the unions. In April,this 
simmering discontent boiled over. Management had posted a notice 
which stated that any employee who lost time would have to report 
to the labour bureau, who would advise when a starting date could 
be set. A loss of time and earnings would ensue. The placing of 
the notice appeared as the final straw. A mass meetin~ comprised 
53 
mainly of non-union labou~was called for the lunch break. 
Management withdrew the notice, but knowledge of this did not reach 
the mass meeting, instead a strike was called and a strike committee 
formed. The new working conditions became the main issue. 
5,000 of the 11,000 workforce stopped on the 25 March, the remaining 
6,000 became laid off. The entire factory came to a standstill for 
the first time since the end of the war. The strikers were almost 
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entirely non-unionists. Their committee functioned outside the 
influence of the established unions in the plant. The strikers, 
without the organised protection of a union organisation, lacked 
the experience of running a strike, and aware of their vulnerability 
to dismissal and replacement arising from the state of the labour 
market, initially adopted the tactic of the "stay in strike" as a 
means of protecting their jobs as well as a pressure for improved 
conditions. 
On the I April a statement issued on behalf of all the unions with 
memberships at Longbridge, while accepting that genuine grievances 
existed, called for a return to work on the assurances given by the 
Employers Association that discussions could take place. 
"In such negotiations", the statement claimed, "arrangements 
will be made to ensure representation from the workers 
in the departments concerned".54 
The policy of the managemen~in regard to those on strike/was quite 
firm. In no circumstances would they recognise or negotiate with 
the Strike Commi ttee. The Strike Committee, on the other hand, 
representing the large body of unorganised workers, rejected the 
representation of the trade union officials, who had no membership 
among those in dispute. Rejecting the union leaderships assurances, 
the unorganised workers were more fearful of the conditions which 
management would extract over a return to work. On 3 April,the 
Strike Committee stated that they had not entirely ignored the 
position of the union officials. Addressing a mass meeting, the 
chairman of the committee, claimed, 
" •••. they must not interfere until they are asked to do so ••.. 
if we went back we would be returning like beaten dogs 
ready to accept the crumbs that were thrown to them" .55 
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r.tanagements policy of "open shop'; through discouraging organised 
trade union activity, created circumstances wi thin which the power 
of mass resentment of workers could emerge outside developed 
channels of communication between worker and management organisations. 
" The Austin managements dealings with trade unions were confined 
to the craft unions, with discussions being held through local union 
officials. No shop floor organisation existed, though on occasion 
a shop member of a craft union might be called upon to report to 
his local official for the purposes of making approaches to 
management. 
The majority of unions represented in the plant, recruited workers 
within their own trades. A E U Brass and Metal Makers SOCiety, 
united Pattern Makers Society, Foundry Workers Union, and the 
Vehicle Builders,all derived from a craft heritage. Union membership 
was based upon a small section of the workforce and confined to 
particular parts of the plant. Semi Skilled workers who did work in 
skilled sections remained unorganised. A nominal presence in 
Longbridge was held by the Workers Union but its membership had 
declined sharply. Recruitment policies among the craft unions 
ignored the position of the less skilled, although the rapid growth 
in semi skilled labour at Longbridge in the late 1920s following the 
introduction of flow line technology was attracting migrant labour 
from regions beyond the Midlands. 56 
Much of this labour was not without a prior experience of unionism. 
The chairman of the strike committee, Ted Bowen, had formally been a 
miner in South Wales, and had only been employed at Austins for six 
h 'k 57 months before t e strl. e. 
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The strike soon reached deadlock. Management refused to negotiate 
with the strikers but would, as they already had, enter into 
discussion with union officials. The union officials did not 
represent the unorganised strikers, while the strikers refused to 
allow union officials to act upon their behalf. Having abandoned 
occupation of the plant over the Easter weekend, a test of will 
emerged. Management reopened the plant but hardened its attitude 
towards those in dispute. It declared that those who had not 
returned to work would be considered dismissed. 58 The dispute placed 
considerable pressure upon the strike leadership. A large proportion 
of strikers clocked in but immediately left work to join the meeting 
of those still out. The decision was to continue the strike but to 
try and start discussions with management. This was refused. The 
question now became one of recognition for the workplace committee 
of the unorganised workforce. The strategy adopted by the Austin 
management towards the mass protest was that no interview or 
discussion surrounding the grievances could take place before a 
complete return to work. Only then would they be willing to 
receive a deputation. No recognition would be made of the unofficial 
strike committee. The chairman of the strike committee argued ~R 
the mass meeting to resist those management terms. 
The following day the strike began to collapse. A policy of 
admission to the works was introduced, only for those workers in 
possession of an entrance card, available from foremen and 
superintendents. Those not in receipt of such cards would be deemed 
to be self dismissed, and left to the mercy of the labour market. 
They would have to reapply for employment. Long queues of workers 
awaiting the distribution of admission cards demoralised the remaining 
strikers. Now only 1,500 appeared to stand by the strike committee. 59 
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It was losing the base of its authority to lead. A vote taken 
among the workers still loyal to the committee called off the 
dispute, and elected a delegation from among the body of the meeting 
to meet the management. The unofficial committee relinquished its 
leadership. 
The ten day dispute, demonstrated the susceptibility of integrated 
flow line production. It illustrated the power it bestowed upon 
semi skilled labour. The strike however proved a failure for the 
spontaneous organisation which emerged among the non unionised 
workers. Without the resources to endure a strike, lacking 
experience in organisation and collective regulation, the strike 
crumbled, through an absence of funds and managements insistence 
that the strike committee had to accept a defeat before discussions 
could begin on grievances with new rates. This management victory 
was in part a hollow one. -For the first time they saw the spectre 
of mass protest among the semi skilled. Production of 1,000 cars 
60 had been lost, the factory had had to close down. The real 
victors to emerge from the situation were however, the trade unions, 
despite their lack of enthusiasm towards a strike. Not only did 
they make gains in membership but were able to point to the failures 
of protest among unorganised workers. It was the trade union 
officials who were to be party to discussions with the Austin 
management and the local employers association/for establishing a 
procedure to resolve the grievances. The management, when faced 
with the exercise of power from an organisation based upon the 
workplace, preferred to deal through established trade unions in 
procedure. 
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The negotiations produced a number of concessions, some of which 
were to have long term consequences for workplace relations. At the 
first meeting, trade union officials and representatives from the 
shop floor, met with management and the chairman of the Employers 
Association. They agreed to set up a small committee which would 
consist of the trade union officials, plus four men and one woman 
from the workshops. This Committee would conduct the negotiations 
and then present a recommendation to the wider body of shop floor 
representatives for approval. At the end of the negotiations,the 
workers representatives had succeeded in getting the basis of the 
new grading system abolished. It would be replaced by the 
recognition/on the part of management, that mutuality should be the 
principle for determining piecework rates. Piecework times would 
be set upon the basic rate. and an increase in the basic rate 
61 
would be paid to women workers. The firm gave an undertaking to 
... 
carry out the operation of the 1922 shop stewards agreement. These 
terms were accepted by the full body of worker delegates; the final 
agreement being signed by Engelbach on behalf of the company and 
nine workers on behalf of the labour force. Names of individual 
unions did not appear upon the document. The workers signature, 
which included the strike leader Bowen, were in the name of 
'The Committee of Workers and Representatives: 
appointed by the General Conference,62 
This many sided dispute was the first occasion when a mass centre 
of semi skilled workers in the motor industry confronted management. 
Although the Strike Committep.,which sprang up from amongst the 
predominantly unorganised workers,acted independently of the limited 
but nevertheless existing union organisations, it had to disband 
itself before grievances could be discussed. The Austin management 
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resorted to procedure to handle the aftermath of the dispute. The 
real outcome of the strike w~s the acceptance on the part of 
management, to operate national agreements on mutuality for piecework 
prices, and recognition of elected shop stewards in their plant. 
The absence of organisation among the less skilled, had meant that 
the nominal minimum national agreement on regulating relations 
with workers were not being met. The agreement on piecework prices 
63 
survived for forty years. It shaped, for almost two generations, 
the most significant issue in workplace industrial relations, 
piecework bargaining, but the continued weaknesses in union 
membership undermined the status of shop stewards until the post 
second world war period. 
Arising out of the undertaking by the firm to operate the shop 
stewards agreement the workers committee set up a special body to 
ensure that union stewards~were elected in various departments of the 
64 plant. Within a month, shop stewards were entering into discussions 
with management and were accompanying officials to works conferences. 
The opposition to new rates had paved the way for recognition of 
shop stewards, a base, to the unions, for increased recruitment and 
more effective organisation. Out of the agreement, semi skilled 
earnings increased, membership of unions improved,but management 
attitude towards trade unionism did not relinquish. Although the 
firm did not oppose workers joining trade unions, they would not 
allow the holding of meetings in their workshops during meal breaks, 
though they did permit the use of a room once a week for stewards 
, 'd th k ' 65 to meet 1n, OUtS1 e e wor s t1me. 
The stewards were being brought into questions concerning anomalies 
in rates, they were attempting to gain consideration for the 
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application of seniority in the selection of workers for seasonal 
66 layoff. Within two months of the April agreement, the seasonal 
rundown in production had begun. Several shop stewards were being 
67 discharged. The loss of full rated jobs was being covered by the 
use of semi skilled workers. 68 In the following year, 1930, average 
monthly unemployment in the industry doubled. In 1931 and 1932 it 
69 had trebled. The registered unemployed in Birmingham rose from 
25,000 in 192~ to 61,522 by the beginning of 1931. Allegations 
about unfair treatment of stewards and active trade union members 
. 70 ~ncreased. In May the Engineering Union was reporting upon the , 
refusal of the Austin management to reconsider their decision of 
dismissing a member who had been involved in the dispute. The 
gains in organisation were being erased, unemployment was breaking 
up workplace organisation in the Austin. The ad hoc Workers 
Committee, comprising a body of delegates from various departments 
at Longbridge, arose to handle the outcomes of the strik~but was 
largely representative of non union semi skilled labour. It did 
not materialise into a permanent workplace organisation. Shop 
steward appointments,under the jurisdiction of the trade union~ were 
confined to the craft unions. Without a significant growth in 
trade unionism among the semi skille~ the development of a permanent 
shop stewards committee remained spurious. Seasonal lay offs and 
a high annual level of unemployment discouraged increases in 
membership. 
In November 1936, there again arose widespread opposition to 
management policies to lower rates and reduce income. The strike 
again occurred spontaneously and spread rapidly among non union 
labour. As management began to adjust rates on the new models, 
the Austin Ten and Austin Twelve, 58 workers in the body section 
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struck. They walked round the works calling out other workers. 
5,500 workers, the whole of the West Works came out. Virtually 
all were non unionists, and a large proportion of them were women 
71 
workers. The dispute was without an identifiable leadership. 
There was no strike committee and the issue took place in isolation 
from similar grievances. concerning the lowering of rates, which 
were being taken up independently by individual unions on behalf 
h ' 72 of their members ~p. It was again the non union labour which 
stopped the factory. 
The 1936 strike highlighted the limited influence the trade union 
possessed at Longbridge. It was the local members of the Communist 
Party who leafleted the strikers and stressed the urgent need for 
the election of a Strike Committee, the appointment of pickets and 
73 
the co-operation of the trade unions. The strike resulted in 
management being willing to discuss grievances once a return to work 
had taken place, but further illustrated the limitations in workplace 
organisation. At a meeting addressed by trade union officials ,the 
impatience at the low level of trade union membership resulted in 
, f th 'k 74 criticism of the act~on 0 e str~ ers. No joint approach/howeve~ 
was made among the unions over the dispute. Individual unions used 
the situation to recruit members, and called their own seperate 
f h ' 75 meetings or t ~s purpose. Out of the strike, the Transport and 
General Workers began to recruit the semi skilled from Austin/but 
i f i mb h ' 76 1 the limitat on 0 un on me ers ~p, weakness in workp ace organisation, 
and a reliance upon the spontaneous enthusiasm of non union labour 
to oppose managerial policies were again revealed as the baSic form 
within which workplace power was being exercised at Austin. 
These general characteristics of workplace relations at the Austin 
175 
in Birmingham were even more evident in the origins of shop floor 
protest in Oxford. The Morris plants in Oxford combined the most 
advanced levels of mass production technology of the British owned 
car firms, with the lowest levels of trade union influence among its 
workforce. Unlike Herbert Austin, William Morris was not a member 
of the Engineering Employers Federation. Not only was he not party 
to national engineering agreements on wages and conditions, but was 
under no obligation to operate procedural clauses arising from the 
1922 lockout, governing relations with trade unions. Though he was 
the largest manufacturer of cars during the inter war period, he had, 
unlike Austin, no involvement with the Mond-Turner talks, which 
attempted to restructure industrial relations in the aftermath of 
the General Strike. These talks were aiming for a more conciliatory 
approach between employers and unions on questions of rationalisation, 
productivity, and industrial relations, and had received a significant 
1 f f 1, i th industrl.'es. 77 i leve 0 support rom emp oyers n e new Morr s 
was, however, a founding, and active members of The League of Industry. 
In 1933, it was claimed that the League had some 600 members at the 
Pressed Steel in Oxford, many of whom were charge-hands and foremen, 
78 but a significant number were shop floor workers. The high 
commitment to rapid technological 'change co-existed with firm 
opposition to trade unionism,which Morris probably associated with 
the activity of craft unionism. In July 1927 the Oxford Times 
quoted Morris as saying, 
"I have no particular rp.verenc~ for tradition - especially 
for industrial traditions. I never allow trade unions to 
interfere with me". 79 
In his extensive dealings in philanthropy, in 1934 he gave £30,000 
towards the creation of an unemployed camp. 
176 
Morris, more than any other of the early British motor pioneer~ had 
been strongly influenced by American mass production technology. 
Along with his engine plant in Coventry, the opening of the Pressed 
Steel plant at Oxford,in 192~was built in line with the latest 
80 American engineering development. Although it employed the largest 
proportion of skilled workers in the Oxford factories, this amounted 
to just under 300 workers or not much more than 15% of the total 
81 
workforce. While the A E U and N U V B had members in the plan~ 
only the Patternmakers had any formal agreements with management. 
The semi skilled workers were without organisation until the 1934 
strike. 
Before 1934 the piecework prices were set by the foremen, but there 
was no guaranteed payment; weekly earnings fluctuated sharply. 
Under the application of the Bedaux82 wage system which operated at 
Pressed Steel, the semi skilled piecework bonuses were based upon 
. 83 
the output of each llne of track. This effectively pooled the 
outcome of individual effort. The setting of individual prices 
influenced the level of output and bonus payments for the whole 
department engaged upon a particular track. Thi$ payments system 
h . 84 encouraged group co eSlveness. The establishment of an individual 
price became the concern of all workers in the department as it 
influenced the line bonus. This pool bonus/provided the basis of 
85 
collective interest among the workforce. 
Prior to the strike, however, trade unionism generally in Oxford 
remained particularly weak. The A E U membership increased from only 
86 36 to 68 between 1928 and 1934. This was confined to the skilled 
87 
toolroom sections. During the early part of the 1930~ the Vehicle 
Builders had only SO members in the town, while the T G W U possessed 
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about 30 members. In 1934,Morris Motors alone were employing 
5,000 workers. A further 1,000 were employed at Morris Radiator~ 
with another 3,000 at Pressed Steel. 89 
Morris utilisation of modern production methods combined with a 
labour relations policy which discouraged the development of trade 
unionism in his plants. He argued, 
""To keep costs down you must have a staff of workers who 
are interested. My experience is that if you look after 
your men, they will look after you. A low wage policy is 
the most expensive way of producing. A moderately high 
wage is the cheapest." 90 
Morris's maximum use of mass production enabled him to employ the 
maximum use of semi skilled labour. He was able to reduce his 
dependence upon craft labour and craft rates, but paid above the 
trade union rate for semi skilled labour. This policy of high 
earnings for less skilled worker~weakened the cause of trade 
unionism in the inter war period. The earnings were the outcome 
91 
of tying virtually the whole workforce to a graded bonus system. 
The effects of Morris's production methods at the Cowley plan~saw 
an increase in yearly car production from 33,000 in 1924, to 58,000 
by 1934. This increase was brought about through a reduction in 
92 the labour force from 5,500 to 5,000 workers. At the Cowley 
assembly plant and the Pressed Steel works/group incentive schemes 
operated. In the Radiator plant/the more fragmented working 
93 
arrangements led to a more individualised bonus scheme. 
Although Morris held personal views opposing trade unionism,he 
managed the organisation of the company in such a way that he was 
virtually able to stave off trade unions activity by an incentive 
scheme, which yielded highlevels of productivity from which he 
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could pay above union rates for low priced/lesser skilled labour. 
His investment in flow production enabled the employment of unskilled 
agricultural and local labour on assembly lines, despite their lack 
of factory experience. This ihdigenous rural labour was; in the main, 
drawn from the surrounding villages,where regular contact with 
trade unionism was an unlikely occurrence. 
The growth of the motor industry in the 1920s howeve~began to 
94 
exhaust these local supplies of labour. By 1936, 46.3% of the 
10,453 employees working in the Oxford car factories were immigrant 
95 
workers. The industry's expansion was the single most important 
th id th . 1'" f d 96 reason for e rap grow ~n popu at~on 1n Ox or • Between 1921 
and 1931,Oxford became the third fastest growing conurbation/as 
its population increased by one fifth. A fifth of immigrants came 
from the surrounding villages. The rest were drawn from Wales, 
~ 97 
the South West, London, the North East and Scotland. This influx 
of labour was drawn from occupations'other than agriculture. Their 
traditions and expectations were removed from rural Oxfordshire. 
Many were not without trade union influence. 
This industrialisation of Oxford,developed later than that of 
Birmingham or Coventry. The transformation from a "university city 
and market town", attracted labour beyond the immediate area, yet 
union organisation was slow to respond. It was not until strikes 
occurred,that the A E U branch became aware of the number of its 
i th t . d 98 . members n e mo or 1n ustry. Ow1ng to seasonal working, many 
members arriving in Oxford were not transferring their branch 
membership. The Transport and General Workers Union did not begin 
to recruit workers until the first big strike at Pressed Steel in 
99 July 1934. 
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While a major obstacle to trade unionism lay in management opposition, 
the combination of migrant labour and arduous working conditions, 
within the intensive mass production technology, were the basis for 
the exercise of collective opposition. It was at the Pressed 
Steel plant .. that these factors were most apparent. Of the Morris 
plants in the Oxford area/the Pressed Steel factory had the 
reputation for poorest working conditions and highest accident rates. 1OO 
It employed the largest proportion of workers attracted to Oxford 
by employment prospects. The Cowley assembly plant,by contrast, 
employed more local labour, possessed cleaner, lighter working 
conditions and a lower wage rate. No industrial dispute was recorded 
in the Morris car plants at Cowley, or the MG plant at Abingdon 
during the inter war period. Occasional stoppages were not unknown 
in the Radiator plant, but did not stem from trade unionism. lOl 
The highly individualistic basis of the piecework system discouraged 
group interests. It was the Pressed Steel plant, with its high 
levels of integrated flow line production and application of the 
Bedaux incentive payments system/which gave rise to the first 
widespread stoppages of semi skilled and non skilled labour in Oxford. 
During the heatwave in July 1934 ,the unpleasantness of actual working 
conditions coincided with managerial attempts to alter rates. 
workers in the Press Shop found that following a full weeks work they 
received less wages. A stoppage during the shift was resolved by 
the promise of a meeting the following morning to discuss the 
questions. On the Saturday, 14 July, the management refused to 
102 
meet Press Shop delegates. A meeting therefore took place between 
the night and day shift workers in the Press Shop/who decided to 
strike from the Monday night. The original issue quickly became 
transformed into grievances relating to workers across the works , 
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as the decision to strike spread. 
On the Monday the dayshift struck. Two hours after the morning shift 
started, the girls employed in the Press Shop came out and led a 
demonstration into the town. 103 The following day the strike extended. 
By the afternoon,some 700 workers had stopped including the shears 
department, assembly floor, sander section, chassis shop, refrigerators, 
and some of the machinists. A mass meeting of this non-union labour 
elected a Strike Committee. 104 Lacking in organisational experience,a 
broad based Council of Action was formed from organisations in 
oxford, to help spread support for the strikers. lOS This Council 
of Action contained 6 members of the Trades Council, 6 from the 
oxford Solidarity Committee, which organised unemployment marches, 
and 6 strikers. The Labour Party was to later have representation 
cn the Council of Action. 
The importance of the Council of Action lay, not only in its spreading 
knowledge of the dispute organising financial support, but in its 
role of encouraging sympathy among the unemployed, the workers on 
short-time in Oxford, and the publishing of a daily strike bulletin 
to keep the strikers informed of the changing circumstances. l06 The 
momentum of the dispute was generated by the semi skilled pieceworkers. 
The skilled workers, including those with union membership, were 
much more uncertain in their support of the strike. Members of the 
A E U were ordered by their District Committee to stay at work 
, 
pending a national instruction, while the Pattern Makers officials 
argued against their members striking because of the existence of 
management recognition and agreements with the union. The 
electricians left safety men in the plant but were threatening to 
withdraw, them if black leg labour was used. Large scale picketing 
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of the plant took place, but although the usual buses were able to 
get into the plant/few workers were in them. 107 
The semi skilled workers began to appreciate the power of their 
position. Not only had they succeeded to virtually close down 
production at Pressed Stee~but the loss of body frames which were 
being produced for Austin, Vauxhall, Wolsely, Hillman and Ford, 
as well as Morris cars, threatened to eventually paralyse large 
sections of the motor industry. lOa The dispute could not be confined 
to the internal consequences of Pressed Steel. The preservation of 
customer credibility, within a highly competitive product market 
was a major factor in management strategy in confronting its 
workforce. During the first week, however, it adopted an uncompromising 
line. The basis of the A E U independent position lay in its 
separate claim for increases in skilled rates. An A E U delegation 
met with management who tried to delay discussing the issue. A 
shop meeting voted to strike but before they could do so the 
109 
management had decided to close the shop. Although they must 
have felt there was little point in continuing to employ workers, 
be it trade unionists, when the rest of production had come to a 
standstill, the effect of the decision was for the A E U members to 
accept that they were being locked out. Meanwhile, pending the 
return of the Patternmakers full-time official to Birmingham, the 
remaining group of workers still in attendance at the works, decided 
110 to refrain from crOSSing the picket lines. 
The behaviour of the craft unions did little to enhance their 
position in the eyes of the unorganised semi skilled workers. It 
was managerial action, rather than trade union principles, which 
created an enforced solidarity among the workforce. A reluctance to 
break with procedure among the recognised craft workers wa~ a point 
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of departure in opposition to management authority. The semi skilled 
were not constrained by such considerations. In these circumstances 
it was far easier for a militant influence to emerge in the leadership 
of the strike. It was the constructed Council of Action, possessing 
as it did, significant Communist Party influenc~which was able to 
give early direction for the strike. 
The Oxford Communist Party was not particularly large, and there 
111 we~no Party members employed at Pressed Steel. Their membership 
was drawn from Ruskin College students, and a few organisers of the 
unemployed marches which passed through Oxford from South Wales. 
They were, however, able to arrange for Abe Lazarus who had played 
a prominent part in a strike at the Firestone Tyre Plant in London, 
to come to Oxford and address the strikers He convinced the Strike 
Committee on ~~e need for trade union organisation,but stressed 
that the control of the strlke should be with the Committee. The 
demand for workplace recognition and control was expressed in a 
strike bulletin, 
"No-one negotiates but the Strike Committee •••• 
no-one on the Strike Committee but the strikers." 112 
The limitations of this position were to become apparent. Meanwhile~ 
the Strike Committee had established a package of ambitious demands, 
which included the question of trade union representation. 
1 Abolition of all piecework 
2 ls 6d flat rate bonus for all departments. 
3 No victimisation. 
4 100% trade unionism and trade union recognition. 113 
The strike had abated the antipathy towards trade unions. 
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Representation and recognition had become major demands by the 
semi skilled. 114 A T G W U organiser was brought to Oxford. On 
the third day of the strike 500 wor~ers were said to have enrolled 
in the union. llS Howeve~ not only had the issue in dispute been 
transformed/but the controlling influence over the strike was 
changing. The previously unorganised strike committee possessed 
little experience in organisation and negotiation. These conditions 
had enabled the experience of Lazarus, who became known as 'Bill 
Firestone' to encourage an effective organisation of the strike. 
Apart from picketing, speakers were sent to other car plants to 
win their support and prevent the transference of jigs and fixtures 
116 for possible chassis and car body assembly, While railway 
workers were requested not to touch 'blacked' work. 
Materially/the strike was supported by the T G W U who gave £300 
for payment in benefits. The Trades Council provided over £150, 
while the Strike Committee itself managed to raise £100. Management, 
seeking a resolution of the conflict,agreed to negotiate with ~~e 
Strike Committe~ on the basis of a return to work on conditions 
which had existed prior to the strike. A mass meeting, attended 
by some 3,000 worker~ rejected this offer and insisted upon the 
four strike demands as forming the basis for an ending of the 
strike. This point indicates a clear break from the workforces 
attitudes to its immediate past. Addressing the mass meetin~ the 
T G W U organiser Geoby, highlighted the workplace rejection of 
pa ternalism, 
"It is not a question of joining some league organised by 
the management so that we could co-operate. It is a question 
of building our own organisation controlled by the working 
class in the interest of the working class. This we had 
already shown our determination to do so by joining up in 
our hundreds in the trade unions" .117 
lB4 
By the second \-Ieek of the strike, the j.nfluence of trade union 
organisations had began to 5hm'1. The scale of activity undertaken 
was unimaginable among the mass of unorg.:mised workers. 
On the 28. July, Pressed Steel Co. joined the E E F. This action 
shaped the resolution of the dispute and paved the \-lay for trade 
union recognit.ion. Resolution of the strike when it came, was 
brought about through negotiations in London bebleL'n mani:HjCTlK!nt and 
national trade union officials. The negotiating experience of the 
trade union officers could not be denied. The limited organisational 
role of the strike committee ,,,as apparent, y(c!t it did not ; immediately 
~ 1 t' f h . ff" 1 118 accede to Lie rc common( a lOllS o· t e muon 0 - ·lCl'-l s. No LlCjTcC'mcn t 
had been reached on the original strike issue, the reduction in 
earnings. t'lliat was being offered was a framework by which 
grievances could be resolved - the managerial fUnctions agreement. 
Recognition of trade unions and shop ste\'lClrds would be granted but 
the company publically stated its policy would be one of maintaining 
h ,,119 an "open s op • An undertaking to consider the introduction of a 
guarantee price, and an acknowledgement of no victimisation WGre 
given. 
A mass meeting endorsed the a<"Treement which eventuc:.lly had the 
support of the Strike Committee. The meeting elected shop stewards 
and a works committC'e .120 The t.\'lO \vcek dU'pUt.0 \Va!) thC' [j.rst: In<<jor. 
triumph in (>rg':lni~al:ion for SL'lili. skil10d work0rf; in UIC' IllotO)," 
industry. On a return to work the following day, shop committees 
\'lere elected and a J S S C formed betvlcen the l\ E U., T G \\f U and 
Patternmakers union. 121 No formCll agreement ... ,as reached with 11lanaqement 
for a closed shop,but by 1936, over 100 shop stewards existed in the 
In plant and every section of workers had shop stewClrd representation. 
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Shop stewards were being brought into piecework negotiations. 
Management began to allow branch secretaries employed in the works 
to act as convenors for the semi skilled. They were able to gain 
easy access to higher management. This encouraged the resolution 
of grievances outside delayed processes of the Disputes Procedure. 
In the recession of 193~ the Pressed Steel management tried to 
curb the level of workplace organisation. As the firm made a number 
of steel bodies for a variety of models produced by Austin, Morris, 
Standard and Ford, regular changes in production and working 
arrangements took place. Wi th strong shop committees undertaking 
piecework negotiations/the management increasingly sought to confine 
shop stewards role to the formal requirements of procedure. 
Supervisors began to prevent inter shop contact among shop stewards. 
The branch officials lost the right to access to higher management. l23 
During the autumn1the Pressed Steel management were introducing 
i .. k" i d f' d 1 124 reduct ons ~n p~ecewor pr~ces, ~n a per 0 0 ~ncrease unemp oyment. 
A convenor was sacked for not being in his own department.125 An 
unofficial dispute took plac~ but did not receive the official 
support of the T G W U, as it was activity outside the operation 
126 
of procedure. Management warned that those on strike would be 
dismissed. A return to work took place but 12 worker~ including 
127 two shop stewards - Len Barker and Norman Brown, were not re-engaged. 
The pressed Steel management were asserting control over the 
workplace organisation through dismissal and containment, in a period 
of decline in the market for labour. 
Trade union membership in the motor industry began to expand during 
the second half of the 1930s. Significantly, this development had 
followed reorganisation of production upon floW line principles 
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among the large manufacturers. Between 1928 and 1934, Austin, 
Morris, Humber, Standard, Armstrong Siddeley, Jaguar, Ford and 
Vauxhall had all invested in mass production te~~niques. The 
expansion in output was undertaken by a smaller group of large 
manufacturers adopting production processes~which would facilitate 
the employment of a larger force of semi skilled workers than had 
been the case during the 1920s. The Pressed Steel plant at Oxford, 
despite the offensive by the management,remained the most effectively 
organised union factory in the motor industry until the second world 
war, but Coventry became the town where employment and trade unionism 
were reviving upon a much wider basis. 
In Coventry, the increase in trade in the motor industry was 
accompanied by a growth in t~e towns general and electrical 
engineering industries. l28 After 1936, however, under the 
.. 
chairmanship of Lord Austin, the major Midland motor manufacturers -
Austin, Rover, Standard, Rootes and Daimler, undertook the 
construction of 'shadow factories' in the West Midlands for the 
assembly of areo-engines. 129 This involvement by the motor industry 
in the rearmament programme,strengthened the market position of 
labour. The building of three of these factories in Coventry, 
by Daimler, Rootes and Standard/increased the towns dependence 
upon vehicle technology and rapidly expanded employment opportunities. 
Between 1935 and 1938/Coventry became the fastest growing Midland 
town, employment in the motor industry grew by over 20%.130 This 
boom was met by an influx in immigrant labour, much of it from the 
traditional industrial areas. The semi skilled nature of much 
of the employment in these new factories attracted labour from the 
mining areas of South Wales, the cotton towns of Lancashire, the 
engineering centres of Clydeside, in addition to workers from Greater 
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d d 'd 131 Lon on an Tynes~ e. Employment in motor vehicles, cycles and 
aircraft increased from 34,550 to 41,800 between 1935 and 1939. 132 
Just under 90% were male workers,of whom a large proportion were 
133 
among the younger age groups. Immigrant labour accounted for 
29% of the total coventry workforce by 1939. 134 The pre-war boom 
expanded the population of the city by over 40,000 between 1931 
and 1939. 135 
This economic boom was favourable to the growth of trade unionism. 
The A E U increased its membership fourfold in six years. It 
increasingly sought to recruit lesser rated workers in an attempt 
to organise the sharp rise in semi skilled workers. 136 By 1939 the 
137 T G W U were opening 3 branches in Coventry. From the mid 1930~ 
shop stewards began to re-emerge in Coventry factories. Spars~(y 
distributed,they were being elected in a number of motor plants. 
After 1934,shop stewards appeared in Riley, Daimler, Armstrong 
Siddeley, and Humber. In 1938,the~ were stewards at Standard and 
MorriS Engines. At Riley and Humber. the shop stewards had gained I 
138 
recognition from management. 
The Coventry Trades Council had originally organised campaigns to 
increase trade union membership but as more workers began to join, 
the individual unions undertook their own recruitment. In the motor 
industry/an absence of workplace recognition plus the presence of 
considerable sections of non union labour, in addition to an uneven 
distribution of shop stewards across the various plant,discouraged 
any tendency towards shop steward organisational independence. 139 
contact external to the workplace among shop stewards/tended to 
rely upon attendance at local branches and committees of their trade 
, ,140 , 
union organ~sat~ons. It was ~n the aircraft industry, rather than 
188 
the motor industry, in Coventry, that a broader organisational 
network between shop stewards existed/beyond the constitutional 
trade union structures and employer organisations. 
Employment in the aircraft industry was not as seasonal as it had 
been in the motor industry. OWing to the finer accuracy in 
construction and the reduced opportunities for mass production 
techniques, when compared to the assembly of motor cars, aircraft 
depended upon a greater proportion of highly skilled labour. A 
wave of strikes had taken place in many of the main centres of 
aircraft production in opposition to management poliCies to introduce 
wholesale changes in working practices, wages and conditions. A 
rank and file organisation, the Aircraft Shop Stewards National 
Council (NSSNC~ operated across the major factories in the industry.l4l 
A newspaper, New propeller/was produced monthly, and regular meetings 
enabled stewards from Rolls Royce, De Havilland, Fairley, and 
Whitehead Torpedo, to be informed of employers activities throughout 
the geographically dispersed industry. 
In Coventry,it was at Armstrong wbitworth Aviation (AWA), that a 
shop steward organisation arose which possessed a degree of 
independence from local trade union authority and which sustained 
a rank and file contact, through shop steward representatives, with 
those other factories. The scale of employment in aircraft factories,. 
the large proportion of skilled workers and the organisation of 
labour into large gangs at AWA,encouraged trade union membership. 
In 1939, 6,000 workers were employed at AWA. This had risen to 
10,000 by 1944. By 1938,trade union influence was firmly 
established at AWA. The ganger was being elected from the workgroups, 
resulting in an increasing number of gangers being drawn from among 
189 
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shop stewards. Shop stewards, in their role as elected gange~ were 
having considerable influence upon the organisation of work. In 
addition to this supervisory capacity, the gang system strengthened 
the representative activities of the shop steward which created 
a basis for organisational independence. 
The distribution of workers into large gangs at AWA,divided the 
workforce into groups based around common areas of work. This 
division of workers around production/rather than their individual 
trades, meant that the shop stewards were elected from gangs rather 
than individual trade union organisations. The large gangs were 
in a stronger position to make up the loss of shop stewards earnings/ 
incurred in carrying out negotiations or attending meetings on 
behalf of members of the gang. Gang working strengthened workplace 
representation. The election from individual gangs/as opposed to 
election from individual trade unions/encouraged a degree of 
independence from their local trade union organisations. The 
soundness of AWA financial arrangements permitted 6 delegates to 
143 
attend the regular meetings of the ASSNC. AWA shop stewards 
committees from the Baginton Whitley and Parkside factories held 
a monthly meeting between their respective JSSCs in a room of a 
ub 144 coventry p • 
This, the most effective level of organisational contact among 
shop stewards in Coventry achieved by 1938, was far removed from 
the circumstances prevailing in the shadow factories. These 
factories were built with the intention of maximising the use of 
k ' 1 d lab ddt' t h . 145 semi s ~l e our an mass pro uc ~on ec n~ques. It was to 
146 these plants that a large proportion of migrant labour had come. 
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During 193~ a series of disputes arose in the Rover, Rootes and 
Austin shadow factories/over management policy to impose motor 
industry conditions and rates. The strikes which took place were 
some of the largest strikes in the 1930s, they resulted in a series 
of successes for workplace organisation and became a stimulus to 
widespread growth in trade union organisation among all classes 
of labour. 
A short strike by non union workers in February had successfully 
prevented the reduction of bonus earnings for a group of workers 
at the Rover shadow factory in Birmingham. When two months later, 
management began to introduce time and motion studies to determine 
piece rates,1,5oo workers struck against what they viewed as motor 
industry techniques. 147 The seven day April strike was support~d by 
148 the ASSNC. It attracted widespread publicity and drew attention 
~ 149 
to the weak state of organisation among those sections of workers. 
Over 500 Rover workers had joined the AEU at the beginning of the 
dispute, but the Strike Committee set up spread the issue to other 
shadow factories. They addressed well attended mass meetings in 
the four Coventry factories, where a levy on workers was organi~ed 
150 
to provide financial support. At the Austin shadow plant in 
Birmingham,a1most half the 6,000 workforce attended the mass meeting 
d b 'k 151 addresse Y Rover str~ ers. These expressions of support appear 
to have encouraged the Rover management to compromise. They 
withdrew attempts to introduce unilateral changes. No change in 
rates was to occur without full negotiations with trade union 
152 
officials. 
This outcome strengthened trade union identification among the 
workers, the majority of which were reported to have become organised 
191 
during the strike. At the Rootes shadow factory in Coventry, the 
management had refused two requests for works conferences over rates 
for inspectors. 52 were locked out. The weakness of trade unionism 
in the plant can be observed by their response. They considered 
raising the dispute in ~~e House of Commons but within three days 
153 the majority of those locked out had returned on employers terms. 
The shop stewards did not appear to be in a position to support 
the inspectors positions. They did, however, produce a lock-out 
bulletin setting out their case. This was sold in the other 
. 154 Coventry shadow factor~es. 
The inspiration of the Rover workers approach ;~ publicising their 
dispute to other shadow factories, was not lost upon the Rootes 
inspectors, but the overall weakness of organisation in the plant 
isolated their dispute. The experience of the Rover strike was 
not entirely forgotten. On the 9 June/the chairman of the Austin 
shadow shop stewards committee was saCked, along with a shop floor 
worker,for refusing to accept time study for the determining of 
rates. The 870 workers in the department walked out immediately 
and a shop stewards meeting called resolved to callout the whole 
of the workforce if there was no reinstatement of the two in 24 hours. ISS 
The Austin management gave way and avoided a major confrontation. 
The chairman of the shop stewards committee was also the delegate 
to the ASSNC. The sacked workers were reinstated, while rate fixes 
156 
and time study engineers were withdrawn. 
In August/the largest dispute of the period took place at the Austin 
shadow factory. Throughout the year/the question of rates being 
paid to workers in the shadow factories had been a constant source 
of discontent. The skilled workers were being paid a basic of 34s. 
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compared to 465. in the aircraft industry. The employers with a 
history in the motor industry/were applying motor industry values, 
but the different standards of work meant that even semi skilled 
workers on motor industry rates were never able, in the shadow 
factories, to achieve the same gross earnings as those in the motor 
industry. The nature of work on aircraft differed from that in 
the motor industry. What had changed during 1938,was the increasing 
level of trade union organisation in the shadow factories. 
The Austin possessed the largest shadow factory. By the autumn of 
1938,it had established a JSSC which comprised of stewards from 
the BSMW, NSMW, ABU, TGWU, NUUB, B & MM, plus the Coppersmiths, 
patternmakers, and Woodworkers Machinists unions. Its senior 
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officials were delegates to the ASSNC. The strikers demands were 
for the full skilled rate for all adult workers. They were also 
~ 158 demanding that management only recruit union labour. 
The nine day strike was for a general rate for the whole factory. 
The 6,000 strikers were even supported by indirect workers in the 
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stores and 20 boys. A management offer of a 36s. basic rate for 
the semi skilled and 40s. to the craft sections was rejected. 
The Strike Committee adopted the Rover principle of wide publicity 
of the dispute in the Coventry shadow factories. Three mass 
meetings were held in Coventry, and a Strike Bulletin had a 
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circulation of over 12,000 among Coventry workers. A special 
meeting organised by the ASSNC took place among Coventry aircraft 
161 
workers. Financial support for the Austin came from the major 
aircraft centres of Fairley, Hawker, De Havilland, Daimler and 
162 Halliwells. support for the dispute even emerged from the Austin 
Motor Company, a mass meeting being called to discuss its implications. 
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The outcome of the dispute did not achieve the full skilled rate 
for all adult workers, but the demand for only trade union labour 
to be employed, and the unity of the workforce, plus the 
organisational activity of the Jointshop Stewards Committe~were 
clear reflections on the rapid transformations taking place in 
centres of predominantly semi skilled labour. The level of trade 
union organisation at the Austin shadow factor~prior to the second 
world wa~was on the verge of 100% membership.163 The revitalisation 
of industrial activity was creating considerable tensions. The 
increasing piecework rates of the lower grade workers in the highly 
mechanised plants, of ten resulted in their earnings being above those 
of the higher rated skilled worker. In November,the toolroom 
workers at Rootes shadow plant in Coventry struc~ against attempts 
to dismiss higher rated workers who were earning less than the 
lower rated pieceworker. #Even this action, by only 68 workers,was 
supported by the semi skilled workers. 164 These challenges to the 
power of management in the workplace during the second half of the 
1930s,corresponded with increasing stability in employment, which 
had accompanied an improvement in trade, and also a revival in both 
trade union membership and workplace organisation. 
In Birmingham, for example, it was the Trades Council,rather than 
the actions of individual union~which became the central focus for 
annual campaigns to increase trade union memb·ership across the 
entire city. The progressive response to these activities discloses 
the change from unorganised power conflict towards organised wage 
labour in Birmingham. Following what was described i~ the Trades 
council report as a successful conference exposing the effects of 
the Bedaux payments system in the City's industry, the Council 
reported in 1934 on its most important week of its campaign held 
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between 10 and 16 September, or just prior to new car model 
d . 165 pro uct~on. The Town Crier, also reported the campaign resulting 
in, 
"One of the most important gatherings which the 
Birmingham labour movement has organised for many 
years." 166 
The cause of the recruitment campaign involved a series of mid-day 
meetings outside factory gates and workshops. It had included 15,000 
individual letters to lapsed members and the distribution of 
70,000 copies of recruitment literature. In 193~within a few days 
of that year's week, campaign,470 new members were claimed to have 
joined the union. 167 Substantial improvements began to be recorded 
in wages and conditions. Among the craft unions, 
the Patternmakers were claiming 100% organisation in a number of 
workshops in 1937, in addition to increases of 12s. a week in 
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wages. Employers were beginning to contact the Woodcutting 
machinists union for union labour, while the Vehicle Builders had 
achieved the abolition of the town's grading structure, and had 
gained improvements on the higher national rates, which had replaced 
Membership increased by 1,200. 169 The Brass and Metal Mechanics it. 
were reporting sh~ increases in membership, particularly among 
younger workers, following the restoration of the rate. Unemployment~ 
in Birmingham,in December 193~had fallen to 15,742, compared to 
57,662 for the corresponding date for 1931,170 although it did 
begin to increase during 1938. In 193~ the ETU opened 6 new 
branches in the city while the AEU reported an increase of 2,000 
members. Of unions with memberships in the motor industry, the 
1930s saw a rapid spread in unionisation. The vehicle bUilders, 
for exampl~ had a national membership of 19,000 in 1929, 30% of 
which was in the Midlands, and one in five of whom were unemployed. 
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Ten years late~ the union membership had increased by 42 per cen~ 
to exceed 27,000. 171 
In the Enginering Union, union growth was developing significantly 
quicker than the national average for the AEU as a whole. Between 
1930 and 1938, whereas the total membership increased by 119%, 
in Coventry it grew by 166%. Birmingham by 200%, and Oxford, 
though from a smaller base, by 963%.172 By far, however, the 
fastest area of growth in the organisation of wage labour, in the 
motor industry districts,was among the semi skilled. Between 1930 
and 19401 the number of TGWU members in No.5 region increased 
fourfold. With a membership in excess of 75,000, the union not 
only emerged as the largest in the West Midlands, but its West 
Midlands membership accounted for 10.1% of the unions total 
membership in 1939,compared to only 6.9% at the beginning of the 
173 decade. Apart from the frequent reports in the improvements in 
rates, working conditions, and union membership, the most important 
aspect of this general growth of the labour movement towards the 
end of the 1930s,was the re-emergence of the shop steward movement, 
in addition to the spread of organisation among the lesser skilled. 
In 193~ the District Organiser of the AEU could report not just a 
2,000 increase in membership in Birmingham and an al1round increase 
of 3s~ but also the growth of the shop stewards movement. 
"A most encouraging feature of the year has been the 
considerable growth of the shop stewards movement. This 
is really a worthwhile job. It asserts in making members, 
retaining them when they have joined and, most importantly 
of all, all brings to light immediately any attempt to 
worsen conditions" .174 
Among the semi skilled, the spontaneous non union action of unorganised 
workforces was beginning to come under the umbrella of mass union 
organisations. In 193~ the union could report in Birmingham, 
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"Large numbers of concessions, increases in wages and 
various sections involved in several disputes, most 
of them unofficial, but have been able to settle them 
to the membership satisfaction".175 
Blewitt, the TGWU area secretary, could write in 1939 of the impact 
of organisations. 
" .••••. hundreds of new agreements been drawn up and put 
into force, membership up from 60,000 to 70,000 •.•• 
new branches opening in the area. Unorganised firms 
visited, reorganisation obtained in all cases".176 
The expansion of the motor industry during the inter war period, 
was at the forefront of the developing technologies of the new 
industries in Britain. Not only did these new production methods 
provide changes in plant layout and labour utilisation,but the 
adoption of American technology made severe inroads into both the 
established engineering tradition, and also the industrial culture 
of the west Midlands, where the British motor firms became located. 
In the body shops and trim sections, for example, by the 1930s, 
177 the "independent republics of craftsmen" had been replaced by 
assembly lines with perhaps 120 operatives working on a single 
section, whose individual job tasks had subdivided the work 
previously undertaken by a gang of few workers, into 500 operati'i,~s. 
Mass assembly discarded a primacy of skill upon which traditional 
engineering had deve lope d, but brought new labour problems in the 
inter war period. A manager of a British car plant stated, 
"The solving of our production problems has created 
a new labour problem. In some instances the physical 
exertion required to lift heavy pieces and place them in 
machines is so great that we have to select operatives 
not because of their ability as machinists, but because 
of their physical strength". l78 
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Speed up and repetition of work tasks intensified the demands for 
physical effort by semi skilled operatives. American catch phrases 
became part of the vocabulary of foremen. "Step on it", "hop on 
it", became imported with the application of the technology to the 
mass assembly plants. In the British motor industry,the ruthlessness 
of competition in the product market and the logic of reorganisation 
in the paternalistic environment of the West Midlands,produced an 
employer philosophy which appeared at a distance from the 
co-operative character upon which labour relations of the small 
scale independent Birmingham manufacturers, or the workshop mentality 
of Coventry, or the rural and service occupations of Oxford, had 
developed. 
The exercise of managerial power increasingly emerged as the 
rationalisation of production technique~ in which an employer 
~ 
strategy in labour relations policies developed more from a professional 
technical managemen~based around production managers/than the roots 
of a tradition of paternalism, with collaborative trade unionism, 
produced in the West Midlands. A labour policy based around a 
worker confidence in production managemen~was no longer the same 
as the Birmingham non conformist employer paternalism, but a blind 
conformi ty to the production policies of production management. The 
exercise of employer power in mass assembl~ sought worker compliance 
almost exclusively through a cash nexus relationship rather than 
the intimacy of the workshop,which had been, and still, during the 
inter war period/continued to be, the basis of an industrial culture. 
The boldness of the motor manufacturers was not only removed from 
the craft based considerations of traditional engineering, they were also 
removed from the cultural traditions still represented within the 
regions infrastructure. In 1938, for example, over 1,500 different 
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trades were still being practiced in Birmingham, while over 10,000 
179 factorie~an average of less than 20 workers were employed, 
many of whom produced parts for the motor industry. In sharp 
contras~in 1939,16,000 manual workers, plus 2,000 full time staf~ 
were employed in car production at Longbridge, while a further 6,000 
1 d th A t ' k 180 were emp oye at e us ~n aero wor s. This workforce travelled 
daily from over 102 towns and villages, with some workers coming 
from as far as Wolverhampton, Tamworth, Worcester, Leamington, and 
Stratford upon Avon. In addition to the transport resources of 
Birmingham Corporation. and Midland Red, there were a further 66 
private coach operators, 2,700 private cars, 3,000 cycles,bringing 
the labour force daily to the works, plus 7,000 commuting by train. 181 
In the works,over 247 distinct trades, 6,000 production machines, 
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worked to an annual budget based upon a 142,500 minute year. 
A managerial strategy of the motor manufacturers during the inter 
war period,developed upon worker compliance to the company, on the 
basis of devising payment systems which incurred increasing speed 
up and intensification of job deprivation for individual operators and 
led to widespread labour revolts, particularly where management 
sought lower rates. Wage labour in the motor industry in an 
insecure labour market, and where employer, and in the case of the 
General Strike,Government support, weakened the position of national 
trade unions and their leaderships, resorted to the unorganised 
exercise of power outside the decision making process. Employer 
policy of opposition to unionisation in the workplace, and the 
weak position of trade union generally, discouraged the development 
of continuous organisation in the workplace. The direction of the 
spontaneous power conflict and the emergence of strike committees, 
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owed more to the militant leaderships which the issues of conflict 
threw up. It enabled, in particular instances, for the activities 
of local Communist Party organisations to assist and advise the 
development of an organisation based upon the grievances of the 
workplace/rather than the administration of a large national union. 
As the position of wage labour in the product market began to 
improve, a rapid increase in union membership of the semi skilled, 
in massive national unions, coexisted with the independent character 
upon which workplace power had developed. Unionisation followed 
workplace militancy and a capacity for independent action. 
Managerial labour policies carne under repeated challenge, while in 
its most advanced form, workplace organisation in the aircraft 
industry began to develop an autonomous organisation in situations 
of power conflict. It was during the second world wa~ that the 
state, in a :national eme~gency, attempted to resolve employer 
policy, union control and an emerging workplace power, in industrial 
relations. 
200 
PART 4 
THE NEW STABILITY 
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Abstract 
Between 1939 and 194~ the war economy transformed the position of 
organised wage labour in the West Midland assembly plants. In a 
labour market c~aracterised by acute shortages of manpower, and 
where industry and labour were required to adapt to munitions 
manufacture, it was the state which acquired extensive powers over 
industrial relations. State power entailed the virtual industrial 
conscription of wage labour and extended over into the traditional 
powers of prerogative exercised by employers. Legislative power 
over the free movement of labour restricted worker choice over 
jobs, but also removed the single authority of management in decisions 
concerning dismissal of a labour force. The absolute powers taken 
by the State in areas of manpower and industrial relations, however, 
were tempered by a policy to encourage industrial co-operation at 
workplace level. For differing reasons, the policies and strategies 
adopted by the state, and the views advocated by the TOe general 
council, despite opposition from the EEF, developed to both 
simultaneously increase the influence of workplace organisation/yet 
confine its growing power to within narrowly drawn, constitutionally 
prescribed, limits. It was during the war period, that these twin 
policies of industrial conscription and co-operation, built upon 
a patriotic fervour, not only compromised the disciplinary sanction 
of management over labour - the right to dismiss - but also paved 
the way for the involvement of shop stewards in redundancy decisions. 
Employers attitudes throughout the period remained pre-occupied by 
the long term consequences of the growing influence of shop stewards 
in the affairs of management in the workplace. 
The section begins with an account of state co~trol over the operation 
of the labour market. This is followed by an analysis of the process 
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whereby the growing influence of the organised shop stewards movement 
for a say in production issues, at workplace level, becomes contained 
within constitutionally prescribed Joint Production Committees. 
The third section deals with the part shop stewards played in the 
origin of 'redundancy' in Britain, while the latter part outlines 
the impact of the war economy in the West Midlands. 
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1 THE STATE AND THE LABOUR MARKET 
Changes in the labour marke~ brought about through the expansion 
of industry to meet the production requirements of the Second 
World War, led to a rapid expansion in trade union membership 
throughout the engineering industry. Direct state intervention 
in industrial relations, in order to overcome limitations in the 
labour market secured the pre conditions for a widespread 
development of workplace organisation based upon industrial 
cooperation. The motor industry again became a major producer of 
munitions, and subject to government influence. Trade union 
membership and the appointment of shop stewards, spread across 
the assembly and components'plants, which geared themselves to 
war production. The emerging shop steward organisations became 
the basis of the modern shop stewards movement. They were, however, 
firmly integrated into ~he management of a war economy. Their 
organisations,consequentlY,displayed far less organisational 
independence from both management and trade union organisation 
than the earlier movements. In the main, they fully supported 
increased production and national efficiency for the war effort, 
in return for a growth in trade union membership and greater 
influence within the workplace. 
The initial responses of government, management and trade unions 
to the increased demand for production and labou~ was not easily 
divorced from the experience of conditions during the inter war 
period. Pelling, the labour historian/writes of the relations 
between government and the unions at the beginning of the war, 
"But there was a strong legacy of mutual distrust between 
the government and the unions, and this could not be cleared 
away in the somewhat unreal atmosphere of the early months 
of the war, which saw no sustained fighting and so failed to 
provide a sense of emergency." 1 
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P. Inman, ~n her history of the munitions industry, writes, 
"The pre-war sanction of dismissal to act as an incentive 
to high output and good timekeeping became largely 
ineffective." 2 
The search was for ways of removing the element of distrust, by 
providing a more harmonious base to industrial relationsl to 
resolve the questions of acute shortages of labour for industry 
and to greatly expand industrial efficiency and output. It was 
the manner through which these objectives were approached,within 
the context of the war period, which not only enhanced the status 
of trade unions in industry and society, but also secured the 
pre conditions for organisations at workplace level. 
Before the formation of Winston Churchill's war cabinet and the 
appointment of Ernest Bevin as Minister of Labour and National 
Service, there had been considerable hesitation on the part of 
government to directly involve itself in some of the more 
pressing issues concerning organised labour. Despite the apparent 
shortage of skilled workers in the engineering industry, partly 
due to the low numbers of apprenticed labour during the depression, 
the government had been rather reluctant on the eve of the war 
to be involved in the 'dilution' issue for fear of industrial 
unrest. Consequentl~ it was left to the EEF and the AEU to reach 
an agreement in August 193~ permitting less skilled workers to be 
employed on traditionally skilled work. Though government did 
not wish to yield to the pressure for compulsion in the workplace, 
its policies progressed on the basis of compulsion in the last 
resort. 
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On the 27 November 1940 Bevin argued in the House of Commons 
that, 
"Whatever my weaknesses, I can claim that I understand the 
working classes of this country. I had to determine 
whether I would be a leader or a dictator, and I prefered, 
and still prefer to be a leader." 3 
He went on to say, 
"If conscription had been applied to labour in the manner 
it was applied in the army it would have been making 
directly for defeat." 4 
Sir John Anderson, who as Lord Pri,vy Seal had been in charge of 
evacuation, and became famous for the construction of the 
'Anderson Shelter', stated on the 5 December, after appointment 
to the Home Office, on the question of industrial conscription 
that, 
"The test to be applied in deciding whether to use 
compUlsion or not was whether it would give results. 
is not to say that compUlsion would not be applied in 
case of civi1ian~labour where it was the last and most 
appropriate method." 5 
That 
the 
By the 14 December, 'The Economist', among others, was calling 
for the introduction of conscription for industrial workers. 
It claimed, 
"There is no inviolable barrier between soldiering and war 
work." 6 
Compulsion, it claimed, was required/not only to undertake 
particular jobs, but also to ensure that workers remained in those 
jobs. 
"If the first aim of wartime labour policy is to place all 
available labour where it is required in the national 
interest, the second is to keep it there; and just as 
compulsory means may be needed for the first, some sort of 
sanctions (applied to workers and employers alike) may 
eventually be required for the second." 7 
The government, in order to meet the requirements of the war 
industries, began to move in this direction. Speaking in the House 
of Commons on the 21 January 1941, Ernest Bevin, the Minister of 
Labour said, 
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"Although everything had been and would be achieved by 
voluntary means, we have now reached a stage when it would 
be necessary to have industrial registration by age groups, 
and by this means to make a list of those who should be 
called upon to serve the state in national industry." 8 
This, the introduction of the Registration for Employment Orders, 
provided the state with statistical information on the skill 
abilities of the labour force,which could not be drawn from the 
existing data based upon the unemployment books. 
Opposition to dilution within the workplace did not prove to be 
a major cause of worker resistence to the allocation of labour.9 
A more important aspect of the dilution question lay in the belief 
that it could create the possibility of transfer to other areas 
of the country. This would involve, beyond personal questions of 
domestic disruption and difficulties obtaining accommodation and 
housing, confronting the wide variations in basic wage levels, 
.. 
bonus rates and piecework prices which existed between different 
regions, districts and among individual firms, within engineering. 
There was no guarantee that the structure of the labour market 
would facilitate the distribution of classes of labour for war 
production. Given the opportunities for extensive overtime 
working, especially among semi skilled workers on piecework, the 
increased earnings could encourage a movement of highly skilled 
workers on a fixed wage to lesser skilled work. The Restriction 
of Engagement Order (1940) was introduced/to prevent the poaching 
of labour by employers. The legislation controlled the movement 
of labou~ by compelling employers to recruit workers only from 
state run "labour exchanges or through approved trade union 
channels. This act did little to secure a redistribution of 
1 b . .. '1 10 a our ~n ex~st~ng emp oyment. 
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In order to encourage geographical mobilit~ the MOL adopted the 
principle that labour transferred ought to be paid the 'rate for 
the job' to which it had been accustomed. Attempts to establish 
universal basic rates were not successful, though uniform rates 
were introduced for skilled workers in some government and 
admiralty works. In engineering/the EEF and AEU were able to 
reach agreement whereby transferred workers would receive the 
basic rate for the district from which they had been subsequently 
employed should that rate be higher than the place of their 
transfer. To discourage the movement away from the skilled 
engineering occupations, a national agreement enabled skilled 
toolroom workers to be guaranteed a fixed differential above the 
earnings of skilled pieceworkers. This was to be a percentage 
increase based upon the level of earnings within their own plant. 
In Goventry,where the pre war motor industry became a major area 
for aircraft and munition production for the war period, the high 
concentration of semi skilled workers resulted in a local agreement, 
where the basis for calculating the toolmakers differential was 
a figure drawn from the rates of skilled pieceworkers for the 
whole district. These agreements were aimed at reducing the 
movement of highly skilled workers to less skilled work, and to 
. b f . . 11 take sk1lled la our out 0 compet1t1on between employers. 
On the issue of wages, Bevin was able to get an agreement between 
the employers representatives and the TUG,which enabled the 
government to dispense with thoughts of a wages freeze. Instead 
of this"wages would be conducted through the existing collective 
bargaining machinery,but to settle pay disputes compulsory 
arbitration would replace the right to strike. Strikes were to 
be prohibited. The cooperation which developed in industr~ was 
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more the result of the wartime national emergency and general 
support for the objectives of a war against fascism,ttan 
responses to administrative and legislative changes. It was when 
faced with a growing shortage of labour/however, that the state 
increased its powers to direct the supply of labour, and provisions 
were made which altered some of the fundamental rights associated 
with managerial prerogative. 
The requirement to tighten up the restrictions introduced to 
control the movement of labour, led directly to the ultimate loss 
of the employers traditional rights to dismiss his labour force. 
The Minister of Labour said to the Commons in January 1941, 
"It would have to be laid down that, in certain types of 
war work, the right of dismissal, except for misconduct, 
must be taken out of the hands of the employers. If a 
person~ services could no longer be used in a particular 
place it would have to be reported to the employment 
department so that~his services might be used elsewhere. 
Similarly no employee would be allowed to leave such vital 
work without permission of the National Service Officer." 
(NSO) 12 
Sanctions were to apply to both employer and worker, 
"If an employer or employee broke orders they would have 
committed an offence. If a person who had been wrongfully 
stood off could prove it, he would have to be paid for lost 
time. On the other hand, if a person stayed away from his 
productive effort he could be ordered to return to his 
place of employment. II 13 
The Essential Works Order (General Provisions), introduced in 1941, 
gave specific powers to the Minister of Labour to schedule 
establishments considered essential to the requirements of war 
production. The legislation was intended to fill weaknesses in 
the Restriction in Engagement Orde~ regarding the free movement 
of labou~ by establishing state controls to reduce labour turnover 
in essential industries. The main features of the order were that 
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employers were prohibited from discharging labour in areas of 
scheduled employment, and workers were prevented from leaving 
their employment without the permission of the Ministry of 
Labour. Having abandoned a dependence upon the workings of the 
labour market to distribute workers in employment, the curtailment 
of the right of labour to freely choose its employer was offset 
by restrictions upon the employer to freely dispose of his 
workers. Employees could be reported to the National Service 
Officer on questions of absenteeism, be expected to work 
specified hours, while employers would have to attain satisfactory 
working conditions and welfare facilities and guarantee a weekly 
minimum wage. 
The EWOs, through increasing state control over the direction of 
labour, had provision to create favourable circumstances within 
·which transferred labour would be more likely to accept their 
new situation. In the creation of these minimum provisions,the 
removal of the employers traditional right to dismiss an employee 
without approval of a ministry official, plus rights of appeal 
on questions of employment securit~ removed the arbitrary 
discretion of management to dismiss. Although the opposition of 
14 
the Appeals Board tended to qualify workers security in employment, 
the EWO increasingly made it difficult for employers to sack 
workers for trade union activity. Through these orders, which 
eventually covered 7 million workers, the intervention of the 
state in the labour market,established rights against dismissal 
in exchange for powers to industrially conscript labour.1S 
The general improvement in the market position for labour and the 
desire for flexibility and cooperation of organised labour for war 
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productio~made it increasingly difficult for employers to 
. 
prevent the appointment of shop stewards in the workplace. The 
EWO obstructed their dismissal. The role of the state in the 
labour market during a national emergency aided the development 
of workplace organisations. 
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2 'CONSTITUTIONAL' SHOP STEWARDS ORGANISATIONS 
Although legislation, combined with the economic position of 
organised labour, reduced employer resistance to shop steward 
appointments, it was the development of Joint Production Committees 
(JPCs), at the end of 1941 and the beginning of 1942,which 
symboliRed attempts to remove potential sources of opposition in 
the workplace. The committees provided a constitutional framework 
prescribing the activities of workplace organisations within the 
objectives of increasing war production. They enhanced the status 
of shop stewards in the war industries, but inhibited any 
tendencies towards the development of independent workplace 
organisation. 
Shop steward organisations in engineering had begun to regain 
some influence with the rearmament programme/which began in the 
aircraft industry during the late 1930s. The formation of the 
engineering and allied trades shop stewards national council 
(SSNC), with its monthly newspaper 'New Propellor; provided a 
. f . d b k 1 .. 16 forum for 1n ormat10n an contact etween wor pace organ1sat1ons. 
In 194~ it demonstrated its potential influence in engineering 
by calling a conference attended by 1,237 delegates representing 
over half a million workers~7 As such gatherings were outside 
the control of trade union leaders, and shop stewards committees 
were not recognised by managements in the workplace, the possibility 
of the creation of a network of workshop co~ttee~ operating at 
national and local levels, raised the question of an unofficial 
movement possessing autonomy and independence. That this did not 
occur cannot be entirely explained without an understanding of 
the commitment of the shop stewards organisations to the objectives 
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of the war aims. That an independent shop floor movement did 
not appear, however, resides in the commitment to stability in 
industrial relations; not just on the part of government, trade 
unions, and to a lesser extent management, but also the shop 
stewards. The production committees were the organisational 
means for the new stabilit~ on the basis of integrating shop 
stewards into the objectives of war production. 
The entry of the Soviet Union into the war on the side of the 
allies, after its invasion by Germany on 21 June 1941, 
transformed the British Communist Party's attitude towards the 
war effort.18 Their support for increased productivity and 
opposition to unofficial strikes paved the way for the formulation 
of a policy of industrial stability among the engineering shop 
stewards.19 InitiallYI they had attempted to expose production 
hold ups and, where-responsibility could be attached to either 
government or management, they claimed stricter state control, 
in some cases nationalisation. Agitation for production 
committees, however, resulted from pressure for increased output 
to be met within the existing framework of management, and 
prevailing state controls. 
Walter Swanson, the Convenor at Napiers Aircraft factory, opening 
the Conference of Engineering and Allied Trades Shop Stewards on 
19 October 1941,cal1ed for a JPC in every factory and the provision 
of full facilities for each shop steward taking part. He argued 
for the acceptance of joint responsibility by stewards and 
managements for seeing that production plans were discussed with 
workforces and properly implemented. The role of the Shop 
Steward Committees were, 
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"To work for coordination of the Works Shop Stewards 
Committees so that with the help of the trade union district 
committees, every facility is obtained for advancing 
proposals, checking up weaknesses, and stimulating production 
throughout a particular industrial district or area, and in 
this way strengthen and extend the work of Regional 
Production Boards." 20 
Swanson,giving the opening address to the conference, saw the 
shop stewards as directly aiding the productivity of the workforce. 
He claimed in his summing up, 
"If workers in the factories today and tomorrow set up 
JPC's, and if the shop stewards movement as a result of 
this conference, has the very valuable assistance of the 
press, we can really stir up the masses of people in this 
country, then the control of industry will not be a question 
for platform speeches, it will be a question for everyday 
action in the factories."21 
A government report ~n 194~ based upon the observations of the 
Regional Industrial Relations Officers/claimed that joint 
committees would not challenge managerial control • 
.. 
"It would appear that only in a very small number of cases 
could it be successfully contended that the joint machinery 
is being used to interest the workers representatives in 
the production difficulties of the managements, although 
some difficulties may have a direct repercussion on the 
wages and conditions of the workers." 22 
Discounting JPCs as a mechanism for gaining direct worker involvement 
in managerial questions,.the report went on to support a 
constitutional framework for positively engaging the shop floor 
into war production. The report said: 
"Apart, however, from any direct interest of this character 
(shop steward interest in management functions) on the 
part of the workers, they are showing under the stimulus 
of the shop stewards movement an increasing concern in 
production proble~ from the point of view of the national 
effort and advantage should clearly be taken of that fact 
by providing constitutional means whereby that concern 
can be translated into active cooperation." 23 
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To the TUC General Counci~ the creation of JPC's appeared to 
resolve a number of questions concerning the deficiencies ~n 
individual trade union organisations, surrounding the relationship 
between workplace organisation, based around shop stewards, and 
trade union structures based upon union officials. They feared 
the development of unofficial organisations, but were aware of 
the limitations in their attempting to ban them. The Munitions 
Production Committee argued: 
It .•• "saw dangers in allowing an unofficial body to develop 
and to form local and district machinery in order to deal 
with problems that were the responsibility of elected Trade 
Union Executive Committees'. However, we recognise that 
merely banning unofficial organisations will not produce the 
desired result. The General Council recognise that the 
present machinery is not completely satisfactory, steps 
should therefore be taken to strengthen it."28 
Protection from summarX dismissal may have been a positive aspect 
of state control over the direction of labour, for trade unionists, 
but the creation of JPCs symbolised more clearly attempts to remove the 
experience of inter war bitterness from the climate of industrial 
relations. They were seen in government circles as a means for 
overcoming belligerent industrial attitudes, by providing an 
instrument for unity between management and labour for the war 
effort. The more cautious response from sections of management, 
reflected a suspicion that they could undermine managerial 
authority in the workplace. For the SSNC,the sustained enthusiasm 
for production committees following the German invasion of 
Russia in 194~ was seen by its left wing leadership as contributing 
to the defeat of fascism and assisting in the defence of the 
Soviet Union,by providing the opportunity for direct worker 
involvement in the organisation of work. 
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The SSNC advocated JPCs in every factory to improve efficiency 
and increase production. They saw them as a means of extending 
the shop stewards role in supporting the management of war 
production. The government ~aving involved trade unionists in 
the administration of its policies at a number of level& was 
aware that what was lacking was the opportunity for the positive 
involvement of the rank and file at the point of production. 
Aware that cooperation of trade union officials did not 
necessarily mean compliance of an organised shop floor,the 
government, seeking the support of both trade union leaderships 
and the shop stewards movement, saw production committees as 
providing a role for shop floor workers without 'superceding' 
the management of the firm.29 
Existence of the committees, it was thought, besides weakening 
intransigent attitudes, would encourage workers to relax their 
traditional job controls over output, speed up production, reduce 
delays, ease bottlenecks, and . 30 generally lmprove morale. The 
committees were seen to encourage a more positive application of 
work, knowledge and experience to industry, increase productivity, 
promote harmony, and reduce conflict. They were seen as means 
for communicating to workers, government and managements, reasons 
for changes in production, and needs for labour rationalisation 
and redundancies~l The JPCs were also to deal with the social 
control of labour over issues like discipline, lateness, 
32 
abs.enteeism as well as welfare, transport, hours of work, etc. 
The engineering employers, however, did not willingly accept the 
idea of production committees, Employers argued that increased 
output owed more to scientific innovation, industrial design and 
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layout, and managerial expertise, than to committees of workers. 
These views of employers were forc.ib1y presented by the 
conservative MP, Sir Patrick Hannon, in his address to a meeting 
of manufacturers on the 21 January 1942. 
"It would be a grave day," he said, "for industrial life 
and for the relations of industry itself if we transfer 
either in whole or in part, any substantial share of the 
executive fower of industry to bodies elected by the 
workers." 3 
Mass observation reflected the dilemma facing employers over the 
basis of their own authority in industry and the question of the 
national interest arising out of the war effort. The study 
concluded, 
"However sacrificial his readiness to victory, if he is 
trained in the thinking of business for profit, the 
implications of what is happening to the factory now, in 
terms of the future are bound to present themselves." 34 
The research found that it was management, more than any other 
group, which dwelt upon the post war prospects. On the 2 January, 
The Times openly criticised preoccupations with the future as 
"Being given too prominent a place in the plans and 
activities of too many industrial concerns." 35 
The Economis~ criticising the slow progress being made in the 
setting up of JPCs ~mphasised their advantages for production 
and was led to blame both employers and the union leadership for 
their negative attitude towards them. On the 24 January, their 
leader said of the committees that were in existence, 
"They have thus contributed to the maintenance of morale 
and often to an increase in output per man. Unfortunately 
there is reason to believe that the trade unions frequently 
look upon them with disfavour as the trade marked merchandise 
of the shop steward movement, and employers too, sometimes 
discourage their establishment." 36 
The SSNC had been pushing for JPC since August 1941. On the 
4 May 1942, The Times welcomed the eventual agreement reached 
between the engineering employers and the trade unions, for the 
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establishment of the committees, which it saw in terms of their 
importance for increasing production. 
"The agreement between the Engineering National Employers 
Federation," it claimed, "and Trade Unions for setting up 
Joint Consultative Committees on production is likely to 
be a major factor increasing Britain's war production." 37 
This claim was strongly contested in a letter from Mr. T.G. John, 
Chairman and Managing Director of Alvis, in Coventry. He wrote 
on 7 May, 
"To suggest that a joint committee of shop stewards working 
in cooperation with a stewards committee and unions and so, 
is going to take care of a defect which is essential to 
winning the war is just political non sense."38 
He went on to argue, 
"The part of the war effort which incorporates the great 
aircraft industry begins with the genius and scientific 
ability of its designers following on with the utilisation 
of long and specialised experience of its managers concerned 
with production, then the skill and physical pertinacity 
and loyalty of the workpeople, and ultimately with the skill 
and heroism of the airforce men who put the products into 
actual use to vanguish our enemies." 39 
The value of shop stewards, he claimed to be of limited importance 
in the context of the war effort. 
"Internal works organisations such as those of shop stewards 
can give valuable help in some of these directions 
(concerning production matters) and undoubtedly are 
welcomed, but what great dis-service can be done to 
national war winning efforts by distorting such things out 
of proper perspective into a relatively unimportant creed -
and is this the time for doing so?" 40 
Executive functions of management,were widely thought not to be 
shared with elected bodies of workers. Behind the engineering 
industry's opposition lay the employers traditional demand to 
control his own workplace. They were particularly opposed to 
the development of any organisational structures which removed 
discussions of workshop issues away from the domestic atmosphere 
of the individual factory t outside the specific preroga.tive of 
219 
plant management. They were therefore opposed to joint committees 
operating at district level/parallel to the structure of trade 
. .. 41 un~on organ~sat~on. 
Trade unions, on the other han~ when they came to accept the need 
for JPC;~ished to have district production committees as these 
would enable full-time officials to influence the activities of 
their shop stewards, and possibly prevent a basis for the 
. . 42. 
emergence of unoff~c~al organisation. A major concern of the 
national trade union leadership was the widespread development of 
unofficial shop steward organisations in engineering. The main 
fear was that these organisations would develop machinery at 
district and national level on questions which the trade union 
leadership considered to be its responsibility. The difficulty 
for the national officers was that shop stewards were recognised 
by their individual unions, but their organisations, cutting 
across several unions, were not. They. therefor~ were not subject 
to the authority and control of individual union leaderships. 
Believing that the shop stewards movement was in danger of coming 
under a controlling influence of the Communist Part~ the union 
leadership took the view that it was necessary to establish some 
form of official machinery so that stewards organisations could 
come under the joint control of employers and trade unions, rather 
than be left to develop its own independent existence. They 
appreciated that merely to ban shop steward organisations would 
reinforce their sense of independence. Yet to grant recognition 
to workshop committees raised the possibility of their replacing 
the role of the full-time officials, or becoming too close to 
management and less subject to union influence. JPCs resolved 
these dilemmas by instituting machinery in the workplace which 
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legitimated the role of shop steward~ by narrowly defining the 
limits to his powers through the constitution of JPCs. 
Under the agreemen~ the production committees were to be 
essentially consultative, as opposed to negotiating committees, 
"The objective of which is consultation between management 
and workers in order to arrive at a mutual understanding 
in regard to the conditions of production, and the 
conditions of maximum production." 43 
Their activity was confined to meeting criteria acceptable to the 
employers. The role of the committees were to cover: 
1) Suggestions for the improvement and maintenance of production. 
2) The observance of works rules, discipline, absenteeism. 
3) Welfare, safety, air raid precautions, etc. 
The consultative nature of the committees and the restricting of 
their functions to aiding the management of war production, 
helped alleviate employers fears over control in the workplace. 
The employers insisted that JPC. powers and spheres of influence 
should be clearly distinguished from those of works committees. 
Production committees were not to deal with questions relating 
to wages and conditions, or issues which could normally be dealt 
within the industries Procedure for Disputes. Membership of the 
committees were to be confined to representatives of manual workers. 
The EEF refused to widen the committees to include technical or 
clerical personnel,on grounds that staff were part of management. 45 
The Government, convinced of the trade unLons view of production 
committees, was able to reach an agreement with the unions for 
their establishment in government munitions factories. Under 
government pressure, the engineering employers entered into an 
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arrangement with the engineering un~ons, whereby they recommended 
~Q 
to their member firms setting up JPCs. The committees were to 
be established voluntarily. They were to be purely private and 
domestic bodies, being without compulsion or attachment to any 
system of appeal~6 
A year after their introduction, Sir Stafford Cripps, the Minister 
for Aircraft Productio~ spok~ on the 9 January 1943, both of 
their importance to war economy of the production committees, and 
to the limitations which they placed upon worker involvement. 
"In these committees all the production sen~e of all the 
workers should find its expression. It is not intended 
that it should in any way supercede the management whose 
duty it is to manage the whole production machine." 47 
He went on to say 
"They should deal with production problems and all the ways 
and means that can contribute from all grades and sections 
of the workers to the speeding up and improvement of 
production. That is their job and if they stick to it and 
if everyone contributes to the suggestions and discussions, 
we shall have created a really useful democratic implement." 48 
The AEU production inquiry in March 194~ revealed that 13 out 
of 14 firms which claimed 100% increase in output had JPCs. The 
inquiry claimed that the 
"most outstanding single factor helping to increase output,~9 
was the cooperation between management and workers in establishments 
with JPCs and that 58% of all cases of increased production was 
. SO 
the result of workers suggest10ns. The work of the committees 
was claimed for contributing to improved time keeping, lower 
absenteeism, improved workshop organisation, better use of plant 
and machinery, and effective use of diluted and female labour~l 
It reported that 27 per cent of firms without committees were due 
largely to management opposition, but a further 15 per cent did 
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not exist owing to worker opposition to them. 
The Committees were not without their critics among trade 
.. 53 Th . d .. b' unlonlsts. elr ten ency was, In 1nstances, to act as a senteelsm 
courts, or become forums for managements to lecture workers and 
avoid questions of production. Over 4,000 JPCs were established 
by the end of the war and it is not unreasonable to suppose that 
54 
they did have an effect upon output. Crucial to their success 
remained the attitude of the Shop Stewards Committees. The SSNC 
issued a statement on the 29 January 194~welcoming the support 
now coming from the ruc for the creation of JPCs, but pointed 
out 
"These committees can only function successfully in getting 
production increased if they are composed of representatives 
of the employers, the management, and of shop stewards. 
They must have a strictly democratic basis as far as the 
worker representatives are concerned. In short, the 
successful functio~ing of JPC's depends upon their free 
election." 55 
Where they existed, they enhanced the role of stewards. Trade 
union insistence that only members of unions could stand for 
election to production committees,resulted in candidates being 
drawn almost entirely from shop stewards. The more effectively 
organised factories had regular JPCs meetings in working hours, 
with time off for shop stewards to meet prior to the meetings and 
h d h d . f k h .. 56 en ance t e status an lmportance 0 wor s op organlsatlon. 
JPCs encouraged the development of workplace organisations in 
constitutional channels, by prescribing the role for shop stewards 
within a framework compatible with the objectives of higher output 
and productivity in the workplace. Although this may have 
inhibited the emergence of an independent shop stewards movemen~ 
the acceptance by management~ during the conditions of wartime, 
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helped to build up shop stewards and trade unLon membership. 
It provided the conditions to organise openly, and increased 
shop floor strength and confidence which was both a reflection 
and an indication of security for active trade unionists. The 
committees operating in the workplace provided representative 
. f hI' f d ., 57 h' exper~ence or a woe generat~on 0 tra e un~on~sts. T ~s 
undermined many of the myths underpinning the notion of 
'managerial pretogative', and established the basis for a post-
h d 
,,58 
war s op stewar s organ~sat~on. 
As the JPCs were responsible for the organisation of air raid 
duties among the workforce, the role of the shop steward was also 
a link between war production in the factories and national 
59 defence. Shop steward organisations grew considerably during 
the second world war but although it enhanced the shop stewards 
role in the workplace, workplace organisation did not possess 
the independence of the first world war shop stewards movement. 
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3 REDUNDANCY AND WORKPLACE RELATIONS 
The state had directly intervened in industrial relations to meet 
deficiencies in the labour market over the distribution of labour 
skill~ in a period of acute labour shortages. The war effort was 
a pursuit which outweighed the preservation of managerial 
prerogative over the allocation and discharge of labour. 
Selection and transfer of labour was vetted by ministry officials 
on the basis of what was considered essential to improving war 
production. The method arrived at for the handling of redundancies 
developed to facilitate the selection of workers required for 
essential work. Under the procedures established, shop stewards 
played an indispensable role in the process of selecting workers 
for redundancy. They were able to act as watch dogs against 
possible employer victimisation and protectors against the use 
of redundancy to weaken workplace organisation. It was at the 
end of ·the wa~when the state abandoned its control in the labour 
market, that the question of redundancy and the security of 
workplace organisation became again a major issue in engineering 
and more so in the post-war motor industry. 
The employers were most pre-occupied by the possible long term 
. 60 implications of changes taking place in 1ndustry. Among workforces , 
the experiences of the inter war depression retained an image of 
pessimism for the post war future. The end of the war was 
considered to spell an inevitable return to a world of unemployment. 
Mass observation investigators commented that insecurity might 
contribute to a loss of work incentive/as feelings of military 
victories would only result in the bleak prospect of a return to 
. 61 past exper1ences. Worker insecurity had been the basic assumption 
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of industry. The sack had been the central force of managerial 
authority. The effect of war and war production upon the labour 
market, did not appear to have removed conceptions of long term 
insecurity from the workforce. Dilution arrangements, the 
demand for manpower in the armed forces, plus the enrolment of 
'green' labour into the war industries ,all raised questions of 
what would happen to such workers following the cessation of 
hostilities. State powers had modified the traditional control 
of employers to dismiss an employee without the approval of the 
NSO. : Employers decisions could be contested by workplace 
representatives, given the period of high demand and general 
shortage of labour skills.lt was not until the later stages of 
the war that insecurity of employmen~ in the form of redundancy 
began to materialise upon a significant scale. As government 
war contracts began to run down and were even cancelled, the 
prospect of surplus labour again presented itself. In engineering, 
the dilution agreements between employers and unions,plus the 
provisions contained in the EWOs, inhibited managerial rights to 
dismiss its workforce. 
The handling of redundancies developed out of the procedures 
designed to facilitate the selection of workers for transfer to 
essential work. In engineering, during the early part of the 
wa~ the Ministry of Labour, acting on the advice of the Engineering 
Industry Advisory Panel, issued instructions on the method to be 
adopted for selecting workers for transfer to other areas of 
1 62 VI· . . emp oyment. 0 unteers were subJect to m1n1stry approval, which 
was taken following consultation with both management and trade 
union representatives. Where volunteers were insufficient or 
were not of the particular labour require~ a selection procedure 
226 
would come into force/in which management would have to present 
their choice of workers to the shop stewards. The stewards 
could oppose anyone on the list,provided they submitted an 
adequate substitute who they considered more appropriate for 
transfer. The criteria for assessing substitutes had to take 
into account the skill of the worker and the needs of the 
prospective job, the importance of the work undertaken, ~n 
addition to questions of domestic responsibilities, age and 
f . . h h f' 63 length 0 serv~ce ~t t e ~rm. 
It was then up to the management to either agree' or reject the 
shop stewards suggestions. In the case of rejection, a Ministry 
official would engage in consultation with management, shop 
stewards and the actual workers concerne~ before deciding who 
would be transferred. The procedure was designed for circumstances 
where large numbers of workers were required to be transferred. 
Where only a few workers were involved,a speedier, more informal 
approach was adopted in the hope of reaching an early agreement 
64 between managements and shop stewards. Both the selection 
procedure and the informal method enabled prior agreement on 
selecting workers for transfer, the belief being that this would 
reduce possible grounds of appeal or contention surrounding the 
movement of labour. 
The selection procedure, although agreed by the EEF and TU 
representatives on the advisory panel, remained voluntary. It was 
largely adhered to by the employers in instances of transferring 
labour, but in Coventr~ the employers association began to press 
for the restoration of rights to discharge labour without 
consultations with shop stewards in cases of redundancy?5 As the 
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procedure did not place an obligation upon employers to consult, 
the Coventry employers wished to dispense with shop steward 
consultations over the selection of redundant workers. They were 
attempting to distinguish between the transfer of workers from 
the redundancy of workers, and were attempting to exercise their 
discretion over consultations. In otherwords, they were 
attempting to dispense with prior agreement with shop stewards 
on the selection of redundant workers. 
By the middle of 1944, pressure in the EEF was building up against 
what they viewed as difficulties preventing their ability to 
dispense with surplus labour. They complained that despite 
agreements being reached witht~~O'long delays took place before 
66 
Ministry officials arranged for transfers. Redundant labour was 
remaining employed and receiving wages for negligible work. They 
reported that unions were beginning to oppose further dilutions, 
on the grounds that suitable skilled labour was already available 
within the area, and that there was under utilisation of skilled 
workers.67 The employers were arguing that Ministry officials 
were imposing procedures on them for transfer of labou~ in 
instances which they considered to be redundancies. This was 
resulting in employers redundancy lists being open to scrutiny 
by shop stewards at workplace level. The engineering federation, 
having discussed the emerging situation with the Ministry of 
Labour, were satisfied that these criticisms, voiced by their 
affiliated members, were not the result of any intended government 
po1icy.6aThe Ministry held the view that, generally, there still 
remained a shortage of labour of all classes which could be fully 
accommodated in employment. It was largely a question of being 
informed where the redundant labour existed/so that arrangements 
for transfer could be made to firms and districts where it was 
~n short supply. Delays concerning declared redundancies were, 
~n the main,due to reasons of suspected victimisation whereupon 
a firm~ application would not be finalised until the question 
of victimisation had been dealt with in accordance with the 
procedure machinery for the engineering industry.L? 
A more significant disagreement emerged over dilution in relation 
to redundancy during 1944. The operation of the relaxation 
agreement had arisen during a local conference in Lancashire. 
At the conference/it was claimed that it had been accepted in 
principle by the Joint Relaxation Co~ttee/that,where redundancy 
occurs, the management would, in the first instance/dismiss 
'dilutees' in accordance with the intention of the provision of 
70 
the Relaxation agreement. Though this was the acceptable method 
for redundancy by Ehe AEU, the union was concerned that it was 
not a universal practice.71 
They argued that changes in the war situation,resulting in sudden 
alterations in production programmes,were creating redundancies, 
but while skilled workers and apprentices in some districts were 
being dismissed, di1utees and female labour were being kept on. 
A report that production would be reduced by 50% in six Coventry 
factories, creating a possible 10,000 redundancies, caused the 
unions to claim that a general deterioration was occurring/with 
72 the possibility of strikes taking place. The union leadership 
wanted the dilution agreements put in reverse, with skilled men 
having preference for employment over diluted labour. They 
demanded that employers should now recognise that skilled labour, 
which had a history in the industr~ should have first call in 
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engineering over labour introduced for the war period. 
The employers were not fully sympathetic towards this position. 
They argued that ultimate control over labour questions still 
remained with the Ministry under the EWO provisions. Employers 
could state that they had surplus labour in particular categories~ 
74 but could not discharge them without NSO approval. For the 
employer~ if there was a choice between skilled and diluted 
labour ~t would be, from the engineering point of view, more 
advantageous to discharge the skilled worker, who possessed a 
much broader based training and experience in the industry, than 
the dilutees who possessed a limited working knowledge, often 
confined to specific operations in particular plants. They 
d ... 75 were thus far less a aptable to chang~ng 1ndustr~al processes. 
The EEF were attempting to articulate a general interest of their 
members. Mobility of skilled labour possessed certain advantages. 
Having been assured by the Ministry that there were still 
overall shortages of most classes of labour, but more especially 
for highly skilled workers/they argued that the unions were 
seeing redundancy only in terms of a particular firm rather than 
the industry as a whole. The national interest, they argued, 
could not be served by questions of which category of labour to 
dismiss. The release of dilutees would not provide the same 
optimum production levels as that of skilled labour. The whole 
question needed to be viewed in terms of what was understood as 
the general demand for labour. 
The AEU were not prepared to accept such a perspective. It was, 
to them, contrary to the spirit from within which it had entered 
into dilution agreements in 1939. They considered as a first 
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principle of dilution, that it was permissible when skilled 
labour was not available, for firms and employers to engage other 
types of labour on work which had previously been done by 
skilled men. It was an evasion of this principle of the 
agreement,whereby firms declared to the Ministry that, in the 
first instance, skilled men or apprentices were redundant. The 
initiative should not come from the employers, who could not 
discharge their responsibility under the agreement by saying 
that the Ministry had overriding power. 
Underlying the union case was the belief that their membership 
had agreed to abide by the dilution agreements on the assumption 
that they would not operate to the material deprivation of 
workers who had been prepared to give up many of their traditional 
d o 76 I h f hOd k OIl d customs an pract~ces. n t e course 0 t e war per~o s ~ e 
workers had actively~assisted in the training of new or upgraded 
recruits to the engineering industry. Now however, as there was 
a falling off in orders and contracts in some sectors of the 
economy, the position beginning to face the traditional 
engineering workforce was the threat of redundancy and the prospect 
of having to move residence to find employment. It was at this 
point that they thought that relaxation agreements should be put 
in reverse. 
On the 30 August 1944,an agreed statement between the EEF and AEU 
endorsed the existing position on dilution for war production
l 
but 
stated that where reductions in numbers of workers was to take 
place under relaxation agreements, the employers accepted the 
principle that dilutees should first be submitted to the NSO. 
This position was widened in informal discussion with the General 
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and Municipal Workers. Both parties accepted as general policy 
the view taken when dilution had been introduced, 
"that men who belong to the industry whose history was 
with the industry and who had an engineering background 
should have a greater moral claim on the industry than 
men who might be brought out of agriculture or a retail 
shop." 77 
This would still hold good where redundancies occurred. 
Preferential claims to an engineering job, as a defence against 
redundancy, were to be made upon the rights of skill and a 
working history in the industry. 
Two complications, however, enter into this reasoning. It was 
argued that during the last five years, even under a peace time 
economy rew entrants would have entered engineering either to 
78 
meet normal natural wastage or expansion in output. Further 
there existed the situation where workers in engineering had been 
upgraded from within the industry. What was their claim on job 
rights? The position of the Transport and General was that 
upgraded semi skilled workers should return to their previous 
jobs~9 It was the last in the industry who should be first to 
leave. 
In the second half of 1944, large scale redundancies began to 
affect the war industries. As 3 million engineering workers were 
employed, munitions cuts in military programmes would have 
considerable implications for employment ~o In Birmingham, a third 
of the city's total population was engaged in munitions 
1 81 h" h " emp oyment, w 11e t e populat10n of Coventry had grown by some 
60,000 with the expansion of the armament industry between 1935 
82 
and 1940. The war economy had resulted in a sharp reduction in 
the production of cars for civ.ilian purposes, but the importance 
232 
of the industry's technology for munitions production had 
expanded total productive capacity. Employment in the industry 
had increased from 253,000 to 407,000 between 1939 and 1943; less 
than one third, however, were engaged in car production, the 
majority were working on military vehicles, aircraft and other 
forms of munitions work. 8l: ighty per cent of aer:o engines were 
84 
manufactured in motor industry establishments. A third of the 
workforce in 1944 were women workers, compared to less than a 
85 
tenth in 1939. Readjustment to a peacetime economy necessitated 
reductions in workers and closures of plants. 
The important issue which confronted shop steward organisations 
was the need to control the process of redundancy and change, so 
that wartime gains in earnings and conditions could be 
maintained through the actions of workplace organisations. 
Coventry's growth in the armament industry had brought a greater 
dependence upon the motor industry~6 Between 1944 and 1945, jobs 
in the Coventry shadow factories were being lost at a rate of 
87 • 350 to 400 a week. In Just over three months,emp10yment had 
. . 88 fallen from 25,000 to 10,000 1n the shadow factorles. Pressure 
from shop steward organisations and trade union officials resulted 
in workplace organisations becoming involved in the joint 
regulation of job loss. 
The origins of a national policy of cooperation between unions 
and management on wartime redundanc~ arose out of the rapid 
decline in the munitions industry in the Midlands. In Coventr~ 
the district union officials were unaware of redundancy notices 
. f .. 89 
appear1ng on actory notlce boards 1n July and August 1944. It 
was only under pressure from the shop floor that the Midland 
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regional officials agreed to meet shop stewards. Under pressure 
from the trade unions and with such large numbers of workers 
being involved in the rundown of munitions production in the 
shadow factories ,the COV EEA relented upon their earlier attempts 
to confine shop steward involvement to questions of transfers 
of labour while preserving the question of redundancy for 
91 
management. 
Although this change of view appears to have been taken to 
prevent possible grounds for worker unrest .. it also became seen 
as a means for enabling a speedier discharge of labour through 
redundancy appeals being lodged against selection to the MOL. 
At a local conference in September 1944 the COV EEA and local 
trade union officials reached an agreement on procedure for 
handling redundancies. The agreement provided the shop stewards 
with an indispensible role in the process of job loss. Where a 
redundancy was to take plac& the management would draw up 
schedules of the workers affected, copies of which would be 
given to the MOL and the plant shop stewards. It was agreed 
that management, in preparing their lists would take account of: 
1) Whether the worker was a mobile or immobile person. 
2) Whether he or she was a Coventry person or an "imported" 
3) 
4) 
worker. 
Particulars as to time keeping etc. 
92 Dilution agreements in cases of skilled workers. 
A record sheet for every worker was to be drawn up/so that when 
the cuts came the lists could be established on the basis for 
agreed selection. This local agreement was intended to serve 
the particular requirements of the structure of the Coventry 
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workforce, where large numbers of directed workers had been 
sent to the munitions factories. The involvement of the shop 
stewards was to encourage their cooperation in the discharge 
of labour, and help assemble an agreed list so redundancies 
could be enacted within a period of two weeks. 
The shop stewards had rights to make alterations in workers 
selected by management; they could offer substitutes. Where 
disagreement emerged the MOL would hold the balance. On questions 
of dilutees ,stewards were to approve as much of the list as 
possible and leave aside doubtful cases. Their submission of 
substitutes was to be compiled within two days. For dilutees , 
length of service in the industry was to be taken into account. 
This gave a stronger claim to employment to those with more than 
a wartime experience of the industry. Consultation over 
dilutions was to·be made through the chief shop steward of the 
union involved or the shop steward negotiating committee. 
Although this agreement gave recognition to the role of shop 
stewards in the redundancy of labou~ the Coventry trade unions 
produced their own seven point policy to strengthen membership 
and organisation in a period of reductions in workers. On the 
31 October 1944, the Coventry engineering unions agreed upon the 
basis for selecting substitutes. These were 
"(1) That non trade unionists should be substituted for 
trade unionists as redundant. We regard this as the most 
important clause in these proposals and over-riding all 
others. 
"(2) Wartime entrants from other industries on skilled, 
semi skilled and unskilled work to be the first to be 
transferred by MOL to suitable work within their own trades. 
We recognise, however, that cases will arise which will 
make it necessary to transfer even skilled men to post-
war development work within the engineering industry. 
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"(3) The dilution agreement should be immediately 
implemented both as regards men and women, and our member 
dilutees should be down graded to their previous work. 
"(4) Workers resident in Coventry shall be retained in 
preference to those who are not in the district. 
"(5) Immobile labour shall be given preference to mobile 
labour. 
"(6) Length of service in the industry shall be taken 
into consideration in connection with the selection 
procedure, as against length of service at the firm. 
"(7) Dispersed workers shall be given equal consideration 
wi th others." 93 
The policy of the Coventry engineering trade unions on wartime 
redundancy/combined the maintenance of trade union membership 
in the workplace with the application of rules which would govern 
the general selection of redundant workers. The unions were 
trying to reduce wartime redundancy as possible grounds for 
arbitrary managerial selection of workers by reason of trade 
.. 
union membership, activity or representation. In other words, 
in exchange for the agreement of job loss was an acquired control 
over the process of dismissal. By establishing union membership, 
seniority, skill and dilution rights as factors in the process 
of selection, the elimination of victimisation established a 
prior entitlement over job rights for categories of workers. 
To gain some controlling influence over the process of redundancy 
was clearly an essential requirement to preventing a return to 
arbitrary dismissal of the inter war period. This was the 
objective of the shop stewards national committee in engineering. 
In January 1945 it set out a six point plan for handling 
redundancy. 
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(A) No new labour to be taken on. 
(B) Volunteers, or those wishing to return to home town. 
(C) Part-time workers and those from other industries 
now needing labour for priority requirements should 
be released. 
(D) Operation of dilution agreements. 
(E) Selection to be on basis of factory as a whole and 
not on departmental basis. 
(F) No-one to leave until union organisation had been 
informed of details of job, rates of pay and conditions 
to which redundant worker was being sent. 94 
The procedure was defining job rights/which in effect would tend 
to favour long servicing employees. The rights to consultation 
over redundancy however were far from clear. 
Throughout most of the war period,the question of employment and 
discharge of labou~ had been subject to statutory regulation. 
In cases of transfer of workers on the initiative of the state, 
the supply officer would inform the firm of the number of workers 
required. Volunteers would be called for and where their number 
fell short of the necessary quota, the additional number would 
be chosen by the supply officer in consultation with the firm 
and workers representatives. In cases involving redundancy 
declared on the initiative of the firm, the firm submitted a list 
of redundant workers which was normally accepted by the labour 
supply officer, but subject to the right of the workers 
representatives being able to challenge any particular name on 
the grounds of victimisation. 
As a result of the run-down of war production, the increasing 
scale of redundancy and growing confusion surrounding its operation, 
the Ministry of Labour, following consultation with the Tue and 
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BEC, issued a letter to the 45,000 firms engaged in war production 
requesting managements to use the machinery of Joint Production 
Committees and Shop Stewards Committees to explain methods for 
discharging labour and arrange for Ministry of Labour officials 
95 to explain methods for selection and possibilities of new work. 
The new procedure for declaring redundancies separated the 
workforce into five categories of priorit~ based upon the least 
interference with production. 
Category 1 - those due for call up 
2 - those being 3 years or more away from home 
and who wish to return 
3 - a) those from non engineering industries 
wishing to return to their former trades 
b) engineering workers who could be employed 
locally on priority work 
4 - thgse able to fill preference vacancies 
5 - additional workpeople required to make up 
the number redundant who are nominated by 
the firm 96 
The procedure had been agreed for the purpose of arranging lists 
on the above lines,where firms, on information from the government 
contracting department, Ministry of Labour, or otherwise, decided 
they could dispense with certain numbers of workers. 
Clause (b) of a Ministry of Labour circular set out how the 
procedure was to be affected. 
"In order to give effect to the arrangements, the officer 
responsible for selecting the workers for release or 
transfer from an establishment should consult the management 
and worker representatives, explain the order of release, 
and endeavour to obtain their full cooperation. Apart from 
volunteers coming within categories 2 and 3, the final 
responsibility for selecting the particular workers to be 
released or transferred will rest with the selecting officer, 
w~o should have regard to the need for leaving the employer 
W1th a labour force adequate to cope with reduced production." 97 
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In the situation of redundancy, the arrangements stated only 
that Ministry officials responsible 
"should consult the management and workers representatives .. 
to obtain their full cooperation."98 
There was to be no obligation on the part of management fu 
make up the lists of redundancies to cooperate with the 
unions. It still remained possible for management to compile 
the lists and then leave it to the supply officer to inquire about 
the workers objections, while both employers and unions had 
recourse to appeal through the local appeal boards against 
decisions of the labour supply officer, in cases of alleged 
I 
vicitmisation it was left to the workers shop stewards to take 
up the matter with management, through the procedure of the 
industry. Management, however, did have the right, where it was 
considered imp"ortant, to claim retention of labour. These 
procedures did not deal with the issue of consultation between 
management and unions on the rundown of labour. 
The AEU took up this point/after the issue had become highlighted 
when a local Employers Association,in refusing to consult the 
shop stewards, had made a distinction between consultation in 
99 
circumstances of transfer and cases of redundancy. They had been 
willing to consult on transfers, but not on redundancy for fear 
of creating precedents which could be used in other districts. 
The AEU argued that consultation was one of the main features 
the trade union movement had insisted upon with the Ministry of 
Labour,in all regulations and restrictions which had been placed 
upon the labour force}CKConsultation had been a cha~teristic 
of recent industrial relations. It had operated in production 
committees, in situations where the membership had given up 
traditional practices which had benefit':ed the nation and also 
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the employers. The Executive stated that the need was to maintain 
the good relationship established with the Federation. 
Consultation had to continue, questions of who should be 
transferred or made redundant could not be entirely left with 
the employers. Questions of domestic hardship needed to be 
raised, whether the worker was a shop steward or active trade 
unionist. The unions had to have a say and this was provided 
for in clause (b) of the ministry circular. 
Whether consultation was initiated by the employers in the first 
instance or the Ministry, was, according to the EEF, open to the 
discretion of management at local level. This, in their view, lay 
within the guidelines of the Ministry of Labour letter. 
Treatment of this issue was clarified by further regulations for 
dealing with redundancy, following discussion with the BEe and 
the TUC. Presented in January 1945, it elaborated category 5. 
"any additional workpeople required to make up the number 
of persons redundant who are nominated for release by 
the firm." 101 
The new procedure to be adopted was that the works manager would 
assess the number of people affected by cancellation of work. 
This information, broken down into classes of labour affected by 
the redundanc~was to be passed to the personnel department/wh~ 
in turn, would notify the convenor of shop stewards. All workers 
were to be divided up by their occupational classification, 
i.e. roughers, smoothers, polishers, etc~02When a number of 
workers were declared redundant in anyone shop or section,a 
method of preference was to be outlined which would operate for 
all workers in that particular occupation. A meeting would then 
be arranged between the works management, the labour supply 
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inspector and the workers representative, and a list of names 
would be compiled of the redundant workers and would be dealt 
with in order of the five categories of priority. Category (5) 
however was now to be broken down into 5 sub divisions 
(a) Volunteers who desired to leave 
(b) Part-time workers (according to length of service) 
(c) Women under the temporary relaxation agreement 
(according to length of service) 
(d) Men under the temporary relaxation agreement 
(according to length of service) 
( ) d d . I h f . 103 e Men an women accor 4ng to engt 0 serV4ce 
Volunteers expected individual considerations could enter into 
the choice, i.e. disability, family support, etc. This Special 
Redundancy Procedur~which had been nationally agreed for the 
handling of redundancies in the war production industries between 
the MOL, employers representatives and the TUC, came to an end 
on 30 May 1946. Though the EWO was still in operation and 
permission was required from the NSO before discharging workers, 
with the rundown of war production comparatively few industries 
were classified as essential work. The Government expressed its 
approval of the degree of cooperation which had been retained 
between employers and unions in the period of transaction. The 
MOL wrote to the Employers Organisation on 30 May 1946 
"It is very fully appreciated that the smooth way in which 
the difficult task has been accomplished of dealing with 
redundant workers in the critical period of the transition 
from war to peace is due in great measure to the 
cooperation of both sides of industry, and the Minister 
desires me to express his thanks for all the help and 
assistance which you and the members of your confederation 
(BEe) have given in the operation of these arrangements." 104 
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It was in the motor industry that a series of major confrontations 
took p1ace}as workplace organisations in the post war period 
sought to gain control over employer discretion to determine 
the level of his own workforce in order to defend workplace 
leadership. 
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4 THE WAR ECONOMY AND THE MOTOR INDUSTRY 
The second world war accelerated change in industry and rapidly 
expanded the productive capacity of engineering in Britain. 
At its peak,in the middle of 1943,engineering employed 2,959,700 
f h 1 048 300 105r B' . h C workers,o w om, , were women. n Lr~ng am, oventry 
and Oxford, the technologies of the new industries were extended 
as these centres became major locations for munitions production, 
much of it under the management of the motor industry. The 
labour force in Birmingham increased by 65 per cent between 1939 
and 1944. A third of the City's population was working in 
munitions. Jewellers and Silversmiths were employed in 
manufacturing components for radar equipment, rifles and aircraft 
parts. At Cadbury's Bournville factory,2,000 women,usually 
employed making chocolate,were manufacturing parts for rockets, 
respirators for the armed forces, and aircraft components. The 
Midlands tradition of adaptability and innovation in manufacturing 
applied to both working establishments and labour forces. 
In the motor industry,the production of private cars in Britain 
fell from 305,000 in 1939 to 2,108 for 1941~6 During the war 
period,output for the private market was down from just under 
107 6,000 cars per week to an average of about 40 cars a week. The 
industry became almost entirely absorbed in war production. 
Over 80 per cent of aero engines were' produced in the motor 
industry establishments. The Nuffield Mechanisations plant, 
built next to the Wolseley car plant, assembled a quarter of the 
country's tanks, It was the only factory to build a complete 
tank within one works. the first occasion that tank production 
in the U.K. had been undertaken with flow-line techniques, with 
108 
the content of work broken down into semi skilled tasks. 
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Morris SU plant produced parts for aircraft, carburettors and 
fuel pumps. The Austin factory at Longbridge assembled 120,000 
military vehicles, while the shadow factory at Cofton Hackett 
.. d . . 109 produced St~rl~ng an Hurrlcane alrcraft. 
Across in Coventry in 1939, a second se t of shadow factories were 
built by Daimler, Standard and Rootes, while Rover built their 
second plant at Solihull. The production of engines for the 
Mercury and Pegasus aircraft was extended to cover the new 
designs for the Hurricane, Spitfire, Blenheim and Whitely. 
Hawker Siddeley Aviations built the Lancaster and Stirling, as 
well as engines for the Cheetah, Avro Anson, and Airspeed Oxford 
trainers. Alvis, moving into ae~o engines, repaired some 18,000. 
Climax produced 25,000 water pumps for the fire service, and 
made generators for airfields. Standard, constructed air frames 
for the Mosquito and assembled 2,800 light armoured cars. The 
Rootes shadow factory produced one in seven bombers made in the 
UK, plus 60 per cent of armoured cars, 30 per cent of the scout 
cars plus the Bristol Radial aero engine. 
At the Morris factories in Coventry, Nuffield Mechanisations 
produced the BOFORS gun mine-sinkers and aircraft components. 
11('1 
The Morris Engines plant assembled tank engines, and produced 
steel tank tracks, for the first time ~n the UK,with the aid of 
a convenor belt system and an unskilled workforce of 2,000. 
The 1,000 coachbuilders a~ the Morris Bodies plant changed over 
from the M.G. Midget to build Horsa Gliders, Shell carriers, 
transportation crates, compressor boxes, tool bags and canopies 
111 
for army vehicles. The factory was filled with unskilled labour, 
a large proportion of whom were women, without a previous 
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experience of factory work. The Riley car plant began to construct 
• 112 Wellington Pegasus eng~nes. 
Near Oxford, the MG sports factory at Abingdon altered its 
assembly tracks to accommodate the construction of military 
Bulldozers, while the main Cowley plants entered into production 
for power units for military aircraft, and anti-aircraft guns. 
They repaired damaged aircraft, produced Navy torpedoes, submarine 
engines, and millions of jerry cars. The Nuffield workforce 
doubled to nearly 30,000:13At Austin, the Longbridge works 
increased its manual workforce from 12,000 in 1939 to 16,866 by 
1943. The Standard Motor Co. in Coventry had employed 2,800 
workers on car production in 1938, By 1943 its Coventry factories 
had a manual workforce of over 10,300. The Rootes factories 
hod 
employed above 10,000 workers, while .. Daimlers plants just under 
8,000 workers. At the three Hawker Siddeley plants in Coventr~ 
the labour force rose from 2,300 at the beginning of the war to 
114 just over 10,000 by 1944. 
An indication of the massive change that occurred in the motor 
industry can be judged by the production of new machine tools. 
Alfred Herberts, an important manufacturer for the new industries, 
produced over 65,000 machine tools. The Wickman ~1achine Tool 
Company in 1940,had orders for over 3,000 machine tools. 
This rapid expansion in the productive capacity of the motor 
industry and its utilisation for munitions production was met 
by a considerable increase in the use of unskilled and female 
labour. In all three of the locations of the British motor 
industry,employment and population grew as workers from other 
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parts of the country were sent to work in this essential war 
industry. In Oxford, the popUlation trebled during the war, 
largely as a result of immigrant workers to the war economy. 
The effect of the munitions industry on Coventry/was to increase 
the city's dependence upon the technologies of the motor and 
aircraft industries. Even in 1938, partly because of the 
rearmament programme which began in the mid 1930s, 38 per cent 
of the total labour fo"rce of the city were working in the motor 
and aircraft plants. In 1941, 60 per cent of all 
Coventry's manufacturing labour, or half the city's labour force, 
. 1 d' h d' f f . 115 Th were be~ng emp oye ~n t e motor an a~rcra t actor~es. e 
composition of the labour force went through an almost complete 
change in this period, as the proportion of female workers 
increased. Less than one in ten workers in the assembly plants 
had been women in 1939. By 194~one in five of all Coventry 
munitions workers were female. The rate of immigration into 
Coventry also was rising sharply. In 1939,24.3 per cent of all 
workers in Coventry had moved from other parts of the country. 
By 1941,a third of the city's labour force comprised of 
116 immigrant workers. A greater proportion of this wartime immigration 
came to Coventry from the non-industrial areas of the country. 
The majority came from parts of London, the South East, the East 
.. 117 Coast, and the rural parts of Le~cestersh~re and Northants. A 
greater part of this movement were drawn"from sections of the 
population without factory or workshop experience. 
In Birmingham,the number of women working at Morris Commercial 
doubled during 1942, ten times as many being skilled and semi-
skilled than were working on unskilled jobs. After the 
introduction of the EWO, one in fifteen Austin workers had been 
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118 transferred from other parts of the country. These movements 
in population, changes in the composition of workforces and 
in the skill content of work/not only directly affected labour 
forces/but had consequences for both management and workplace 
union organisation. 
On the 6 September 194~ the MOL prepared a report on the outlook 
and attitudes of the Midlands industry. The report pointed to 
the continuing influence of the vigorous individualism which 
still appeared as a principal feature of the vast number of 
medium sized and small firms which gave much of Birmingham, 
Wolverhampton and the Black Country its particular character. 
The report pointed to a consequence of these attitudes in the 
management of Midland industry. 
"The manufacturers of these parts are self-reliant, if 
they are anything, and with this self reliance goes a 
certain self-centredness and insularity of outlook. By 
the same token these manufacturers are apt to react 
strongly against any national proposals which appear to 
affect their immediate interests."119 
The employers in Birmingham had strongly opposed the agreement 
to introduce JPCs in the workplace. In October 194~ the District 
Secretary of Birmingham AEU, Alderman A.E. Ager,publically 
criticised the attitudes of the Birmingham ~ngineering employers. 
He said 
"While I believe there has been this cooperation nationally, 
there has been very little cooperation locally."l20 
On the 26 March 1942, Emmanuel Shinwell MP, with the exception of 
BSA, criticised the Birmingham munitions firms for obstructing 
. 121 
the proposals for JPCs. As a result of political pressure by 
central governmen~ employer reluctance gave way. A Birmingham 
District Production Committee and a Midland Regional Production 
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Board were set up as employer resistence to joint cooperation 
was broken down. These committees coordinated common issues 
in the Birmingham munitions industries. In 1944, about 500 
.• ... h 122 factory JPCs were ~n ex~stence ~n B~~ng am. 
The Birmingham employers traditional opposition to the extension 
of a trade union role in their workp1ace~had been preserved 
through the structure of Birmingham industry. The ownership and 
diversity of manufacture, and the small scale of organisation. 
were the resources by which industry in the West Midlands had 
been able to respond to the continual changing technical and 
production demands of the new industries, like the motor industry. 
The attitudes and character of ownership reflected employer 
views towards industrial relations. The MOL reports saw the 
standard of industrial relations in Birmingham reflecting 
conditions in the labour market, rather than the innovations of 
employers. 
"Industrial relations are, generally speaking, good in 
this district, but it is due, I think, more to a 
relatively high standard of prosperity between the wars 
and a good employment record than to any pioneering in 
this field. I should say Birmingham and the Black Country 
industrialists tend rather to lag rather then to lead in 
the matter of organised collaboration, in the joint 
consultative sense, with their labour."123 
But while the labour market may have presented favourable 
opportunities for employment, workin~ conditions in parts of the 
West Midlands were considered to be falling behind, particularly 
in the industries which gave the region its managerial character. 
The MOL report concludes 
"I would say that politically and in the formation of 
public opinion it is still the middle sized and prosperous 
small firms which gave Birmingham its colour. These firms 
are mostly concerned with metal products of one kind or 
another, though they are not by any means all engineering 
in the strict sense of the word. It is the type of firm, 
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usually owner-managed, or, at any rate, still bearing 
the mark of the family business, which determines its 
outlook rather than its attachment to any particular 
industry. In these firms generally, I imagine, labour 
is not highly organised and tends to be content as 
long as the wage is sufficient and employment secure. 
The working conditions, physically, with which this class 
of labour seems content are often very poor against 
modern standards." 124 
Despite their resourcefulness and innovativeness in the war 
economy and their backwardness in factory organisation and 
methods of management, these firms ,which provided a formative 
character of the Birmingham manufacturing philosophy ,were 
falling behind the changes in the Midlands economy which was 
being accelerated by the war economy. The structure of 
Birmingham industry was increasingly becoming dominated by 
local firms employing in excess of 10,000 workers. Austin, 
Lucas, ICI, GEC, became the industrial leaders in Birmingham, 
while a group of firms with labour forces between 3,500 and 
10,000 began to undermine the traditional organisation of the 
city's industry. Among these were BSA, Guest Keen and Nettlefo1ds, 
Met~o-Cammell, Birmingham Carriage and Wagon Co., Chance Bros., 
and Wand T Avery Limited. In the motor industry,there was 
Nuffield plants at Wolesley, Nuffield Mechanisations, S.U. 
Carburretors and Morris Commercial. 
These larger firms brought a professiona1isation of management 
and a transfer of control. For many of the larger companies, 
ultimate managerial control lay outside Birmingham, in their 
London offices. In Coventry, because of the city's dependence 
upon motor car manufacture and aircraft the proportion of large 
factories was, even during the inter war period,already greater 
than Birmingham. The war economy both extended this tendency 
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towards size and the adoption of new methods. The MOL reported 
on its industry, 
"Coventry means the motor industry. Modern, agressive, 
hard boiled in its outlook, very well organised in its 
bigger units, efficient but rather inhuman in its 
relations with labour. Labour accordingly rather advanced 
in its tendencies." 125 
Any change which did take place in employer strategy towards 
workplace relations, in the car factories on munitions contracts, 
arose mainly out of a condition of reluctant realism on the 
part of works management,rather than from outright encouragement 
or appreciation of the role of workplace organisation. While 
the most obvious war time transformation was the rapid spread 
of unionisation,the majority of those who joined unions in the 
Midland assembly plants were not only likely to have had no 
prior experience of workplace organisation, but were, with the 
exception of skilled workers, generally without previous pre-
war experience of labour discipline in the technologies of the 
new industries. This mass employment of 'green labour; a 
large proportion of which was female and an increased dependence 
upon the skilled worke~provided the Circumstances in which a 
significant number of left wing activist~ schooled in the 
struggles for recognition of workplace organisation in the late 
1930's, possessed both the experience and the ability to command 
the allegience of these new memberships. As workplace organisati9n 
became established and extended into "new areas like Production 
Commi ttees and later the administration of redundancy, it was 
union officialdom rather than workplace organisation which had 
gained ~cceptance in the stability in labour relations provided 
by war-time conditions. 
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The war period saw a dramatic increase in union membership. 
Between 1937 and 194~the total union membership affiliated to 
b ' d h' d 126 the TUe grew y Just un er a-t ~r • Among unions which 
organised in the West Midland industrie~ the increases in 
membership far surpassed the national average. In the seven 
years to 1944, the Brass and Metal Mechanics saw their membership 
grow by three quarters, the sheet metal workers by just over 
two thirds, the ETU more than doubled, while the patternmake"x:s 
grew by less than a quarter, and the Vehicle Builders by 
127 
a-fifth. The membership of the AEU in Coventry was two and 
a half times greater in 1946 than it had been in 1938. 128 
The growth in craft membership was not only indicative of the 
new confidence to be found among the skilled worker~ arising 
from their position in the war economy, but was also the outcome 
of transfers from the small non-union West Midland industries 
to the larger more organised plants. But as these unions sought 
to restrict membership, and in the case of sheet metal workers, 
oppose dilution, or oppose the recruitment of female workers, 
it was the TGWU and to a lesser extent the AEU which experienced 
the most spectacular growth in membership. Between 1938 and 
1946; the membership of the TGWU grew by 88 per cent, nationally, 
but in the No 5 region it was up by 146 per cent and in the metal 
129 
and engineering section the increase was 175 per cent. In 
the Birmingham area much of this expansion was among 'green 
labour'. The union could report in 1941, 
"Thousands of members have gone into the forces but 
in spite of these inroads the strength of the union is 
greater than ever". 130 
It was the position of the lower paid, less skilled, inexperienced 
factory worker where the anomalies ariSing in the payments 
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systems, grievances over working conditions, in addition to the 
employment of women in new industries which gave rise to rapid 
union growth. The very success of the result in unionisation 
became a spur to union growth. As the Area Secretary of the 
TGWU claimed, 
"The war has made many workers, both men and women 
realise the necessity of joining the union. Factories 
and shops that hitherto have turned a deaf ear to the 
appeals of trade union officials have been organised 
with gratifying results. Unions have been able to rectify 
many of the lower paid semi skilled workers rates, 
increase the bonus in many cases, arrive at agreements 
for double time for Sunday work which was formally at 
time and a half".l3l 
The initial growth in union membership during the early part 
of the war period,did not in itself result in the acceptance 
by works managements of workplace organisation. Quite the contrary. 
The Midlands,in particular, saw an increase in employer opposition 
to shop stewards. During 1940. and 1941, the incidence of 
employer victimisation of stewards became an important issue 
in the Coventry motor industry. At Standard, in September, a 
strike broke out after management had dismissed a shop steward 
132 for holding a shop meeting. In 1941, the Metal Products 
plant in Birmingham stopped,following the sacking of a steward 
133 for alleged misconduct. At the Rover plant across in Solihull, 
in October 1941, the works convenor and an AEU steward were 
both sacked following a number of grievances which resulted 
in a ban being imposed on Saturday afternoon's overtime working. 
The dismissal was heard by a tribunal which upheld the decision 
~Nol 
of management was closely associated with a campaign by the 
workplace organisation to establish a JPC. The charge placed 
against the dismissed stewards was, 
"Serious misconduct by impeding production through being 
instrumental in inducing others to cease work". 134 
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The hearing heard of two attempts by the convenor to intervene 
to prevent disputes erupting in the previous week. The banning 
of overtime was itself a controled gesture of protest to prevent 
an actual stoppage by the workforce. What lay behind the 
grievances was the difficulties of works managements confronting 
problems of discipline with the workforce and,in the absence 
of acceptance on the part of management,the difficulties which 
the workplace leadership faced in restraining spontaneous 
protests. The Birmiingham AEU DC took the view that the firm 
cho< -se to get rid of the stewards, 
" •••• to rid themselves of these two members because they 
know they were in a position to point out the serious 
faults in management and production and that the 
allegations of the firm could not be substantiatedll .135 
The Rover management sought later to overcome its problems 
with the shop floor by setting up a non-union works council. 
After pressure from the shop stewards, however, it submitted 
to a ballot at No 2 works where a non-union council was already 
in operation, and the No 1 works, a choice between a works 
council and a JPC. Of the poll cards issued, only 1.2 per cent 
136 
of the vote supported the management view. It was, however, 
the employment of women in factory conditions which actually 
gave rise to some of managements most persistent labour relations 
difficulties. Down at Morris Radiators in Oxford, for example, 
many of the younger male workers who. were not sent to the armed 
forces were directed towards the mines. There,places in what was 
largely an unorganised workplace wi'''~ filled by an influx of 
female labour, largely without factory work experience. Though 
a union presence had emerged/through the transferring of skilled 
workers/the womens protests arose outside union organisation. 
It was when confronted by a high incidence of unorganised conflict 
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through a multiplicity of grievances among women workers, 
that the Morris works management not only accepted unionisation 
and shop stewards, but saw their way to establishing a JPc. l37 
At Standard in Coventry, outside the skilled sections of 
employment, the workforce was almost totally unorganised at the 
beginning of the war period. But/as the firm undertook the 
construction of aero engines,the transferring of unionised 
skilled workers from the well organised AWA factory in Coventry 
not only introduced a gang system,which had developed in the 
, 
mid-l930s in the cities main aircraft factories, but it brought 
an active union membership which began to encourage the growth 
of membership and the election of shop stewards. As the 
complaints grew over wages and conditions of the women workers, 
these individual protests soon found expreSSion through workplace 
organisation. 
A similar picture is revealed in Austin. In 1942, two stewards, 
one a member of the Communist Part~ had been sacked for arranging 
138 
a shop meeting without the permiSSion of the foreman. Even 
meetings to elect a sectional steward required the permiSSion 
of the works personnel management. But as the membership in the 
plant grew and a works committee began to meet on a regular 
basis after working hours, the increase in disputes, over issues 
arising out of the piecework prices,s~w management beginning to 
operate through stewards. Though the works committee was not 
officially recognised towards the end of 1943, meetings were 
being held between the Longbridge management and shop stewards 
over the problem of the grading of skilled work. As the munitions 
contracts began to be rundown, the works management conducted 
discussions over grievances, victimisation and selection, hardship 
cases, and other discrepancies with the works convenor. 
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Austin, like other Birmingham engineering firms accepted JPC 
as forums for resolving their production problems. On the 18 
November 1944, a summary of the experiences drawn from the 
operation of District Production Committees in the Midland 
Region, was presented to the Ministry of Production. The 
report stated, 
"Very special value is attached to Regional and District 
organisation as a means of fostering good relations between 
managements and workpeople". 139 
As the war drew to a close and thoughts began to address the 
post war period, the Coventry District Production Committee 
could point to the confidence it had gained from the industrial 
communi ty of the Ci ty • 
" •••• that this feeling of goodwill could be turned to 
great advantage in the difficult transition period 
which lies ahead". 140 
In Birmingham,the Production Committee reported, 
"The Committee considers the retention of some body 
representative of industry as a whole through which 
programmes could be worked out and the present collaboration 
between employers and workpeople maintained, a logical 
necessity". 141 
It went on, 
"The Committee stresses the benefits which accrue from 
employers and workpeople meeting and working together on 
DPC's and points out that the vertical organisation of 
industry hitherto existing has tended to emphasise the 
directions in which employer and employe~ interests differ 
rather than those which coincide, whereas on DPC's working 
under the limited terms of reference appropriate to them 
this factor has largely been overcome". 142 
The concern of the report of the Birmingham Committee was to 
advocate the continuation of such a committee largely in terms 
of their wartime role. They recommended post war cOmmittees, 
and, 
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"To act as a focal point for encouraging business and 
production efficiency, with the object of increasing the 
national income and standard of living". 143 
"To encourage co-operation between industrialists generally 
and workers generally by discussing national, economic, 
and wide business issues, other than wage rates and 
working conditions for which proper negotiating procedures 
already exist, and so build up unity of purpose and harmony 
among the industrial community, and overcome the dichotomy 
which to date has been an unfortunate outcome of large-scale 
enterprise both public and private". 144 
As these accounts, drawn from the experiences of collaboration 
at District level in Birmingham and Coventr~between committees 
comprising ministry officials, local full-time trade unionists, 
and industrialists wtfi being drafted, the picture of post war 
industrial relations for the motor industry was already beginning 
to take shape at workplace level. 
On the 19 September 1944, a sit-down strike had begu~quite 
spontaneousl~ on a contract for Government departments to be 
supplied with the Austin Ten. The management were seeking to 
establish that prices would be based upon pre-war levels, and 
therefore sought to exclude a cost of living bonus which had 
been established for war production. On the second day of the 
strike, nearly 14,000 Longbridge workers had become involved. 
The stewards attempted to prevent work which had a direct 
bearing on the war effort from bein~ affected by the strike. 
The Chairman of the shop stewards committee, Hindmarsh,saw the 
managements refusal to negotiate over the issue as an attack upon 
workplace organisation and a reversal of the working relationships 
which had been built up. Addressing a mass meeting on the 20 
September,he said, 
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"The attitude of the management is one of inconsistency 
as we have always negotiated any agreements or disputes 
which has arisen in the past. We are of the opinion that 
this is a deliberate attempt to smash the organisation. 
Maintain 100 per cent solidarity behind your organisation".145 
On the 23 January 1945, 5,000 Humber workers in Coventry went 
on strike after the works management were accused of putting 
pressure on the rate fixers in the determination of piecework 
prices. The strike/which had broke out 'in the machine shop 
had spread through the works. The whole of the day shift and 
the night shift became involved. Both the Austin and Humber 
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strikes began without the knowledge of local officials. 
At Morris Commercial on the 12 March, 3,000 of the Birmingham 
workforce went on a four day strike after management attempted 
to unilaterally change the method of consolidating wages and 
bonus payments. The strikers were calling for recognition of 
147 their works committee. As the war time contracts began to be 
cancelled, and the prospect of unemployment appeared, works 
managements in the motor industry were trying to prepare the 
way for post war reconstruction, by challenging war time gains. 
The Midland Regional Controller of the MOL, H S Gosne~ saw an 
unrealistic assessment of future job security lying behind this 
growth in workers discontent. On the 1 March 1945, he was 
reported as saying, 
"It is natural that behind many of the complaints and 
criticisms there is the fear of unemployment but so far 
as I can see, there is no justification for it. On the 
contrary, there is every prospect of a severe stringency 
of labour for some time to come". 148 
While the national trade union officials had become absorbed 
in a network of collaborative committees with employers and 
state representatives, to enhance co-operation over production, 
the massive growth in union membership took place under a 
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workplace leadership which sought to establish organisation 
within the workplace without departing from a common cause of 
higher output for the war effort. The creation of JPC's} 
though reluctantly accepted by the engineering employers, 
provided a basis from within which a prescribed constitutional 
framework defined the basis for workplace involvement in production 
matters, on terms which were acceptable to works managements 
and trade union officials. The ,~C agreements of 1942 helped 
secure the growing influence of shop stewards. It provided 
for the payment,at not less than the time rate, for attendance 
at meetings with management. While the Federation refused to 
accept the engineering unions demands, on the 1 November 1943, 
for payments to members of JPC's to be raised to not less than 
average earnings, such a practice had in fact become widespread 
towards the end of the war in many workplaces. 149 The wartime 
experience schooled thousands of workers in the arts of negotiation 
and representation at the point of production. It saw the 
activities of the shop steward extend into matters of production 
and redundancy. In terms of workplace organisation at its most 
advanced, for example, in the shadow factories around Coventry, 
a distinct hierarchy of convenors and senior stewards had emerged. lSO 
Regular meetings of departmental stewards co-existed with monthly 
meetings of all stewards regardless of union membership. 
Executive functions of co-ordination became a distinct feature 
of the workplace leadershi~ as it sought to overcome sectional 
interests and create unity within the workplace. In some plant~ 
senior stewards were being elected irrespective of which union 
151 he belonged to. At Standard in Coventry, a sheet metal worker 
and a member of one of the smallest union memberships in the plan~ 
had become chairman of the JSSC. Though, perhaps, " _ Standard 
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in Coventry was the only firm in the motor industry which was 
approaching 100 per cent union membership towards the end of the 
war; the war period saw an important consolidation of left wing 
leaderships in workplace organisation. Besides Standard, in 
the British owned sector of the motor industry, Austin, Morris 
Motors, and Rover, all had elected convenors who were Communist 
Party members. The gains made under wartime conditions were 
not without important limitations,even in the most advanced 
workplace. Though stewards had become accepted in the operation 
of wartime regulations and procedures, their achievements were 
not necessarily formally consolidated. Though they may have 
increased their power and influence/their formally constituted 
authority within their particular unions remained unchanged. 
They did not necessarily have the authority of their organisation 
to call joint meetings of stewards and memberships/either within 
a workplace or between different workplace organisations, even 
though such acti vi ty may have taken place. Furthermore, 
managements were still at liberty to ignore workplace representatives 
or not grant recognition to senior stewards, convenors or. works 
committees. They could still choose to act through local union 
officials. Also,the structures of workplace organisation even 
at its most advanced level, in no way sought to displace the 
functions of procedure for avoiding disputes. Rather, it worked 
in accordance with procedure,which meant that issues would not 
only be subject to delay but representation would be through 
union officials,while justice would be administered by the 
representatives of the employers. It was following the removal 
of the 'wartime procedures and agreements, that the newly acquired 
power of workplace organisation was to be found wanting. The 
wartime gains had not been consolidated into organisational 
rights in the workplace. 
PART 5 
RECONSTRUCTION AND THE MOTOR INDUSTRY 
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Abstra~t 
The change over from munitions manufacture to car production and 
the re-emergence of a market economy for both capital and labour, 
saw employers in the federated motor companies~ seeking to both 
reduce wage rates and regain their traditional authority over 
wage labour. Following the dismantling of the direct powers of 
the state. over industrial relations, and the operation of the 
labour market, motor industry employers first looked for a period 
of unemployment as the instrument for enhancing their pOSition 
over organised wage labour. The employers federation, on behalf 
of their affiliated membership, feared the development of JPC's, 
with constitutional provisions for shop steward representation_ 
in the post war period. Their concern arose from a belief that 
such organisations would not only enhance the increased power of 
organised wage labour in the workplace, but would threaten their 
ability to defend the power of managerial prerogative. 
This section begins with an account of the ways in which the British 
Motor industry was able to rapidly adapt to post war conditions, 
in such a manner as to be able to achieve a considerable advantage 
in world markets. The success of the changeover, however, provided 
conditions for the defence of workplace gains in the assembly 
plants. The final parts of the section examine the process by 
which the engineering unions unsuccessfully" attempted to reach 
an agreement with the federation on production committee~ so 
as to contain the growing power of shop stewards by providing a 
constitutiona~ link between prodUction issues in the workplace 
with the authority embodied in the wider organisation of the union. 
The section concludes with an account of how workplace organisation 
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in the assembly plants withstood employer attempts to reduce 
rates and weaken workplace organisation during the period of 
reconstruction. 
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1 POST WAR EXPANSION AND THE LABOUR MARKET 
The British owned sector of the motor industry at the beginning of the 
post war period, suffered from a number of fundamental weaknesses 
when compared with its overseas rivals. Despite the domination 
of the industry by the technology of mass production, car assembly 
in the UK remained distinguished by a relatively high level of 
individuality both in model design and components. This lack of 
standardisation in component parts and the high dependence of the 
industry on bought in parts, increased unit costs and reduced the 
advantages derived for the application of economies of scale to 
motor manufacture. Though these basic limitations had significant 
consequences for the long term international competitiveness of the 
motor industry, the British Motor industry during the early post 
war period was perhaps better placed than most other car producing 
nations to recover from the demands of a war economy. Not having 
experienced, despite the wartime bombing of manufacturing centres 
like Coventry, widespread industrial destruction or military 
occupation, the main British firms were able to move quickly from 
muni tions production to car assembly. The shadow factories in the 
west Midlands were ideally suited to mass assembly. At Rootes, for 
example, pre-war car production which had been undertaken at the 
, 
firms Stoke plan~was transferred to the reconverted Ryton shadow 
factory. Here the assembly of the Humber, ~illman, and the Sunbeam-
Talbot enabled the Rootes group to vastly expand their productive 
capacity and concentrate their foundry and engine assembly in their 
older premises. This divided the Coventry workforce into mUlti-
plant organisations, but between 1949 and 1954, the firms total car 
2 
output doubled. 
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Austin at Longbridge was perhaps the best placed domestic car 
manufacturer to make the change from war to car production. It was 
already assembling the Austin Ten for Government departments, but 
had been also the largest producer of military vehicles during the 
war period. The Austin shadow factory, which had produced aircraft 
became the basis for expert production. In 1948, the Longbridge 
works became completely reorganised for the new post war models. 
Some 16 miles of conveyers were installed,connected by over 100 
miles of cable/to transport parts and engines to the main assembly 
lines. Three overhead conveyers moved axles, front suspensions as 
well as painted and trimmed completed bodies. 3 Nuffield,among 
the main federated car producers, took the longest time to re-adjust 
to post war production. Its production lines had had the least 
direct involvement in the assembly of military vehicles during the 
course of the war period. It was,also,the only major car manufacturer 
to expand plant away from the West Midlands. In 1945, Morris closed 
the highest wage factory in Coventry, Nuffield Mechanisations, and 
declined a government offer to take over a shadow factory at Castle 
Bromwich in Birmingham. Morris still maintained both body and 
engine plants in Coventry, and a factory for the production of 
commercial vehicles in Birmingham,the organisation expanded into 
south Wales, taking over assembly facilities in Llanally. Though the 
Morris organisation expanded its pre war plants at Cowley in Oxford, 
post war production on new car models did not begin until the 
organisation of management had been streamlined to increase central 
control over what was the most geographically dispersed multi plant 
assembler of cars in the UK, possessing ten manufacturuing subsidiaries 
4 in five different towns. It was the West Midland motor manufacturers 
whO were the first to make the change back to car production. 
Austin, Standard, Rootes, Rover, plus component producers like Lucas 
and Dunlop/were all among the first 19 factories to he releAac': bY 
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the Government in order to begin post war production. The organisation 
of industry in the West Midlands,which had fed components to the 
shadow factories, provided the same source of supply to the post 
war motor industry, enabling such a rapid switch to take place 
giving British manufacturers a considerable international lead in 
post war output. 
The manufacturing capacity of the car industry had been considerably 
increased due to the use of the shadow factories. In 1948, when the 
first post war models appeared at the motor show, output was already 
surpassing the 1937 pre war peak. By 1950, the manufacture of cars 
increased by a further 25 per cent, to exceed the half million mark 
with nearly three quarters of all cars produced being exported. In 
the early period of reconstruction, the most important change in 
employment in the industry was the restoration of male employment. 
At the beginning of 1945, a third of the total employees engaged 
in the 'construction and repair of motor vehicles' had been women. 
During the following 12 months, over 100,000 women workers had left 
the industry, by 1948 when the new post war models appeared, fewer 
than 13 per cent of workers in the motor industry were female. 5 
The early post war pattern in employment and job security, however, 
significantly differed from the inter war experience of seasonal 
employment. Car manufacturing,though still prone to falls in sale~ 
fluctuating demand and model change-over which would give rise to 
periods of redundancy and recession, nevertheless became an industry 
which entered into full annual production,which did increase employment 
stability and replaced the inter war cycle of casual employment with 
a more permanent labour force. Between 1948 and 1955, though 
redundancy conflicts became a major issue in the motor industry, the 
general level of unemployment was remarkably low across the industry 
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as a whole. Of the 96 months during this period, monthly registered 
unemployment never exceeded 4,000 in more than four single months, 
and in only one single month did it exceed a figure of 10,000 
, 
registered unemployment. Redundancy in this period became largely 
an instrument to control the growing influence of workplace 
organisation. It was the developments in workplace organisation 
during the war period which gave the motor manufacturers their 
greatest cause for apprehension in the period of reconstruction, and 
which had an important bearing on employer attitudes towards workplace 
consultation and changeover in the period of reconstruction from a 
war to a market economy in both cars and labour. 
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2 WORKPLACE ORGANIS~.TION AND FEDERATION POLICY 
The population of Britain,during the second world wa~was subject to 
more extensive and intensive state control than during 1914-1918. 
Military conscription, rationing, blackout regulations, civil defence 
activities and the direction of labour for industry, took place upon 
a much broader scale and was in operation for a longer period of time 
than had occurred during the first world war. A far greater proportion 
of the population felt the effects of direct State intervention. 
The end of military conflict reduced the need for the level of State 
involvement but, as had been the experience of the first world war, 
demands for State control and regulations over sections of industry, 
employment and profits, appeared inevitable. The Official Committee 
on Post War Internal Economic Problems, set up in 1942, warned: 
"These demands will not be as easily dismissed on this 
occasion as they were in the programme put forward by the 
trade union movement in 1919 for nationalisation of mines, 
transport, shipping and electricity supply, and for the 
elimination of private profits from shipbuilding and 
engineering industries". 7 
Employment would be a major concern. Alternative employment for 
Md 
munitions workers, members of the armed services was required upon 
a far larger scale than in 1918. The Committee argued: 
"The prosecution of the war on its industrial side has 
required a large and increasing mea~ure of State control 
over whole industries and single establishments as well as 
over the freedom of managements and individual workers. 
The demand is inevitable that the control which was 
necessary to win the war should also be exercised to make 
the peace tolerable".8 
The TOC Annual Congress in 1941 had already stated: 
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"We have merged our interests ••.• to defeat the enemy and the 
same spirit should animate post-war reconstruction" 9 
The Atlantic Charter signed by America and Britain on 12 August 1941 
talked of one of the war aims being: 
" a desire to bring about the fullest collaboration 
between all nations in the economic field, with the object 
of securing for all improved labour standards, economic 
advancement and social securi ty" . 10 
The Reconstruction Committee,set up to examine a possible post-war 
industrial relations policy, saw employment as being the central 
question. The Committee claimed in 1942, 
"The supreme concern when hostilities cease will be employment. 
Millions of the armed forces and mobilised munition workers 
will need to be provided with other forms of employment; 
and the State, which has conscripted and controlled both the 
military and civilian forces with much greater vigour than 
in 1914-18, will fallon correspondingly intensive demand 
to provide employment in peace". 11 
In 1942, the Beveridge Committee on Social Insurance and Allied Services 
recommended comprehensive provision against want arising from unemployment, 
sickness, disablement and old age. The sequal to this publication 
was the famous Beveridge report, Full Employment in a Free Society, 
was published in November 1944. This argued that the State, rather 
than individual employers, held the primary ~esponsibility for the 
general level of employment. The war-time Coalition Government produced 
a White Paper entitled, "Employment Policy'; in 1944 which undertook 
state obligation for the general level of employment. The forward 
read, 
"The Government accept as one of their primary aims and 
responsibilities the maintenance of a high and stable level 
of !mployment aft(>t" the w.ar" .12 
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This political commitment to employment was less specific than that 
set down by Beveridge. It was to 'high' rather than 'full' employment. 
The exertions of a war economy, however, had built up a massive demand 
in the civilian economy which wftS . unlikely to be met by the existing 
labour force. The virtual absence, with the exception of the 
necessities of life, of the production of consumer goods; the decline 
in building, other than for war purposes; the general lack of new 
plant and equipment, besides that for the munitions industries; tne 
the cuntraction in public services, and the existence of blitzed 
areas; all created a massive shortage of goods and services. By 
January 194~ the elected Labour Government produced a White Paper on 
the'Economic Considerations Affecting the Relations between Employers 
, 
and Workers which saw the shortage of labour as being the crucial 
I 
factor shaping the early post-war industrial relations. The paper 
claimed, 
"The biggest problem is the almost universal shortage of 
manpower. This affects everything. There is far more work 
to be done than there are men and women to do it. This is 
the legacy of six years of war". 13 
Although there had been an increase of 570,000 in the working population 
between June 1939 and November 1946, the major proportion of the labour 
force was engaged in the Forces, Auxiliary SerVices, or in the 
manufacture of equipment and supplies for the military. In addition, 
there had been a growth in the numbers employed by national and local 
government as well as services like the Police and Fire Service. 
outside these areas of employment,the labour force had actually' 
declined by 241,000. With the Government committed to a large scale 
programme of house building, expansion of the public services, 
hospitals, schools and the needs of industry to modernise, re-equip 
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its plant and build new factories, the demands for labour were not 
likely to be met entirely from demobilisation. The rising of the 
school leaving age to lS, and a prospect of a decline in the total 
labour force after 1948, owing to the fall in the birth rate during 
the 1930's, all indicated a period of overall shortage of labour in 
relation to the demands of the economy. 
An expansionist economic policy, however, of high employmen~would 
affect the conduct of industrial relations and the position of 
workplace organisation. Aspirations towards full employment would 
reflect responses to questions of redundancy. 
war-time legislation had impinged upon the primacy of collective 
bargaining and managerial prerogative. Government had had the power 
of 'industrial conscription' over the direction of labour and the 
right to veto managements authority to dismiss. The greatest pressure 
upon government was exercised upon its power over labour. Workers 
directed to essential war industries,desired the restoration of choice 
in occupation. Forced employees may wish to return back to their 
former employment, or previous towns of residence. Some women workers 
would choose to leave the labour market. The continuation of such 
labour controls would be unpopular and likely to be resisted, as well 
as appearing contrary to the ideological objectives under which the 
war had been conducted. The advice from the Reconstruction Committe~ 
on the future role of the State in industrial relation~was unambiguous. 
"One thing is very clear in connection with post-war industrial 
relations, viz. that the State regulation of the terms and 
conditions of employment, except the purposes of prescribing 
minimum conditions, will not be tolerated by the trade unions 
unless such regulation is accompanied by rigid control of 
prices, profits and the exercise of managerial functions".14 
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The Committee fully acknowledged the customary rights established by 
labour in a market economy. 
"The right to strike", it argued, "and the right to 
individual freedom to change employment are deeply embedded 
in the minds of British workmen whether they are, or not, 
members of trade unions. These rights will not be 
surrendered even in return for permanence of employment. 
They are regarded as fundamental"lS 
The committee/consequently/took the view that any post-war restoration 
of a private enterprise economy would have to consider the acquired 
rights of labour, but while a substantial control over labour appeared 
to be inconceivable, the rights of employers also required re-establishing. 
"If competitive private enterprise is to be restored as the 
prevailing economic system after the war it is hardly conceivable 
that there should remain any substantial degree of control 
over labour since it is inherent in any competitive system 
that the employer should be free to engage and dismiss 
staff at their own discretion and workers should be free to 
seek employment in the best market open to them, and in the 
last resort to use the threat of withdrawing labour").6 
The anticipated wave of riSing expectation emerging with the 
conclusion of a war economy would impose demands upon an elected 
government for state support and provision in employment and welfare. 
The post-war economy required the dismantling of war-time controls 
over industry and labour. Conscription of workers, restrictions 
upon the right to strike, plus the free movement of labour and choice 
of occupation were incompatible with the developed traditions of British 
industrial relations and control of industry. The war-time protections 
for labour against the traditional powers of employers to dispense 
with their workfor~es was not seen to be compatible withthe revival 
of a market economy in which the overriding consideration was competition. 
A system of social security would be the basis for preserving a largely 
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free market economy. The restoration of a competitive market for 
labour would endorse the freedom of choice over employment for the 
worker and would be balanced by the employers rights over dismissal 
and redundancy. In aneconomy of high employment, however, the 
employers authority over labour would be transformed. He could no 
longer entirely rely upon the fear of unemployment to impose industrial 
discipline in the workplace. The Times,in an article on Employment 
published on 23 January 194~ said, 
"The first function of unemployment (which has always 
existed in open or disguised forms) is that it maintains 
the authority of the master over men". 17 
With the eventual decline in war-time patriotism and the loss of a 
traditional basis of employer power, the weaknesses of the worker in 
the inter war labour market, the period of post war reconstruction 
would take place in conditions of a stronger position for organised 
labour. Full employment did not mean total job security for the 
worker in his place of work, rather it meant that should a worker 
lose his job he had a stronger possibility of gaining another. 
Employers still retained the prerogative over dismissal and discipline. 
Entitlements to unemployment benefits reinforced labour discipline. 
The rights to payment were related to contributions based upon 
employment. After a 12 month period of uoemployment, benefit 
entitlement became discretionary. Dismissal by an employer for 
reasons of industrial m1sconduc~arising from a judged workers 
negligence, absenteeism, lateness, dishonesty, or breach of works 
rules,could result in disqualification of unemployment benefit, 
while voluntarily leaving a job meant a loss of unemployment payments 
for a six week period. 
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The State did preserve, though in a modified form, aspects of the 
administrative structure which had been devised for the war economy 
to deal with the immediate post war shortages of goods and materials 
during the period of reconstruction. The National Joint Advisory 
Council was reconstituted,to enable Government to receive advice and 
assistance on questions including aspects of industrial relations. 
The Council comprised of 34 representatives drawn equally from the 
BEC and the TUC. With the role of the State being primarily directed 
towards the control of demand management of the economy, the MOL was 
reorganised to promote labour mobility and handle unemployment. 
In industrial relations/the Parliamentary Secretary to the MOL for the 
I 
new Labour Government,endorsed the restoration of collective bargaining 
between employers and trade unions. Speaking in the House of Commons, 
he said on the 29 January 1946, 
"It is the declared policy of the government to entrust 
the responsibility for the determination of terms and 
conditions of employment to the joint machinery of negotiation 
between employers and workpeoples organisations. There is no 
intention of departing from that policy, but the government 
consider that it will assist and reinforce this machinery of 
joint negotiation if there is the closest possible contact 
between the two sides and government". 18 
Collective bargaining would regulate industrial relation~ while National 
Joint Advisory Councils would continue into the post war period to 
enable regular contacts among national employer and trade union 
leaderships. The State tried to encourage the preservation of 
co-operative relationships in the workplace. The Government issued a 
Statement in January 1947, in a white paper on the Economic Considerations 
Affecting Rel~tions between E~loyers and Workers. This highlighted 
the difficulties involved in the transition from a war to civilian 
economy, but had had little to say about the conduct of post-war 
industrial relations, other than the hope that both employers and 
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employees would extend war-time co-operation. The Statement said, 
"Until the output of British Industry is considerably 
increased there is bound to be some fear of our ability to 
maintain the stability of prices and the orderliness of our 
industrial system which have characterised Great Britain 
throughout all the difficulties of the war and the transition 
from war to peace. The nature of our industrial relations 
system entails responsibilities on both sides to work together 
not only for the common good of the industry on which both 
defend, but also for the common good of the country as a whole. 
These responsibilities are greater today than they have 
ever been".l9 
The White paper, in fact,only contained two sentences on the Labour 
Governments attitude towards post-war industrial relations. It said, 
"During the war in a number of industries machinery was 
developed for joint consultation between management and 
workpeople on production problems. The extension and 
further development of this practice would be of advantage"~O 
In the engineering industr~ the Employers Federation had only 
reluctantly entered into a war time agreement for the creation of JPC~, 
on 18 March 1942. On the 8 March 1944/ the EEF had resisted attempts 
by the engineering unions to amend aspects of the JPC. constitutions 
and to commit the EEF to a continuation of Production Committees 
into the post-war period. The unions were trying to alter the 
qualifying conditions for membership of the Committees. As war 
production began to be run down and movements in labour became 
inevitable'the union leaderships were pres~ing for either two years 
employment in the firm,or five years employment in the engineering 
industrYI as the minimum requirement for eligibility for election to 
a JPC. The employers were opposed to these changes which might 
encourage the appointment of workers drawing upon experience from other 
establishments. The Federations eventual acceptance of these Committees 
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was upon the basis of restricting their role, and confining their 
representation. The position of the EEF Management Board was expressed 
by the engineering president, Mr. G.S. Maginness, at a central 
conference on the 31 May 1944. 
"When they (the Management Board) were going through the 
general questions and considering the general principles 
they were not unmindful of the fact, first of all, that 
the Production Committees are domestic bodies, and if they 
are going to be useful they must reflect the domestic 
atmosphere and enjoy the domestic responsibility and 
experience, and, one hopes, the willingness to co-operate 
in solving domestic problems. That is one rather basic 
view which we have taken". 21 
The employers were wishing to preserve regulations which ensured that 
membership of production committees would be erased upon their long 
serving employees. Although they did not oppose elections to Production 
Committees, the employers were against the idea of a formal, annual 
election as this might endanger the stability and continuity of worker 
representatives. Production Committees had, moreover, began to be 
co-ordinated at district level in some areas of the country. The 
union officials were seeking rec~nition for these Joint Trade Union 
District Production Committees which would provide a role for the 
local union official in the activities of Production Committees and 
thereby enable union officials to exercise greater influence over the 
activities of their shop stewards at workplace level. Under the war 
time arrangemen~union officials had repres~ntation upon Government 
established Regional Boards which occasionally had contact with 
individual JPCs. The suggestion for District Production Committees, 
however, was largely an attempt by the trade unions to integrate the 
workplace committees into the structure of union organisations. It 
was the employers who were resolutely opposed to such developments for 
fear that they further threatened the employers control over production 
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matters in the workplace. The EEF president, said at the Central 
Conference in May 1944, on the question of the containing of 
Production Committees to the domestic leve~ 
"It is one to which we hold with a great deal of 
firmness" • 22 
He went on, 
"To put it as briefly as I can, our point of view is just 
this. We say that the full usefulness of Joint Works 
Production Committees can only be expressed if we continue 
to regard them as domestic concerns engaged with domestic 
issues and carrying out their deliberations in the mutual 
domestic sense. If they cannot agree, if there is some 
point which appears to be not so domestic but rather more 
fundamental, there is the opportunity of an approach to the 
Regional Board. If we were to recognise District Production 
Committees .•••• there would be a tendency to take questions 
to the District Production Committee which should be dealt 
with in the individual factory". 23 
The Employers opposition to District Production Committees stemmed 
from their traditional opposition to possible external influences 
being exercised by trade unions over the employers rights on matters 
of production. The EEF would give no commitment over the future of 
JPCs after the war. They would only conced~ to reconsidering the 
question after the conclusion of the war. On the 11 May 194~the EEF 
refused to discuss the engineering unions application, 
"That Joint Works Production Committees should be continued 
in the post war period" .24 
The Employers replied in August 194~that the economy was still partlyo~ 
a war footing, owing to the fighting in Japan. Later that yea~ the 
National Engineering Joint Trades Movement, again approached the EEF 
to request discussion on production committees for the post war period. 
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They enclosed a suggested draft constitution. It was on the 4 December 
1946 that the Engineering Employers decided to respond to the unions 
initiative. 
The position of the trade union leadership was that the employers would 
require the co-operation of the unions for not only the changeover to 
post war production,. but also for the cont.inued expansion of industry 
to meet the pent up demand which had arisen owing to the war. The 
position had already been put by Jack Tanner, the President of the AEU, 
at a meeting with the EEF on the 31 May 1944, where he claimed production 
committees to be more in the interests of employers than the trade 
unions.He had said to the Federation representatives, 
"You are going to be faced with the question of getting 
back to peace-time production. You are all veri much 
concerned, I suppose, at the present time, or those of you 
who did any export trade before the war will be concerned 
about improving it after the war. It is said that we have to 
increase our exports by 50 per cent, even to maintain our 
previous standard of living. I do not know how you propose 
to increase production unless you havol! the cO-'operation of 
your workp€ople. I say quite frankly that you will not get 
the co-operation of your workpeople and you will not get the 
co-operation of the w~jons unless there is some form of 
organisation like .Joint Production Committees where the 
workpeople can put forward proposals and make suggestions 
which are going to be in the interests of both parties". 25 
Tanner concluded by saying, 
"It seems to me to show a very short-sighted view if you 
even query the advisability of these Joint Production 
committees continuing after the war" .26 
Until the Governments statement, in their 1947 White Paper, over the 
relations between employers and workers,the post-war negotiations 
between the EEF and the engineering trade unions was characterised 
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by a lack of enthusiasm/on the part of employers,for the extension 
of JPCs and a belief, on the part of the union leaderships, that these 
committees provided both an opportunity for reducing conflict in 
industry/as well as providing a basis for integrating the role of 
shop stewards, on production matters, into the authority of the union 
structure. 
On the 6 August 1946, the Engineering unions presented the employers 
with their suggested draft proposals for post war production committees. 
The outline contain 17 proposals which they wished to see constitute 
a Works committee and Joint Production Consultative and Advisory 
committee. Effectively, the unions wanted to see a merging of both 
the existing works committees, which operated under the engineering 
procedure, wi th a modified Production Committee. The draft stated, 
"In all factories or works where not less than 100 manual 
workers are employed Committees shall be set up and shall 
combine the work formerly done by both Works Committees 
and Joint Production Consultative and Advisory Committees" .27 
These Committees were to comprise of equal numbers of representatives 
from both the workforce and the employers. Their declared purpose 
was clearly set out. 
"The object of the Committee shall be to handle all matters 
referred to them under the Provisions for Avoiding Disputes, 
and questions of efficient production and improved methods 
in all phases, absenteeism, and the general welfare of the 
establishment" .28 
The proposals ·offered nine illustrations of the issues which these 
committees could enter into discussion upon. These were: 
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"1 Maximum utilisation of machinery 
2 Upkeep of tools, fixtures, jigs and gauges 
3 Improvements in methods of production 
4 efficient use of the maximum number of productive hours 
5 elimination of defective work and waste 
6 efficient use of material supplies 
7 efficient use of safety precautions and devices 
8 absenteeism and .unpunctuality 
9 matters referred to them under the Provisions for 
Avoiding Disputes". 29 
The union proposals were seeking to increase co-operation in industrial 
relations at factory level by increasing the functions of shop stewards. , 
This was to be achieved by extending the issues handled under the 1922 
Disputes Procedure, into areas concerning the efficiency of production, 
while at the same time curbing any tendencies on the part of stewards 
towards independent activity. By producing a constitution/which combined 
both the functions of the Works Committee and Production Committee 
into the Procedure for settling disputes in the industry the union 
leadership were seeking to integrate workplace organisation into the 
structure of authority in the unions. Not only was the steward to be 
concerned with wages and conditions of his members but he was to be 
party to the improvements in efficiency for the industry. Disagreements 
on either could be placed into procedurel enabling their resolution to 
be undertaken by local or national officials through the stages of 
procedure. 
The outlined proposals,consequentlY/stipulated that workers 
representatives would be shop stewards elected in the works by ballot 
and would hold office for a year but could be eligible for re-election. 
Though the Committee would comprise of equal representatives between 
management and workers, it was to be as small as possible, but 
sufficient to be representative of the unions in the works. The 
chairman would be appointed by management while the vice-chairman , 
would be elected by the works representatives. Both sides would have 
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secretaries. Weekly meetings would be held with the workers 
representatives receiving wages for time spent away from work" based 
upon average time at the piecework rate for that week. The Committees, 
however, were not to discuss matters which were considered appropriate 
for discussion by the Trade Unions and the Employers at local or 
national level. 
Although the unions, in their meetings with the employers were arguing 
for combining works and production committees on grounds of simplicity, 
they were seeking to institute the new committees under the jurisdiction 
of the Federation. Bill Hutchinson,of the AEU,gave the main reason 
for the union officials desire for these committees coming under the 
regulation of Procedure. The main question/he claimed/was the 
personnel of the committees, the shop stewards. Hutchinson argued, 
on the 4 December 194~ at a meeting in Broadway House: 
"I think it would be more convenient, especially from the 
employers point of view, if the works Committee WaS also 
the Production Committee handling all these questions. 
I believe that because the unions here this morning are 
responsible for their shop stewards who comprise the Works 
Committees, which are under the jurisdiction of the District 
Committees of the respective unions, and therefore under the 
jurisdiction of the Executive Councils of the respective 
unions. I think you have far greater control from that angle. 
I think that there is a greater relationship between our 
existing agreements and our responsibilities in a committee 
of that description than there would be with an ordinary JPC" .30 
Until the publication of the Government statement in January 1947 
suggesting the continuance of JPC~the engineering employers were 
clearly far from content with the trade unions proposals for post-war 
co-operation on prodUction matters. On the 9 April 194~ the Federation 
replied to the CSEU draft proposals. The EEF rejected What it described 
as fundamental change. Specifically, it objected to the two major 
aspects of the draft constitution. Firstly, it opposed the idea of any 
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combining of works committees with Production Committees. The view 
of the Federations Management Board was, 
"They had in mind that Joint Production Committees are 
limited in their functions by the exclusion of all matters 
which are covered by agreements between the Employers 
and trade unions, and matters which are dealt with under 
the Procedure Agreement Thus, all functions of the two 
Committees being specifically defined, the Management Board 
feel that there need not be any overlapping of duties as was 
suggested by your representatives at the conference nor is 
there any need for them to be combined". 31 
I Secondly, and perhaps of equal importance, the EEF were against JPCJ 
enhancing the role of shop stewards in the workplace. The letter 
stated, 
"The Management Board fail to see why the representatives 
of the Joint production Committees should be restricted to 
shop stewards". 32 
Under the war-time JPC agreement,only union members were entitled to 
vote in elections for Production Committee representatives. This had 
resulted in a large number of shop stewards being returned. The 
employers did not wish to encourage this development in the post-war 
period. 
Eighteen months after military hostilities had ceased, and three months 
following the stated Labour Governments support for the continuation of 
production Committees, the engineering employers were still opposed to 
entering a new agreement for post-war JPC's. In their letter to the CSEU 
on the 14 MaY,they pointed to developments being enunciated by both 
sides of industry which were being encouraged by the Government. 
Besides the establishment of Regional and District Committees of the 
soard of Trade,there was the formation of an Engineering AdVisory Council, 
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and the creation of the Motor Advisory Council, under the 
jurisdiction of the Ministry of Supply, both of which comprised 
of employer and trade union representatives. In regard to post 
war reconstruction, the Employers Federation saw the call for 
increased production being curbed with collective bargaining 
agreements which had reduced the working week to five days. The 
demand for greater output in industry, during the period of 
reconstruction, ran concurrently with energy restrictions. In 
1947 a serious shortage of fuel and power, and certain raw I 
materials, especially steel supplies for engineering, created 
difficulties which were beyond the control of individual employers. 
These circumstances, together with the Federations general 
suspicion of JPCs, led to employer rejection of the CSEU proposals 
for a new agreement on Production Committees. The EEF wrote, on 
the 14 May, to the engineering unions, 
"The Board have reviewed the situation very carefully. 
They accept the principle of Works Production Committees 
and are prepared to continue, for the time being, 
existing arrangements". 33 
but, the letter went on, 
" the Board would suggest to your Confederation 
this is not the appropriate time for our respective 
organisations to make a new Joint Production 
Committee Agreement, certainly involving such 
fundamental changes as your Confederation propose",34 
The employers were, in effect,accepting the principle of JPc~ 
while opposed to discussing the unions proposals for an agreement 
to operate in the post-war period. To the unions, the Production 
committees had been direct expressions of the war-time consultation 
in industrial relations, despite an initial reluctance on the part 
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of some employers. For the employers, the fear of conced; tng 
control over production matters in the workplace and the desire 
for maximum manoeuvre during the period of economic transition 
to the post-war production/led to opposition to the signing of 
any formal agreement with the trade union leaderships. This 
indecision on JPCs and the concern by the unions of a lapse in 
their functions and even abandonment, in some instances, at 
individual factorie~promoted Government action. 
On the 23 April 1947, at a meeting of the National Joint Advisory 
Council (NJAC>, to which representatives of the British Employers 
Confederation (BEC) and the TUe were in attendance, the MOL 
raise the question of extending and developing the machinery for 
joint consultation between management and workforces on production 
problems, in accordance with the suggestion in the January White 
Paper. The Council agreed to recommend,in principle,JPCs. The 
MOL wrote to both the BEC and the TUC on the 2 May 194~ setting 
out the terms of the recommendation. This letter stated that the 
NJAC had approved the setting up of a JPC where it did not at 
present exist. The purpose of these Committees was defined as 
being, 
" •••• for the regular exchange of views between employers 
and workers on production questions provided it was 
clearly understood: 
a) that such machinery would be purely voluntary 
and advisory in character 
b) that it would not deal with questions relating to 
terms and conditions of employment which were 
normally dealt with through the ordinary machinery 
of joint negotiation 
c) that it would be left to each industry, thought 
its ordinary negotiating arrangements to adjust the 
form of machinery best suited to its own particular 
circumstances and to decide, in particular, whether 
such machinery can best be established at the factory 
level or cover a wider area". 35 
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Both;:the BEC and the TUC agreed to bring this reconunendation 
to the notice of their respective affiliated organisations. 
On the 30 April 1948, the engineering employers met again with the 
principle unions in the industry to reconsider the position of 
JPCs in the light of the developments which had emerged after 
support from both Government and the NJAC. A central problem 
• 
in these discussions again surrounded the role of the shop 
steward, and the Federations attempt to maintain a clear distinction 
between issues being discussed in Works Committees and those 
in Production Committees. The union delegation argued that the 
war-time experience of shop steward representation on Production 
Committees, had enhanced the importance of the Committee. Jack 
Tanner, of the AEU, reported that, 
"We have had the experience in several establishments 
where workpeople are elected to the JPCs who hold no 
official position that they have not been so successful 
in dealing with the questions as those who are properly 
elected and have, to a certain extent, authority, as the 
shop stewards have". 36 
On the question of a conflict of loyalties between the needs of 
maximum efficiency and the interests of membership Tanner claimed, 
"During the war, I held the point of view that 
it probably was not wise or advisable to appoint 
shop stewards on these JPCs. The shop stewards might 
approach the question of increased production and 
approved methods, and so on, from a different angle. 
Of course from their experience and training in the 
past when they have taken up these operations with the 
management they have in effect, had to press issues 
which, in the opinion of the management, were perhaps 
not too much in the interests of the management~ 
but, quite frankly we find that where shop stewards 
have been the delegates of the workpeople on the JPCs 
and have handled these questions, the pOSition has been 
much more satisfactory, because the interests of the 
accredited shop stewards are not simply confined to the 
question of working conditions, but they cover the 
283 
whole range of factory life and activity and they do 
really represent the workpeople ";7 
He went on, 
"Shop stewards have the advantage not only of bing 
practiced in Committee work, but in the main, of being 
generally conversant with all matt ers that ar taking 
place in the factory, and the shop stewards do hav 
certain degree of authority to discuss any question 
which is likely to arise in the factory". 38 
, and finally, 
"Shop stewards are more responsible to the direct control 
and come directly under the juris diction of the Tr de 
Unions, and probably under the management Iso, i n 
sense, because if the management have any compl int about 
the shop stewards, well, they can always take it up 
wi th the unions". 39 
For the Federation, it was essentially the appearance of incre sed 
union influence on matters of production which they most objected 
to. The Director of the EEF, Sir Alexander Ramsey a r gued, 
"I should have thought that, to get the right spirit 
and atmosphere on a joint production committee , you 
had to divorce it from any semblance of partisanship 
and to get away from the idea that it was a mere 
instrument of the trade unions" .40 
On the point of union representation, and' more particula rly shop 
steward representation, Ramsey went on, 
" ••••• that the shop steward was under the control 
of the union and the other fellow was not, and that 
appeared to be an advantage? To us, that appears to 
be a disadvantage when dealing with matters that are 
of common interest". 41 
.~ ._ . :""1 ........ ~ . ..•. ,' _ ...... \,.. ..... .. .. .1 4 .~ . ,I,', • I 
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The Employers Federation, while reluctantly havi ng to cont empl t 
the continuance of JPCs, were aware tha t their acceptance meant 
they could not entirely preclude the e l ecti on of shop st w rd 
where such support was given by the workf orce . Th y we r , 
however, opposed to the signing of any agr eemen t whi ch m d 
provision that elected Production Committee r epresen t tiv s 
could only be drawn from shop stewards . Gove rnme nt pr ssur~ 
during 1948,faced the Engineering Employer s acceptance of the 
inevitability of some form of JPC. 
On the 30 June 1948, the Engineering Employers circul ated th ir 
Federated Associations to advise the continuation o f Production 
and Consultative Committees. The Federation Pol icy Committe 
and the Management issued a recommendation which said , 
"That in the light of recent deve lopments a policy of 
laissez-faire in relation to Joint Product i on Committe s 
is ill-advised at the present time ". 42 
What was being advocated instead,was a continua tion of t he Mar ch 
1942 agreement, and with it a reiteration o f the war- time 
recommendation that, 
"There shall be from the Fede r a tion a strong r ecommend tion 
of these proposals to the Fede r at e d Employe r s ".:l 3 
Stress was placed upon the voluntary na ture of the Committees 
but a warning was given of possible consequences/ should the 
recommendation fail to be implemented. The circula r claimed : 
"That the principle set forth by the Nationa l Join t 
Advisory Council to the Ministe r of Labour that J oint 
Production Committees are to be 'purely voluntary and 
pdg ' r s T is sb - - eg'-j'"" '" ?Hv ~ j - .! ~ - -.- ~r j e ,--
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The EEF consequently called for the resUs tltation of coromi tt s 
which had fallen into disus~ as well as the establishment of JPCs 
where none existed. The letter to the secretaries of the 
Federated Associations referred to the 
" •.••• ample evidence to show that the Gove rnme n t 
is intensifying its efforts to stimulate the 
development of Joint Production Committees or simil r 
joint consultative machinery at factory l eve l". 4S 
The engineering employers earlier apprehension of JPCs w s bing 
' overcom~through a fear that a Labour Gove rnment, poss sSing 
substantial Parliamentary majority/might be tempted to resort to 
legislation to encourage the organised co-opera tion it d sir d 
in industrial relations. The Federation were , however, ev r 
mindful to preserve their traditional concern, the m i n t enance 
of employer control in the workplace. In the circular sent out 
to the Associations, on the 30 June, active encouragement w s 
given to individual managements to involve . themselves i n the 
operation of Production Committees so as to prevent the initiative 
falling into the hands of shop stewards. The l ette r warn d , 
"That Federated Employers should e ndeavour to make their 
Joint Production Committees a success by taking a 
personal interest in them, making sugges tions as to th 
points to be included in the agenda for meetings , and in 
general to take the initiative in these matters rather 
than to allow the initiative to fall into the hands of 
the workpeoples representatives" . A6 
In June 1948, an enquiry carried out by the Enginee ring 
Federati~n revealed that nearly two thirds of the 1,250,000 
employees working in 1,900 Federated establishments possessed 
47 
a JPC. These were predominately firms which employed more than 
150 workers. The 2,000 F aderated firms with a labour force of I 
. , \ . ..... ,. .. - .... . .: ... -
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less than 150 worker~ could exempt themselves f rom the establishment 
of production committees. 
The 1945 Labour Government, while not wishing to become directly 
involved in the operation of industrial r e lations , positive ly sought 
to extend the workplace co-operation that ha d been establ ish d 
in the war economy by encouraging the continuance of JPC ' s i nto th 
period of post war reconstruction. In Enginee r i ng, t he revi v 1 or 
preservation of such committees did not arise f rom a str ong commitment 
on the part of employers, but rather a f ear tha t the fai lure to 
establish a voluntary arrangement could r esult in uni on i nf luence 
being brought to bear on a Labour Government for a more rigid and 
possible radical proposal being imposed upon employe r s . Whi l e the 
position adopted by the Federation retained a c e rtain degree of 
employers discretion in how these committees would f unction, 
their main objection to an elaborate constitutional ly c reated system 
of JPC's lay in their concern that such an arrangement would i nevitably 
enhance,not just the influence of trade unionis m but would i nstall 
a workplace organisation possessing a defined s t a tus and legitimacy 
on production issues. This traditional defence of manageri al rights, 
to maximise the discretion of individual employers ove r the activities 
in their workplace, lay behind the basic failure to trans l ate the 
acquired power of workplace organisation, under war t ime conditions , 
into an agreed organised body of representative r i ghts . The engineering' 
trade unions,on the other hand, failed to convince the employers to 
accept a combining of the works and production commi ttees which l 
while it would enhance the position of their shop s t ewa rds , would 
do so within a framework which could contain their activity by 
prescribing their role within the authority structures of the 
individual unions. It was, in other words, the inabi lity of t he 
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unions to get agreed machinery for linking co-operation on production 
questions in the workplace, with the wider organisation of the union, 
and the employers search for exclusive control over production 
issues,which left unclear the role of shop stewards in post war 
labour relations. Wartime achievements in the workplace would 
inevitably have to be defended by the exercise of workplace power. 
Industrial harmony,through non-intervention on the part of the State, 
relied increasingly upon the commitment of the trade union leaderships 
to the defense of a Labour Government,for the creation of industrial 
peace and increased post war production. As the significance of 
production committees began to decline with the rise of workplace 
bargaining, their demise mirrored the break up of the co-operation 
which had been so manifest in war time industrial relations. This 
transformation in workplace relations, with a growing dependence upon 
power rather than authority/was particularly apparent in the post 
war motor industry, where the activities of shop stewards were 
continually having to be asserted rather than accepted as work forces 
confronted works managements seeking to regain their traditional 
authority over wage labour in the period of changeover to post war 
expansion. 
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3 THE DEFENCE OF WORKPLACE GAINS 
The motor manufacturers in Britain/facing the end of the war economy 
and the consequent loss of cost plus Government contracts, confronted 
the re-emergence of market competition with a heightened workers 
expectation encouraged by high war time earnings, and wage rates, 
plus full employment. The virtual unlimited opportunities, on both 
the home and international car markets presented to the British 
motor industry was, however, considerably outweighed by their fear 
of changes which had taken place on the shop floor. During the period 
of re-adjustment and reconstruction, the car manufacturers were 
preoccupied by a concern to regain their authority and control in 
the workplace. Important disputes took place at Humber in Coventry, 
and a.t Austin in Birmingham, as works management attempted to take 
control over the method for piecework determ!nation in periods of 
reorganisation. A managerial offensive against the wartime gains 
achieved through workplace organis~ation in a transformed labour market 
situation, saw workplace activity being exercised not just against the 
authority of management, but also in opposition to the newly acquired 
power of union officialdom. 
Coventry shop stewards had been directly involved in the jOint regulation 
of the run-down of labour in the Shadow factories, but in March 1945, 
the Coventry Shadow Factories Provisional Committee began to push for 
the expansion of employment. At a mass meeting attended by 6,000 workers, 
shadow factory employees demanded work or maintenance. The agreed 
resolution stated: 
"We demand that the Government shall produce immediately an 
adequate plan for the change-over to post-war production that 
will ensure the minimum amount of temporary unemployment. 
We also demand that in all cases where redundant workers suffer 
periods of unemployment they shall be paid during such periods 
the minimum wage under the EWO" .48 
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The employment crisis in Coventry was compound d by numb r of 
uncertainties . A large section of the workforce w s migrant labour/ 
of which an unknown number would choose to leave the town. 
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George Hodgkinson, the Mayor of Coventry, concerned at the growing 
deterioration in employment, called a meeting of local MPs and 
representatives of the employers and trade unions to discuss the level 
of redundancy. They sent a letter to the President of the Board of 
Trade, stressing the need for designers, draughtsmen, planners and 
technicians to re-convert the Coventry motor factories back to car 
• 49 productl.on. 
It soon became apparent to the Interdepartmental Governmental Committee 
set up to consider the resettlement of the motor industr~ that whatever 
war-time cooperation had been developed between management and workforce~ 
it was unlikely to be fostered in the post-war period. The most 
significant impression made to the committee following its talks with 
the Managing Directors of the leading motor manufacturers/was the 
general despondency with which they faced the future. A major concern 
underpinning their anxiety was the acquired strength of organised labour 
in the workplace. 
The Regional Controllers report, on the 14 July 1945, stated of Daimler, 
where a dispute concerning recognition of a multi-plant Joint Negotiating 
Committee was in progress 
"numerous examples of difficulties which they were experiencing 
with their workers who were adopting a 'go slow' policy." 50 
After his discussions with the Managing Director of Jaguar he wrote 
"not anxious about supplies but seriously disturbed with regard 
to the attitude to labour." 51 
Even at Rootes, the most optimistic of the Coventry car firms I e' 
Controller's notes claimed 
"optimistic about sales, complained of difficulties of 'bought out' 
____ . " ~.' .' : , ~ ~ _ 1, .. ~ • • " " I , ['" , " ,. r '"' 
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At Morris Engines, the main concern was wage costs on bought-in parts 
and a redundancy of labour. 
"wage cost per engine up 50 per cent on pre-war prices, prices 
for 'bought-out' parts considerably up. One, three or four 
times as much in some cases. A fear of costs limiting sales 
visualizes a redundancy of approximately 2,000 workers." S3 
Across in Birmingham,Leonard Lord the Managing Director of Austin,who 
had also been an industrial advisor to the under employed development 
regions before the wa~ could write of the attractions of the attitudes 
of labour in areas of high unemployment. Drawing on his involvements 
in 1937, in Durham, Cumberland, South Wales and Scotland, he remarked 
on the 21 September 1945 
"I found labour problems more easy to solve in development areas 
then in Birmingham. I found every workman willing and capable."S4 
Drawing upon his reports, the Regional Controller wrote of the atmosphere . 
1n the Coventry factories 
"The most disturbing feature of the interviews was the almost 
unanimous opinion that labour was 'difficult', labour costs 
were 'too high' and the sooner they had a showdown with labour 
the better." 55 
The employers remedy to the new power of workplace organisation was 
the traditional one - unemployment. The report stated 
"It is really disturbing to find employers (responsible employers 
at that) rather welcoming the possibility of a row with their 
workpeople and looking forward, as many of them evidently are, 
with some satisfaction to the possibil~ty of their workpeople 
having a period of unemployment in the expectation that this will 
lead them to becoming more amenable and better disciplined. To 
some extent this feeling may have arisen as a reaction to the 
war-time condition when the worker rather more than the employer 
was in the saddle." 56 
The report concluded 
" that the employers are anxious to see a period .ot_unemployment 
in order that workpeople will adjust themselves to the economic 
co~ditions ~t a lower rate in order to avoid producing cars the 
prlce of WhlCh, through labour costs, will remain too high." 57 
-. .", ', ~ T' r ' ) " - , 
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The long term inadequacies of the industry were submerged into the 
immediate prospect of challenging the gains of labour organisations in 
the workplace. As the war industries began to be rundown,wage rates 
fell. Between the beginning of 1944 and the Autumn of 1945, the rate 
at Humber fell 1/2d; Morris Motors by lld; Alvis by laid; Jaguar by 6d; 
Daimler by 3id; Singer by 2id; and Armstrong-Siddeley by 2d. The 
Coventry rate, under the Toolroom Agreement, reached a war-time peak of 
4/l0d in October 1944, but declined through most of 1945 and had fallen 
to 3/9d by the beginning of 1946~8 Redundancy and closure of plants 
partly account for this fall. Of the highest plants in Coventry, 
Nuffield Mechanisations was shut, while the Standard Motor Company left 
the COV EEA in March 1945, to enable the payment of wages and 
conditions outside the EEF. With the loss of these two companies and 
the limited bargaining opportunities for price increases during the 
change-ove~ the employers began to seek further wage reductions. 
Following a strike at Daimler in 1946,when attempts were made to reduce 
piecework levels, a four week strike took place at Humber/where 
management made 550 workers redundant in their negotiations to get 
reductions in rates. The dispute became a major test for the JSSC who 
saw the move as a policy of 
59 
"back to pre-war wage levels." 
The organisation of work around small gangs at Humber, had a fragmenting 
effect upon the trade union organisation. Shop stewards had to 
struggle against the independence of individual work groups in order to 
sustain a collective unity within the workplace organisation. Over 
1380 piece work p.rices were in dispute. A shop stewards leaflet claimed 
"Dissatisfaction and discontent is rife everywhere. The stewards 
are doing all in their power to control the situation. But for 
this there is no doubt that most if not all these sections 
would have taken strike action." 60 
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Behind the dispute lay the issue of domestic bargaining which had 
accelerated during the war period. The shop floor was objecting to 
the rate fixers dispensing with discretion and imposing 
"a pre-determined price." 
"shop practice has gone by the Board. There is no longer 
mutuality over decisions at shop floor level."61 
Management were denying effective local bargaining and were placing 
all objections into procedure. The high local Coventry standards were 
being assessed against much lower national criteria. The Humber 
stewards had submitted claims for 120% on the Consolidated Time Rate 
(CTR), while the nationally agreed rate was 27i% on CTR. The defence 
of the Coventry tradition was summed up at a meeting of the works 
management by the senior shop steward 
"I would like Mr. Cole to bear in mind we are living in 
Coventry, and 27i% is foreign to Coventry." 62 
The attack on the war-time gain,s was being vented through confining 
reconstruction bargaining to national and local agreements. In 
confining disputes to procedure and formal agreements/both local and 
eventuall~ national trade union official~would be brought into a 
position of having to abide by their own agreements. For the shop 
stewards this meant one thing, wage reductions. Rejecting the 
involvement of the trade union officials the leading steward claimed 
"What do they (the trade union official:s) do when they consider 
this question? They consider the agreement of 27i%. This 
maybe the lowest basis but they consider it a reasonable basis." 63 
It was this pr~servation of shop floor gains beyond those negotiated 
between management and the trade union officials, that was the basis 
for the independent action of the shop stewards. The prices issue was 
an attack upon shop steward power which had been enhanced by war-time 
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conditions. That three stewards had been sacked,arising from heated 
exchanges with managemen~merely added to the situation. The JSSC 
called for all workers to work 'day work' until management were 
prepared to discuss rates upon the basis of mutuality. Management 
designated this tactic as a 'go slow strike' as output fell to a few 
cars a week. After five weeks, the firm,on the basis of the decline in 
output/applied to make an initial 1,500 workers redundant. The trade 
union officials attempted to delay the MOL decision under the operation 
of the EWO, in the hope of being able to formulate a basis for a 
return to work. 
With permission given to declare the redundancie~ a mass meeting voted 
for a strike following the issuing of the first 550 names. The position 
soon became confused. Under the EWO, permission for redundancy was 
not normally given where a dispute existed. However, the Minister in 
the House of Commons was claiming that no redundancy existed in the 
motor industry; there was, he claimed, a shortage of labour, yet the 
same day the local labour office was issuing permission to declare a 
64 
redundancy. 
The Chief Conciliating Officer arranged a London meeting between the 
EEF and the National trade union officials. A memorandum emerged 
which, it was hoped,would form the basis for a return to work. The 
declared redundancies would stand but the next wave would be suspended. 
On resumption,any question of further redundancy would be dealt with 
under the provision of the EWO. Full procedure would be utilised to 
deal with the questions in dispute following a return to work. 
The COV EEA gave an undertaking that the 550 redundant workers would 
have first consideration to future employment at Humber. These 
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conditions were unanimously rejected by the Strike Committee and the 
ABU DC. A resolution declared: 
"That this DC demands the unconditional withdrawal of all 
redundancy notices at the Humber, and we wish to make it clear 
that redundancy is not due to cancellation of war contracts 
but as a means to intimidate the workers into accepting minimum 
wage rates." 65 
This major dispute over reconstruction began to take on a wider 
significance; the domestic piecework traditions could only be defended 
by workplace organisations. A meeting of all works convenors of 
engineering factories in Covent~y was called by the Humber Shop Stewards 
Committee. It passed a resolution which raised the possibility of a 
general Coventry strike in support of the Humber workers. 
n(l) That the Rootes group acting through the Humber management 
in leading a general attack on Coventry wage standards, their 
insistence on 27~7. as the basis for fixing piecework prices is 
the first attempt to depress Coventry wages to national level." 
n(2) That the Ministry of Labour in declaring 1,300 Humber workers 
redundant at the insistence of the employers have actively and 
unjustifiably interfered in a Trade Dispute." 
"That this situation is of real and immediate danger to all 
engineers in the District and can only be combated by a united 
and determined action of all workers in the District." 
"We resolve that decisive action is necessary and call for 
immediate strike action. To that end, we demand that a meeting 
of all shop stewards in the District be convened to endorse this 
resolution. n 66 
This resolution failed to get through the AEU DC. It was lost in 
favour of a motion calling upon the ABU EC to call an official strike 
in the event of the MOL failing to withdraw the 550 redundancies. 
The temper of ,the dispute was heightening. The MOL refused unemployment 
benefit to those made redundant. The initiative moved to the shop floor. 
A meeting in York between national union officials and members of the 
EEF"resulted in a compromise offer to the workforce of reinstatement of 
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254 workers who had appealed against the redundancy under the EWO. 
The shop stewards were standing their ground on their minimum demands; 
no redundancy and an undertaking to discuss the basis for fixing 
piecework prices. A meeting of 400 shop steward~ drawn from 83 
engineering factories in Coventry/endorsed the Humber workers position 
and called for a general strike of all Coventry vehicle and engineering 
workers. 
"This meeting of the shop stewards from all Coventry declares 
that the Humber managements attack on wage standards is an 
imminent threat to all engineering workers in the District. It 
expresses its admiration for the Humber workers in their resolute 
resistence and declares the need for immediate full support. It 
therefore resolves that a state of strike shall exist and calls 
upon all engineering workers in Coventry District to withdraw 
their labour at 11.00 a.m. on Wednesday 13 March. It further 
directs workers to attend a mass meeting at noon on the same day."67 
The gulf was widening. One trade union official commented: 
"If there is a general strike on Wednesday it will be at the 
insistence of the shop stewards and entirely without the 
authority of the unions concerned and therefore will be a 
disregard of agreements and entirely unofficial." 68 
Consternation existed,not just among trade union officials but among 
the Coventry employers themselves. While/both publically and privatel~ 
~~~~ 
they had argued the 'go slow strike' was both in breach of works rules 
and procedure, they began to pull back from attempts to confine union 
69 
officials to national agreements. Strong actions by trade union 
executives against their shop stewards were feared by employers as 
much more likely to lead to a general strike then the existing support 
for the Humber shop stewards. For the COV EEA the situation could 
easily be 
" •••• turned into a straight issue of control in the unions 
between the District officials and the shop stewards owing to 
the power which workplace representativ~s had been able to 
gain through the war period."70 
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The employers had doubts about the trade union officials ability to 
get a return to work. Attention, however, began to focus upon what 
kind of support was likely to emerge for the Humber workers from 
among the motor industry and engineering firms. Press reports on the 
eve of the strike indicated that GEC, BTH and AWA firms not directly 
involved in motor industry,would not strike. It was not known what 
the response would be at Morris Motors, Standard, or Armstrong-Sidderly. 
Local officials from both the AEU and the TGWU spoke out against the 
proposed strike. The AEU DC Secretary in an "off the record" opinion 
said the strike would receive less then 50%~1 The N.C. of both unions 
sent instructions to all their shop stewards to remain at work. The 
TGWU statement said that 
" .••• the Council are definite in its view that the agreement 
so far been reached with the employers offered a fair and 
equable opportunity to settle outstanding c1aims."72 
This build up towards the day of the strike had its effect. Less then 
10% of workers struck and these were mainly from small firms. The 
mass meeting to begin the General Strike was poorly attended. The 
General Strike failed but the Humber dispute continued, the initiative, 
howeve~had moved back to the trade union officials. In the following 
days,the Humber workers began to drift back to work. Some of the 
redundant workers had found alternative employment. At the end of 
four weeks, the JSSC convened a meeting of shop stewards from the 
Distric~ which called upon the DC's of their respective unions to seek 
. 
the intervention of their NE's to reinstate the remaining redundant 
workers. It was agreed that half the workers would be reinstated and 
the rest re-employed within a period of three weeks. A works 
conference, attended by local officials and shop stewards,established 
the principles by which piecework prices would be framed. Mutuality 
was endorsed over price determination and a minimum rate was agreed 
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at 60% on CTR. This agreement arrested the decline in rates which 
had fallen from 4/10d in March 1945 to 3/10d in January 1946. 
Following the strik~ the rate at Humber began to increase but it was 
74 June 1948 before it reached the highest war-time level. 
During the period of negotiation,pockets of resistence persisted 
among the workforce, until the conclusion of the agreement forms of 
. .. 75 
"go slow" were still be1ng operated 1n sect10ns of the works. The 
Humber dispute remained the most important conflict during the period 
of post-war reconstruction. At stake was the whole question of 
Coventry piecework prices and the methods of shop floor bargaining 
which had developed through the growth of shop stewards during the 
war period. Not only did the strike contain a challenge to employers 
control over redundancy, but it expressed workers expectations over 
rates of remuneration. Bargaining practices had grown up during war-
time conditions, but neither managements nor unions could produce 
written evidence for the way in which piecework rates were arrived 
at, either for the factory as a whole, or individual departments. The 
strike attracted national publicity but the trade union leadershi~ in 
their attempt to stave off a general strike in Coventry,had to 
demonstrate that a constitutional approach could resolve these questions. 
The shop steward organisation and the workforce were aware of the 
higher rates being paid at Standard Motors," Morris Motors, Jaguar and 
Armstrong-Siddeley. They were insistent that the method of mutuality 
could not be dispensed with, nor prices left to times established by 
use of the stQP-watch and the Planning and Demonstration Department. 
The Works Conference held on the 25 March 1946, resolved that prices 
should in future be fixed by mutuality. The rate-fixer would 'arrive 
at a piecework price through shop floor negotiations'. 
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The importance of the Humber strike lay in its defence of war-time. 
gains, achieved through workplace bargaining. It reversed the decline 
in wage rates in Coventry and provided assurances that shop stewards 
would be notified over future redundancies. Essentially, it preserved 
the stewards role in shop floor negotiations. 
Throughout 1946, there was a general increase in the scale of strikes 
in the motor industry, and a pronounced development in disputes 
surrounding questions of trade union representation. In 1946, there 
were 26 strikes involving some 30,000 workers, compared to 23 strikes 
76 
in 1945, which had involved only 12,500 workers. The 81,000 striker-
days lost during 1945 had been a record for the industry but in 1946 
this had increased more then threefold to reach 256,300 striker-days. 
Of the disputes in 1945,12, or just over half, had been concerned with 
questions of pay, the majority being questions of piecework prices. 
Only one strike, over the reinstatement of a shop steward, at the non-
federated Ford Motor Co. at Dagenham, had concerned a trade union 
matter. 
Of the 26 strikes in 1946, however, only 9 arose from pay questions 
but 8 stemmed from issues connected with trade union matters. These 
later disputes totalled 156,800 striker-days, or just under two-thirds 
of all striker-days lost for 1946. During the big Humber strike, 
11,000 Ford workers at Dagenham struck for .seven days to gain union 
recognition, while 6,000 Austin workers in Birmingham stopped over the 
employment of non-union labour in the body assembly section of the 
West Works. 
Strikes over piecework prices took place at Jaguar, Singer and 
Carbodies in Coventry, In addition to the Humber dispute, a strike over 
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bonus payments occurred at Rover. Among the Vehicle Builders,the 
undermining of piecework prices in the Trim department,across the 
Coventry-car plants/appeared through the employers introduction of 
lower rated female labour, despite unemployment among N.U.V.B. members. 
A special meeting of shop stewards from all Coventry's trimming 
departments was held on the 16 April. This decided, 
"That we oppose girl labour in all shops - certainly while we 
have trimmers on the vacant book. ''77 
The stewards also called for a meeting of all trimmers working in 
Coventry. This meeting was held on the 7 Ma~ at which it was argued 
that it is 
" •••• quite evident that employers intend to make every effort 
to use girls and lads to get prices down to a very minimum." 78 
Though the meeting accepted that this move should be fought wherever 
it appeared, it agreed that the real solution to the question lay in 
79 
"equal pay for equal work." 
The mass meeting passed a resolution calling for the union officials 
to resolve the issue 
"That this mass meeting of Trimmers call upon the E.C. and 
Branch Committee to take immediate steps to deal with exploitation 
of female and boy labour in Trimming shops and to treat this as 
a matter of real urgency." 80 
The only dispute that broke out over the trim question in Coventr~ took 
place at Morris Motors, on the 11 June, when a two month stoppage of 
40 trimmers had began over the cutting of leather and the covering of 
spring seats for the M.G. Midget. The employers claimed four or five 
women had been employed on trim during the inter-war period. The 
. , 
vehicle bu~lders only recollection of female employees had been in 1922, 
301 
when production levels were low, before assembly techniques. The 
only recent employment of women had occurred after the Coventry Blitz 
when a large proportion of male workers were transferred out of the 
city for essential war work. It was only because of the shortages of 
apprentices/that the N.U.V.B. had agreed to the employment of women 
as dilutees on trim work. They opposed their general use to lower the 
rate. The strike was eventually resolved after 'a return' to work on 
pre strike condition~ pending assurances made prior to a works 
conference. The trimming issue largely diminished owing to the rapid 
expansion of production and employment in the motor firms following 
the readjustment of the industry. The N.U.V.B. feared the loss of 
orders for military aircraft would leave large numbers of their 
membership unemployed. The reverse proved to be the case. During 
the wa~ the number of apprentices entering into Coach Building fell, 
leaving a critical shortage of skilled labour, especiallY in Coventry. 
post-war expansion strengthened the position of Vehicle Builders, their 
employment prospects immensely improved, while their membership grew 
. 81 
by a third in Coventr~ between Apr1l 1945 and December 1946. In 194~ 
Jaguar announced their first wholly designed and manufactured car which 
~ould require the employment of a further 1,000 high class Coachworkers, 
Although disputes over piecework rates during 1946 were an important 
challenge to the advances made through workplace negotiations in war 
conditions, the growth of strikes over trade union matters involved a 
~re definite attempt to confine the organisational gains established 
bY shoP stewards. At Daimler/during the first six months of 1946 a 
series of strikes broke out over the question of workplace organisation. 
on the 8 January,a one day strike for recognition of a Joint Negotiating 
co~ttee, formed from shop stewards organisations within the three 
pailmer factories/was supported by 3,250 workers. A return to work was 
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agreed pending national negotiations, but three weeks later on the 
21 Januar~ the workforce again struck over dissatisfaction with the 
progress of the negotiations. On the 23 May, the Daimler management 
refused facilities for shop stewards to hold a meeting on the firms 
premises; 589 men stopped work in protest. Five weeks later, on the 
82 27 June, 800 men walked out. 
Friction at workplace level was not exclusive to Coventry. At Morris 
Motors in Oxford/ l,700 workers began an eleven day strike on the 
12 September for the reinstatement of the Convenor of shop stewards 
who had been dismissed for what the management described as 
83 
"insubordination". In the Pressed Steel plant, work stopped over the 
suspension of four workers arising out of "go-slow" tactics as part of 
.. 84 lB· . h Sh M 1 k h b d piecework negot1at10ns. n 1rm1ng am, eet eta wor ers at teo y 
building plant of Fisher-Ludlow, successfully established recognition 
for their semi-skilled membership after a two week strike at the 
beginning of 1946. 8~n the 12 Februar~ a further two week stoppage 
prevented non-union labour being employed in the sheet metal shop. 
Over 1,000 workers in the paint and body building shops at Austin began 
a sit-down strike during the Humber dispute. Although regular 
statements on behalf of the Longbridge management stressed that the 
strike was unrelated to the Coventry dispute, the issue was one of a 
fear of management attempting to weaken trade union organisation in 
86 
the West Works. The dispute arose among a group of Coachbuilders who 
refused to work with two workers not members of the union. Support 
" 
for the Vehicle Builders spread as other shops in the West Works 
stopped in sympathy, by mid morning 3,000 workers were on strike. 
During the lunch-break, the J.S.S.C. from the main works met to consider 
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the effect of the stoppage upon the rest of the factory. Their 
delegation sent to meet the management received a "blank refusal" to 
discuss proposals for ending the dispute. The strike began to spread. 
The nightshift in the West Works refused to start and by the following 
d 6 000 k h d b old 0 , 0' ok 87 ay, wor ers a ecome lnvo ve 1n a staY-1n str1 e. 
Austin had just announced a record output of 2,547 cars for January, 
almost half the total output of the U.K. motor industry. Forty-one 
per cent of their cars were being exported. The management were having 
to contemplate their principle of 'open door' employment policies 
with the prospect of the entire works being progressively brought to 
a halt over two workers not members of a trade union. The ultimate crisis 
however was never reached; both workers decided to join the N.U.V.B. 
Austins headlong start in car production remained intac~while neither 
workforce nor union members were able to test the will of management 
in the immediate post-war labour market. During the early period of 
reconversion/the Longbridge plant was remarkably free of inciden~with 
the one exception of an acrimonious demarcation dispute between the 
sheet metal workers and the AEU over the employment of an engineer on 
a solder plenishing job. The dispute lasted three weeks but caused 
only a limited lay-off of workers, and had little direct effect upon 
output. It did, however, sow inter-union relations. 
The first major stoppage at Longbridge occurred during the massive 
reorganisation which took place in 1948. The issue at stake was of 
paramount importance for the influence of workplace organisation at 
Austin. During the large scale modernisation of the Longbridge work~ 
a dispute arose in No. 5 machine shop over the method for settling a 
new multi spindle cutting machine. The management insisted on timing 
the new machine. On the performance of. the demonstrator and breaking 
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from the customary method of 'a man of average ability'. The shop 
stewards calculated that this change would mean a loss of earnings of 
25s. to 30s. per week for each machine operator/as demonstrators were 
promoted to their position because of their above average abilities . 
. Rates based .upon their operations would necessarily produce a lower 
rate. 
Mutuality in piecework determination, and workplace bargaining with 
rate-fixers had become the established method by which shop floor 
earnings could be increased beyond the limits set by management. For 
the shop steward/the rate became the important factor to the piecework 
price. The Convenor,Dick Etheridge criticised workers who relied 
upon high piecework bonus but did not consider the question of the 
rate. The importance of the rate was fully appreciated by the management. 
He claimed 
"The reason the employers fight every rate increase so vigorously, 
is because they want to be in a position of having a basic rate 
to give them scope for reducing earnings within the framework of 
national agreements in th~ event of accentuated world competition."88 
On the question of the demonstrators price he argued 
"If they got away with this, it would be worse then Bedaux, 
because the price would be based on a man promoted for his 
efficiency i. e., the demonstrator." 89 
It was the role of the steward to defend the rate. 
"It is our job to see that a wage rate is established on the 
basis of national agreement to ensure that the lowest rated 
pieceworker is earning a reasonable minimum wage." 90 
Although management claimed the new spindle cutter would increase 
productivity by 140 per cent,the demonstrators time provided a threat 
to the rate. On 19 AugusS the Shop Stewards Committee met, following 
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their representatives meeting with the management. They unanimously 
agreed to call a strike of all 16,000 day workers and 2,000 on the 
night shift over the question of piecework determination. It was the 
first occasion that the whole of Longbridge had come to a halt under 
the shop stewards leadership. The stewards considered there could be 
no concession over the principle of using demonstrators. The 
implications went far beyond work in the machine shop, they feared a 
new pricing system spreading through the factory. A statement issued 
by the shop stewards outlined their attitude towards modernisation 
"While the shop stewards accept the policy of increased production 
through improved engineering techniques they cannot accept the 
position of reduced earnings whilst increasing production." 9l 
The machine shop, after two months of disagreement/came out on strike 
on Wednesday 18 August. The stewards called the whole workforce out 
two days later. 
The issue was a major test of workplace organisation at Longbridge. 
The Steward Organisation, was still in its infancy and not entirely 
certain of its support in the plant, even among the 16 established 
unions. The J.S.S.C. had only beg"n to be placed upon a serious footing 
in 1946. This late maturing of a steward organisation in the largest 
U.K. car assembly plant was partly a reflection of the long established 
separate activity of many of the Longbridge unions, particularly those 
with skilled origins. The right to act separately had characterised 
union identity at Austin, while the relatively unstable levels of union' 
membership ahithe extent of non union labour, especially among the 
semi-skilled, discouraged the development of a permanent workplace 
organisation •. 
By the end of the wa~ an annual meeting of all the shop stewards began 
to elect an eleven-man committee. Th ff" 1 't' th J S S C e 0 lCla POSl lons on e ".. 
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were largely dominated by the leading figures in the AEU, the largest 
union in the plant. The Committee's credibility in the workplace had 
increased. They played an important part in seeking a compromise with 
the local union officials over the demarcation dispute. In 1947 they 
prepared the ground for the negotiations for a 42! hour week, which was 
signed locally by the CSEU officials. When the National Confederation 
Leadership instructed that this had to be amended as it lay outside the 
Nat.ional agreement of 44 hours, the Shop Stewards Committee refused to 
. 92 
accept any alterat~on. 
The decision to strike was a significant step for workplace organisation. 
It was taken by the whole shop steward body following their refusal to 
put the issue into Procedure. The decision signified an important move 
towards unified action on the shop floor which was independent of 
individual union differences, and beyond the immediate influence of 
local trade un~on officials. The strikers clocked in each day to 
demonstrate their willingness to work but refused to man the production 
lines. For the Austin managemen~ the strike came just after the 
signing of a large contract to sell cars in Canada. The Company 
accounced that the stoppage of the production lines was costing $50,000 
a day in exports. Pressed Steel in Oxford gave notice to the first 
300 men to be laid off owing to the effects of the stay-in .strike. 
Under the pressure of potential losse~ the management agreed to meet 
the Convenor on Tuesday, the fifth day of the strike. Following a 
discussion with his shop stewards/the Convenor was able to establish 
grounds for a return to work. The shop stewards had decided to accept 
the issue being put into Procedure, providing the firm dispensed with 
demonstrators times. The stewards called a mass meeting at which the 
following resolution was . !igreed~ , ... ~ _ . 
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"We recommend a return to work and ask for a Works Conference 
on the understanding that the present method for fixing 
prices by demonstrators time is discontinued while it goes 
through Procedure".93 
The case went through Procedure and was eventually referred back 
from central conference following 'failure to agree'. The firm 
eventually conced-_ed defeat over the claim. 
This period of post war reconstruction was a crucial moment in the 
post war development of workplace organisation. Gains clearly had 
been achieved in the workplace under war time conditions, but with 
the rundown of war contracts, factories began to close and many 
workers returned to their places of origin. A decline in wage rates 
and the possibility of a sustained employer offensive against workplace 
gains and organisation in a period of change and uncertainty, was 
arrested partly by the rapid re-establishment of car production to 
take advantage of world demand, but also by the defiance of the 
shop floor. While the attractions of increased sales and profits 
weakened the resolve on the part of federated companies to engage 
in what would be a long and costly offensive against workplace 
organisation at the end of the second world war, it was the willingness 
of the shop floor to defend their interests and give support to the 
workplace leadership in generally favourable trading conditions, 
rhAr, gave the workplace organisation its authority to act. In the 
absence of any clearly defined role to clarify the acquired position 
of power and when confronted with a reluctance on the part of union 
officials to give official recognition to conflicts on issues outside 
those nationally determined, it was shop floor organisation which 
independently fought the principle battles against the employers. 
Union officialdom,obliged to honour minimum agreements increaSingly 
acted to discourage a widening of workplace support for sympathy 
.. 
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actions. Although the motor industry was far from completely 
unionised in the early post war period, the spontaneous outbreaks 
of unorganised non union conflicts M: the interwar period were 
already being replaced by conflicts among organised workers in 
opposition to the advice of union officials. It had not been until 
after 193~ that the TGWU appointed a full time official in Oxford, 
and 1939, before Jack Jones appeared in Coventry, while the AEU, 
NUVB, and the SMW were all under the jurisdiction of local officials 
based in Birmingham during the height of the inter war depression. 
Though the war period elevated the position of union officials, 
ingratiating them into the regional and district JPC's,in company 
with the representatives of employers and civil servants from the 
various departments of State, the return of a market economy and the 
disintegration of committees of co-operation resulted in local 
officials seeking to retain control over the workplace t~ugh 
the disciplines imposed by the procedure for resolving disputes. 
As federated motor industry employers sought to challenge the pace 
of workplace bargaining during periodic recessions which hit the motor 
industry, ~hrough the dismissal of prominent workplace leaders 
tluGugh redundancy, workplace organisations repeatedly faced a choice 
of either acting constitutionally and weakening their own representative 
power to act, or act unofficially and face the unified power of 
management, the lack of support from officialdom. It was essentially 
a managerial strategy to restore itstl3ditio~al authority over 
wage labour which gave rise to the basic post war dilemma 
confront''''9 the shop stewards movement in the motor industry. 
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PART 6 
REDUNDANCY AND THE RISE OF WORKPLACE POWER 
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Abstract 
Between 1946 and 1956,shortages of materials, steel rationing and 
periodic changes in domestic demand for cars, (largely as a result 
of government defence expenditure, and economic and fiscal policies) 
in addition to employer model changes, all ensured that despite a 
public policy of full employment, the expansion of car production 
would be volatile, with frequent layoff and redundancies. This 
part of the study will account for the way in which the federated 
car firms were able, from 1946 until 1950, to apply the regained 
rights governing the discharge of labour, established by national 
agreementS, to curb the increasing power of workplace organisation. 
Through an analysis of a series of disputes before 1950, where 
redundancy involved the dismissal of senior stewards, it will be 
maintained that a managerial strategy developed in the motor industry 
by federated employers, to attempt to weaken the growth in workplace 
bargaining, through the removal of the trade union leadership from 
the workplace. It is argued that an important factor in this 
managerial policy was the vigorous support for managerial rights 
and opposition to workplace involvement in the process of redundancy 
by the Federation. Furthermore, union opposition remained weakened 
by an absence of a unified policy at national level within the CSEU, 
over redundancy, but more importantly the sectional basis of workplace 
organisation/encouraged individual union action led by national 
officials, through constitutional channel? Despite the growing 
influence of workplace bargaining, sectionalism, non-unionism, and 
the absence of authoritive joint committees in the workplac~ 
contributed to securing employer control over redundancy. 
The section begins by examining the impact of workplace bargaining 
upon wage rates among the federated car firms and accounts for the 
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industry's differences with the federatiorls national wage 
policy. It is maintained that it is these differences, which in 
periods of recession in the motor industry, encouraged the management 
of the federated car firms to seek to reduce their wage costs by 
weakening workplace organisation. Following an analysis of 
redundancy conflicts,the section concludes by comparing the state 
of workplace organisation in the federated plants with that in the 
non-federated Standard Motor Company, in Coventry. It is argued 
that it is an employer strategy based upon the application of 
'managerial rights' in situations of weak workplace organisation, 
rather than a militant workplace ideology, which is the central 
source of power conflict over the issue of redundancy between 1946 
and 1950. 
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1 THE DEVELOPMENT OF WORKPLACE BARGAINING 
The era of cooperation in industrial relations in the engineering 
industry! effectively came to an end with the submission of a rational 
wage claim in 1948. The president of the Employers Federation, 
Philip Johnston claimed 
"During the war, when we were all working for a C01ll1llon end, 
there was a big advance in mutual confidence and cooperation 
between employers and their workpeople, and between the 
Federation and the unions, and indeed this spirit was maintained 
throughout the wages advance in 1946 and the shorter working 
week negotiations at the end of the year. I feel that the 
spirit of mutual understanding is being undermined, partly by 
the influence of left wing c01ll1llunists, and partly by statements 
by members of the Government which, although they may not make 
definite assertions, certainly engender feelings of suspicion 
against employers as a class." 1 
The engineering pay claim had been submitted within weeks of the 
publication of a Government White Paper, PERSONAL INCOMES COSTS'AND PRICES,2 
on the need to restrict increases in incomes to increases in production. 
The Federation's rejection of the c1aim,on grounds of defending public 
policY,was challenged by the unions argument for exemption on grounds 
of low basic wages existing in engineering. While the resumption of 
national pay bargaining may have appeared as the point of departure in 
industrial relations cooperation, in the motor industr~ the considerable 
expansion which took place in the production of car~ gave a new stability 
to car workers in the early post-war labour market. In these condition~ 
workplace bargaining and shop floor organisation flourished. The 
Federated motor industry employers faced no·t just the consequences of 
national negotiations but the challenge from within the workplace. The 
most vivid expression of the acquired power of organised labour in this 
transformed labour·market,lay in the proportion of wage increases being 
determined at shop floor level and a growing opposition to employer 
prerogative over redundancy. The most bitter of the early industrial 
313 
disputes in the motor industr~ surrounded the redundancy of shop 
stewards, not all of whom were communists. The control of redundancy 
became the most important issue in the right to create an independent 
workplace organisation,while the spread of shop floor bargaining 
continued to give influence to shop stewards. 
The separation of interests which arose within the Federation was not 
so much a division within branches of engineering but primarily an 
outcome of the way in which workplace bargaining developed in the car 
assembly plants. It was the extent of the emerging shop steward 
influence,more then the groupings of interests, which may have otherwise 
arisen. among manufacturers of textile machinery, general and electrical 
engineering, machine tools, foundry manufacturers and the producers of 
motor cars, which give rise to the most severest disagreements within 
the E.E.F. over national pay bargaining in this early post war period. 
For the Federated car firms facing a growth in workplace organisatio~ 
their continuing allegiance to both Federated procedure for the conduct 
of industrial relations, and employer solidarity in national pay 
bargaining, became a contradictory basis upon which industrial relations 
W~S ". mediated during this period of general low unemployment and 
expanding production. 
The recommencement of national wage bargaining left the motor industry 
subject to increasing shop floor bargaining over piecework rates 
• 
while having also to conced~ annual general increases arising out of 
national negotiations. Low wages were being paid in parts of the 
industry because of the level of national minimum rates. This became 
the basis for trade union demands for substantial increases. In 194~ 
an attempt by the Federation to partly remedy this positio~ by awarding 
an increase on the basic rate for time workers and the raising of the 
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basic time rate for settling piecework prices from 27! per cent to 
45 per cent, improved the position of the lowest paid workers in the 
industry but left substantial numbers of higher paid skilled pieceworkers 
with little or no increase. Widespread unofficial action broke out 
across the traditional districts of engineering in a two year struggle 
to preserve differentials. The higher paid workers in the Manchester, 
Clydeside, North East Coast, Sheffield, Leeds, and London districts, 
demanded comparability. This experience taught the Employers 
Federation not to indulge in conce:.ding only to the lower paid as a 
remedy for low earnings. General, across the board increases, on the 
other hand, though they help preserve differentials within the industry, 
resulted in the high wage employer paying further increases in line 
with the lowest paying employer. 
In the motor industry; these annual increases boosted wage costs by 
adding to the price of domestic bargaining within the industry. The 
Federated motor firms, some of whom were wage leaders for the engineering 
industry as a whole, were placed in the position of paying wage increases 
arising out of engineering pay claims which were being lodged by the 
Confederation of Engineering Trade Unions because the low basic rates 
existing in parts of the engineering industry. Table 4.1 shows the 
average hourly wage rates being paid by the principal British motor 
firms between 1945 and 1955. 
Among the Federated companies,the highest rates were being paid in the 
Coventry plants. Alvis stood as the highest paying Federated car company' , 
with an hourly average of 8/6~d in September 1955. The other Coventry 
firms of Jaguar, Armstrong-Siddeley, Rootes, Morris Engines and Morris 
Motors, were all paying an average rate of between 7/- and 7/4d, while 
the Daimler rate stood at 6/llid, and the failing Singer, 6/9~d. 
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TABLE 4.1 
Annual average hourly wage rates 
motor firms, 1945-1955. 
YEAR ALVIS STANDARD JAGUAR 
1945 3/8~ 6/U 3/6 
1946 3/6! * - 3/8 
1947 3/9! 4/2! 4/5 
1948 4/0! 4/8! 4/9 
1949 4/4 5/7! 4/9 
1950 4/6! 5/9~ 5/3 
1951 5/2! 6/2! 5/8 
1952 5/6i 6/4~ 5/8! 
1953 710 6/ll! 6/3 
1954 7 Ill! 7/2 6/6 
1955 8/6! 7/9! 7/1 
*Left the EEF June 1945. 
(Coventry) 
YEAR MORRIS MOTORS DAIMLER 
1945 3/11 4/0! 
1946 4/3! 3/10! 
1947 4/7 4/t! 
1948 4/41 4/5i 
1949 510 4/10 
1950 5/4! 510! 
19S1 SIS! 5/2 
1952 Sill 5/8! 
1953 6/1 6/2! 
1954 6/4 6/8! 
1955 7/1 6/ll! 
(September-October) in British 
ARMSTRONG- (Coventry) 
SIDDELEY ROOTES MORRIS ENGINES 
4/1 3/3! 4/5 
4/2 4/2 3/6 
4/3 4/6! 4/7 
4/4 4/8i 4/9 
4/6 5/5 5/0 
4/9 SilO! 4/9i 
5/4 6/1! 510 
519 6/7! 5/6i 
6/2 710 Sill! 
6/7 6/11 6/3! 
710 7/4 7/0! 
(Oxford) 
AUSTIN MORRIS MOTORS SINGER 
3/10~ 
. 3/10! 
4/61 
4/41 4/31 
4/7 4/101 
4/9 5/41 
4/9! 4/2! S/8! 
SIS! 4/9 6/01 
5/7 5/0 6/0~ 
6/2! 5/6 6/41 
6/7 5/10! 6/9~ 
SOURCE Coventry Toolroom Agreement 
(Minutes) 
B.M.C. Combine Committee 
(Minutes) 
H.A. Turner 
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Outside Coventr~ the rate was lower. At Austin in Birmingham~it was 
6/7d and in the Morris plant in Oxford/it averaged 5/l0id per hour. 
All these rates, however, stood significantly above the average hourly 
earnings for the motor industry as a whole, which in 1955 was 4/7!d. 
Not only was there a considerable difference between the rates in the 
assembly plants and those in the rest of the industry but the pace of 
increase was accelerating. Between 1947 and 1955, average hourly rates 
in the motor industry increased by 55.3 per cent, whereas among the 
Coventry motor manufacturers, the average increase was 69.9 per cent. 
An important factor in the rise in rates lay in the increase of 
bargaining opportunities at plant level,with the re-establishment of 
the post-war motor industry. During the change-over from war to post-
war productio~ Coventry hourly rates had declined. Following the 
introduction of post-war models, however, and the reorganisation of 
jigs and fixtures for car productio~ sharp increases took place in 
rates. In 1946, at Humbe~ the average rate increased by lO!d, in 1947 
at Alvis by 9d, and during 1948,when most manufacturers had completed 
their adjustmens the average hourly rate increased by 9d at Jaguar, Sid 
at Humber, 7d at Armstrong-Siddeley, 6id at Daimler and 5id at Morris 
Motors. Although rates in general increased after the beginning of 
post-war· car production,variations existed between plants throughout 
the industry. In Coventry, the Coventry Toolroom Agreement provided 
a barometer of wage movements for the city's motor employers and a 
local knowledge for shop stewards for the going rate in the district. 
The British motor industry's dependence upon piecework and its wide-
spread use of semi-skilled labour in assembly plants, encouraged worker 
inventiveness and adaptability in working methods provided, and 
influenced earnings. Alterations in the use of components and working 
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methods, or changes in materials, all created fresh opportunities for 
re-negotiating wage rates. New models and face-lifts in the existing 
cars/required fundamental adjustments in piecework prices. Fluctuations 
in rates were also affected by movements in the product market. In 
periods of recession the scale of increase in rates was reduced. 
During I95l,the rate only increased by !d at Austins, and MId at Morris 
Motors in Coventry, while in 1952 it improved only by !d at Jaguar. 
This recession, partly the result of Government directing resources 
towards rearmament, hit the manufacture of private cars but enhanced 
the position of firms like Alvi~ which produced military vehicles as 
well as private cars. From 1951 to I95~ the rate at Alvis continued 
to increase through the recession. It rose by 6d in 1951, 4id in 
1952; 5id in 1953, and ll!d in 1954. Alvis paid the highest rate 
among Federated car firms, while Standard Motor~which left the 
Federation in June 194~ paid the highest hourly rate among the 
Coventry firms assembling private cars by 1954. 
The location of car plants across the West Midlands, the pre-dominance 
of the technology of the new industries in the region, and the wide-
spread use of piecework. as a means for increasing productivity and 
reducing fixed wage costs in periods of market decline, ran contrary 
to the pattern of national wage bargaining for most of engineering. 
It was the Federated motor employers who vigorously opposed general 
national increase~ as they raised the motor-industry wage bill 
without an obvious increase in production. 
Table 4.2 shows the yearly increases in the annual wage rates plus the 
proportion of annual increase determined by plant bargaining among 
the major car firms in the Federation. On average over the period, 
66 per cent of the Jaguar and Armstrong-Siddeley rate increase arose 
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through workplace bargaining, 64.2 per cent at Austin following the 
reorganisation of Longbridge in 1949, and 63.9 per cent at Morris 
Motors in Coventry. At Alvis,63.2 per cent and at Rootes,6l.2 per cent 
of rate increases came from local bargaining. In Morris Motors at 
Oxford, and the Daimler Company in Coventry,ihop floor bargaining 
accounted for 57.3 per cent and 55.7 per cent of rate increases 
respectively. At the lower end of the spectrum/at Morris Engines in 
Coventry, which was adversely effected by rationalisation following 
the B.M.C. merger, and at the declining Singer Company, the 
proportion of rate increases due to plant bargaining fell below 
50 per cent between 1945 and 1955. 
Although variations in opportunities for increasing rates locally 
depended upon plant circumstances, the generally favourable position 
of the British motor industry during this period/provided shop stewards 
with possibilities for frequent improvements in wage rates. An 
indication of this can be seen in Table 4.3 which presents the monthly 
movements in wage rates in the Coventry District. In the 132 months, 
an increase in the average wage took place on 73 occasions or 55 per cent 
of the months. A fall in the rate occurred on 31 months or 23 per cent 
of the recordings, while there was no movement in the rate on 28 months, 
or just over 21 per cent of the time. In other words, an increase in 
the Coventry Toolroom rate took place almost every second month 
between 1945 and 1955. During the year of" major readjustment from 
munitions to car manufacture, 1945, the monthly rate fell for 9 months, 
but after the introduction of the post-war car models in 1948, despite 
the effects of recession, in 1952 and 1955, an increase in the monthly 
rate took place on eight or nine months in every year, while no more 
then two single months registered decrease, with the exception of 1955. 
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TABLE 4.3 
An analysis of monthly movements in the average Coventry wage rate 
1945-1955. 
INCREASE 
YEAR (MONTHS) 
1945 2 
1946 8 
1947 4 
1948 6 
1949 9 
1950 8 
1951 7 
1952 6 
1953 8 
1954 9 
1955 6 
TOTALS 73 
TOTAL MONTHS 132 
DECREASE NO 
(MONTHS) MOVEMENT 
9 1 
2 2 
5 3 
1 5 
1 2 
2 2 
1 4 
2 4 
2 2 
2 1 
4 2 
31 28 
SOURCE Coventry Toolroom Agreement 
(Minutes) 
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In the transformed post-war labour market, British car workers were 
able to sustain regular improvements in wage rates. The increasing 
scale of the industry, plus the appearance of a virtual inexhaustable 
demand for cars, provided a multitude of bargaining possibilities for 
shop stewards. While clearly the propensity for bargained increases 
on the shop floor would var~ in accordance to the extent to which the 
opportunities for improvements arose in each workplace, it would 
appea~ from the prece'ding evidence that between 50 and 66 per cent 
of all annual increases in wage rates among the leading Federated 
motor manufacturers were being determined at workplace level, between 
1946 and 1955. It was in Coventry, where the most effective gains 
in workplace organisation had been established during the war period, 
that the momentum in bargaining achievements was most sustained. 
But even in Coventry, workplace gains were being sustained, especially 
in periods of recession, by the results of national awards. In 
Table 4.4, the effect of national wage agreements in engineering can be 
seen against the annual increase in the average rate under the Coventry 
Toolroom Agreement. Between 1946 and 19501 increases from nationally 
negotiated awards for engineering were particularly low. Excluding 
1948, in 1949, 1950 and 1953 there were no increases as a result of 
national industry-wide agreements, while in the first two post-war 
years,the annual increase added only id to the rate. The wage award 
in 1948 accounted for 45.5 per cent of the"increase in Coventry but 
the much greater rate increases during the period of expansion and new 
model programmes in 1949 and 1950,were entirely the outcome of 
workplace ba~gaining. In the recession,which hit the motor industry 
in 1951, the opportunities for local increases diminished, but though 
there was a decli~e in the proportion of the Coventry rate determined 
at shop floor level, because of the results of national engineering 
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TABLE 4.4 
The effect of national wage agreements upon the yearly increases in 
Coventry wage rates, 1946-1955. 
YEAR COVENTRY 
RATE INCREASE 
(PENCE) 
1946 5id 
1947 lid 
1948 2id 
1949 3id 
1950 5!d 
1951 7id 
1952 4d 
1953 4!d 
1954 6id 
1955 5d 
NATIONAL NATIONAL AS 
AWARD PERCENTAGE OF 
(PENCE) COVENTRY 
ld (4.7) 
!d (14.3) 
lid (45.5) 
(00.0) 
(00.0) 
3d (41. 3) 
2d (50.0) 
(00.0) 
2id (33.3) 
3d (60.0) 
SOURCE D.E. Gazette 
Coventry Toolroom Agreement 
(Minutes) 
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negotiations, the actual rate continued to increase. Despite the 
recession and the weaNaing in shop floor bargaining, the Coventry 
rate increased by 7id, its highest post-war increase before 1955. 
In 1952, and again in 1955, a decline in the impact of local bargaining 
was offset by an overall increase in the rate due to national 
negotiations. But for nationally agreed increases, wage rates at 
Rootes, Morris Engines, Morris Motors, and Daimler in Coventry, and 
Austin in Birmingham, would have been 2d or 3d an hour below the rates 
paid in these plants over the preca::ling year. 
In the Federated motor industr~ after the initial change-over to 
private car production, there was a subsequent spread in workplace wage 
bargaining in all the main assembly plants. Although variations took 
place in annual rate increases, and within the regularity of changes 
in rates within plants and between different firms and districts, 
hourly rates increased largely because of the growth in workplace 
bargaining. Workplace bargaining, however, depended upon opportunities 
for advancement. During negotiations for the introduction of new models, 
or during rapid expansions in production shop floor negotiations were 
able to advance considerable rate increases. In periods of market 
decline, increases in locally negotiated earnings also fell, but such a 
fall was invariably cushioned by the effect of national wage increases. 
This trend in wage bargaining in the motor industr~ isolated the car 
firms interests from the general wage policies of the Federation. 
Table 4.5 shows the differences between the average hourly earnings 
before 1956 for Federated companies compared to the monthly weighted 
averages compiled under the Coventry Toolroom agreement. 
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TABLE 4.5 
Average monthly wage rates paid in Federated firms compared to 
Federated firms in Coventry, 1948-1956. 
DATE FEDERATION AVERAGE 
HOURLY RATE 
(PENCE) 
Jan 1948 3/3! 
June 1951 3/10, 
May 1952 4/3i 
June 1953 4/7 
Sept 1954 4/11i 
Sept 1955 5/41 
Sept 1956 5/9i 
COVENTRY AVERAGE PERCENTAGE 
HOURLY RATE DIFFERENCE 
(PENCE) (PENCE) 
4/2 26.5 
5/4i 37.4 
5/11i 37.6 
6/31 35.2 
6/9* 37.1 
7/3* 35.7 
7/8 33.3 
SOURCE EEF Proceedings at special 
Conferences, 
Coventry Toolroom Agreement 
(Minutes) 
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The rates for the federated engineering industry are based upon the 
averages for the combined classes of workers in the industry, whereas 
the Coventry figures are drawn from the weighted averages of wage 
rates for skilled production workers. It can be seen from the table 
that, following the introduction of the new post-war cars in 1948 , 
Coventry rates had increased from 26.5 per cent to 37.4 per cent above 
the Federated average by 1951. During the recession in the motor 
industry/the difference over the Federated average in 1953 had only 
fallen 2 per cen~ but in 1956, a year of severe crisis for the motor 
industry, the percentage increase still remained at 33.3 per cent above 
the industry average, despite the loss of 48,000 jobs from car firms 
in the first eleven months of that year. The tension in the Federation 
between the interests of the motor manufacturers and the rest of 
engineering became acute. The plight of the motor industry lay in stark 
contrast to the widespread prosperity of the rest of the engineering 
industry. 
The Times Review of Industry commented upon the mood of optimism among 
the traditional sectors of engineering at the beginning of 1957, 
"Among the heavy engineering firms, mechanical, electrical, 
machine tool makers, locomotive builders, and constructional 
engineers, the cheerfulness about prospects this year seems 
to be fairly general; this at any rate is the tone of the 
reports from the main engineering centres."3 
Moreover,the aircraft industry had reporte~ its best year ever in 
1956,as sales of over £100 million had compared to the previous record 
of £55 million in 1955. Full order books were reported for heavy 
plant and electrical equipment in the Midlands and the North West. 
Profits in the motor industr~ by contras~ had tumbled. The pre-tax 
profits of B.M.C. were down from £20.7 million to £11.7 million in 
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1956, compared to 1955. Rootes fell from £3.3 million to £1.7 million. 
Even among the non-federated firms, Standard dropped from £3.3 million 
to £800,000 while the American Vauxhall Motors fell from £10.8 million 
to £6.4 million, and Ford dropped from £18.1 million to £10 million. 
Among the Federated car firms,the recession, with redundancies and 
short-time working, hit workplace wage bargaining. At Austin/there 
was a fall of 3!d in the shop floor rate. Morris in Oxford fell by 
3!d. In Coventry, the fall was less severe, Morris Motors and Humber 
both fell by 1d. Among the specialist car producers, the rate actually 
increased q~ Jaguar by 6d, Armstrong-Sidde1ey by 5d, and Daimler by 
3d. It was, therefore/among the mass market volume car producers that 
the recession was felt most and where the decline in the rate was most 
apparent. Although the Federated car firms in Coventry were not able 
to get the reduction in the rate that occurred in Birmingham and 
Oxford/the sharpest fall in wage rates in the British owned sector of 
the industry took place,significant1~ at Standard in Coventry. The 
rate at this non-federated firm fell by 4!d. The only car firm 
entirely immune from the recession was Alvis, its rates had increased 
by 9!d,but the firm was now largely specialising in military vehicles. 
Though the federated car firms faced their biggest post-war crisis in 
1956, with profits and sales sharply declining, especially among the 
domestic mass market, and were being overtaken in overseas markets, 
they still incurred a rise in wage rates. Despite the fact that the 
effect of workplace bargaining on wage rates declined, trade union 
pressure for national increases largely offset the fall in the domestic 
rate. The undoubted prosperity experienced among the rest of the 
engineering industry provided the grounds for national bargainers to 
argue for substantial pay awards. The outcome of national pay 
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negotiations resulted in an award of 3~d upon the rate in the federated 
motor industry. 
The preservation and expansion of workplace organisation during the 
period of post-war readjustment and market expansio~ provided not 
inconsiderable opportunities for workplace bargaining. Wage rates in 
the motor industry rose beyond the levels obtained in most other 
sectors of engineering.Rates in the assembly plants, particularly 
in Coventry and to a lesser extent Oxford and Birmingham, ou~aced 
the Federated wage rates, largely because of the results of workplace 
bargaining. The motor industry, however, was susceptible to market 
recession. The weakness of bargaining opportunities during recessions 
was invariably supported by the fruits of national pay awards. The 
federated car firms became increasingly isolated in the first post-
war period by the demands of workplace bargaining,conducted by a 
growing shop steward influence, while they faced the national pay 
awards demanded by national trade unions because of the prosperity 
in engineering and the existence of low minimum rates. 
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2 THE EMERGENCE OF REDUNDANCY AS A WORKPLACE ISSUE 
The favourable position of the British motor manufacturers in the 
international car markets/considerably improved the potential 
for the organisation of labour in the workplace. The development 
of workplace bargaining encouraged a growth in shop steward 
organisation. The car firms proneness to sharp, short-term 
recessions, despite the general prosperity in the industry,resulted 
in redundancy becoming a not infrequent event. In the absence of 
State regulations over the process of dismissal and the withdrawal 
of the Special Redundancy Procedure for the discharge of labour, 
the question of redundancy not only became a regular issue in the 
motor industry but also a source of direct challenge from the 
organised shop floor to the restored contrel OVer labour being 
exercised by the ~ployers. 
Redundancy became an increasingly important issue in British 
industrial relations in the post war period. This no doubt was 
partly a response of the expectations toward full employment, 
which had been generally presented as a political objective to be 
pursued after the military victories, but equally, better organised 
groups of workers were more able to resist the implementation of 
redundancy. In the motor industry, not only was there the frequency 
of redundancy but also the circumstances for the development of 
workplace organisation. Moreover, arising from the importance 
of the motor industry to the manufacture of munitions, the shop 
stewards organisations which emerged, had had direct experience over 
the regulation of redundancy. It was workplace organisation in 
the motor industry which provided the severest challenge to the 
national ~ngineering agreements which reinstated managerial 
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prerogative over redundancy. 
A number of advances in working conditions and trade union organisation 
took place immediately following the end of the war. The guaranteed 
week which operated under the EWQ was introduced into the post 
war agreements in engineering. Provision was made for six 
annual days statutory holiday, and the working week was reduced 
from 47 hours to 44. At the Standard Motor Company, and Austin, 
a 42~ hour week was negotiated. In 1947 ,the entry of the AEU 
into the CSEU paved the way for the encouragement of inter-union 
co-operation at national level in ~ngineering. At local level, 
the effect was perhaps more significant. The growth of JSSC's 
from 1937 until 1946 had remained outside the formal control of 
the unions in engineering. JSSC were not recognised either by 
individual trade unions or employers. In May 1946,the CSEU 
agreed in principle to give recognition to~ JSSC's. Individual 
unions operating in the workplace,would continue to elect their 
own shop stewards. The stewards would elect among themselves 
their own JSSC, electing both chairman and secretary. These 
officers of the JSSC would act as Confederation Shop Stewards, 
being the organisational link between the workplace and the DC 
of the CSEU. In effect/the CSEU had agreed in principle to 
grant recognition for a Shop Stewards Movement to operate within 
a distric~ under the governing framework of the local full-time 
officials of the Confederation. This CSEU structure gave expression 
to some of the benefits associated with industrial unionism,without 
breaching the autonomy of individual unions. It enabled the 
inter union co-operation which had been developed during the war 
period, at workplace level, to be channelled into the structure 
of trade union organisation. The CSEU provided an organisational 
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means for co-ordinating activities between the various engineering 
unions on issues of common interest at both national and local 
level. 
The war time co-operation between shop steward organisations and 
employers howeveri regulating the rundown of employment, came to 
an end with the withdrawal of the EWO from the engineering industry 
by the MOL. In engineering I the Special Redundancy procedure, 
introduced by the Joint Consultative Committee in September 
1944,was cancelled in May 1946. This decision paved the way for 
the restoration of managerial control over workforces, subject 
to the provisions of industry agreements. The EEF circulated its 
membership on 7 June 1946, informing them that, 
"The question of discharging a worker on grounds 
of redundancy will in future be at the discre;1on 
of the employer and in accordance with clause (C) 
of Section C of the National Agreement of 3 April 
1946". 4 
This agreement laid down the general requirements for notice, 
specifically mentioning its application in cases of redundancy. 
"Where the employment of an hourly rated manual 
worker who has been continuously employed by a 
federated firm for not less than four weeks is 
terminated for reasons other than misconduct eg, 
redundancy or where the worker wishes to leave) 
the duration of notice given shall be equivalent 
to the non-overtime weekly hours operating in the 
establishment for the time being". 5 
Under the national agreement, notice would be given equivalent to 
the. length of the working week operating in the establishment 
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at the time of dismissal, or, as outlined in an agreed note which 
accompanied this clause, payment of a weeks wages in lieu of 
notice. In the motor industry, two small craft unions, the UPA 
and the A.Soc.W., plus a union which had craft origins, the NUVB, 
all had longstanding clauses in their piecework agreements ~ich 
stated: 
"In the event of a depression in trade in any 
establishment systematic short-time working shall 
be worked, if practical, in preference to the 
discharging of workmen". 
(Section V Clause 13 National Woodworkers Agreement) ? 
In the broad question of redundancy, the ultimate decision was a 
managerial one. OVer the particular application of the short-
time agreement the question remained less precise, being one of 
preference rather than a right. These clauses governed the issue 
of redundancy for the federated employers in the motor industry. 
Until 19S~ the only aspect of redundancy which had exercised 
the minds of the EEF policy-makers,lay in the encouragement of 
member firms to co-operate with the local labour exchanges through 
an early notification of large scale redundancies. Other than 
these efforts, concerned to promote the workings of the labour 
market rather than the process of control over redundancy 
decisions, the EEF did not address itself to the question of 
redundancy until it became especially pertinent in the car 
industry. 
The 1946 ~ational Agreement in Engineering claimed back the 
employers right to unfettered control over redundancy, subject 
only to the terms of notice. Employees had the entitlement to a 
weeks notice, or the payment of wages in lieu, but had lost the 
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involvement of the MOL and the prescribed role for workplace 
organisation in the process of redundancy. The question of the 
future handling of redundancy by federated companies was raised 
in a central conference referenc~ after a South London Engineering 
firm had posted the following notice in its works on 4 May 1946. 
"Formal notice is hereby given to the termination 
of the redundancy agreement of January 28, 1945 
on the 4 May 1946 coinciding with the de-scheduling 
of this firm and the withdrawing of the EWO".7 
The shop floor representatives approached the works management 
with a proposal for the regulation of redundancy in the post war 
period. Their suggestions were largely based upon the agreed 
procedures which had operated over the war-time redundancies. 
The forward to their proposals stated: 
"With a view to continuing the policy of co-operation 
between work people and management the following is 
suggested as an appropriate method for dealing with 
redundancy should the issue of work not warrant 
the continued employment of the present number of 
employees". 8 
The redundancy proposal contains three clauses. 
"1. If at any time it is necessary to reduce the staff 
of a particular grade of work the following categories 
should go in order. 
a) volunteers, (b) workers registered under TRA, 
(c) workers according to length of service as section 
5 of the agreement of 26 January 1945. 
2. No workers should be discharged until the appropriate 
shop steward or shop stewards convenor has been 
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consulted as under the provision for the avoidance 
of disputes. 
3. The management and foreman to refer all cases of 
absenteeism, misbehaviour etc, to the JPC, or a sub-
committee thereof, or alternatively the appropriate 
shop steward or the shop steward convenor".9 
Drawing upon the experience of the Special Redundancy Agreemen~ 
the London proposal suggested the continuation of union-management 
co-operation upon the basis of a distinctive involvement of 
workplace representatives. The proposal set out an order of job 
rights to employment, for the workforce and specified a role for 
the workplace organisation on the operation of redundancy and 
the handling of discipline at work. The intention was not that 
this proposal should replace the Managerial Functions agreement 
but rather, the co-operative spirit within which it could operate 
would remove the need to resort to issues having to be decided 
outside the works through the Procedure Agreement. The unions 
argued their approach, 
"Should faciliate immediate understanding so in most 
cases it will not be necessary to take the matter 
beyond the works, thus preventing delay and hardship 
to any workers concerned".lO 
When the proposals were presented at Central Conference all trade 
union officials saw them as, 
"An attempt to prevent a deterioration in relations 
to the pre-war position in order to promote confidence, 
mutual trust, resulting in an increase in the 
efficiency of industry" .11 
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The redundancy proposal did not deny managements right to the 
determination of its own workforce, but merely established 
provisions that in cases of redundancy/decisions would not be 
implemented without consulting the workplace organisation. 
For the employers,the signing of the dismissal clause reestablished 
their traditional status over labour~ The proposal was suggesting 
that shop stewards should have a continual role in a traditional 
concern of management. The employers view was that war-time 
conditions had been replaced by the return of a market economy and 
the restoration of the free movement of labour. There were, 
therefore, no parallels with the war economy. The Special 
Redundancy Agreement had been designed to meet exceptional 
circumstances; the large scale run down of the munitions 
industries. Adjustments of labour in the post war world were 
envisaged as being on a much smaller scale. The employers neither 
required a special procedure or an agreed involvement of shop 
stewards. In the larger firms, the development of personnel 
managers, welfare officers and labour officers, it was argued, 
gave employers the capability of knowing the personal circumstances 
of their workers. Therefore/the shop stewards role was not really 
necessary in this area. As it was thought the majority of post-
war dismissals were likely to arise from the suitability of 
individual workers, this was a managerial decision which could 
not be shared with shopfstewards. 
The EEF's view, which was taken as an indication of post war 
attitudes', was seen by the unions as a reiteration of the traditional 
pre war position, 
"We hire and we fire" 12 
From 1946 to 1950,t~is question of managerial control over 
redundancy came under repeated stress, particularly in the motor 
industry where/despite the general level of full employment, and 
shortages of labour, the incidence of redundancy becoame common 
place. Without an agreed procedure which enlisted the shop 
stewards, redundancy became a source of acute strife as workplace 
bargaining and shop steward organisations began to spread. The 
I 
federated employers attempts to apply their authority bestowed 
in tiational agreements/came under increasing pressure from the 
shop floor. In the early post war period, redundancy became 
an inevitable reflection of the degree of growing unionisation 
among workforces. The challenge towards employer control of 
redundancy was indicative of the growing importance of workplace 
organisation in the federated car firms. 
Table 4.6 gives a breakdown of the underlying issues which arose 
in redundancy strikes among the main car firms,between 1947 and 
1956. The analysis of redundancy disputes has been undertaken 
through an application of the DE revised Stoppages Relating to 
Redundancy cause-classification, established in 1973. In applying 
these categories to this earlier period, it can be seen that 1~ 
or 36.3 per cent,of all redundancy stoppages arose as a response 
to a management decision to declare a redundancy or threaten a 
redundancy, (cause 1 and 2); while 28, or 61.3 per cent of 
all redundancy strikes primarily involved issues connected with 
the handling of redundancy, (cause 3 to 9). 
The major factor in the redundancy strikes was the number of 
stoppages which occurred owing to the selection of workplace 
representatives in redundancy situations. This, (cause 4), 
accounted for 17 disputes, or 38.7 per cent of all redundancy 
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TABLE 4.6 - REDUNDANCY STRIKES IN THE MOTOR INDUSTRY (MLH 381) 
CAUSAL ANALYSIS OF PRIMARY ISSUES 1947-1956 
STRIKE CAUSE NO STRIKES 
1 
2 
Against feared or proposed 
redundancy or plant closure 
Demands for reinstatement of 
redundant workers 
3 Insufficient consultation or 
adequate warning 
4 Against selection of union officials 
members of factory committees, shop 
stewards, convenors. 
5 Other" first-to-go" disputes including 
demands for non-union labour before 
union members. 
6 
7 
8 
9 
Over short time working, working 
sharing or lay-off as alternative to 
redundancy 
OVer redeployment or transfer of 
workers, as result of redundancy 
Against engagement of additional 
workers during actual or threatened 
redundancy 
Over introduction, or revised procedure 
agreements or procedural practices 
regulating redundancy 
TOTALS 
SOURCE: DE 
13 
3 
3 
17 
1 
2 
1 
3 
1 
44 
(PER CENT) 
(29.5) 
(6.8) 
(6.8) 
(38.7) 
(2.3) 
(4.5) 
(2.3) 
(6.8) 
(2.3) 
(100) 
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strikes during the period. Conflict over the selection of work 
place representatives outweighed, opposition to a proposed 
or actual redundancy, and to demands by workforces for alternatives 
to redundancy. Thirteen disputes arose against feared or proposed 
redundancy or plant closure, including cases where notice of 
redundancy had been served. Only two strikes arose over demands 
for short-time working or work sharing as an alternative to 
redundancy. 
In Table 4.~figures are presented for the number of striker-days 
lost through redundancy strikes in the motor industry. These 
figures are an indication of the scale or duration of the actual 
strikes. This table reveals that opposition to the actual 
redundancy decision is far less intense than the opposition to 
the actual handling of the redundancy. Cause (1) and (2) account 
for 29.9 per cent of all striker-days,whi1e cause (3) to (9) 
measuring the striker-days lost over the manner of handling 
redundancy, total 70 per cent of all striker-days for the period. 
In terms of the number of striker-days lost,causes (1) and (2) 
total 345,900 days, compared to 810,050 striker-days lost for 
causes (3) to (9) inclusive. 
What is perhaps the most dominant feature of a1~is the proportion 
of striker-days lost involving the 'se~ection of union officials, 
members of factozycommittees, shop stewards, convenors'. This 
accounts for 654,600 striker-days, equivalent to more than half 
the total striker-days for the whole ten years of redundancy 
strikes. The conflict registered through these strike figures 
involving workplace representatives in redundancy situation~ 
considerably outweighed OPposition to a proposed or actual 
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Tl~LE 4.7 - REDUNDANCY STRIKER-DAYS IN THE MOTOR INDUSTRY 
(MLH 381) CAUSAL ANALYSIS OF PRIMARY ISSUES 1947-1956 
STRIKE CAUSE 
1 Against feared or proposed 
redundancy or plant closure 
2 Demands for reinstatement of 
redundant workers 
3 Insufficient consultation or 
adequate warning 
4 Against selection of union officials, 
members of factory committees, shop 
stewards, convenors 
5 Other "first-to-go" disputes including 
demands for non union labour before 
union members 
6 Over short-time working, work sharing 
(000) 
STRIKER-DAYS 
256.3 
89.6 
6.1 
654.6 
3.5 
or lay-off as alternatives to redundancy 139.6 
7 
8 
9 
OVer redeployment or transfer of workers, 
as result of redundancy 0.06 
Against engagement of additional 
workers during actual or threatened 
redundancy 5.79 
Over introduction, or revised procedure 
agreements, or procedural practices 
regulating redundancy 0.4 
1,155.95 
SOURCE: DE 
(PER CENT) 
22.2 
7.8 
O.s 
56.6 
0.3 
12.0 
0.0: 
0.5 
0.1 
(100.0 
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redundancy, and to the intensity of opposition to proposed or 
actual redundancies. It resulted in 56.6 per cent of all striker-
days/compared to 256,300 or 22.2 per cent of striker-days against 
feared or proposed redundancy; and 89,600 striker-days, or 7.8 
per cent of the total striker-days,for demands for reinstatement 
of redundant workers. Only 12 per cent of striker-days, or 
139,600 striker-days,involved disputes over short-time working 
demands, work sharing or temporary lay-offs, as alternatives to 
redundancy. 
The general picture revealed by these two tables suggests the 
workforces,between 1947 and 1956, did not generally aspire to 
oppose redundancy as such, but ~n~~ the method or manner with 
which redundancy was being carried out. Its important to exercise 
caution when interpreting statistics, for it could possibly be 
argued in this case that all redundancy strikes, ipso facto, 
were strikes against redundancy. An element of this is undoubtedly 
true. What is being analysed here is the main, or primary cause, 
which is being identified, and not secondary or subsidiary causes. 
Therefore, at this stage only general observation can be drawn. 
The preponderance of strikes and striker-days over the selection 
of workplace representatives suggests that while there was less 
of a sustained challenge to the legitimacy of managements role 
over redundancy, even with an expectation of full employment among 
workforce~ there is a definite opposition to managerial attempts 
to weaken workplace organisation, through the control of 
redundancy. SO,although workforces may not have considered they 
possessed a right or power to effectively oppose the authority of 
management, prescribed by the national agreement of 3 April 1946, 
" 
340 
willing to accept managements authority to discharge workplace 
representatives. 
The productive base of the motor industry expanded following the 
conversion from munitions to car assembly. In 1947, however, 
the output of cars fell below the level of 1935. A serious fuel 
crisis in the first three months of the year and a scarcity of 
vital materials and equipment,left the industry averaging between 
only 75 to 80 per cent of capacity. The particular shortages of 
~teel to the industry and difficulties in acquiring jigs and 
machine tools resulted in an increase in unemployment. Registered 
unemployed in the industry rose from 11,429 in December 194~ to 
56,679 by March 1947. 
Trade union concern lay in the fear that the increases in 
unemployment were providing opportunities to victimise shop 
stewards. At the first quarterly meeting of Coventry AEU shop 
stewards, calls were being made for the right of appeal in cases 
AAd 
of redundancy to an MOL independent tribunal, for employees to 
consult with shop stewards over engagement or dismissal of 
workforces. The stewards were also asking for legal protection 
and compulsory recognition of shop stewards and convenors, and 
for legislation to prevent employers operating black lists of 
workers. These proposals had followed a series of complaints 
about cases of victimisation which had taken place in Coventry. 
During the spring of 1947, the C~1 CSEU had received protests 
from 18 trade union branches, numerous shop stewards committees, 
plus the ·TGWU DC,over incidents of victimisation of trade unionists.') 
In July 1947, the C~ CSEU District Secretary, Jack Jones, 
referring to the incidence of victimisation,called upon the Citys 
shop stewards to develop ways and means of protecting trade 
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oft~~ concealed victimisation by clever manoeuvring. In Oxfor~ 
the closure of Morris Radiators during the fuel crisis resulted 
in the loss of three prominent members of the shop stewards 
committee, including the AEU convenor and chairman of the JSSC, 
Norman Brown. He and two other shop stewards/Alf Goldsmith and 
Henry Rimmer/were not offered employment when production14 
restarted after the four week closure. During these early post 
war years; a number of small redundancy disputes arose in which 
federated management refused to conCEde the question of prior 
consultation with shop steward organisations. 
At the Humber works in Coventry, shortages of materials had 
combined with disagreements over piecework prices in the 1t'r:i.'ll 
section of the Sunbeam-Talbot line. As the production levels 
fell, the management dismissed 59 members of the NUVB including the 
r 
unions shop steward and ~hief shop steward. The outcome was a 
strike of 68 trimmers which lasted 26 days. Out of the Sig 
strike in 1946/the vehicle builders argued that the management 
had agreed a procedure in cases of redundancy. The employers 
representatives claimed that the management stated they would 
merely give a list of redundant workers to the shop steward of 
the section involved, once the redundancy notices had been given. 
With the two stewards dismissed and a 'go-slow' in the trim 
section, the union argued that there was litt~e hope of resolving 
either the strike or the piece-work price issue. Under pressure 
of the production lines "drying Upl~ the Company agreed to 
reconsider the reappointment of the Chief Steward provided this 
was taken'as a gesture towards resolving the piecework differences. 
No guarantee could be given surrounding other dismissed workers 
until production had been fully restored. 
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Following a return to work/a Works Conference was held with the 
officials of the CSEU over the question of future redundancy 
procedure. The Humber management made clear it stood by the 
National Agreement; that if work was not available. workers 
. , 
would be laid off, without entitlement to the guaranteed week. 
It was, however, conceded that where future redundancy arose, 
shop stewards of sections involved would be given the names of 
the dismissed workers once notices had been issued and the right 
to propose substitutes for dismissed workers could take place 
during the period of notice, even in instances where wages had 
. 15 been paid in lieu of not1ce. These proposals became the COV EEA 
policy for the handling of redundancy but fell short of the prior 
consultation with shop stewards which had operated with the 
redundancy of munition workers. From this first experience of 
post war redundancy,the role of workplace organisation began to 
increasingly appear as the major question underlying redundancy 
issues. 
At the Rover factory in Birmingham, it was an arrangement with 
the NUVB to overcome the shortages of skilled trimmers which gave 
rise to a strike of 60 vehicle builders following a redundancy of 
5 workers. Rover had moved their car assembly out of Coventry 
to their Shadow factory at Solihull in Birmingham, owing to the 
war damage at their Coventry premises •. The general shortage of 
vehicle builders became particularly apparent among the specialist 
car firms once car production began to expand. At the Solihull 
factory, the shop steward organisation had been unable to get the 
management to set up a JPC for post war production. After 18 
months of protracted discussionS/the local officials had raised 
16 
the matter with their MPs. To overcome the anticipated shortage 
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of trimmer& the management had agreed with the NUVB to the setting 
up of a training school to increase the supply of available 
workers. Under the scheme/the vehicle builders had agreed to 
the employment of trainees at the semi-skilled rate until they 
had acquired sufficient experience and ability to carry out 
the fully rated jobs. During the arrangements for setting up the 
school, assurances had been given by the firm regarding the 
position of skilled vehicle builders. Given the standard of coach 
work at the Rover, the management had informed the union that 
they would always require a large proportion of skilled workers. 
In the fall-off in production during 1947, however, the management 
declared 5 vehicle builders redundant on the 29 October. Two 
were fully rt=lT.F(l employees and three were trainees. The workers 
in the trim department did not question the need for the redundancy 
but were challenging the redundancy of the skilled workers, 
while other trainees remained in the shop. Elsworth, the NUVa 
Birmingham area organiser, who had been party to the training 
scheme negotiations stated: 
"I think I can say this quite confidently, that 
unless we had had some assurances that the rate of 
the skilled men and the position of the skilled 
men would be safeguarded, I do not think we could 
have persuaded Our members in any department to 
accept this scheme •••• on that basis, and that 
basis alone, the safeguarding of the position of 
our skilled men, that we have been able to get them 
to accept the scheme and to. \IoIOrk along with trainees" .17 
The issue for the vehicle builders was their traditional control 
over the coach building assembly shop. In Tbe Rover, Elsworth 
claimed they had: 
"always been regarded a skilled man's shop, - that 
is, as far as the coach side is concerned". 18 
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It was the shortage of skilled trimmers which had led to semi-
skilled trainees in the shop. The management were seeking to 
exercise their rights over redundancy. Their criteria challenged 
the notion of a 'union shop'. The issue for the management was 
the capability of the workers involved. Agreements governing the 
employment of semi-skilled workers did riot state that they should 
be declared redundant before skilled workers, nor did they accept 
that any section of the works should be considered for union 
members only. Employment in any particular shop, the management 
argued, depended upon the nature of the work. Although a return 
to work had taken place after a three day strike/to enable the 
issue to be placed with procedure, an eventual informal settlement 
at workplace level was reached following management assurances that 
the two skilled workers would have preference to future employment. 
The Rover dispute raised important aspects of craft unionism 
still being defended among the vehicle builders. The two skilled 
workers declared redundant had worked at coach building since 
1918, following a seven year apprenticeship. Mass production 
techniques had had a considerable effect upon the workmanship 
employed on volume car production. Among the specialist car 
manufacturers, like Rover, Daimler, Jaguur, Alvis and Armstrong-
Siddeley I a high standard of craftmanship was still being 
utilised. In the body and trim sections of these firms, 
vehicle builders still held an attachment to the craft traditions 
of their union. The fall in apprenticeship for coachwork, during 
the war period, and the expansion and modernisation of production 
after 1946,created shortages of vehicle builders. The NUVB,being 
unable to supply sufficient numbers of union members to the industry, 
agreed to accept semi-skilled trainees. While the membership in 
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the shop were prepared to tolerate these developments, they did 
so while defending their craft status. They demanded preference 
for their apprenticed members before trainees who had been in the 
motor industry for less than eighteen months. Craft aspirations 
among the vehicle builders remained a characteristic of their 
workplace organisation despite the evident decline in job skills, 
through mass production technology. The nature of their craft 
unionism transformed with changes in technology. It lay less in 
the practice of a craft tradition in work but more in the right 
to exclusively organise the workforces in the coach building 
sections of assembly and preserve the skilled rate. The vehicle 
builders official stated during the Rover Local Conference: 
"I am going to submit that during all those 
discussions what was uppermost in our minds and in 
the minds of our members employed at the Rover 
company, was the danger which they saw to the rate 
of the skilled men". 19 
For the vehicle builders the: 
" •••• man is rated not the position" 20 
The control of redundancy implied a control over opportunities 
to alter the ri'\1~e through changing the balance of work undertaken 
in the coach building shops. The stoppage. was therefore a direct 
challenge to management selection undertaken without prior 
consultation with the shop floor representatives. In their 
defence of the r4te,the vehicle builders were questioning management 
rights to determine redundancy on the basis of work content, 
skill levels and employees aptitude, and general record with the 
firm. These considerations were secondary factors to the defence 
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During these early post war years, the federated managements were 
attempting to exercise their authority over the determination of 
their workforces. They were refusing to enter into any arrangements 
for prior consultation with shop stewards for fear of compromising 
their right to choose and discharge labour. If grievances aros~ 
they could be channelled through the avoidance of disputes 
procedure. For the unions involved,the procedure could give 
little co~ort to their discontent. Apart from the inevitable 
delay in being able to respond to what were immediate issues, the 
agreements governing dismissal gave management the right to 
decide. Unofficial action in the workplace became inevitable. 
Forty five engineers at Carbodies struck/on the 6 Novembe~ for 
two days/after the management had made redundant 17 AEU member~ 
while at the same time starting a former employee, who was not 
21 I 
a member of the union. The local officials attempts to get the 
non-unionist removed from his job in the toolroom failed during 
their negotiations with management, after a return to work. The 
management had been willing to take the issue to arbitration but 
neither party could agree upon the terms of reference. 
The shortages of supplies to the motor industry, plus the 
introduction by car firms of new model~was resulting in management 
dismissing workers. Towards the end of 1940 the car manufacturers 
were becoming increasingly pessimistic over the future rationing 
of steel to the industry. In December,the motor manufacturers 
were forecasting a fall in production in 1948 to 260,000 cars, 
about two' thirds of the capacity for the industry. The Government 
were attempting to get the car firms to rationalise their model 
range and standardise their use of components in order to make 
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British cars more competitive for export markets. In November 
194~ the MOS suggested that each manufacturer should concentrate 
upon one proven model of car which should be attractive for export. 
Behind the proposal lay an attempt to conserve the use of steel 
used by the industry, while encouraging car firms to overcome some 
of their basic deficiences. Car tax was altered to encourage the 
manufacture of larger engines, more suitable to overseas motoring, 
while steel supplied to the assembly plants was rationed according 
to the proportion of cars produced for export. 
The industry resisted wholesale change. The specialist firms 
argued for the need to preserve individuality in car design, 
while the mass manufacturers opposed change which would require 
considerable investment in new machinery and machine tools. It 
would conce~ t..'1e current advantaged position of the British motor 
industry in world markets and result in large scale displacements 
of labour from the industry. The rationing of steel and model 
change, however, had an increase in the number of redundancies 
in the industry and a rise in the challenge of management to 
workplace organisation. 
In February 1948 the Birmingham AEU DO report claimed: 
"Redundancy has reached serious dimensions in parts 
of the division. Birmingham shop stewards having 
met on this issue". 22 
The most serious challenge took place at the Rover works. The 
scale of the redundancies had virtually wiped out the workplace 
organisation. The Rover stewards sent a letter to their MPs 
pointing to the effect of the Companys method for applying 
redundancY durinG a model ':ha.:"lfJe. 
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" •.•.. with the net result that all the JP<;:, and between 
80 and 95 per cent of all productive workers are now 
discharged, together with the convenor and the majority 
of shop stewards". 23 
The shop stewards had tried to raise the question of the changeover 
through the JPC. The firm had refused to work the guaranteed 
week, or consult with shop stewards through the production 
committee over their decision to declare the redundancy. 
At Austin, the changeover for a new model brought a redundancy 
of 600 workers, who were given a weeks notice. The notices were 
issued without prior consultation with either the shop stewards 
or their JPC. An approach for consultation by the stewards was 
refused by the management. L.P. Lord, Chairman of Austin, 
said on the 16 January: 
"~'i'hen staff redundancies occurred during the war 
the shop stewards were consulted by National 
agreement. This Agreement terminated in June 
1946". 24 
He went on to say: 
" it was the directors and not the workers who 
ran the factory". 25 
Feelings among sections of the workforce were running high over 
the manner of dismissal, a number of those made redundant had given 
long service to Longbridge. On the 17 January/the stewards held 
a meeting' attended by some 300 employees to report upon their 
failure to get the management to agree on joint representation by 
management and workplace representatives on the redundancy list. 
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·Dick Etheridge, was reported as saying. on the 19 ,Tanuary: 
"We are not asking for strike action but through 
our organisation we can take this matter up on a 
National level and we expect support from the 
Government on this". 26 
The shop steward committee received the approval of the meeting 
to take the issue up with the Midland Regional Board for Industry, 
while the Birmingham MP, Y.V. Yates, raised the issue of consultation 
in the House of Commons. The Austin stewards had previously agreed. 
to the introduction of a nightshift to ease the effect of the fuel 
shortage at Longbridge. They did so on the understanding that 
there would be no unemployment. Now they faced a redundancy without 
explanation. Etheridge stated the committee's attitude towards 
the managements methods: 
"We are not looking for trouble but we are not 
afraid of it. We are extending the hand of friendship 
in the interest of production but if the firm does 
not want it that way, they can have it the other". 27 
~he stewards approach achieved little other than publically 
raising the question of the role of JPCs. The Midland Regional 
Board reported that there were 65,000 vacancies in the West 
Midlands. When the redundancy was raised in the House of Commons 
on the 27 January~the Minister of Labo~~Geo. Isaacs, merely 
re-stated the Government's faith in industry resolving its own 
difficulties. 
"I would point out that there is well established 
constitutional machinery in the Engineering industry 
for the settlement of differences between employers 
and their workpeople" .28 
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Though the Government favoured consultation, and would be willing 
to call industry together to discuss the advantages of it, they 
would not become directly involved, nor place a statutory obligation 
upon employers to operate JPCs. The Minister, in answer to a 
question arising from the circumstances at Austin said: 
"I think it is unfortunate that a mass discharge 
should take place without at least some sort of 
consultation with those concerned. The constitutional 
machinery of the industry, however, must be used 
before I intervene". 29 
and on JPC's 
"We think that committees of that sort are most 
valuable if they voluntarily work in that way, and 
they are most likely to be useless if they are 
compulsory". 30 
The Austin and Rover redundancies illustrated the employers 
willingness to utilise the authority bestowed in the National 
Agreements. The Longbridge management had not sought to replace 
the special redundancy procedure, as they saw the determination 
of the level of the workforce exclusively a management matter, 
beyond the concerns even of the JPC. Lacking the direct support 
of the Labour Government and confronted with the limitations of 
procedure, redundancy was becoming an issue which could only be 
challenged in the workplace. 
OVer in Coventry, the January redundancies were seen as direct 
attacks upon shop floor organisation. At the Armstrong-Siddeley, 
union membership had been growing. In December 194~ a campaign 
conducted by all the unions and the plant had began for 100 per 
cent membership. Armstrong-Siddeley had continued the war-time 
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practice of consulting with shop stewards where they had a 
redundancy of more than five workers, but during the past year 
they had began to challenge the position of convenor of shop 
stewards, even though it had existed in the workplace organisation 
since the war. The growth in workplace bargaining had been met 
by restrictions placed upon the movement of the convenor during 
working hours. This attempt to curtail the activity of the JSSC, 
through preventing access to their convenor,had been combined with 
a series of individual dismissals which lay outside the practice 
of prior consultation. 
On the 21 January, Allcock, an operator of a radial armed operating 
machine, was given a weeks notice on grounds of redundancy. He 
was a member of the AEU and had been employed 01 the firm for 10 
years. The day before he was to leave, it was discovered that his 
job would be filled by Kirman who had been previously a member 
of the AEU but now was known to oppose union membership. When 
the question was raised by the section steward of the AEU, with 
the superintendent of foremen, there appeared to be the possibility 
of alternative employment being offered. The position of the AEU 
convenor and shop steward was that this should go to Kirman. On 
the 26 January,when these facts were being reported to a general 
meeting of all shop stewards in the factory, a stoppage of work 
took place in the machine room. while the stewards were away. 
It soon spread to the whole works as 4,000 workers went on strike. 
When this information reached a shop stewards meeting the stewards 
gave their support to the shop floor action. They sent a message 
to the machine room which said: 
"The meeting of shop stewards at present being held 
supports the action of the operators who have ceased 
work, and will now proceed to recommend that all 
operators throughout the factory cease work immediately".31 
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The unions in the plant saw the dismissal of Allcock and the 
replacement of his job by Kirman,as a response by the management 
to their efforts before Christmas/to recruit non-unionists to 
their respective unions. At the works conference which followed 
the ending of the strike, the AEU official, Billy Stokes, argued: 
"It is, therefore), understandable that the general 
mass of workers and shop stewards throughout the 
factory are firmly convinced that this is a 
challenge on the part of the company to let the 
workpeople know that they are having no t::rncJ: ",i th 
100 per cent trade union membership". 32 
The Company were arguing their right to declare redundancies 
upon the basis of the level of work. Al though the unions did not 
challenge this view, nor that there was an actual redundancy, 
they did contest the action of dismissing a trade unionist 
whose ability was not in question, and replacing him with a non-
union employee. 
The state of union management relations was seen by the employers 
as resulting from the position of shop stewards, who were failing 
to see that agreements were adhered to. THe COV EEA Director 
said, on behalf of the firm, at the Local Conference held on the 
28 January: 
"They must have a responsibility to their unions 
to see that agreements are honoured. It is their 
responsibility, when a stoppage of work occurrs, 
to do their best to see that the procedure is 
operated: but here your stewards went out of their 
way to extend the stoppage and to abuse procedure")3 
The COV EEA saw the issue of deteriorating relations at Armstrong-
Siddeley resulting from the increasing influence and independent 
action of the shop stewards organisation. 
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"The shop stewards decided to take action and what 
they consider is appropriate action is strike 
action against the firm, if the firm are not prepared 
to dismiss a non-unionist. Therefore I do not see 
how you (the trade union officials) can contend this 
deterioration in the atmosphere lies at anybody 
else's door but your own stewards". 34 
The outcome of the dispute was that Allcock was suspended,pending 
the outcome of the issue going into procedure. 
The use of procedure, however, for the handling of redundancy 
cases was increasingly being seen to be of little relevance, 
especially on the shop floor. The encouragement by local officials 
to get issues placed into procedur~ either to prevent or stop 
industrial action by workforces ~as becoming exposed by the 
limited redress on questions of managerial rights. During the 
Autumn of 1947 and the beginning of 1948, the vehicle builders 
officials had consistently discouraged their membership from 
taking strike action in redundancy situations. The membership 
were insisting that where redundancies arosel the short time working 
clause should operate in preference to job-loss. 
on the 11 February 1946, the Coventry branch of the NUVE in response 
to the initiative of their shop stewards, had passed a resolution 
that: 
"As from 18 February 1946 we definitely ban overtime 
as long as we have members Signing the vacant book" .35 
The Bran~h secretary was asked to place an advert in the Coventry 
Evening Telegraph, and write to the C0V EEA informing them of the 
decision. The Employers Association had taken the whole issue 
to Central Conference, claiming it breached the National OVertime 
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and Nightshift Agreements. The NUVB officials were left with 
convincing their membership to agree to particular/rather than 
blanket,policies towards overtime bans. 
In August 1947, Daimler made 16 NUVB members redundant and refused 
the stewards request for short-time working. A mass meeting of 
the vehicle builders at the factory decided upon strike action 
should the management refuse to operate short-time working. The 
NOVE union official had been brought to the works and had: 
" •••• with the greatest of difficulty, on a close 
vote got the workforce to accept putting their 
case into procedure". 36 
The union considered it had strong grounds, in view of the short-
time working agreement, for establishing the principle of short-
time in the Coventry district. The reference in procedure was 
that the: 
"principle of short-time working to prevent disturbances 
in the Coventry district, in keeping with Section V 
Clause 13 of the National Agreement".3 7 
At the local conference, the employers drew an emphatic interpretation 
of the agreement and the reference. The Director of the Cav 
EEA stated: 
"You have asked us, in your terms of reference, to 
say to every member firm that they should keep what 
labour they have got, and if they do not need it 
work short-time. Our answer to that is NO". 38 
He went on to add: 
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"All I am saying is that a known level of 
production should be balanced by a labour force 
that will give a full working week". 39 
At Central Conference,the position of Clause 13 was given more 
clarity from the EEF viewpoint. It was pointed out that the 
agreement advocating short-timing working hinged upon the phase. 
" if practicable ••.• " 40 
~here could be no general ruling upon what was practicable. As 
conditions and circumstances varied, not just between particular 
firms, but over time within the same firm, it was not possible 
at Central Conference to say categorically that firms should 
always work short-time and never discharge men. This had to be 
left to each individual firm to decide. The ~mployers, in other 
words/were saying that they were willing to comply with the 
short-time clause in the agreement, but its application depended 
upon particular practical circumstances to be determined at local 
level by the individual employer. The decision was of importance 
to the NUVB. In February they had SO body makers, finishers, 
and trimmers unemploye~with a further 100 members under notice. 
In addition, Morris Bodies and Armstrong-Siddeley were declaring 
large redundancies. 
On the 24 February 1948, the vehicle builders raised the question 
of short time working at the bodies factory of Morris Motors. 
The labour force had been cut by 16 per cent. The local officials 
were losing their case upon the Central Conference decision. 
The firm refused to work short-time, claiming it impractical. 
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They argued, also, under the 3 April 1946 agreement/they were 
under no obligation to pay the guaranteed week to redundant workers 
whom they subsequently re-engaged. The guaranteed week agreement 
was effectively encouraging employers to declare workers redundant 
rather than hold on to labour and operate short-time working. 
Unlike the inter war period, employers had less incentive to share 
out the work. To avoid the possible payment under the guaranteed 
week,the motor industry f~derated employers were seeking to work a 
full week with the least number of personnel. Where the balance 
of work failed to sustain the level of the workforce, redundancies 
took place. 
This was vigorously opposed by vehicle builders/whose union 
had long adopted work sharing to prevent the signing of the 
vacant book. This practice was particularly prev~lent in the 
Railway workshops, as well as the inter war motor industry. 
On 12 May, the officials of the vehicle builders were again at a 
works conference, this time for the continuation of short time 
working at Jaguar. The union side were stressing the difficulties 
they were placed under when firms declared their members redundant. 
Jaguar had in the past regularly worked short time. The NUVB 
had seen this as the firms accepted policy. Owing to shortages, 
supplies output had failed to reach the anticipated 250 cars 
a week. As production fell to 150 a week, the company began to 
shed labour. The NUVB officials registered 'fail to agree'. 
The redundancies which occurred in the motor industry between the 
Autumn of 1947 and the beginning of 1948, saw the federated 
employers standing firm over the managerial functions aspects of 
redundancy. The co-operation which existed between employers and 
unions and "' particularly, the agreed joint working between 
mppossmspF§ . . -.. . . .... - ~ ... • §' , , ~, 
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terminated with the return to a market economy. The employers 
showed no desire to replace the Special Redundancy Procedure. 
JPCs were being ignored in regard to redundancy questions. The 
withdrawalof state protection over dismissal and the establishment 
of employers rights under the 3 April agreement,left the only 
constitutional course of action for workforces,the increasingly 
doubtful Avoidance of Disputes Procedure. 
OVer short-time working/the officials of the vehicle builders 
credibility was being undermined by their lack of success in 
getting the Coventry motor industry to adhere to the spirit of 
the national agreement with the employers federation. The union 
had had the experience of Morris Bodies and Jaguar declaring 
workers redundant but recruiting fresh labour within two or three 
weeks. Elsworth, the area official of the union,was again back 
at Central Conference claiming: 
"Our people in Coventry are very much concerned 
about what they feel is the somewhat casual way in 
which redundancy is operated. Men are dismissed and 
within, perhaps, a fortnight taken on again" .41 
The union was faced with the Coventry employe~s acting as the 
arbiter of what was "reasonably practicable in the interpretation 
of a collective agreement, without consulting with the workforce. 
At a local conference, held in Coventry on 11 March 194~ the NUVB 
branch secretary A.V. workmen, criticised the employers control of 
short-time. 
"The problem is that employers take the view that 
they are judge and jury as to when practicable. They 
possess information not available to the workforce 
yet if they explained the position to worker 
representatives then much of the suspic~ could be 
removed and a better feeling created" .42 
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The growing bitterness over employers attitudes cowards the 
operation of short time working and redundanCY,broke out in a 
strike at Barkers, the coach building works of Daimler in Coventry. 
Ironically, it occurred when the managing director of the firm 
, 
had called a meeting of all shop stewards J~ the firms main 
factory. While the stewards were attending the meeting to hear 
of the redundancy the foremen in the body shop were issuing notices 
to 28 vehicle builders. The Branch Secretary told the Coventry 
Evening Telegraph on the day of the strike, 14 February, 194~ 
"There was an immediate flare-up because the 
firm had in its wisdom picked out practically all the 
men who were active trade unionists such as shop 
stewards and secretaries" .43 
The redundancy list of 28 workers included three NUV9 shop stewards 
plus their convenor, Billy Thompson, a member of the Coventry 
Branch committee, who had a number of years service with Daimler 
and had worked in the body shop longer than at least three other 
vehicle builders who were being retained. The local official 
of the NOW explained that the issuing of notices while the 
stewards were talking with the managing directo~had created such 
bad feeling among the membership that there was a spontaneous 
reaction, with 180 workers out on strike. The area official, 
Elsworth, claimed that even by the standard of relations between 
management and unions in Coventry/the issue proved to be one of 
the most difficult he had encountered. Speaking at Central 
Conference he explained, 
" when the stewards got back to their benches 
they found the notices already there. You can imagine 
the "feeling that would go round a workshop with 
condi tions such as those operating, and of course the 
thing went up in the air and it was my job to get it 
back on the rails aaain. It was one of the most 
difficult jobs I ha~e had, even in coventry" .44 
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The whole of the work~which. produced the bodies for the Daimler 
2.5 litre saloon and Daimler Ambulance/had stop~d. In the main 
Daimler factory,a further 300 redundancies were issued. 
on the second day of the dispute the trade union officials were 
able to get the vehicle builders to call off their strike in 
order that the whole redundancy could be discussed at a works 
conference the following morning,l6 February. The officials agreed 
to raise three questions with the firm and the COY EEA. 
"1 That short time working should operate instead of 
redundancy • 
2 The procedure adopted in this instance in declaring 
redundancies. 
3 The request that consuLtation should in future take 
place before workers get their notice - this relates 
to the reinstatement of Thompson". 45 
At the conference, the employees moved little from the previous 
policy of employers rights under the agreements. They were only 
prepared to give a broad indication of the likely numbers of 
workers involved in a redundancy to trade union representatives. 
Only after the notices were served would they enter into a 
discussion over the merits of individuals, or give consideration 
to possible substitutions being made. The employers rejected the 
suggestion that selection had been victimisation of active trade 
unionists. The choice was not made upon union membership but 
was based upon ability. They accepted that Thompson was a 
skilled man but not as good as those who remained. On the point 
of him having longer service, the firm would consider this only 
where, 
" 
360 
46 
other things being equal". 
The union official attending the conference wn~ left with the 
view of re-opening the question of the names on the list. This 
was referred back to the works where substitutes to take Thompson's 
place could be considered. On the point of short time working 
and the procedure for declaring redundancie~ the unions in 
attendance declared 'failure to agree'. 
The strike had clearly placed pressure upon the workings of 
procedure. Th. ough the dispute largely involved the vehicle 
builders/it was supported by TGWU members at Capmartin Lane. 
It was therefore the CSEU representation, which included its 
secretary, Jack Jones, who were conducting the union side at the 
Conference. The stoppage had had total support in the body shop. 
The vehicle builders clearly considered their chief steward had 
been victimised through their inability to influence redundancy. 
Even before the hurridly organised conference, the NUVB branch 
committee had applied to their N.C. for victimisation benefit. 
A special committee meeting of the NUVB heard on the 14 February 
that, 
"The firm agreed that if there was any substitute 
they would consider the same and that W. Thompson 
would be allowed what they (Daimler) describe as 
reasonable entrance to the works in order that the 
position could be investigated".47 
OVer the position of substitution the report to the meeting said, 
"The whole of the shop volunteered to go out in order 
that Thompson could retain his position with the firm. 
One man was chosen and his name submitted to the 
management';. 48 
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In April/the Birmingham District organiser of the vehicle builders 
reported the reinstatement had been complete~ following a member 
volunteering to act as substitute. His July report stated that 
the firm had agreed on a redundancy procedure in which the 
management would consult with shop stewards before dismissal 
notices were issued. 
Industrial peace at Daimler did not last very long. At the 
beginning of Novembe~ a strike took place over an attempt by 
management to change the method for determining piecework prices 
in the body shop. Ten workers had been dismissed over the 
adoption of time study to fix prices. The branch committee,in 
offering its support for the workers at Daimler/offered to call 
a meeting of all the citys vehicle builders and ask for the 
'blacking' of work to the company, should the workforce decide 
to continue with the dispute. It was eventually decided that the 
striker~plus the ten discharged/should return to work and give 
14 days for negotiation, through which time study would be 
operated. I~ at the end of the period,there was still no 
agreement then the case would be put into procedure. As negotiations 
got underway/the main assembly sections were able to agree a price, 
with the exception of the door hangers and cleaners. Once these 
negotiations were completed, however, the management announced 
a redundancy. They informed the shop stewards of the numbers 
involved, but not the names. When the notices were given they 
contained the name of Billy Thompson, the NUVB chief steward.49 
The firm agreed to consider any substitutes put up by the stewards. 
They were given the names of the last six starters, but refused 
50 
to accept any of them. Since Thompson's reinstatement at Daimler, 
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he had been offered a foreman's job which he refused. The 
management claimed they were not questioning his ability but his 
timekeeping. They were not prepared to alter that decision. on 
the 8 November, 150 vehicle builders went on strike, only the 
inspectors in the union remained in the works, but even these 
indicated they would come out if the dispute became official. 
The Coventry branch decided it was time for the national leadership 
to take on the question of victimisation. In Jul~ following the 
previous encounter at Daimler/Coventry branch had sent a resolution 
to the national conference 
"That Conference notes with concern the increasing 
number of active trade unionists subjected to 
victimisation and black listing and request general 
conference to consider urging the Government to 
introduce legislation. Safeguarding the fundamental 
right of every trade unionists to earn his living".5l 
on the day of the strike/the branch passed a resolution recommending 
a return to work and suggesting the EC call an official strike of 
all NUVB members at the Daimler. The resolution stated, 
"That we agree to recommend to our members that they 
return to work and that we make application ot EC 
for official sanction to call all members working on 
Daimler bodies wherever they are working, out on 
official dispute". 52 
At a meeting of the membership in the works the following day, the 
resolution was accepted,with the reservation that everything 
would be undertaken to get Thompson his job back. The Coventry 
branch called upon the General Secretary to organise a National 
Conference with the EEF to get Thompson reinstated. If a satisfactory 
conclusion was not reached in two weeks,he would be asked to call 
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an official strike. The General Secretary's suggestion of taking 
the case through procedure was rejected at a special branch 
committee meeting. The Coventry vehicle builders had lost 
confidence in the local workings of procedure in cases of 
redundancy. 
A 
The resolution to the ~~B EC at special meeting, held on the 
14 November said, 
"That the Coventry branch is of the op~n~on that 
no useful purpose could be served by taking this 
case through local procedure". 5 3 
The meeting went on to agree a resolution for the reinstatement 
of Thompson. 
"This Branch views with some urgency that matter 
of dismissal of our member W. Thompson and request 
EC Committee to take steps to get Bro Thompson 
re-instated or to withdraw our members from the shops 
doing Daimler work". 54 
A deputation from the Coventry branch,composed of Richmond, Wyatt 
and Elsworth. addressed the EC on 26 November. They stressed , 
that the strongest possible lead should come from the National 
leadership. The branch had already rejected a local conference. 
" •..• as it only meant delay, victimisation was getting 
serious in Coventry and a stand had to be made to 
protect stewards". 55 
They went on to remark of the consequence of failure, 
" •••• if we failed our stock would certainly drop 
in the area" .56 
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The EC voted 7-5 in favour of calling the membership, employed 
in Daimler, in Coventry/out on strike. The EC justified its action 
by claiming that the employers were evading their obligations 
over the recognition of stewards in the 1922 Procedure agreement. 
The EC minutes of the 26 November state, 
"We consider the circumstances surrounding the 
dismissal constitutes a violence of our national 
agreement insofar that the employers action is regarded 
by the union as an attempt by them to interfere with 
the discharge of our function as a union. We therefore 
instruct the Coventry branch and the Birmingham 
DC to withdraw all members employed by Daimler and 
declare all their work 'black' ".57 
Not surprisingly, the original cause was beginning to lose some 
of its momentum in the workplace. It was 39 days after Thompson 
had been made redundant that the NC support for an official strike 
was given. In the run-up to Christma~there was a reluctance to 
forego wages for what was being seen by some of the membership 
as an increasingly lost cause. In Coventry, the Branch Committee 
met on the 5 December to start arrangements for the strike. Notice 
was given to the Humber management of a one day token strike by 
vehicle builders in support of Th~pson. Discussions took place 
at Morris bodies for the timing of their protest. The Branch 
called a meeting of the Daimler workforce for Saturday, the 17 
December,in the AEU Hall. 
In the meantime/all overtime would be stopped at Daimler and the 
Branch Secretary was requested to avoid sending any further labour 
to the works. 
An official strike/beginning on the 2 January 1950, would be 52 
days after the original one day stoppage of the 8 November. The 
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meeting of the Daimler vehicle builders decided on a narrow 
majority to further request that the EC should approach the 
Employers Federation at National level. At the Branch Committee 
meeting on the 19 December, it was decided that the only course of 
action was to request a works conference. The Cov EEA were willing 
to call such a Conference at short notice/providing the letters 
notifying strike action were withdrawn. The Branch Committee 
voted to accept this condition and called off the strike. 
, 
This protracted dispute may have been indicative of a car firms 
attempts to curtail the influence of shop steward~during a period 
when the industry was seeking to re-adjust for a new model range. 
Not only was this a period of extensive shop floor bargaining 
, 
but an occasion when the firms management were seeking to 
establish new piecework times by the stop-watch. The working 
methods of the apprenticed coach builders were still largely an 
anathema to the engineering techniques of the motor industry. 
The shortages of craftsmen available to the industry after the wa~ 
the increasing supply of semi skilled trainees, the introduction of 
female labour, in addition to the decline in the proportion of 
apprentices, was beginning to transform the composition of the 
workforce in the body and trim shops. This development was being 
felt not just on the big assembly track~ but also within the 
specialist manufacturers. 
The NUVB steward in the workplace, with his loyalty to the union 
and allegiance to the skills of his trade/became the defender of 
craft pride and shop organisation. He was at the forefront in an 
industry whose product was the outcome of dynamic change in 
appearance and production technique. The feelings of the Midland 
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Vehicle builders towards the use of the stop-watch, had been 
firmly voiced at their 1948 Annual Delegate Conference. The 
Birmingham District Committee proposed, 
"That this Conference is definitely opposed to 
the use of the stop-watch, as a method of fixing 
piecework prices, but we are agreed that a 
suitable timing arrangement 'mutually agreed' is 
acceptable ". 58 
and froo Coventry, 
"That this Conference will support EC in any action 
they may deem necessary to end the pecnicious system, 
prevalent in the engineering industry, of timing 
workers with a stop-watch" .59 ' 
This question of 'mutuality' clauses, governing the negotiation of 
piecework prices/contrasted with the sole discretion being claimed 
by employers over questions of redundancy, in these early post war 
years. The shop steward became the defender of lithe rate" in the 
workplace. As the assembly plants were ,prone to almost continuous 
technical change, compared to the mainstream of British e.ngineering 
industries, and subject to shazpfluctuations in job opportunities, 
it was the steward in the workplace who was becoming the arbiter 
for the fate of the workgroup. Workplace control over redundancy 
became an essential support to the existence of workplace 
organisation. 
The defense of 'mutuality' clauses governing the negotiation of 
piecework prices, contrasted with the sule discretion being 
exercised by employers over questions of redundancy in those 
early post war years. As workplace control over redundancy 
became essential/to retain the existence of workplace representation, 
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the employer strategy to curb the influence of workplace 
organisation. through the application of the power to dismiss 
I 
established through national agreements, met opposition in the 
better organised sectors of the industry/where the defense of 
standards were more consciously associated by the shop floor 
with the character of shop representation. In the main, this 
was in Coventry, among the better organised skilled sections of 
the motor industry. The spontaneous strikes among vehicle 
builders at Humber, Armstronq-Siddeley, Daimler, and the Rover 
plant in Solihull, all involved the tightly organised body 
building and trim sections. Here the defence of organisation 
was invariably associated with defending craft status. These 
disputes were,therefore/entirely sectional and removed from a 
wider workplace support. The unofficial basis of the action 
on the NUVB lines/moreover/was probably not unrelated to the 
, 
strategic limitations of the unions local official, who was 
based in Birmingham. This not only encouraged independent 
activity on the part of the membership directly affected, but 
frequently led to support from the predominantly lay membership 
which comprised the Cov BC. The delay in the arrival of officials 
to the scene of a strike, ~~d the absence of prior notification 
of redundancy notices, encouraged these well organised groups 
to take spontaneous action in support of their workplace 
organisation. In the poorer organised workplaces, like Morris 
and Austin, the basic weaknesses in organisation enabled works 
managements to either completely ignore workplace organisation 
and JPC's in the handling of redundancy, or forced the leaderships 
of these workplaces to rely upon the support and intervention 
of local MP's or Labour Government Ministers. 
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Although the national agreements gave works managements the 
authority over redundancy decisions,without local arrangements 
I 
giving workplace representatives a say in the redundancy process, 
the.ffect of procedure merely acted to weaken the position of 
I 
the local officials attempts to resolve conflicts constitutionally. 
While procedure operated to give control over the handling of 
the grievance to the union officials, the individual union basis 
upon which representation was made, divorced the defence of 
workplace organisation from possible workplace organisational 
support. Th~ small scale redundancies1 both administered and 
opposed upon a sectional basis,enabled works management/in the 
motor industrY,considerable latitude in being able to select 
prominent workplace leaders in some of the better organised 
sections of the industry/at a moment when the power to act was 
considerably weakened due to a fall in trade or a decline in 
work, through model changes, or reorganisations in production. 
The power of management was considerably enhanced by the prevalence 
of strongly organised but sectional interest, and from a 
fundamental lack of shop steward unity in effectively operating 
joint committees. In many parts of the federated industry, but 
especially in the Morris and Austin plants, low levels of union 
membership, especially among the semi-skilled track workers and 
the indirect workers/precluded the possibility of any opposition 
at all to the power of management on the question of redundancy. 
During the 1947-1948 recession, the federated management in 
the car industry/clearly demonstrated that,over the issue of 
redundancy, they had completely dispersed with the workplace 
gains which/under the wartime arrangement~had acted to prevent 
the victimisation of workplace representation. 
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3 EARLY POST WAR WORKPLACE ORGANISATION 
In the transition per~od( the scale of unrest, despite the far greater 
absorption of the state, labour and capital into the workings 
of the war industries, was merely a pale shadow of the conflict 
which accompanied the conclusion to the first world war. Reasons 
why this should have been the case; can not only discount the 
undoubted support given by the shop stewards movement towards the 
war effort between 1939 and 1945, but also, during the period of 
post-war reconstruction, their sympathy towards a Labour 
Governmen~ elected by such a large degree of popular working 
class support in the 1945 election. 
At the end of the first world war, 89 million working days were 
lost through strikes between 1918 and 192cf.° The conclusion of 
the second world war witnessed a marked contrast in the pattern 
of conflict. From 1945 until 194~ the total number of working 
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days lost was only 6.5 million. Clearly, strikes/like those 
in the motor industry, over 'trade union matters' and the attempts 
to change the methods for determining piecework prices, were of 
importance for the future shape of workplace organisation after 
1945, but there was no challenge by the engineering employers to 
match the events of the 1922 'lock-out'. In engineering,the 
existence of the 'shop stewards agreements' arising out of the 
first world war upheaVAls, provided a limi ted role where organisation 
existed within the workplace. During the inter war period .. the 
general weakness of workers in the labour market undermined the 
role of the shop steward to the point of virtual extinction. 
In the motor industry, the absence of a continuous workplace 
organisation for the majority of the workforce, resulted in 
intermitted stoppages by largely non-unionised workforces. The war 
economy and full employment enabled the presence of shop stewards 
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to be established. The requirements of a war economy, state 
regulation over dismissal, and encouragement of a positive 
involvement in production at workplace leve~provided the conditions 
for a 'constitutional' shop stewards movement to emerge in 
engineering. 
In the period of reconstruction/the employers in the motor industry 
increasingly sort to utilise their re-established powers under 
the 3 April 1946 agreement, to contain and discharge the extension 
of the shop stewards activities. The strikes which occurred 
during this early post war period,invariably began to strain the 
commitment of shop stewards organisations to a constitutional 
resolution of their grievances. This dilemma was most vividly 
being enacted in the Midland motor industry,particularly over 
issues concerning piecework prices and redundancy_ The ambiguity 
remained implicit in the general attitude of the shop stewards 
movement/towards their loyalty to the Labour Government on the 
one hand, and their defence of workplace gains on the other_ 
Discussing strikes, following the ending of the Humber dispute in 
May 1946, the Metal Worker cited the difficulty, 
"The strikes which have taken place in various 
engineering centres have not been due to any desire 
on the part of the shop stewards to impede the 
Governments prograrrune or to cause friction with the 
trade unions. On the contrary, the shop stewards 
who werepraic;ed during the war by Cabinet r1inisters 
and the press for the magnificent part they played 
in the war production, are determined to see the 
programme of the Government they elected fulfilled 
speedily, but they are also aware that if a drive 
for increased. production is to meet with success the 
employers also have certain responsibilities"p2 
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These responsibilitie? lay in seeing that worker aspiration for 
improvements in ear~ings and working conditions were not abused. 
The demand was for, 
" a fair share of their output" .63 
'The Economist', on the 22 March 1947, reflecting upon the position 
shop stewards had achieved on the shop floor, and,ascribing an 
importance born of their role in the war economy, described them 
as the NCO's of industry. While it distanced itself from an 
endorsement of the SSNC 1945 manifesto", 'Shop Stewards and the 
Future', it did acknowledge the possibility of harnessing the war 
time collaboration in industrial relations for the post-war period. 
In somewhat conceited tones,it pointed to the potential the 
stewards could offer during the economic crisis of 194i-48. 
"Jejune and misconceived the shop stewards manifesto 
certainly is and yet it would quite clearly be wrong 
to dismiss it as valueless in the present crisis. 
It is a reminder of the great fund of goodwill and 
eagerness to help which still remains to be drawn 
upon in the lower ranks of industry. Its real and 
substantial point is that better use needs to be made 
of the NCO's of industry and there is enough meat in 
it, for all its faults, to show that they have something 
of value to offer. It is also a warning of the neea 
if this fund is to be drawn upon, for much more 
effective and detailed educational campaign that has 
yet been attempted. Ignorance is as big an obstacle 
to efficiency as any other". 64 
In other words, it saw the importance of the influence which shop 
stewards could play in industry; if only their views could be changed. 
Or, as "The Economist" put it, 
"If the shop stewards manifesto proves anything, 
it is that the patient cannot be trusted to write 
his own prescription" .65 
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For the employers in the West Midlands motor industry, especially 
in Coventry, the period 1946-1950 saw the strengthening of 
\'1orkplace organisation at the point of production, proceeding 
alongside a challenge to the extending influence of the shop 
steward:At Jaguar, in Coventry, the District organiser of the NUVB 
could report in July 1949. 
"The organisation in this shop continues to 
improve, thanks to the good work put in by our 
shop stewards in all departments". 66 
At the Humber, the Coventry Branch Committee heard on the 24 
october 1949, 
" .•... that NUyB have 100 per cent membership in 
bodymakers, finishers and trimmers. Very big 
improvements in the position since Bro. Bush took 
over as convenor. The week spot iS6~elders where 
membership is mainly AEU and TGWU". 
And at Arrnstrong-SiddeleY,where the factory was moving towards 
100 per cent union membership during the last quarter of 1948, 
the vehicle builders, reported at their committee meeting of 
31 october 1949, 
"Agreed that apart from the lack of a steward in 
the trim shop the organisation was quite good. 
Agreed effort should be made to get trim shop steward"~8 
In Dairnle~although the body shop was fully organised/the AEU 
were contesting the CO~! CSEU failure to challenge the Daimler 
management policy of all workers, irrespective of whether they 
belong to a trade union or not, had the right to nominate a 
trade union member for the JPC. 
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The case in procedure over Thompson, the convenor, had reached 
'fail to agree' at Central Conference on 20 January 1950. 
Daimler requested 30 body makers in the first month of the yea~ 
but when the Branch Secretary forwarded Thompson's name/his 
application was refused. The NC agreed to protest to the EEF. 
On the 23 January, the Coventry Branch Committee were informed, 
"It seemed very likely we should have more trouble 
but Bro. Thompson after considering the position 
made a statement that he had no further desire 
to seek employment at the firm. This our members 
accepted with extreme regret". 69 
The challenge to workplace representatives through redundancy 
situations was not confined to federated employers. Standard 
Motors possessed both high union membership and an effective 
JSSC. It was the workplace organisation which had achieved the 
42~ hour week in 1946. The chairman of the JSSC, Bill WarMan, 
could comment to the Metal Vorkers in August 1946, 
"We are proud of the success achieved by Standard 
workers in winning the shorter working week. This 
sets the seal on the many improvements in working 
conditions as a result of trade union organisation, 
now practically 100 per cent. Unity among the 
unions inside the factory has largel~' accounted for 
the advances made. Inter-union rivalry has not been 
allowed to hamper the stewards organisation". 70 
Standard, of all the car firms in Coventry, had positively sort 
to encourage the continuance of war time co-operation into the 
post war period. Following its decision to leave the Employers 
Federation,-the Company's deputy chairman, Sir John Black, took 
charge of production and labour relations. The firm went for 
high productivit~based upon a combination of capital investment 
with an inte:. gration of worker effort through high incentive 
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and co-operation with. the workplace organisation. Between 1945 
and 1947, £3 million was invested into re-equipping the plant for 
the production of the Ferguson tractor and the Vanguard car. 
All pre war plant was written off. In 194~ £50,000 was taken out 
71 
of profits and put into a special fund for employees. 
The firm concentrated upon a limited model range and enlisted the 
involvement of the shop steward organisation/in what the company 
report for 1947 called, 
"A radical review of production methods and great 
capital expenditure". 72 
Any overtime would operate by consultation with the shop stewards~ 
prior consultation was agreed for cases of redundancy. The firm 
placed considerable responsibility for achieving its goal of 
rapid growth upon the influence of the shop steward organisation. 
The stewards were involved in planning output targets. The EC 
of the JSSC held regular meetings with the management to discuss 
future production programmes and even suggest the lay-out of the 
factory so that output targets would be more likely to be met. 
In December 1949, the wages structure was completely modified. 
The straight piecework system was replaced by a premium bonus 
system/based upon a higher base rate than the federated agreements. 
Eight base rates replaced the eighty different rates which 
existed previously. Both direct and indirect workers were under 
bonus schemes. This rationalisation of incentives with a limited 
number of bonuses/accompanied the division of the workforce into 
large gangs/grouped similar to that developed in the Coventry 
aircraft industry. The result was the creation of large multi-
skilled gangs,in which the authority of the senior shop stewards 
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we,'f. enhanced, both by management, and the organisation of work. 
The workplace organisation became under a direct obligation to 
pursue increased output and producti vi ty. Bill Narman wrote of 
the 42~ hour week agreement in January 1947, 
"When the agreement was signed, the shop stewards 
were conscious of the responsibility they had 
accepted in saying that no loss of production would 
be felt as a result of the shorter week".73 
In the report back by the stewards to the Standard workers, of 
the outcome of their negotiations, Warman writes that two features 
of the agreement were given priority, 
"(a) The important lesson to be learned in the 
value of Trade Union organisation, and the need for 
a drive for 100 per cent membership in the whole of 
the factory". 
"(b) The importance of the workers backing, to the 
full, the stewards pledge that production would 
not suffer because of the reduction in hours". 74 
Not only did the firm eventually become completely organised in 
1940 but the management were able to claim an increase in production 
of 30 per cent. The shop stewards were involved in the dual role 
of enhancing the interests of their membershi~while having to 
b8a~ the responsibility for the honouring of agreements entered 
into with the management. This example of the extension of war-
time collaboration was based upon the managerial co-operation of 
workplace organisation. The results of this were spelt out by 
Warmcn , 
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"One of the reasons for this remarkable increase 
in productlon has been the way in which workers, 
through their trade unions, have been consulted 
in the planning of target figures". 75 
Labour relations at Standard were not just characterised through 
a formalisation of war time collaboration, they involved an 
organisational integration within the workplace organisation, and 
an acceptance of the modern methods implicit in the technology 
of the car industry. On the 17 October 1949, a procedure agreement 
was signed between the company and the COV CSEU. Under this 
agreemen~the company not only undertook recognition of shop 
stewards but provided facilities in the works for holding trade 
union ballots. The division of the Company's plants into areas · 
for shop steward: representatio~ were mutually agreed between 
management and unions. Provision was made for the acceptance on 
the part of the company/of the recognition of a senior shop 
steward for each union with membership in the firm. Written into 
the agreement was the recognition of the JSSC for each factory, 
in addition to a Joint Works Committee to cover the three Coventry 
factories. The agreement stated, 
and 
"Each Trade Union having shop stewards in the 
company's factories may appoint a senior shop 
steward for that factory, who will be responsible 
for the co-ordination of all shop stewards of his 
union employed in that particular factory and he will 
be granted by the company reasonable time and facilities' 
to undertake his responsibilities". 76 
"Each factory shall have a shop stewards works 
committee composed of the senior shop steward of each 
affiliated union. The shop stewards works council 
should elect a sub-committee of not more than four 
of their number, inclUding the chairman and the 
secretary for the purposes of negotiating with the 
. , ' tn"f1 Z"· 77 comr . n , 
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Not only was there to be JSSC for each factory/but also recognition 
of a Joint Works Committee to cover all three factories. 
"There shall be a Joint Works Committee composed 
of representatives of the company and representatives 
from each factory shop stewards Works Committee".78 
Shop stewards were allowed a weekly meeting,. to be held on the 
f 
firms premises and in working time. Stewards were provided with 
access to other departments, with foreman permission, additional 
meetings could be held on application to the Production Director, 
Sir John Black. The first level of the procedure agreement lay 
with the worker raising the issue with his section shop steward~ 
unlike the EEF procedure where the foreman was the first point 
of contact. Depending upon the issue, representatives of the 
section shop stewards, senior shop stewards, or members of the 
works committee or joint works committee, would be involved in 
the first stage of procedure and could be present along with 
local union officials at the works conference stage. In 195~ 
the firms output of cars had risen by 58 per cent compared to 
194~ while its workforce had only increased by 46 per cent in the 
same period. 
In April 1949, however, a collapse of standards overseas tractor 
markets,saw the possibility of the whole of the Banner Lane factory, 
3,600 employees, being made redundant. The redwldancy arose at 
the same time as negotiations were still taking place over the 
procedure agreement. Because of a sterling crisis/exporters were 
finding it difficult to sell cars in dollar markets. Standard 
experienced a dramatic fall in sales to their main markets, France 
and Argentina. Tractor production fell from 1,500 per week to 
under 5OO~ France and Argentina alone had accounted for the sale of 
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2,000 tractors per m~nth. In February, to meet this decline in 
production, the management introduced short time working plus a 
redundancy of 350 workers from the tractor assembly at Banner Lane, 
as an alternative to reducing the labour force by 1,100. By 
March,.the tractor plant was on a three day week. In April, the 
firm announced a further 1,700 redundancies, which still fell 
, 
short from dismissing the plants whole workforce. The response 
of the shop stewards was to call upon the Government to break 
with part of the trade agreements operating under the Marshall 
Aid programme, which forbid trade with Eastern Europe. Pointing 
to the possibilities of long term markets in the state socialist 
countries, the Standard shop stewards issued a statement on the 
10 September 1949 which said, 
"We find it impossible to understand how it is 
that with a policy of full employment the Government 
is prepared to see one of the most efficient plants 
in the Country, engaged on producing a vital commodity, 
sink to a position where it is producing a fraction 
of its potential output".79 
At the AEU DC, meanwhile, criticism was beginning to mount over 
the handling of the redundancies. The DC heard,that on the 12 
April/that 293 workers originally made redundant had been re-engaged 
while the company were still declaring further redundancies. 
The works manager at Banner Lan~had refused to allow the factory 
1-" 
shop stewards hold meetings and had been preventing some 
stewards from carrying out their functions. Although this took 
place before there had been full agreement on the procedure 
agreemen~it did little to deter the AEU DC/on the 12 April, 
passing a resolution supporting their shop stewards actions, 
resisting what was described as, 
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" ...•.. Anti-trade union activities on the part of 
a section of management". 80 
Among those declared redundant was Ernie Roberts, AEU shop 
steward at Banner Lane. On the 27 September,the General Purposes 
~e',IJHA1e 
Committee reported the failure to Roberts, who had been a 
member of the Communist Party at the beginning of the war, and 
who had become a known figure to local employers. He subsequently 
was offered a job at the Rover works at Solihull, in Birmingham, 
to begin on the 19 December. Before, however, he was due to start, 
he received a letter from the management which stated, 
"Due to re-arrangements made by Head Office they 
could not now engage him, as promised, on Monday, 
19 December".81 
The Company offered the payment of an 'extra gratia payment ~ 
amounting to the guaranteed week wage,as compensation. On 
investigation by the AEU District Secretary, the Labour Management 
at Rover reiterated that, 
" .... they have no sui table vacancy to offer at the 
present time".82 
OVer in Birmingham,the state of workplace organisation was 
generally in a poorer condition in the car factories,compared to 
the position in Coventry. Union membership was lower. Three 
months after the dismissal of the convenor and shop stewards at 
Rover in Solihull, the Divisional Organisers report K the Local 
Conference, in June 1948, failing to find a 'settlement'. 
At the Rover plant,at Acocks Green the Birmingham AEU DC heard 
I 
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reports on the 14 September of the, 
"Anti trade union attitude of the management" 83 
The Morris Commercial plant, in Birmingham/possessed only 13 
shop stewards. A report to the DC stated, 
"That organisation generally was in a bad state 
although some progress had been made, considerable 
loss of membership had occurred due to arrears 
which had arisen from the refusal of members to 
attend branch meetings". 84 
It was agreed that the District Secretary would attend a special 
meeting of the AEU Shop stewards. The convenor of Nuffield 
Metal Products, meanwhile, told the AEU DC that, 
"Trade union organisation consisted mainly of toolroom 
workers, but considerable progress had been made 
in the recruitment of apprentices ••.• difficulties 
exist in recruiting shop stewards •..• most workers 
on night work falling behind into arrears resulting 
in expul.sion".85 
The Nuffield convenor agreed to arrange for a factory gate meeting 
and asked for suitable leaflets to be published for circulation 
in the works, to encourage recruitment. 
At Birmingham's largest car plant, the Austin works in Longbridge, 
the development of workplace organisation during this early post 
war period/encountered both a growth in the employed labour force 
and an increase in the number of trade unions in the plant. The 
growth in Shopfloor representation remained permanently constrained 
by the management of the firm. Although the JSSC came to play 
an increasing role in certain areas of shop floor organisation, 
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it often lacked the complete support of all the unions in the 
plant. On a question like the defense of mutuality in the 
determination of piecework prices, it had, in 1948, been able to 
attract widespread support from all the stewards plus the shop 
floor workers. There were, however, a large number of skilled 
unions with memberships in the works, some of whom lacked a prior 
experience of the motor industry and who reserved their right to 
act independently in furtherance of their own interests. The 
growth among the mass industrial unions occasionally brought 
about allegations of 'poaching'. The Longbridge works had a 
significantly larger workforce than other federated car firms and 
also a numerically greater proportion of employees who were 
classified as skilled. The very diversity in the composition of 
the labour force/plus the attitude of management impeded the early 
development of workplace organisation in the Austin. 
Table 4.8,showing the number of manual employees working for some 
of the main car firms in August 1946, reveals that Austin engaged 
a larger proportion of skilled workers than the specialist car 
firms like Armstrong-Siddeley, and Daimler, or the mass producers 
like Humber, and Standard. Moreover,although 65 per cent of the 
Longbridge operators remained unskilled, the 5,000 skilled 
employees was almost equivalent to the total workforce employed 
by a medium size car firm like Standard. Austin also had a 
greater number of skilled unions. At Standard,for example, seven 
of the ten trade unions had representation among the 900 craft 
or skilled workers, while three unions, TGWU, AEU, and the NUUB 
recruited workers upon a mass scale. At Longbridge, however, 
there were 16 unions in 1946, of whom 13 were exclusively skilled 
unions, while the three major unions TGWU, AEU, and NUVB sought 
memberships among the majority of manual workers. Working methods 
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TABLE 4.8 - THE EMPLOYMENT OF SKILLED WORKERS IN THE BRITISH MOTOR 
• 
INDUSTRY 1946. 
FIRM TOTAL TOTAL PERCENTAGE 
MANUAL SKILLED SKILLED 
EMPLOYEES EMPLOYEES 
Armstrong-Siddeley 2,700 628 (23 ) 
Daimler 3,000 i93 (27) 
Humber 4,000 607 (16) 
Standard 4,774 716 (19) 
Austin 14,126 5,000 (35) 
Source: Coventry Toolroom (Minutes) Dick Etheridge Collection 
P.R.O. LAB/46. 
at the 100 acre site. had/by 1946, been reduced to over 100,000 
separate operations. From its origins at Longbridge, in 1912, 
Austin had relied to a lesser extent than the majority of car firms 
on outside suppliers. Having its own body shops, engine assembly, 
and machine shops on the central sit~ the Longbridge works 
employed a workforce possessing a far wider range of specialist 
skills and abilities than found, for exampl~ at Morris Cowley in 
Oxford, where much of the pre-assembly work was brought to the 
works from the outlying factories of the Morris mpire. This 
relatively high number of skilled workers and the considerable 
extent to which the division of labour at the works had been broken 
down into the skilled, but limited job skills, led to a fragmented 
trade union organisation/in which the particular interests based 
upon a union organisation was less willing to submit to a common 
organisational unity based around the JSSC. 
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During the early post war years/growth in trade union membership 
increased the diversity of unions. There existed the skilled 
unions,with a long history of organisation at Longbridge, like 
the UPA/whose patternmaking shops were 100 per cent organised. 
86 The union had had members working at Austin in 1906. The 
Boilermakers, on the other hand,with only a small membership at 
Austin, and without strong ties to the industry, began, in 194~ 
87 
to elect a shop steward at Longbridge. The ETU had a small 
membership concentrated mainly in the maintenance section, but 
it also had a number of members spread across the works. These 
included electricians, telephone engineers, plus car wirers, in 
the production shop, as well as outside contractors who worked 
in the plant but were not on the Austin payrol~~ There was both 
the Birmingham sheet metal workers. and National Sheet Metal 
Workers Union1with memberships in different parts of the works, 
but agreeing to hold a joint meeting to elect a leading steward, 
and a deput~? There were also Foundry workers, Metal mechanics, 
members of the Heating and Domestic Engineers Union, a Draughtsmen 
union, and a clerical union. In addition, there existed skills 
draWlfrom the building trades, - woodworkers, bricklayers, and 
plumbers, - whose organisations were not affiliated to the CSEU; 
consequently they had no redress in proced~~ beyond the works 
conference level. 
Between 1945 and 195~ the manual labour force increased from 
90 
12,536 to 17,758. In this period/both modernisation of the plant 
and the growth in the workforce changed the relative importance 
of particular unions in the production process. Among the skilled 
unions/there was a decline in those trades working in wood, as 
metal and plastiC materials became more important in car production. 
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The real benefactors in this period of growth,were the three 
mass industrial unions/whose presence in the works increased 
immeasurably. The AEU remained the largest Longbridge union, 
organising the skilled workers from the toolrooms; 
toolfitters, maintenance engineers, and machine shops. Its 
membership comprised a whole matrL~ of skilled and semi skilled 
trades among the press-tool setters, jig makers, gauge-makers, 
stampers, forge-men, hardiners and grinders. The fastest 
growing post war union, however, was the TGWU,which,by 1950, 
had three union branches covering its membership at Longbridge 
among the semi skilled and unskilled workers, in assembly, 
transport, stores, packing, and machine shops. The third main 
union, NUVB, continued to organise the body, trim, paint, and 
final assembly lines. 
Despite this undoubted growth in union members, the development 
of workplace organisation was hindered. in an important respect, 
by the attempts of management to prevent an extension of shop 
steward activity in the works. In 194~ the Austin management had 
agreed to recognise the convenor, but insisted upon calling him 
91 
a 'chief shop steward'. They refused to recognise either a 
chief steward or senior shop steward for any of the unions with 
workplace representation at the works. Where, as was the case 
during the war period, a number of sections were without a shop 
steward/the issue would have to be handled by the convenor. The 
limitations of this arrangement soon became apparent. The convenor 
increasingly became absorbed on a mass of isolated complaints from 
sections without shop steward representation. 
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In 1944 George Harriman, the Managing Director of Austin, accepted 
that unrepresented sections could go to the nearest shop steward. 
This arrangement had certain advantages for shop floor workers, 
as it gave them an element of discretion over which steward 
would represent their views. They could, in effect/choose the most 
experienced, or most capable or most militant, and could choose 
92 
a steward irrespective of their or his union membership. 
From the front line management point of view, it meant foremen 
were often having to negotiate with stewards from a different 
section of the works~on questions affecting the workings of their 
own department and the workforce. for which they held ultimate 
responsibility. Dealing with unknown outsiders often m~ant the 
application of different values, methods and working practices. 
It also led to negotiations being conducted with a shop steward 
from another section,who was also under the jurisdiction of another-
I foreman. In other words, the managements attempts to restrict the 
development of workplace organisation/by only recognising the 
convenor, and refusing to accept the role of either a senior 
steward or member of the JSSC, led to a considerable fragmentation 
in bargaining, nego~tion and representation at shop floor level 
between individual stewards and foremen?3 
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The outcome of the higher managements attitude towards workplace 
representative~ did have consequences for the level of workplace 
organisation. It firstly discouraged a unity between shop 
stewards, particularly those from different unions. It confined 
the union activity of senior shop stewards to out of works time. 
Their possibilities for attending meetings with their members 
or other shop stewards,was restricted to lunch-breaks or after 
work hours. The limitations of time necessarily encouraged a 
more sectional and less unified organisatioh, as priority 
tended to be given to their own members and shop stewards of their 
union. Consequently, the representatives of the JSSC in 1945 
comprised of memberships entirely drawn from the largest union, 
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the AEU. 
The managements attitude towards workplace organisation/not only 
discouraged its development, in terms of a representative JSSC 
covering all the unions, but it also deterred workers from seeking 
the position. afshop steward in the weaker sections of the firm. 
While the better organised sections of the works, like those 
covered by the AEU, might be able to create sufficient financial 
support to cover the loss of earnings of an individual steward 
during negotiations, the weaker parts of the works certainly did 
not. Even the position of convenor required not just the 
additional hours spent on trade union activity, but also an 
acknowledged loss of income,despite the support coming from the 
membership. The position of convenor was subject to strict 
regulation by management; both his movements in the works and 
access to the convenor, either by a trade union member or shop 
steward,was subject to the permission of superintendent of foremen. 
The results in a works like Longbridge were inevitable. Long 
hours, excessive overtime during the war period, shift-work plus 
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the distances which Austin workers travelled on their daily 
travel-to-work journeys/offered few opportunities for union 
activity. Night shift workers/ in particular, had to make special 
appearances _during the day to gain access to their convenor. Despite 
these limitations in,1946, a shop stewards organisation was in 
existence with its own headed notepaper titled: 
"Austin Motor Company's Shop Steward Organisation" 
Chairman O. Cresswell 
Works Convenor R.A. Etheridge 
Deputy Works Convenor G. Vernom 
Secretary A.H. Bennett 
The methods of election was established during this period. 'At 
an annual meeting of all shop stewards/the election of the convenor 
would take place on a show of hands. This ~'1ould be followed by 
the election of a chairman,secretary and then a committee covering 
the whole factory. The election to any of the posts or a position 
on the committee,took place upon an open vote. There were no 
reserved positions, or arrangements for places or votes upon 
trade union lines. In practice/it was the AEU, because of its 
organisation, and number of stewards, which held most of the early 
official positions. In 194~ there were about 30 shop stewards 
95 
attending the annual meeting. 
During the early post war period, the managements opposition 
towards workplace organisation continued/despite the growth in the 
number of unions and in union membership. These developments 
placed considerable stress upon the JSSC's struggle for acceptance 
among large sections of the workforce, on the one hand, and its 
attempts to gain a unity among union representatives on the other. 
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The convenor,Dick ~theridge/wrote in the Birmingham Journal in 
November 1946: 
"These new conditions demanded a different approach 
to trade union organisation, and the success at 
Austin in building the organisation indicates that 
these new methods bring results. Probably the most 
important factor in building efficient shop steward 
organisation in a factory of this type, is to obtain 
satisfactory co-operation, between the various 
unions. This is obtained at Austin Motors by a 
joint shop stewards meeting held monthly and a works 
committee elected annually. No problem which is 
likely to affect the interests of the whole of the 
workers is taken to a final issue before consulting 
the works committee and thereby the rest of the 
unions" .96 
This basis for organised unity was, in a period of trade union 
growth, often a fractious one, particularly where expanding 
departments of the works were being contested by different unions 
for the right to organise; or where changes taking place in 
working methods and skills, or materials, being used in the 
production of cars, were subject to change. In such issues, the 
sectionalism and the established right of an individual union to 
act independently/weakened the legitimacy of the JSSC,which 
possessed no real sanctions which could be applied against union 
independence. 
Before 1950/ the increase in membership into the mass trade unions, 
AEU, TGWU, and NUVB, was largely a fluctuating one. Numbers of 
workers failed to sustain their union membership; some changed 
unions because they were transferred to another section 
of the works where a different union held the membership. Some 
became disenchanted with their existing union, or left after 
falling behind with contributions. It is, however, clear from the 
, 
AEU shop stewards minutes at Austin/that a constant source of 
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tension between the leading unions in the works,lay in disputes 
over membership. The resulting inter union conflict weakened 
the unity of workplace organisation. The effect of the formation 
of the Birmingham CSEU,led the AEU stewards at Longbridge to 
consider the importance of unity among their own organisation. 
On the 16 February 1948,a meeting of the stewards proposed, 
"It is necessary to org~nise the engineers in the 
AEU so that in the event of our long term aim of 
amalgamation the AEU poli~ would have a foremost 
claim in any new set up". 7 
The meeting went on to agree to give Etheridge and Cresswell the 
AEU support at the next JSSC elections. It also decided to 
hold a monthly meeting of AEU shop stewards to encourage unity 
among its organisation. 
On the 9 April/there were appeals being made for the AEU to give 
its support to the JSSC which was established under the 
Confederation Constitution. Dick Etheridge, having been elected 
works ccnveno~ faced the criticism from his own stewards over 
the election of only two AEU stewards on the JSSC. The minute 
book records, 
"Etheridge appealed for unity in the activities of 
the AEU otherwise there would develop a trade union 
squabble which would not be healthy in a works 
of this size" 98 
By the 24 September, there was a call for, 
" the loyal ty to be shown by the AEU shop 
stewards to the ABU first and other organisations 
after". 99 
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The AEU/the largest union of Austin became more vigilant over 
its membership towards the end of 1948. On the 1 December/the 
AEU shop stewards committee heard reports of the poaching of its 
members by the TGWU. Complaints were made against the sheet 
metal workers, 
"All sorts of methods being used to encourage AEU 
members to join the SMW" .100 
The Engineers agreed that, 
"AEU inform shop management that AEU shop stewards 
do not accept that members can be moved from any 
section or department until the question of 
demarcation has been taken through trade union 
machinery. We pledge support for any action members 
may take should it continue" .101 
This exercise of organisational independence on the part of 
indi'lidual unions, undermined the credibility of the JSSC. 
Individual unions ran campaigns to attract membership from 
particular sections of the works/without regard for the general 
unity of workplace organisation. In the West Work~ the sheet 
metal workers had established their membership in the body section, 
but the NUVB claimed the right to membership for all the boot, 
lid, and door hanging operations. Those jobs were closed to 
exclusive control by the vehicle builders. The AEU dominated 
recruitment of skilled workers in the machine shops and tool rooms, 
but beyond those areas/accusations of poaching were a feature of 
this period of union growth, where the diversity of abilities and 
unions combined with a manufacturing process open to constant 
change. It was left to the JSSC to regUlate this position b~ 
first of all,operating a policy of "open door" access to all the 
works departments. In an attempt to reduce inter union friction 
, 
391 
it adopted the prin~ip1e that, 
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"Once you are in a union at Austin you stay in". 
Besides inter-union conflict~management opposition to workplace 
organisation continually weakened shop floor unity and representation. 
Lacking the facilities from management to hold shop steward 
elections, the actual numbers of shop stewards remained unknown to 
the convenor and JSSC, while the integrity of the sec.tional 
steward was often open to question by workgroups. 
I 
The Austin shop stewards report, refers to the effect of 
management attitudes upon workplace representation, 
"In the early days the managemen·, took a very 
'slap happy' attitude to the reccgnition of shop 
stewards apart from their general discouragement 
for the election of any. This resulted at various 
periods with shop stewards being nominated without 
any section meeting, with shop stewards being 
appointed from branches of certain unions, and other 
methods, which while not being out of rule of the 
particular union led to dissension in the sections 
of mixed unions where they were to operate".103 
The existence of a large number of craft unions and the 
establishment of three mass unions, in a context of managerial 
opposition to workplace representation, raised continually 
questions over the rights of the shop steward, especially on 
sections with membership of more than one union. The members of 
different unions would challenge the right of a steward to represent 
them. Stewards from one union might refuse to represent workers 
from another organisation. Tensions between union organisations 
led to challenges over the attendance of externally elected 
stewards to JSSC meetings. In the absence of regular workplace 
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elections based upon.the membership of the workgroup, the haphazard 
development of steward representation generated areas of confusion 
and uncertainty which undermined shop floor unity and became a source 
of conflict within workgroups and between unions in the works. 
The period of post war growth in the workforce, attracted manpower 
from other employers, with different experiences of shop floor 
organisation. The election of shop stewards from among this 
new labour encouraged further fragmentation as they began to 
apply their previous shop floor practices to the conditions at 
, 
Austin. The Austin shop stewards reports comments on the influence 
of new labour upon shop floor representation, 
"If such conditions at the previous factory included, 
closed shop, separate union negotiation, different 
waiting time payments or fall-back payments, it does 
not need the brains of Disraeli to see the problems, 
that are going to be created".I04 
The development of workplace organisation at Longbridge during 
this early post war period was inevitably slow and not without 
internal conflicts. 
The progress towards workplace unity among the Austin trade unions 
remained precarious despite the establishment of the Birmingham 
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CSEU, and the appointment of Confederation stewards at Longbridge. 
On the 22 November 1949, the Austin management reported that 
output,during the year ending in July/had reached 127,000 cars. 
This, despite the shortages in raw materials and the mass redundancy 
which took place in January 1948, was 48 per cent above the prp.vious 
years output. As employment at Longbridge had begun to increas~ 
workplace representation expanded rapidly. In September 1948, 
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the AEU were reported as having 75 shop stewards. By May 1949, 
106 
this had risen to 95. At the beginning of 1950/the wider 
representation of union interests on the JSSC was encouraging 
the development towards unity on the shop floor. In January, 
difficulties which were reported by members of the AEU,from shops 
with mixed union membership/led the engineering stewards to 
advocate a far more concilitory approach to inter-union conflict. 
The AEU stewards agreed at their union meeting on 26 January that, 
" •••••• though we should be prepared to protect our 
members the most sensible solution is to achieve 
an understanding with other unions on questions 
of demarcation". 107 
The gradual movement towards a more representative workplace 
organisation at Austin, led to an exacerbation of relations with 
the management. After 1950,the JSSC entered into a period of 
struggle for the recognition of their organisation. Internal 
dissent and managerial hostility continued to be the opposing 
forces which the JSSC had to overcome. Following the announcement, 
on the 15 October 194~ that Lord Nuffield and L.P. Lord had, 
after a series of talks, agreed to an arrangement whereby a 
constant interchange of information on production methods, costs, 
design and research patents, would take place between Austin and 
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the Morris organisati?n, it was reported in the Birmingham 
Journal, March 1949 by George Varnon, Deputy Convenor of Austin's 
that, 
"Already the AEU shop stewards have a joint 
committee for information between the Austin and 
Nuffield shop stewards and this must be developed 
so that threats to full employment and wages in the 
industry can be effectively met" .108 
This, the first contact between the shop stewards of the two 
largest federated car manufacturers, was the start of the 
transformation of workplace organisation in the motor industry. 
f 
Although the organisational ties between the two firms shop 
stewards committees did not take place until the 2 February 1952, 
after the formation of BMC, in the Nuffield organisation there 
already existed the embryo of the future combine shop stewards 
committee. 
Lord Nuffield had appointed Mr. R.F. Hanks, the former managing 
director of Nuffield exports, as the organisations new vice-chairman, 
in November 1947. The appointment was to partly redirect the 
company towards export markets, and to introduce younger men with 
new ideas to the organisation. Lord Nuffield, along with several 
othenof the firm~ existing directors, were passed retiring age. 
The first task undertaken was a series of changes in the management· 
of most of the Nuffield factories. The organisation came under 
more centralised control/as three directors were given the 
responsibility to streamline the re-organised grouping of the 
company into three areas of administration~ the Midlands, Oxford, 
and the Sheet Metal factories. It was the outcomes of organisational 
integration that gave rise to the setting up of the Nuffield 
Combine Shop Stewards Committee. 
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Workplace representat~on/at Morris Motors in Oxford/had been 
improving as the firms production began to increase through 1948. 
On the 15 November 1949, the Financial Times reported that Horris 
was exporting 1,500 vehicles a week. During much of that year 
the new management had presented a three page document to the JPC 
committee. This outlined a firm code of conduct for the handling 
of behaviour at work. "Loitering" and "Smoking" were to be 
"prohibited". For a first offence there was to be a suspension, 
109 dismissal would follow a second offence. Following reports by 
the works police, 6 workers employed on the fixing of headlamps 
110 
were suspended. A go slow began in the shop, and the management 
. 111 decided upon re~nstatement. 
The new management, however, were engaged in far wider change in 
the workings of the Nuffield organisation. During 1949,work from 
the central controlling company in the group, Morris Motors, was 
being transferred out of Oxford to the recently opened Nuffield 
plant at Llanelly, where wage rates were lower and workplace 
organisation had barely been formed. The assembly of the Morris 
van was under consideration for transfer,from Oxford/to Morris 
Commercial in Birmingham. The effects of the various changes 
taking place in the Nuffield organisation/brought frequent 
inquiries from different factories in the group over the level of 
prices for transferred work. The idea of the Combine appears to 
have originated from a meetingiheld in Coventry/by the local 
communist Party to discuss workplace organisation in the Nuffield 
factories in Coventry, Birmingham, and Oxford, during the summer 
of 1949. The actual setting up of a Combine Committee emerged 
after Percy George, AEU convenor at Morris Commercial, wrote to the 
Morris Motors shop stewards suggesting a meeting of the Steward 
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committees on the question of moving the Morris Van for production 
in the Midlands. This meeting was arranged for September. The 
I 
Morris Motors stewards elected a delegation, comprising three AEU 
stewards; Alf Franklin, deputy convenor, Arthur Exell, and the 
youthful Les Gurl, who had just left the Navy: and recently 
elected steward at the Cowley works. This Birmingham meeting 
decided upon the formation of the combine Committee. A Secretary 
was elected, George Woods, convenor of Metal Products, who was to 
circulate all factories in the group, inviting them to send 
delegates to a Combine meeting the following month. 
Before the next meeting took place, a redundancy of 29 workers 
occurred at Metal Products. Included in those dismissed was 
Geo. Woods.ll~n the 27 November 1949,an emergency meeting of the 
newly formed Combine was held at the District Office of the AEU 
in Oxford, to discuss the Combine. Secretarys dismissal. Twenty 
delegates/representing the major plants in the Combine,attended 
the meeting. Woods, who was also the AEU convenor, had been given 
his notice at 12.30 and not allowed to remain on the premises 
until the end of the shift. The AEU members had come out on 
strike at Metal Products. No Works Conference had been called 
for over Woods dismissal. The Combine Committee, though they had 
the assurances that at least one department represented would 
favour strike/action decided to ask Woods AEU Branch to raise the 
redundancy at National level with the J\EU. The COllUnittee took 
the view that they were in no position to challenge the Nuffield 
organisation over the Secretarys redundancy. The meeting elected 
Les Gurl as Secretary and requested that he write a letter to all 
the Secretaries of JSSC in the Nuffield organisation, informing 
them of the Combine Committee and inviting them to send delegates 
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to future meetings. The meeting agreed that, 
" ..... in future all major action taken in any of 
the Nuffield factories be reported at once to 
all other members of the Committee" .113 
The Committee also decided to get some, 
"Concrete understanding so that in future no man 
could be finished and made redundant under the 
same conditions as Woods, ie, finished at 12.30 
even though the normal working day finished 
at 5.30 pm"114 
On questions of organisation, the Committee agreed that both 
Secretary and Chairman should come from the same factory. 
Alf Frankin, Deputy Convenor at Morris Motors and Branch Secretary 
of the AEU, was elected Chairman of the Combine. This dramatic 
first meeting of the Nuffield Combine proposed that the newly 
elected Secretary should write to H.F. Hanks, the Nuffield 
Vice-Chairman, informing him of the setting up of the Combine, 
and request recognition. 
It was agreed that/in cases of dispute,all other JSSC's would 
offer financial aid. A leaflet was drawn up setting out the 
functions and organisational principles of the Combine for 
circulation throughout the Nuffield factories. The Combine 
Committee continued to meet every two months and was mainly 
concerned with watching the movement of work, and the variation 
in prices being paid in the different areas of the Nuffield 
organisation. Within a yea~ all the Nuffield factories had 
delegates attending the Nuffield Combine with the exception of 
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S. U. Carbur-!tters, in Birmingham. S. U. had informed the Combine 
that, 
" .•... S.U. Carb~ters Committee believe that 
without official recognition by Mr. Hanks, JSSC 
was a waste of time". 115 
The Nuffield Combine covered a labour force of just over 20,000 
drawn from M.G., Morris Motors, Morris Radiators, in Oxford, 
the Engine and Body .. plants in Coventry and Morris Commercial, 
Tractor and Transmissions, and Metal Products in Birmingham, 
plus a Metal Products works in London. The Committee itself had 
24 members, two delegates from each factory plus a secretary and 
chairman, covering 12 factories and the Nuffield organisation. 
Although the Nuffield Combine had emerged as a response to the 
increasing centralisation in the Nuffield organisation/the Combine 
itself was unable to get recognition from the management. Hanks 
had replied to the Secretary~ letter saying he could not consider 
recognition until all the plants trade unions had given the 
Committee recognition. The Combine meeting to discuss this 
response decided that members should approach their own organisation. 
Les Gurl recalls the letter he wrote to Jack Tanner, President 
of the AEU, in an interview on 11 April 1979. 
"I wrote to Jack Tanner explaining the situation, 
that we were not looking for jobs as officials, -
saying we were ex-servicemen worried about our 
jobs - jobs might be lost. Steel shortages at the 
time - but large demand for cars. Explained need 
for Committee to safeguard our jobs - might be on 
short time or lose jobs. Sole purpose of setting 
up this Committee to safeguard our jobs, safeguard 
workers rights and to make sure we get workers into 
the unions". 116 
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Tanner's reply was that,as president,he had no right to recognise 
any Committee that had other union~ as this would lead to 
animosity with other union organisations; there was no way a 
Committee composed of representatives of other unions would 
receive AEU funds. This became the classic response not only 
for the Nuffield Combine but also for the BMC Combine, until 
the formation of the 'British Leyland Corporation Combined 
Trade Union Committee I on 1 May 1968, when 30 full-time union 
officials attended the merging of the BMC and Leyland Shop 
Stewards Committee. 
On 1 December 1951, the Nuffield Combine members met to discuss 
whether their Committee should continue to meet on a regular 
basis, or only when an issue of importance arose. They were 
addressed by Joe Green,a member of the Smith's Combine Shop 
Stewards Committee/which had been formed in 1940. The meeting 
heard the advantages of maintaining a Combine on a continous 
basis, even if it lacked official support. In October 1950, 
the Secretary of Smiths Combine, Len Nicko1ay/had set out the 
two basic principles which determined the authority of their 
Combine Committee. In an article he wrote for the Metal Worker 
he stated, 
"It has to be emphaSised that the role of the Combine 
Acting Committee is purely advisory and it is left 
entirely to the shop stewards committees of the 
individual factories as to whether or not they accept 
these recommendations". 117 
He went on to write, 
"Combine organisations such as this must not be 
regarded as an alternative to the existing trade 
union machinery, but as an addition to it". 118 
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The experience of the Smith Combine shaped the direction of the 
Nuffield combine Committee until its merger with the Austin Shop 
Stewards Committee on the 2 February 1952. 
Until the formation of the BMC Combine Committee, the Nuffield 
combine continued to meet upon a regular two-monthly basis, 
alternating between Oxford, Coventry and Birmingham. The Committee 
were able to record some success over the question of prices and 
the movement of work. 
In the first four year period following the second world war, 
unionisation in the motor industry generally appeared strongest 
in the car factories in the Coventry area. Among the specialist 
firms in particular, the slower pace of work and the high 
premiums placed upon quality and finish, attracted a large 
proportion of skilled workers to the upholstering, trim, 
body building and metal work sections of car construction. 
Although the principles of mass production were applied, the 
payment of the skilled rate and the retention of the close knit 
values and traditions of a craft heritage, saw the establishment 
of closed sections of employment to society members/in works like 
Armstrong-Siddeley, Daimler, Jaquer, ROVer, and to a lesser 
extent, Alvis. The creation of workplace powe~based upon the 
control over the supply of labour on certain sections of car 
assembly, where the full rate was being paid, inevitably 
reinforced an exclusive interest and a sectional consciousness 
among those groups of unionised workers reaping the benefits of 
their organisation. This condition not only induced considerable 
inter union rivalry, not only from the inequities inherent in 
piecework bargaining, but also as changes in materials, car 
design and technology made less clear the demarcation lines 
401 
between established union or work group spheres of influence. 
Sectional unionism within workplaces with levels of unorganised 
semi skilled and unskilled workforces, strengthendthe independence 
of individual union organisations in the workplace, but helped 
to separate union from non-union workers, and discourage support 
for joint committees. It was in the medium size to large assembly 
plants/where the tempo of work remained much quicker, and where 
the proportion of workers with a skilled work history, a craft 
background, or a life time experience of the industry, was likely 
to be a smaller proportion of the workforce, and where a higher 
specialised division of labour was much greater, that an 
organisational unity between workplace unions became far more 
imperative, in order to combat the ability of works managements 
to exploit the vulnerabilities of workplace leaderships at the 
maximum point of weakness - recessions in trade and lay offs 
arising from changes in production and the introduction of new 
car models. Though the general effectiveness of workplace 
representation differed in accordance with the density of union 
membership, the proportion of the workforce on the skilled 
rate, and the willingness of managements to seek to regain 
increases in rates conceded during favourable trading conditions, 
the general defense of workplace representation remained largely 
sectionally based and invariably in the hands of individual 
union officials, after works managements in the federated companies' 
had failed to effectively mount a general offensive against wage 
determination. Despite the influence of left dominated shop 
stewards in Austin, Morris, Rover, and Jaguer, it was only at 
the non-federated Standard that the ideal model of 100 per cent 
organisation,structured through a hierarchy of senior stewards, 
factory convenors, so fostered by the left-wing,war time shop 
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, 
stewards movement, had. actually become established. While 
clearly, the different labour relation~ strategies between federated 
and non-federated employers certainly had an influence, encouraging 
either a general tendency towards organised unity within the 
workplace organisation or acted to promote the potentiality 
for division and sectionalism already implicit in tile operation 
of the piecework system, the actual influence being exerted 
by the Conununist Party within the workplace organis.dtion, 
appeared to be one of seeking to create an administrative 
workplace unity among the leading workplace representatives, 
while attempting to contain any potentiality for overt conflict 
which might appear to endanger the elected Labour Government. 
This was perhaps most evident at Standard, where the workplace 
leadership cultivated a collaborative relationship with the 
I 
works management,which involved considerable worker responsibility 
for the level of productivity provided a distribution of surplus 
was partly made available to the workforce, Sut even at Austin, 
where the works management refused to recognise a workplace 
organisation, or seniority in representation, other than the 
position held by Dick Etheridge the convenor and party member, 
Etheridge was able to direct the considerable discontent over 
the mass redundanCY,while the management insisted upon completely 
ignoring the workplace representatives, into procedure and get 
the issue raised through local Labour MP's in the House of 
Commons. It was in the Nuffield organisation/that a war time 
development of inter-plant conunittees emerged. While this was 
novel to the motor industry, its creation out of the roots of 
labour insecurity in a centrally administered multi plant 
organisation was itself the outcome of Communist Party initiatives. 
It was in fact modelled on the Smiths Combine Committee, though 
earlier combines did exist in the iJnter ',ofClr aircraft i.nc:b<;t:ry. 
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Smiths had been formed in 1940,by Communist shop stewards with 
the specific objective of offering advice, the exchange of 
information, and policy recommendations on the clear understanding 
that it would not seek to supercede the functions of trade union 
officials or union organisations. It was1however, the very failure 
of union officialdom to effectively challenge the authority of 
management over the issue of redundanCY,which was to be both a 
spur to the rapid spread of Combine Committees in the motor 
industry during the 1950's, but which was to pose their left 
wing leaderships with a most profound dilemma - what was to be 
their attitude towards union officialdom and independent 
workplace activity in the defence of the right to work and the 
right to determine the representatives of the workplace? 
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PART 7 
THE STRUGGLE FOR THE 
CONTROL OF REDUNDANCY 
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Abstract 
Before 1956,EEF policy towards the issue of redundancy strongly 
opposed any approach on behalf of the CSEU which appeared to imply 
an infringement of the discretionary powers of individual employer~ 
in matters associated with redundancy decisions. The leadership 
of the constituent unions within the confederatio~ remained 
severely divided over policy towards redundancy. In particular, 
they appeared unable to overcome the persistent threats which 
the redundancy issue posed, not just for the basic insecurity of 
wage labour, but to the position of shop stewards in the workplace. 
In the motor industry where, after 1950, reaLmament and shortages 
of vital ~aterials for vehicle assembly resulted in a number of 
large scale lay-offs,charges of employer victimisation of workplace 
representatives through redundancy selection brought about a 
series of shop floor challenges to managements insistence upon 
unilateral control. This part examines the dynamic process by 
which redundancy became a central issue, not just between the 
institutionalised relationship of the EEF and the CSEU, but how 
it became a crucial issue in the formation of combine committees 
in the motor industry. 
The section begins by providing an analysis of the failure of 
employers and unions to reach an agreed accommodation over the 
managerial control of redundancy. The second section examines 
a series of lengthy strikes during 1951 in which the defence of 
workplace organisation appeared as the central question in 
redundancy conflict. The final part accounts for how these isolated 
struggles at workplace level became generalised as redundancy itself 
became a formative issue in the creation of combine committees 
across the motor industry. It is maintained that in the struggle 
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for the control of redundancy, it was a left wing leadership 
organised through combine committees/rather than the organisation 
of trade union officials at national level, which provided the 
basis for a unified policy towards redundancy, to challenge 
managerial control. While this leadership, however, operated 
outside the established decision making proces~ the implementation 
of its policies, at individual workplace leve~ remained subject 
to repeated attacks by not just employers and local union officials, 
but also dissident groups of rank and file workers. A unity 
of workplace policy over redundancy, at shop steward leve~ had to 
continually confront the power of both institutional and shop 
floor opposition. 
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1 REDUNDANCY POLICY AND THE DEFENCE OF MANAGERIAL PREROGATIVE 
The prominence of redundancy as an issue of power conflict in post 
war British industrial ralations emerged with the rise of unemployment 
during the economic crises of 1947-48 and 1951-52. It eventually 
reached a crisis in 1956. Though there was a general increase in 
job insecurity of wage labour across engineering, layoffs, short time 
working and redundancies. were most keenly felt by employees in the 
motor industry, especially in the mass assembly plants. The 
involvement of the motor industry in munitions manufacture during the 
war period and the consequent role of workplace representatives in 
production matters, including the administration of redundancies 
during 1944 and 1945, had led to attempts throughout the car plants 
for shop steward organisations to retain some level of control over the 
power of management in redundancy decisions. For the Federated 
companies, however, EEF policy and interpretation of the Termination 
of Employment Agreement, of the 3 April 1946, obliged the employer 
to give a week's notice, or provide payment in lieu. In regard to 
the issue of redundancy, this agreement restored the power of 
managerial prerogative in terms of the actual redundancy decision 
and its implementation. Importantly, it enabled management to 
exercise power over the selection of who was to go. This national 
agreement, governing the power to discharge labour, became a 
cornerstone of a managerial strategy to curb the growing power of 
workplace organisation, during the first ten post war years. In the 
motor industry the operation of this termination agreement in 
redundancy situations became a critical issue of power conflict in 
workplace relations. 
In the motor industry where periodic recession and the layoff of 
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wage labour were combined with a growth in workplace organisation, 
insecurity affecting both employment and workplace organisation 
gave rise to acute sources of discontent. Employer allegience to 
prerogative, embodied in the national agreements on the one hand, 
and the emergence of considerable inter union disagreement at national 
level on the other, led increasingly to an inability of the national 
leadership to act in a concerted way to abate the growing power of 
workplace organisations demanding an influence in the control of 
redundancy. The differences at national level among the union 
leaderships over redundancy policies, despite the organisational 
unity established through the formation of the confederation 
in 1947, prevented a unified institutional challenge to managerial 
power on the basis of Federation policies. It was workplace 
organisation which directly experienced the outcomes of managerial 
decision making which remained far less inhibited about challenging 
managerial power despite it being underpinned by the authority of 
the EEF. 
Following the cancellation of the special Redundancy Procedure and 
the signing of the Termination Agreement of the 3 April 1946, the 
engineering employers remained firm over their right to exercise 
their power of discharge in redundancy situations. Above all, 
Federation, Policy remained most insistent that management's should 
not relinquish control over decisions taken in the workplace. In 
April 1949, for example, the chairman in central conference rejected, 
without further consideration, the redundancy of ten employees from 
an engineering works where both the ABU and the NSMM contested that 
neither the need for a redundancy had been proven, or that the 
redundancy selection itself had taken place upon a reasonable basis. 
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"We cannot a.ccept the position", stated the Conference 
chairman, "that in these days when redundancy occurs there 
has to be agreement on the shop floor as to who goes or 
does not go because, quite frankly we would get nowhere: 
we would be just wasting our time. It is the function of 
management, and that, quite definitely is our attitude. 
We would, of course, encourage the management to act 
with discretion but, in acting with discretion, we are 
not for the moment suggesting that they should in any 
way waive their rights. Once it became a question of 
committees and consultation, or running backwards and 
forwards on issues like this, the management of the works 
would be completely impossible, because the views of one 
man would not agree with those of another" ,1 
The policy of the EEF opposed any arrangement which appeared to 
compromise the authority of management in redundancy decisions. 
Federation policy, did however, allow for individual employer 
discretion over how the actual redundancy decision was to be 
intimated. This was not to appear as a compromise over the redundancy 
decision. On the 12 May 1950, central conference considered a 
protest from the TGWU over a redundancy and the Coventry district 
which involved four shop stewards, including the branch chairman 
and secretary. On the question of whether a redundancy list should 
be submitted to workplace representatives the chairman stated EEF 
policy. 
"It is not obligatory for any firm to submit lists: it 
is not in any agreement, and it is not the usual practice. 
It is a question of courtesy. In the vast majority of 
works, it is not done at all : but here we have a firm 
that is extending extra special courtesy to shop stewards, 
and in this case your union. I am prepared to say that 
the firm is prepar~d to continue that, but it is only a 
courtesy gesture". 
Although this Coventry firm was still paying lip service to the 
war time regulation of providing lists of redundant workers, they 
had abandoned the consultative aspect of the arrangement. The firm 
refused to engage in discussions over the method of selection of 
redundant workers and would not consider substitutes from among 
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workers with less service than those declared redundant. 3 
The EEF, as well as opposing any compromise in managerial authority 
with trade union or workplace representatives for redundancy 
decisions, were also opposed to accepting a responsibility for those 
affected by their decisions. The Federation in conjunction with the 
BEC organised a powerful lobby to oppose two attempts to introduce 
a private Parliamentary Bill to provide employer compensation for 
loss of employment. The first Bill introduced in 1949 by W Guy, 
4 
a Labour MP, and the second, more restricted Bill presented by 
a Conservative MP 5 and supported by Edward Heath, both provided 
for compensation to be awarded to any worker with 5 years service 
in cases of dismissal, (other than grounds of misconduct), reduction 
in salary, wages or emoluments; or, where a worsening of employees 
position in regard to the conditions of his service as a whole, took 
place. Though neither Bill reached second reading, the Federation's 
observations of member firms and associations revealed complete 
opposition to its introduction, while the BEC Standing Committee 
on unemployment, on which the Federation was represented, were 
reported as being unanimous in their opposition to the very principle 
of the Bi11. 6 Not only did they inform the Chief Industrial 
Commissioner at the MOL but they dispatched a deputation, in 1949, 
to the Government prior to the date of second reading. Both Bills 
7 failed to gain Government support. 
Within the Federation the membership's objection was that it placed 
upon the employer a liability for the state of the labour market. 
From the districts of the motor industry, the employers complaint 
was that falls in piecework prices, depressions in trade, and low 
employee performance, would become the responsibility of the employer 
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8 
and not the employee. In other areas of the Federation, it was 
claimed the Bill would inhibit the power of management to dismiss 
9 
workers in recessions or reduce wages. Increased security 
experienced by workforces would not only interfere with the workings 
of the labour market but would, 
" ....• weaken discipline still further and add to the 
already serious undermining of the powers of 
management". 10 
The view of the Federation was that, 
"(we) consider this Bill by far the finest piece of 
legislation for rUllning business yet devised. 
It is completely unsuitable to engineering with trade 
cycles and changes in labour demands" .11 
The policy of the EEF remained one of opposing state interference 
with the labour market, where it felt the responsibility for 
unemployment was being transferred from the shoulders of Government 
to that of the employer. The Federation defended the pOSition of 
freedom to act, unrestrained in both market and work situations, by 
either public policy or trade union activity. 
Among the trade unions, in the engineering industry before 1955, 
it was largely the absence of unity in policy rather than the 
absence of policies, which characterised the CSEU approach to the 
question of redundancy., It was, however, events in the workplace, 
where the outcomes of managerial decision making were experienced, 
that a growing challenge to the policy of the EEF remained far less 
inhibited by managerial power and authority. Victimisation of 
active trade unionists, particularly shop stewards, and later, a 
growing fear of automation, both became central questions in the 
issue of redundancy during the first half of the 1950's. 
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In 1946, the TGWU.· metal and engineering trade group from the 
Midland region, pointed to the weakening effect employer redundancy 
t · h' th i '. 12 h . prac ~ces were av~ng upon e un ons organ~sat~on. T e reg~on 
was calling for a continuation of the selection procedure which had 
operated under the wartime redundancy arrangements. At the TGWU 
Biennial Conferences in 1947 and 1949, the question of redundancy 
was the subject of considerable debate. In 1947 a resolution was 
debated proposing the setting up of a co-ordination panel, whereby 
both sides of industry could meet to prevent, 
" .... the large number of active members being discharged 
under the guise of redundancy" .13 
This, however, was defeated by Conference. At the 1949 Conference, 
the TGWU unanimously supported a redundancy policy embracing both 
prior consultation and compensation, in cases of redundancy. The 
resolution stated, 
"That this Biennial Delegate Conference of the TGWU 
calls for fullest conSUltation with the trade union 
representatives throughout industry, including 
nationalised industries before discharges take place 
on redundancy grounds II .14 
The union also supported, 
"The payment of adequate compensation to displaced workers 
who particularly by reason of age, cannot be absorbed".lS 
The position of the TGWU was to basically support the idea of prior 
consultation, which had operated during the war period, and redundancy 
compensation, which in 1930 Bevin, as General Secretary had negotiated 
16 
with the Flour Milling Employers. In 1951 the TGWU failed, 
following pressure from the leadership,to endorse a motion at its 
Biennial Delegate Conference which had called for the GEC, 
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" ..... to seek legislation to compel all employers to 
give 21 days notice to the Ministry of Labour when 
redundancy occurs in their factories, and that no new 
labour be allowed to be employed until the redundant 
workers have been reinstated".17 
Conference report stated, 
liTo proceed by way of legislative action to deal with 
the problem of redundancy involved dangerous implications 
calculated to destroy the value of Trade Union 
representation •... The view was taken that the interests 
of the membership would be best served by continuing to 
deal with the problem through the medium of the normal 
machinery whereby the union was able to represent the 
position of the member, or members, considered to have 
been dealt with unjustly" .18 
af all the unions in the Confederation, the attitude of the Vehicle 
Builders towards redundancy was perhaps more directly an outcome 
of the experiences of the motor industry. Not only did the Nuva 
possess a greater proportion of its membership in the assembly 
plants, than the larger, general unions, but it had been subject to 
a series of disputes with Federated employers on redundancy questions. 
In 1948, at its Annual Delegate Conference, the union endorsed a 
coventry resolution that the EC, 
" .... vigorously resist every attempt by employers to 
victimise and blacklist shop stewards and active trade 
unionists" .19 
In February 194~ the Coventry branch and the EC tried to get the 
CSEU Group Council to approach the employers association with a view 
to establishing joint machinery "to deal with this growing eVil",20 
of employer victimisation. At that year~ conference of the union, 
the Birmingham DC also called for an approach to the EEF for a 
redundancy agreement, in which they wanted to specify that, 
" ••.. when a redundancy occurs shop stewards must be 
consulted on an agreed basis which includes skill and 
length of service". 21 
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In July 1949, the Coventry Branch was urging the EC to consider 
Government legislation to prevent victimisation and to safeguard, 
" .... the fundamental right of every trade unionist to 
earn a living".22 
Among the 1eaderships of the engineering trade unions, the main issue 
they faced over the redundancy question, during 1948 and 1949, had 
been the victimisation of workplace representatives. At the CSEU 
annual meeting held at the beginning of May 1948, the first 
redundancy resolution sought an agreement with the EEF on a procedure 
to enable prior consultation. The resolution moved by the 
Association of Scientific Workers stated, 
"This conference instructs group EC to approach the 
Engineering and Allied Employers National Federation for 
the purpose of securing an agreement that in the event 
of redundancy in any establishment, management shall 
submit redundancy lists to the trade unions in order 
that joint consultation and agreement is reached on a 
procedure for discharge before any notices of such 
discharge are issued".23 
At the following years Conference, the CSEU EC reported that they, 
having to face a further resolution from the Vehicle Builders calling 
for the establishment of joint machinery through an agreement with 
the Federation as the only remedy to prevent victimisation through 
redundancy, would undertake to insert the principle of prior 
consultation in their negotiations over the constitution of the 
post war JPC's. Although the Vehicle Builders decided to withdraw 
their resolution,to enable the redundancy question to be dealt with 
under the production committees,the debate disclosed a number of 
divisions within the CSEU. In the districts of the motor industry, 
support was firmly behind an agreement based upon shop stewards 
rather than JPC's. Jack Jones, of the TGWU in Coventry, argued for the 
continuation of the wartime consultation with stewards, which still 
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operated in some of the large Coventry car plants, despite the 
absence of an agreement. He wanted consultation with stewards on 
redundancy lists and not coupled with JPC's. 
"Consultation should take place with stewards who 
represented departments and sections who were in a 
position to ensure that redundancy lists were issued 
they were dealt with in complete fairness".24 
Jones also called for the working of a full weeks notice to enable 
stewards to take up redundancy cases with managements. J L Longworth, 
from Luton; argued for an agreement with stewards rather than JPC 
to help eliminate the delays in the operation of procedure in cases 
of victimisation,25 while from Birmingham, J T Ealas, claimed not 
only that employers used redundancy to remove stewards but that 
the composition of production committees were sometimes made up 
.. 26 
with non-un~on~sts. 
Opposition to the argument, that a redundancy agreement should be 
based upon stewards, arose from the claim that it would be seen to 
give preferential treatment to the position of the steward. It 
would encourage unions to give preferential treatment to their own 
members, became engaged in discussions with management to differentiate 
membership between, married and single, women and men, those with 
children, as opposed to those without. For W Hutchinson of the 
AEU argued, 
"Once one tried to differentiate and give preferential 
treatment to one's own members it would be disastrous 
to the organisation ...• it meant a steward would have to 
argue with employers that one trade unionist should go 
against that of another". 27 
For W Heppell from the Tyne DC, 
"If a union held a hope of permanent employment to make a 
man a steward it would destroy the shop steward organisation".28 
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The CSEU had been unable to make progress with the EEF over the 
question of consultation through JPC's. In 1953, however, following 
a period of mass redundancies, the AEU NC formulated its own redundancy 
2'7 policy to combat the growth in unemployment in engineering. At 
the Annual Meeting of the CSEU, in August it presented its policy 
for Confederation policy: 
"I Prior consultation to take place before redundancy 
declared. 
2 Where redundancy occurs all overtime should cease 
on the part of that class of labour in the workshop 
concerned, or where the CSEU DC considers it necessary 
in the district. 
3 Government Training Centres for the training of 
engineering workers to be tolerated only by agreement 
with the CSEU DC. 
4 The adoption and pursuit of the CSEU plan for 
engineering".30 
The AEU, claimed William Carron, introducing his unions motion was 
" ••.•. opposed to the idea of accepting the inevitability 
of redundancy and then having to place our people in a 
position of deciding and agreeing to who should become 
unemployed".31 
The engineering union did not regard consultation at workplace 
or district level as an adequate basis to prevent the increases 
in both redundancy and unemployment. They maintained that such 
consultation should only arise after the major issue had been settled 
at National level. The union should also be prepared to initiate 
to 
overtime bans to prevent redundancy, stop excessive overtime while 
32 
unemployment and short time working. AEU policy towards redundancy 
emerged as part of a wider opposition to the insecurity of wage 
labour. It was not just a question of seeking a prior agreement 
over consultation with the employers on a procedure to implement 
redundancy without victimisation. The development of AEU policy 
417 
with its suspicion of training centres was influenced, in part, by 
the unions craft origins and membership influences. 'Restriction 
of numbers' and the prevention of 'systematic' overtime to "destroy 
the redundancy in the labour market", 33 had been the foundation 
of the union~ trade policy since its formation in 1852. Its view 
that sanctions should be imposed by the district committee, arose 
out of the AEU's long attachment to localism in the implementation 
d l ' 34 of tra e po ~cy. The AEU redundancy policy had emerged in opposition 
to any consideration of compensation. 
The TGWU were looking for a national agreement over redundancy and 
therefore proposed an amendment of all four measures of the AEU 
resolution. The TGWU wanted the CSEU to seek an agreement with 
the employers on the following objectives. 
"1 Joint consultation at District level between employers 
and unions concerned prior to a declaration of 
redundancy and with a view to minimising the effects 
of such a redundancy. 
2 Basic principles to be applied, in the event of a 
redundancy being inevitable, to determine the number 
of members of staff to be discharged, with special 
regard to the general principle of 'last in first 
out', but without prejudice to the rights of key 
workers, hardship cases, registered disabled persons 
and those having legal rights to continued employment. 
3 Basic principles to be applied when re-engagement 
of dismissed workers is possible. 
4 The institution of measures for the transfer to, or 
training for, alternative occupations in the 
establishment concerned".35 
The TG~, which had already been party to redundancy agreements with 
individual employers, did not see opposition to redundancy per se 
as the centre of a redundancy policy, rather they wished to possess 
an agreemen t with employers whereby, through an accepted procedure, 
they would be able to enter into negotiations to both reduce the 
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actual level of red~ndancy and where redundancy took place, 
instigate a criteria of seniority to protect the older workers from 
the uncertainties of the labour market. It also wanted seniority 
to be applied for re-engagement. 36 Apart from a greater commitment 
to retraining and redeployment within the works in cases of 
redundancy, which had more in common with industrial or general 
unionism than a craft tradition, the TGWU opposed the dominant 
influence in Confederation policy being decided by CSEU district 
committees. It argued that overtime may still need to be maintained, 
to prevent bottlenecks in production flows, even when a redundancy 
takes place. 37 These decisions were considered to be matters for 
individual unions to decide and could not be left to CSEU DC's, 
over which the engineering union generally held the majority influence. 
The TGWU, with its engineering base in the new industries of the 
west Midlands, was applying a more adaptive policy towards redundancy 
in industries where short term layoff and short time working had 
long been practiced. It therefore was seeking to control re-engagement 
as much as job loss. Unlike the AEU,it wanted to approach this 
through a procedural agreement to operate at local level, rather 
than union opposition to be exercised by national officials. Both 
38 the resolution and the amendment were referred to the CSEU EC. 
In 1954/following a recommendation of the General Purposes Committee, 
the EC was advised to approach the EEF to establish the prinCiple 
that joint consultation should take place at individual works 
39 immediately redundancy was anticipated. 
On the 10 August 1954, in the absence of a specific agreement over 
the issue of redundancy the CSEU, largely prompted by the Federation, 
established with the EEF that the prinCiple of consultation be 
written into the Procedure Agreement of 1922.40 The new clause, 
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an addition to the General Principles, stated, 
"(C) The employers and the trade unions, without departing 
in anyway from the principles embodied in clause (A) 
emphasise the value of consultation, not only in the 
successful operation of the procedure set out in Section II 
but in the initial avoidance of disputes". 41 
This clause to, "emphasise the value of consultation" did so upon 
the already established principles of Clause (A) of Procedure, 
"managements right to manage", and the trade union right, "to 
exercise their functions", with the "intention not to create any 
specially favoured-class of workpeople". This consultation clause 
possessed no specific assurances in regard to its application to the 
42 issue of redundancy. It contained no obligation on the level at 
which consultation would take place, and as a statement of general 
principle it provided no guarantees surrounding the treatment of 
shop stewards in redundancy situations. The consultation clause 
in Procedure, neither infringed the employers right to prerogative 
over redundancy, nor did it satisfactorily resolve union differences 
over redundancy within the CSEU. 43 On the 8 February 1955, the General 
secretary of the CSEU, Gavin Martin wrote to the Federation with a 
view to specifying consultation towards redundancy in line with CSEU 
Conference recommendation. The letter called for establishing, 
" ••••. the principle that joint consultation between 
management and workers' representatives at individual 
forms should take place immediately redundancy is 
anticipated". 44 
The Federation, following a discussion at Management Board, replied, 
" ...•.. although the Federation is prepared to encourage 
intimation of known redundancy to the workers or their 
representatives, with appropriate explanation to avoid 
misunderstandings, it is not feasible for management to 
accept the establishment of any procedure under which they 
might be deemed to share their responsibility for grappling 
with the problem in the best interests of those who might 
be affected and the maintenance of employment for the greatest 
number".45 
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On the 9 January 1956, following a further Board meeting held 
on 29 December, the Federation circulated their associations outlining 
a method whereby joint consultation in relation to redundancy could 
be applied at domestic level, without having recourse to the creation 
46 
of a special redundancy procedure, through a National agreement. 
The method had five clauses. 
" (a) When a company is confronted with such a problem, 
the management should take the earliest opportunity 
of informing the work people's representatives, 
giving appropriate explanation to avoid misunderstanding, 
and telling them how the measures to deal with the 
situation will be put into effect. 
(b) The men who are to be discharged should be given 
individual notice of termination of employment. A 
list of names should not be posted in the works. 
(c) If a worker who receives notice considers that there 
are special reasons why he should be retained, he 
should consult his foreman. If no agreement is 
reached he may refer the matter to his shop steward. 
The shop steward may take the matter up with the 
management, in accordance with the company's usual 
practice. 
(d) If, after due consideration, the management consider 
that the workers application is justified, they 
should not hesitate to amend their decision and 
withdraw the notice. The final decision must remain 
wi th the management. 
(e) The decision of the Management, whether it is to 
maintain or withdraw the notice, should first be made 
known to the worker. Thereafter the shop steward 
should be informed if he has been concerned in the 
discussions". 47 
The EEF position over redundancy was one of being prepared to 
encourage 'intimation' but not to qet engaged in n procedure for 
handling redundancy. Intimation could take place, for example, 
through JPC's where they existed, or directly with the worker, or 
sometimes the workers representative concerned. Management at all 
times would retain its power over the redundancy decision, even to 
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the point of amending its own decision. The method provided no 
means by which trade union official~ either at National or district 
committe& could become involved. 48 Workplace representatives could 
only become involved after the decision was made and in accordance 
with the workings of procedure. Trade union officials, were 
therefore, to be placed in a position of being involved only in 
cases which went beyond works conference level, on particular 
questions which went into Procedure, which would normally be discussed 
after the discharge of labour had taken place. The basic principle 
upon which Federation redundancy policy was developed was the 
individual contract of employment. In its circulation of its 
associations it was emphasised that, 
"The engagement of a worker by an employer is the subject 
of a contract which is a personal matter between the 
worker and the employer. When, for any reason, a 
workers' contract of employment is terminated by either 
party, the termination of the contract is again a personal 
matter between the worker and his employer. In the 
interests of employers and employees it is highly 
important that this principle should be preserved".49 
For the Federation it was the management of the firm which was the 
only competent authority to assess its labour requirements. Such 
decisions could not be shared either with workforces, workplace 
representatives, trade union officials, or even employers associations. 
consultation, in other words, would be in accordance with managerial 
prerogative. 
The Confederation, despite its own differences, between unions, on 
policy towards redundancy, was even with the Federations initiative 
of introducing the principle of conSUltation into the Procedure 
Agreement, unable to establish the minimum agreed basis for its 
redundancy policy : prior consultation. Beyond the discretion of 
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employer intimation, no role existed for union or workplace 
representatives in the decision making part of the redundancy process 
Federation policy, over redundancy, which restated managerial 
prerogative, and denied a place for the institutions of wage labour, 
became an important base upon which a managerial strategy to check 
the growing power of workplace organisation developed. Actions in 
the workplace became the focus of the challenge to managerial power. 
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2 WORKPLACE CONFLICT AND CONTROL 
At the beginning of the 1950's the British motor manufacturers 
became the centre of a production crisis. Shortages of raw 
materials, a fresh impetus given to arms production and the 
introduction of fiscal measures by a newly elected conservative 
government, appeared to threaten the early post war prosperity 
of the industry and its labour force. Furthermore, restrictions 
upon the industry at a time of re-emerging international competition 
not only appeared to challenge the industry's supremacy in world 
ex~rt markets, but placed job security and the control of 
redundancy ~s a central issue of workplace relations. Employer 
control ove= the question of redundancy, combined with a common 
strategy to curb the growth in workplace organisation, produced 
a series of major confrontations between management and organised 
wage labour in the industry. The fear of the re-establishment 
of unemployment as a government policy to reinforce labour discipline 
in the workplace and the expansion of the arms economy at the 
expense of the motor industry, served to broaden the basis for 
opposition to redundancy in the car industry. It was the formation 
of combine committees at a moment of widespread job insecurity, 
in the absence of a unified union policy, which saw the development 
of attempts to co-ordinate workplace opposition, not just on an 
industry front, but also upon a political basis. This challenge 
arose from the outcome of isolated conflicts organised to protect 
workplace organisation during a recession. From these events, the 
question of redundancy, had by 1952, become a focus of attempts 
to provide an inter plant challenge to managerial control. 
The expansion in armaments, as the western economies increased 
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military expenditure after 1950, placed a considerable drain upon 
essential supplies required for the manufacture of cars. The 
demands for copper, nickel, chrome, sulphur and zinc for arms 
production, reduced the supplies available to the motor industry. 
In 1951,the allocation of imported sheet steel for the motor 
industry was cut by a fifth. Contracts with American steel 
producers were cancelled, as stockpiles were reserved for the 
arms industry. Furthermore, for the first time during the post 
war period, the British Motor industry, which in 1950 had exported 
70 per cent of its production, faced a serious decline in sales 
among some of its main overseas markets. Car producers, in 19501 
began to face the conflicting national requirements for defence, 
exports and home demand. By 1953, almost 20 per cent of the 
engineering labour force was engaged upon arms production. 50 The 
expansion of this sector of employment contrasted with the decline 
in the motor industry. The production of cars fell for two 
successive years after 1950. By 1953,car exports had fallen by 
51 100,000. Output for the domestic market was 70,000 lower than 
52 it had been for 1950. This under utilisation of capacity 
increased production costs. Employers shed labour and introduced 
short time working. Registered unemployment for the industry had 
remained under 1,500 at the beginning of 1950, but in the spring 
53 
of 1953 it stood at 10,500. 
The recession in the industry had its affect upon workplace 
organisation. In the West Midlands the post war growth in union 
membership was checked. The AEU membership in Birmingham fell by 
7,500 in two years to 31,700 in 1953. 54 The TGWU lost 13,000 
members during 1952 in the West Midlands,55 while the NUVB, whose 
National membership had increased by a quarter between 1948 and 
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and 1952,56 largely because of the growth of employment in the 
car industry, stagnated for the next three years. Less than 100 
new members joined the AEU in Oxford between 1950 and 1953. 57 
Coventry remained the only centre of the motor industry which 
showed an increase in union recruitment and this was mainly due 
to the AEU. Although there was a number of large redundancies 
in the Coventry motor industry during this period, local employers 
like Alfred Herberts, Coventry Precision, and Alvis, all benefitted 
from arms contracts. Membership of the AEU rose from 20,000 
in 1949 to 29,000 in 1953. 58 Although the expansion of jobs in 
the arms sector may have retained a growth of unionisation among 
the city's engineers, it did not diminish the significance of 
redundancy and short time working for those in motor manufacturing. 
Although some of the West Midland car producers did receive 
contracts for military vehicles, these tended to only accelerate 
mili~ry claims on the diminishing supplies of raw materials. 
Because of their four-wheel drive systems and their greater need 
for toughness, military transport required more of the scarce 
metals, particularly the light alloy steels, than did the manufacture 
th . 59 of e pr~vate car. As a result,in 1950, car production progressively 
60 fell from a post war peak of 51,020 in March, to its lowest 
monthly output since the 1947 fuel crisis, of 30,747 in August. 
The industry in 1950 had an estimated "tooled-up" capacity of about 
61 600,000 cars. It was not until 1954, that it manufactured to 
this level. Over capacity had consequences for jobs. In Coventry, 
during April 1950, the vehicle builders, a union with perhaps the 
highest dependence upon car production, after receiving a report 
that improvements in the body sections supplied to Standard Motors 
was likely to result in a further redundancy of Branch members, 
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the Committee declared: 
"It must be fought out on the shop floor and we 
must give them every support".62 
On being informed of the possibility of a sudden redundancy at 
Daimler during May the BC stated, 
"This has come as a big surprise after the assurances 
that the firm had given u~ recommend, that stewards 
fight either redundancy or short time working".63 
At Morris Bodies, the employer had refused to inform the NUVB 
stewards of the names on their redundancy list. When it was 
issued, it contained the name of one of the vehicle builders shop 
steward~ who had had 17 years service with the firm. Citing the 
procedure for prior consultation practiced at Stnndnrd,the NUVB 
officials came directly up against federation policy to sustain 
managerial control when they took the case to Works Conference. 
The cov EEA, secretary reiterated EEF policy. 
"Neither the association or the employer accepted 
that prior consultation and discussion should take 
place. Responsibility for deciding on those to be 
made redundant must rest with the Company and they 
could not be expected to share it with the shop 
stewards. It would place a burden on them that they 
should not be called upon to bear" .64 
The local officials were unable to get any assurances over consultation 
in the future, other than the stewards would be informed once the 
redundancy selection and notices had been served. The NUVa 
, d' . al f d fell back upon ~ts tra ~t~on cra t efences, amid the growing 
threat of redundancy. On the 26 June, they established a membership 
policy between the Coventry and Birmingham branches to control 
entry into the society and spelt out a craft criteria for job 
rights in redundancy situations. A four point policy was to apply 
at local level. 
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"1 Applica~ts who have not served their time 
or have not worked a long period at the trade 
must be classed green labour, to be considered 
as dilutees. 
2 Entrance to the trade should be by apprenticeship 
through the union. 
3 Dilutees and replacements should be controlled 
and sanctioned by Branch Committee. 
4 Dilutees and replacements should be first to 
go in any redundancy cases". 65 
The policy was tobe executed through the Midland branches and by 
the shop stewards in the workplace. Despite the mass production 
methods employed in the industry, the NUVB were using craft status 
not just as a means for controlling and organising the workforce 
in the trim shops. and assembly sections and to retain the skilled 
rate, but they were also using it to provide a seniority in jobs. 
By the end of 1950 the NUVB were adVising their Daimler stewards 
that mobile labour transferred or redeployed into the body huilding 
or trim sections had to be transferred back to their original 
66 
sections in the event of a redundancy. The union did not wish 
to see redundancy being used as a possible cause for weakening 
their control over the sections which they sought to completely 
organise, but of their inability to directly control the process 
of redundancy and in the face of the unified position held by the 
federation and their member firms, the NUVB were attempting to 
defend their position through sectional actions bas~d upon their 
craft past. However, during 1950, in the vehicle industry, it 
was strikes outside the West Midlands which were to prove the 
major challenge to federation redundancy policy. At Crossley 
Motors, in Stockport, and Duple Motor Bodies,. at Hendon in North 
London, lengthy confrontations developed following management 
attempts to remove representatives from workplace organisation 
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during the recession in trade. The recession, the fall in earnings 
and the existence of widespread short time working appeared to , 
prompt managements to use the opportunity to weaken shop steward 
leadership through their control over redundancy selection. On 
the 8 February 1950, what was described as a "lightning strike",67 
of 2,000 workers took place, after the employers had issued 
redund~cy' notices to 63 workers one of whom was John Blackburn, 
the works convenor. At a mass meeting the following day, the 
deputy convenor presented the shop stewards view of the issue at 
stake, 
"This is a question of principle - of whether a 
convenor has any particular right whereby employers 
are expected to keep him in employment until the 
last man goes". 68 
Of the 2,000 workforce, 1,300 decided to go out on indefinite 
strike in order to gain Blackburn's reinstatement. Only the sheet 
metal workers and the maintenance staff remained at work. The 
central issue was the integrity of workplace organisation, the 
right that elected workplace representatives should, in a redundancy, 
be retained in order to maintain the organisation. The Crossley 
management held to the EEF position that the control over the 
selection in a redundancy was a q~estion entirely for management 
and that there was no principle of preference for shop stewards which 
could be accepted. The strike committee which formed immediately 
set about gaining support for their case from their national union 
organisations, local shop stewards organisations in the Manchester 
district and from within the heavy vehicle firms which formed part 
of the Associated Vehicles Group, to which Crossley Motors was a 
part. These included AEC at Southhall, Mausdely at Worcestershire, 
and Park Royal Motors in West London. Blackburn, on the 14 Februaryr 
refused an offer of employment from a local firm and would not 
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69 
register unemployed. .Along with shop stewards he refused to 
accept the validity of the management's decision. Though the issue 
was strongly supported at workplace level .. a major split arose 
among the National officials of the principal unions involved, as 
well as a sharp difference between the leadership of the AEU, 
Blackburn's union and the workplace organisation. 
The NUV8, the woodworkers union, and the Furnishing Operatives 
Union, all gave full recognition to the dispute. The Country's 
largest engineering union, the AEU, instructed the local officials 
to get a return to work. On the 1 March, Hugh Scanlon, DO, 
addressing a meeting of just over 1,000 of those on strike stated, 
"The decision of the EC instructing you to return to 
work pending negotiations is in the post and will 
reach me today. It is my job to tell you to go back 
to work and I hope you will carry it out".70 
This call was reported to have resulted in shouts of "No", and 
"Not likely".7l Harry Holland, the strike committee chairman 
then addressed the meeting. 
"Are we going to sell our principle for a El a week which 
is all we would get on strike pay?" 72 
The meeting voted unanimously to continue the dispute, and voted 
a "No confidence" motion in the AEU EC. The strike conunittee 
then set about organising wider shop floor support for their cause. 
Failure to win the support of the ieadp.rship of the largest union 
in the CSEU increased the efforts to get the support of other 
workplace organisations in the ar~;l~ engineering industry. On the 
2 March the Crossley stewards organised a demonstration outside 
Metropolitan Vickers, at Trafford Park. This was the largest 
engineering employer in the North West. The following day the 
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Crossley Strike committ~e called for a half day general strike 
across the area's engineering industry in support for the defence 
of their convenor. This was arranged for Monday, 6 March. It 
was planned that there would be a mass meeting of the City's 
engineering workforce to hear the case, followed by a mass 
demonstration in Deansgate. In preparation for the strike, Crossley 
stewards visited over 30 local firms, addressing factory gate 
73 
meetings. The motor firms apprentices were dispatched on cycles 
to leaflet further factories in the locality. For the first time 
convenors from the main companies in the Associated Vehicles Group 
met and formed a committee to co-ordinate support within the group. 
By the end of the third week/strike benefit was being paid to the 
members whose unions gave recognition. AEU members were being 
supported by donations collected from plants "allover Manchester". 
The strike committee sought to extend the redundancy dispute by 
gaining the support of the areas 100,000 engineering workers in 
the half day dispute. On the Friday before the day of the strike, 
74 
only 3 firms had actually voted to support the stoppage. Two 
days before the half day strike, and on the day, 600 engineers at 
Manchester Dry Dock voted to com e out in sympathy with the Crossley 
dispute,a dramatic turn of events took place within the Stockport 
AEU DC. The committee, which had repeatedly called for recognition, 
were informed minutes before a meeting to discuss its attitudes 
towards the imminent 'general strike', that the AEU EC could in 
no circumstances give official support to the Crossley strike. 
The AEU EC ruled that as no agreement existed between the union 
and the engineering employers on the issue of redundancy, there was 
no way the dispute could become official. It argued that the only 
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way to settle the dispu~e was to challenge the victimisation case 
through procedure. This meant that the strike would have to be 
called off. After a three hour meeting the Stockport DC, on a 
narrow majority finally agreed to accept the position of the EC. 
On the 4 March ir. ruled, 
"1 The men be recommended to go back to work and 
that Bro. Blackburn apply for victimisation 
pay. 
2 Th~t the DC apply for an immediate Conference 
of the local employers' federation to discuss 
the 'victimisation'. 
3 That the EC be recommended, on the return to 
work of the men, to pay dispute benefit 75 
retrospectively for the period of the strike". 
The EC , not willing to back a strike which it did not consider 
the EEF would back down over, felt it could head off a possible 
wider conflict by salvaging the position of Blackburn through 
gaining an understanding over how redundancy selection should be 
undertaken. The intervention proved decisive. The Stockport DC 
decision was the main front page headline in the Saturday edition 
h . 1I_ 76 of the Mane ester Even1ng ~~ws. Though it remained uncertain 
what level of support would be expressed on the Monday, the 
Manchester engineering strike proved to be a flop. The large 
engineering plants/A V Roe, Platt Bros., Mather and Platt, all 
reported full attendances for their Monday afternoon shifts. 
Fairey Aviation, the nearest large firm to Crossley· Motors, took 
no action. Only 2,000 workers from 4 firms, out of the area's 
100,000 engineering workers stopped work. Less than 700 workers 
attended the demonstration. Metropolitan-Vickers, the largest and 
strongest organised of the areas engineers, had not taken a 
decision on what form of support to give to the Crossley strike. 
With this level of rank and file support the strike committee began 
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to concentrate upon shop steward committees. Bill Gallagher the 
vehicle builders convenor, at the beginning of the strikes fourth 
week, stated, 
"This will be the final and decisive week in the 
Crossley strike".77 
The Strike Committee sent a speaker to address 8,000 workers at 
Metropolitan-Vickers the day following the half day strike. The 
firms shop stewards agreed to ballot the workforce on sympathy 
action. On the 9 March,a meeting of Stockport shop stewards from 
31 of T~e towns engineering firms met to register their strong 
criticism against the failure of the AEU EC to support the Crossley 
case. On the 14 March, 3 buses were organised to transport over 
150 Metropolitan-Vickers shop stewards to the Manchester AEU 
headquarters in Rusholme, to consider "practical measures" to help 
~~e Crossley strike. 78 On the 16 March, the local AEU officials, 
after informal soundings with the employers associatio~·arranged 
to meet the strike committee to head off this new offensive. After 
a 3 hour meeting, the strike committee eventually agreed to end the 
strike on assurances for, 
" ti t' t d' .. ." 79 Nego a ~ons 0 re-open an no v~ct~m~sat~on 
The five week dispute came to an end on 17 March. By the end of 
the year, ~ll the members of the Crossley strike committee had lost 
their jobs. A further redundancy took place later in the year 
which included 2 AEU shop stewards. The AEU leadership persiste~ 
with trying to defend workplace organisation through procedure. 
On the 8 December, R Openshaw, (AEU EC), in a central conference, 
and held over the redundancy methods at Crossley. called upon the EEF 
to put pressure upon the local works management. 
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"What we are asking you to do is to have a talk with 
your local peopLe and remove this atmosphere, not of 
suspicion, but of reality that all is not well within 
the works when it comes to the method of handling 8 
redundancy,particularly when shop stewards are involved". 0 
The federation, however, would not involve itself in infringing 
the power of decision of works management in the question of 
redund~ncy. They even questioned whether labour relations were 
particula;Ymore difficult than anywhere else. The chairman pointed 
to a newly formed works committee after the dispute. The committee, 
however, contained none of the shop stewards who had been connected 
with the earlier dispute. The management acknowledged the need to 
re-establish a seven man works committee ~ut had effectively 
liquidated shop floor militancy during a recession, which had been 
built around the dismissal of the central figure in the workplace, 
John Blackburn. The lack of unity within the trade union leadership 
on how to handle the redundancy question and the absence of a 
redundancy policy within the CSEU,forced the initiative back upon 
workplace organisation. The commitment by the ABU leadership to 
n~501·,Ting red',w1i"lncy questions within procednrel though avertirig 
a wider conflict, failed to get reinstatement. Though defeated, 
the Crossley shop stewards had taken the first steps to organise 
support through a committee of contacts at other plants in the 
vehicles group. The main strategy, however, centred upon gaining 
the active support at workplace level in the engineering industry 
of the North West. No attempts were made to gain support in the 
West Midlands car plants. 
During 1950, two strikes over redundancy arose at Duple Motor Bodies, 
in North London. Both involved the selection of shop steward 
commdttee members and the works convenor. Both disputes were seen 
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as attempts by the management to take advantage of a changeover 
in production methods d~inq a period of recession to remove the 
shop floor leadership. The disputes at Duple's were successful in 
gaining reinstatement. They were to pave the way for not just an 
offensive against employer control, but also for a wider network 
of workplace contact across the British motor industry. The 
management at Duple had established a reputation for taking a tough 
line against union organisation in their plants. The motor J::adi.:es 
plant employed 1,200 workers, the majority of whom were members of 
craft unions. THe NUVB had 700 members, there were some 250 SMW, 
while the rest of the labour force were either in the woodcutting 
machinists, the electricians,or the AEU. 81 
In September 1949, the management, in a display of its opposition 
to workplace unionism, had sacked the works convenor for addressing 
a meeting over a complaint which had arisen from canteen facilities 
at the firm. Over 1,000 workers had struck for four days before 
. d 82 11 i the issue was put Lnto proce ure. Eventua y a nat onal 
Arbitration Tribunal upheld the position of the management. On the 
1 June 1950, a 16 day strike began in the sheet metal shop. The 
management gave an hours notice to 35 sheet metal workers of 
redundancy. The 35 not only included Les Buck, the works convenor, 
but the whole of the metal shop stewards committee. A meeting of 
the remaining metal workers was called in works time, after which 
the management promptly dismissed all 200 who had attended the 
meeting. On the 3 June, the London branch of the SMW voted for a 
position of, 
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"All back or none". 
The Duple management were seeking to undermine the cohesiveness of 
the metal workers shop organisation during the rundown of production 
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on the first post war car models. They were, in particular, 
attempting to remove the Communist Party influence on the metal 
workers shop committee, in order to pave the way for the introduction 
of a new press and later that year, a complete changeover to a 
new assembly line 84 whose construction was almost complete. All 
these changes would involve the firms shop stewards in renegotiating 
wage rates. The policy established by the London Branch was to 
stand behind the membership. The Branch rejected a management 
suggestion to reinstate the 200 dismissed, on condition the original 
35 redundancy notices stood. The metal workers agreed 
" •.•.. to secure a general resumption without the 
impasition of the notices on the 35 originally declared 
redundant".85 
On the 10 June/the SMW Branch agreed three basic demands which 
were later endorsed by the union; leadership. 
"I No dismissal while work is put out to sub-
contactors and no work to be handled from 
sub-contractors. 
2 The cut in the production programme to be restored 
which will maintain full employment for some 
future months. In the meantime alter work to be 
sought. 
3 Full consultation on production and employment 
problems with the stewards".86 
Although only the sheet metal workers were in dispute, other unions 
in the works refused to handle sub-contracted work which arrived 
at the firm. The vehicle builders agreed not to undertake work 
normally carried out by the metal workers. After three weeks on 
strike, the management conceded the metal workers demands. Not 
only were the 200 dismissed reinstated, but the whole of the metal 
shop committee, including Les Buck,the works convenor. An 
important factor in the dispute was the official backing of the SMW 
union. This not only helped to curtail the supplies from sub-
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contracting put signalled to the employer the unions resolve to 
fight the issue. The dipsute received widespread support among 
the vehicle firms in North London and Duple's stewards were sent 
to plants in the west Midlands to outline their case. The Duple's 
workers saw their success not just in terms of their own workplace 
but as a victory for workplace organisation throughout the 
federation. In a letter of thanks published in the Metal Worker 
they stated, 
"To date no further mention of redundancy has been 
made by the man age men t. Full production has been 
restored on the job which was the cause of the disputed 
redundancy. 
Having achieved the aims which we set out in our 
original circular, and maintained throughout the 
dispute, we are proud of the role we have played in 
the defence of organisation in Duple and throughout 
the Federation". 87 
The success of the Duple'S challenge to the management control over 
redundancy was far from permanent. Three months later the 
management announced a "redundancy of an exceptional character" 
which would operate progressively until five-sixths of all the 
manual jobs were lost. The largest union affected would be the 
vehicle builders but the first set of 70 names also included the 
works convenor from the Sheet Metal shop. The Duple management 
along with other coachbuilders in North London, the Rootes BLSP 
factory, and Park Royal Vehicles, were attempting to subject the 
coach and body building sections to time study work methods at a 
time of recession and at a moment when established production 
was being run down in preparation for a new round of models from 
the Autumn Motor Show. The first redundancy notices brought a 
stoppage of the 1,000 strong workforce on the 19 October. A 
statement issued by the Strike Committee said, 
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"This has been provoked by a stiff-necked management. 
They think they-can smash any body and that we should 
take it .•.•• This is the fourth strike we've had this 
year and the cause is the same every time - the management 
is trying by one means or another to smash trade unionism 
in the factory". a8 
The Duple management had first attempted to negotiate from a 
position of strength, with a drop in production of the old models 
and the rundown of the existing production lines. Due to shop 
floor opposition they abandoned negotiations, refusing to put 
the outstanding issues into procedure. Their attempt to systematically 
make all but 20 per cent of the workforce redundant before offering 
new employment on the new completed assembly tracks, where the 
sheet metal and coachbuilding work would be controlled by time 
study, led not just to a unity of the workplace but all five main 
unions, including the AEU, made the dispute official. 
A mass meeting of the workforce endorsed a four point policy 
"1 Withdrawal of all notices. 
2 Full inquiry by ministries concerned into the 
reasons for the sackings. 
3 Maintenance of present rates and conditions. 
4 Any men who have been dismissed to have first 
opportunity for re-engagement". 89 
The Duple dispute with its combined attack upon rates and workplace 
organisation through redundancy at a time of recession and 
changeover, not only unified national union leaderships with the 
shop floor, but provided the first serious attempt to extend the 
redundancy issue within the motor industry to other centres. 
The Austin JSSC set up a special sub-committee to assist the Duple 
workers, while the Standard JSSC pledged to give any support 
requested by the Duple workforce. Motor firms in the London area 
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levied two hours pay per week per worker throughout the dispute. 
Large sums were reported to have been collected in the Coventry 
factories. The management again attempted to separate the 
workplace leadership from the shop floor. At the end of the fourth 
week of the dispute the management intimated that they would 
reinstate all but the first 200 declared redundant, provided 
there was an acknowledgement that, 
"Questions relating to redundancy were still the sole 
prerogative of the management. A works conference 
to consider the outstanding issues". 90 
These were rejected by a.mass meeting, as the first 200 contained 
the works convenor and several shop stewards. On the 18 November 
the Employers called upon the MOL to invoke Order 1305 to get a 
return to work. The MOL were reluctant to use their powers of 
for the intervention in this way but arranged case to go to a National 
Arbitration Tribunal. On 11 December the Tribunal, allowed both 
parties to reach a mutual decision. The management and the National 
officials agreed, 
"1 All men who were at work on 18 October to 
return to work on Monday 18 December. 
2 An immediate works conference to be called to 
discuss the existence and extent of redundancy 
within the departments and the steps necessary 
to overcome it. 
3 Withdrawal of all dismissal notices and no notices 
tobe issued until there has been a decision 
at a National conference on, or after, 27 December. 
In no case notices to be issued before the 
27 December. 
4 Works Conference would also consider priority 
of re-engagement for any men who had been or 
would be redundant". 91 
This settlement was hailed by the Duple's works committee as a 
significant breakthrough in the question of the control over 
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redundancy. For the first time in the post war period, a federated 
employer , though after an eight week strike, was conceding that 
the "existence and extent of redundancy" would become subject to 
discussion, with the objective of finding ways to overcome it. 
This was a breach in the established position of sole employer 
prerogative. Furthermore all the shop stewards who were included 
in the list of 200, plus the convenor,were to be reinstated to the 
position before the notices were given. The Duple workplace 
organisation celebrated their success in a pamphlet they published, 
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entitled "How Duple's Won". The introduction, setting out the' 
history of the dispute claimed, 
"The employers attempted to use redundancy as a weapon 
to smash trade union organisation within the factory .••.• 
A notable advance for trade unionist everywhere was 
achieved when the employers were forced to accept 
redundancy as a matter for negotiation through the normal 
channels of procedure, with no dismissal notices issued 
except by agreement, and until a national conference has 
considered the circumstances".93 
Not only did the workplace organisation return in tact but the 
employer advantage of dismissal of shop stewards, being subject 
to the final stage of procedure after the worker had lost his job, 
was replaced by the maintenance of the status quo until central 
conference. 
The strategy employed by the Duple management to bring about a 
change among the traditional working practices and wage rates, 
through redundancy and the removal of workplace representatives, 
in a period of a fall in trade, had gravely underestimated the 
resistence of the workforce and even the capacity for unity among 
the national officials. In the end, the point of maximum workplace 
weakness, the rundown of production on the existing assembly 
tracks, became its position of strength, as Duple's began to receive 
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orders for new models in the Autumn season. The management could 
not have envisaged that the workforce would be prepared to er~ure 
such a long stike in support of its workplace organisation. Nor 
could the employer have anticipated the kind of support received 
from other sections of the motor industry for such an issue, which 
boosted the morale of the labour force. At the beginning of 1951, 
however, the position of the motor trade generally was far from 
being in a healthy position. Shortages of raw materials were 
increasing the practice of short time working. The earnings of 
car workers were estimated to have fallen by a fifth. A spokesman 
for manufacturing industry, in the West Midlands, Mr W G Robin, 
claimed on the 10 January, 
"Industry in the Midlands has never been in a graver 
position".94 
On the 1 February/further government restrictions over the supply 
of raw materials to the industry came into affect. The SMMT 
maintained that production in the motor industry was having to 
be cut back by between 15 to 20 per cent, during the early part 
of 1951. 95 The tempo of redundancy and short time working began 
to increase. Rootes, Rover, Jaguar, and Singer were on short time. 
Morris Cowley in Oxford was on a four-day week, large parts of 
96 Pressed Steel were working short time. In Birmingham a third of 
97 the 20,000 Austin workers were put on a four day week. In 
March, Fisher Ludlow declared a quarter of its workforce redundant. 
At Standard Motors, the JSSC had been informed of a possible 15 
per cent redundancy, while Armstrong Siddeley announced a job loss 
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of 10 per cent. The COV NUVB BC, on hearing reports of the state 
of trade in the district gave full support to opposition to 
redundancy. At its meeting on the 5 March,the committee took a 
strong line against redundancy. 
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"Agreed: that we recommend they fight the issue to the 
last ditch. We· are deeply concerned with the position 
and recommend that they claim organised short time 
working and fight the issue with every means in their 
power" .99 
In the midst of the growing worker insecurity a strike of vehicle 
builders had already began at the Jag~ar plant in Coventry. On 
the 23 February, the Jagu&r management issued redundancy notices 
to 9 vehicle builders working in the body shop on the Hlark F.ive 
saloon. This production line was being run down and a new model, 
the Mark Seven,was to be introduced. OWing to changes in the 
bought-in body panels from Pressed Steel, less labour would be 
required for the new model. The nine redundancy notices were 
given in accordance with the previous practice applied to 33 
vehicle builders declared redundant at the beginning of the year; 
no prior consultation but a week's wages in li7u of notice. Two 
factors, however, were different in the redundancy of the 9. 
Firstly, a number of vehicle builders had been offered alternative 
employment on the new lines and secondly, two of the 9,Strong 
and Holden, were NUVB shop stewards, Strong being the senior steward 
for Jaguar's 368 vehicle builders. A works conference was arranged 
wi th the NUVB official to discuss the case. A meeting of the COV 
Be claimed that both Strong and Holden had been "put on the spot", 
while other workers with less service had been progressively 
transferred from the section to other areas of employment. The NUVB 
COV BC called upon the NUVB Jaguar stewards to call a meeting before 
the arranged date of the works conference, the Thursday before the 
notices expired, with a view to taking industrial action. The 
meeting, held during the Wednesday afternoon shift, called for the 
suspension of notices or there would be a strike. The management, 
prompted by the intervention of stewards from other unions, hastily 
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called an informal meeting of the vehicle builders local officials, and 
agreed to suspend notices for 24 hours. At the conference, the 
Jaguar management offered to reinstate all 9 on the redundancy 
list and offered alternative work. They also agreed to discuss 
future arrangements for redundancy selection, with the union, 
provided those proposals were acceptable. The alternative employment, 
however, was that the senior steward, Strong, would be transferred 
to the experimental department, while Holden would be offered a 
job in the service department. The vehicle builders, whose main 
source of employment lay in the trim and body shops,saw this as a 
failure by the Jaguar management to first dispose of their workplace 
leadership through redundancy, but saw to isolate them from the 
membership prior to a round of price negotiation on the new Mark 
Seven. The management proposals were rejected. The redundancies 
stood and a 31 day strike of 358 members of the NUVB began in 
defence of the workplace organisation. 
What lay behind the actions of management was their acknowledgement 
of the growing power of workplace organisation,which they associated 
in the NUVB, with a growing communist party influence,both in its 
workplace and even among some of its national officials. lOO The 
course of the dispute, however, disclosed the extent to which both 
the EEF and the Jaguar management sought to exercise considerable 
pressure upon the NUVB general secretary, who became increasingly 
isolated from his own Ee, but it also revealed the considerable 
reluctance upon the part of an elected minority Labour Government, 
to wane to the pressure of employers for state intervention under 
Order 1305, when the solidarity of the vehicle builders failed to 
be broken by the unions general secretary. This commitment by the 
NUVB workers, was largely undertaken within the unions tendency to 
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fight its own issues in isolation of other unions. 
For the aov EEA, and the Jaguar management, the dispute was about 
workplace power, in particular the growing tendency within the NUVB 
to ignore procedure as a means of settling redundancy issues. 
The secretary of the Cov EEA was infuriated by the vehicle builders 
call to hold a meeting in works time. He immediately reported the 
incident to the EEF, on 27 February, stating that he had been 
informed that the NUVB DC 
and, 
" do not consider procedure appropriate to settle 
disputes of this character they are, therefore, going 
to take the law into their own hands" .101 
" a flagrant case of flouting procedure agreement 
not only by the men but also the district committee •.... 
action of the district committee and stewards very 
close to incitement to strike action".102 
He maintained that the only distinction between the local officials 
and the DC was that the former "recommended", while the latter 
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"instructed" . On the first day of the strike, the Cov EEA 
Secretary wrote informing the EEF, 
"It's quite certain that the matter is now completely 
outside the hands of the district officials. There 
is a desire for the Federation to take it up with 
the NUVB NEn .104 
The failure of officials at local level to exercise a constitutional 
influence over the Jaguar membership, led the employers association 
to seek action to be exercised at National level, through the 
influence of the EEF. The approach of the federation was two-fold. 
Firstly, to establish what influence the MOL could bring at both 
National and local level. On the 1 March/the Cov EEA Secretary 
was asked by the federation secretary to, 
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" .•..• find out whether they have got a Ministry of 
Labour man in Coventry who is any good, and who is 
likely to be able to help, if so, then we should see 
that he is properly directed from Headquarters. If 
he thinks it will help we shall certainly be sure that 
the Chief Industrial Commissioner take a personal 
interest in this matter". l05 
Secondly, the federation sought to put pressure upon H Halliwell, 
the NUVB General Secretary. Following a conversation between the 
federation secretary E C Hoppald, and Halliwell on the 12 March, 
it became clear that the union leader opposed the strike action. 
He had informed the federation, 
" •.•• that shop stewards could not be considered 
sacrosant ••.•• "l06 
He acknowledged, however, that in practice management attempts 
to interfere with shop stewards were seen by the membership as 
moves to break down the organisation. Halliwell, had been able to 
prevent the dispute from being declared official, at an emergency 
meeting of the union, but he would,despite his personal inclinations, 
have to adhere to any decision taken on the 16 March, the date of 
the next EC meeting. 
The strategy, from the employers side was directed towards preventing 
the dispute becoming official, and to seek to demoralise the 
strikers by encouraging their isolation from both their union, and 
from wi thin their workplace. On the 13 March, the MOL informed 
the federation, 
"Halliwell is not in sympathy with the present strike 
but that he wanted all the moral support he could get 
in order to counter the attitude of his EC, which meet 
on Friday, 16 March, to decide to make the dispute 
official. Time factor, is therefore important in that 
as much pressure as possible should be brought to bear 
on Halliwell and the EC prior to the meeting as the 
situation would be much more difficult if the strike is 
declared official". l07 
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With only a few days to the EC meeting, the Jag~r management 
issued a detailed statement which appeared in the Coventry press 
placing the responsibility for the dispute upon the unions failure 
to accept a constitutional method for resolving the issue, and 
denied that the status of the stewards was under threat. 
"It has been made clear to the union that the alternative 
work need not in any way affect the status of the stewards, 
and it is disappointing to the Company to feel that the 
union are not prepared to settle this dispute by the 
proper agreed procedure". l08 
The day before the EC meeting the Jaguar management announced to 
the press, that in addition to 300 workers they had laid off due 
to the strike, a further 3,000 would be without work by the weekend, 
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all of whom would be members of unions not party to the dispute. 
The Works management at Jaguar were seeking to gain the support 
from other unions by stressing that the redundancy had been carried 
out in a manner that applied to all workers. The importance of 
this attempt to divide union stewards was communicated in a letter 
from Orr, the works manager, and Happold, on the 14 March, 
" ••••• Some value in having the collaboration of shop 
stewards from other unions that these were the 
practices and principles under which redundancy has 
always taken place". 110 
The management did not find it difficult to utilise the existing 
divisions in the workplace organisation. The AEU DC Secretary had 
had to visit Jag~ to investigate allegations the AEU members 
were carrying out the work of vehicle builders. On the 7 March, 
the AEU DC had only just carried a resolution, 
"that our shop stewards on Jaguar Cars be advised to 
do nothing to impede NUVB members in their fight 
against victimisation". 11l 
An amendment that the matter be held in ~beyance, until a decision 
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on whether the dispute.would be made official, was only narrowly 
defeated. Furthermore, a statement to the press by the Secretary 
of the Jaguar shop stewards committee, A Brittain, and A Wood, 
the Jaguar AEU convenor, criticised the action of the vehicle 
builders. They claimed, 
"Had the dispute been discussed through constitutional 
channels a decision would have been reached by now".ll2 
Further pressure upon the vehicle builders came as a result of the 
actions of the MOL not to pay unemployment benefit for those laid 
off, but not directly party to the dispute. On the day before 
the NUVB EC meeting, the national leadership of 7 unions with 
memberships at Jaguar met Halliwell, and later issued a statement 
that members of their union were unemployed as a consequence of a 
dispute which they were not involved in. 113 Despite the concerted 
pressure upon the general secretary from the federation, national 
trade union officials, and the MOL, it was becoming clear that the 
defence of the NUVB organisation at Jaguar, was not just strongly 
held in the workplace, but that from the past experiences of 
redundancy in Coventry, a majority of the EC were prepared to stand 
behind their membership. The MOL reported to the EEF on the 
morning of the NUVB EC decision, 
"Halliwell is on our side and doing all he can to 
rectify the position but is up against serious opposition 
from his people, not a great deal of hope of an early 
settlement unless Strong is re-employed in the body Shop".114 
Later that day the decision was made declaring the strike official. 
No resumption of work would take place unless both redundant stewards 
were reinstated and the senior steward returned to the body shop. 
After two weeks, with a failure to break the resolve of the Jagu~ 
vehicle builders, the MOL was still advising the employers against 
invoking order 1305. Not wishing to face a confrontation with the 
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courts the MOL were suggesting that if the dispute were to be 
reported, the MOL would decide that the issue would have first to 
go through engineering procedure. They therefore advised that 
informal channels should be used to get a return to work. On 
the 19 March,informal negotiation began between the NUVB general 
secretary and the secretary of the ~~ EEA. This had been arranged 
following contacts between the Cov EEA and Jack Jones/secretary 
of the COV CSEU DC. On the 20 March, a proposal by the Cov EEA, previously 
negotiated with Halliwell, for arbitration of. the dispute was 
rejected by the membership at a mass meeting. The Jaguar management 
issued a statement claiming they were now'powerless~ and unable 
to bring about a solution following the decision of the vehicle 
builders. 
"In the informal talks which took place between the 
employers association and the union officials during the 
weekend, it was stressed on behalf of the company that 
they were quite powerless to take any action to put to an 
end the strike as the agreement between the employers 
federation and the union which provides for a settlement 
of the dispute, through constitutional channels had been 
violated by the new cease work action". llS 
The conditions for arbitration presented to the workforce were 
that the company would be willing to accept the outcome, provided 
that in the meantime there was a return to work, and the two 
shop stewards accept the offer of alternative employment pending 
the arbitration decision. This rejection by the mass meeting led 
to the Coventry management demanding a tough line being adopted by 
the MOL. On the 5 April, the federation were informed that 
Weekes, aov EEA secretary, and, W Lyons, managing director of 
Jaguar, were prepared to meet the industrial commissioner at the 
MOL. 
"Both felt it absured that there should be a law of the 
land - even if this might be altered - and that no effort 
was being made to see it was obeyed. Useless to have a 
meeting locally, it must now be handled at a high level".116 
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The Employers in Coventry were wanting Order 1305 to be exercised 
against the vehicle builders. For the Jaguar management the 
dispute had become a straight conflict between management control 
and the vehicle builders workplace organisation. On the 16 March, 
the works manager had submitted a detailed account of events to 
the EEF and the MOL. This concluded, 
"Consideration of all circumstances leads to the 
conclusion that the union have absolutely no grounds 
on which they can take this case through constitutional 
procedure with any possibility of success, as the main 
purpose of the strike is to establish the right of the 
workers to over-rule the all-time prerogative of company 
managements to place workers (within of course their 
sphere of trade) on whatever sections or jobs where they 
may be required".ll7 
In a personal letter to Sir Godfrey Ince, MOL, W Lyons, the 
Jaguar managing director, after complaining at the failure of the 
MOL to, 
" ••••. make no attempt to deal with this illegal strike,,1l8 
went on to claim, 
"Unfortunately, there is a strong communist influence 
which takes very good care that the workers, the majority 
of whom I am quite sure have a sincere wish to return 
to work, are given no fair opportunity of considering 
any proposals which the company may put forward" .119 
, 
The managements fear was that not only did they not have the power 
to end the dispute, but that should they lose, they would even 
further strengthen the position of workplace organisation. An 
attempt to re-open the factory on the 28 March had failed to 
induce any of the vehicle builders to return, even after four 
weeks on strike. On the 9 April, C Gallagher, the NUVB organiser 
for the South Mid1ands t responded to the public statements attacking 
the NUVB, by the management over the strike. In a letter in the 
Coventry press he wrote, 
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"It is regretable but true, that there is no recognised 
process of obtaining a settlement in alleged victimisation 
cases. The NUVB is deeply concerned that this should be 
so. Considerable numbers of trade unionists have suffered 
hardship and long periods of unemployment because of their 
trade union activities and the only redress open to 
them is strike action by their workmates".120 
The momentum of the conflict began to move against the Jaguar 
management. Deliveries for North American contacts, received 
at the previous Autumn's Motor Show, were overdue. Furthermore, 
in federation circles and within the MOL, doubts surrounding the 
validity of the managements case,should it eventually go to 
arbitration, began to be voiced. The initial offer by management 
of "suitable alternative employment which would automatically 
cancel the redundancy notices", raised questions of whether it 
was really a question of the location of the two stewards rather 
than an actual redundancy which was the issue. Their case appeared 
further weakened by the suggestion to re-examine the basis upon 
which future redundancy selections would be made. On the 5 April 
the Cov EEA secretary accepted the opinion of the federation, 
" ••• that their case might have been weakened by their 
attempt to avoid trouble by suggesting that in future 
they might be prepared to arrange redundancies on 
departmental basis, but felt if the men could be got 
back to work they would very likely get practically 
everything they want" .121 
After taking a tough line for five weeks against the Jagt~r 
vehicle builders throughout the strike, the management side were 
left having to find a face-saving formula upon which to get a 
return to work. On the 11 April, Sir Robert Gould, the Chief 
Conciliation Officer, announced that the MOL would begin an 
inquiry into the dispute. The inquiry lasted less than a day. 
As Ja~r management said they would be willing to devise a method 
for selecting redundancies upon a departmental rather than a 
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section basis, the MOL left both sides to find their own solution. 
The management side, however, 
" ••• stressed", to the conciliator, "that they did not 
wish to make it appear that the workers had gained a 
victory and therefore they could not agree to any 
inclusion in the form of wording of any reference to the 
fact that they were proposed to institute a procedure 
for departmental selection".122 
On the 12 April, at separate interviews between the union and 
management representatives the basis for a return to work was 
agreed, 
"1 a firm could not employ men for whom they had no 
work. 
2 there could be no special privileges 'for shop 
stewards converse ley there should be no 
discrimination by a firm against shop stewards. 
3 On a resumption of work on the status quo, an 
immediate conference would be held with the 
question of redundancy".123 
The union leadership accepted the wording of the statement, in 
assured 
order to avoid embarrassing the management, after being that Jaguar 
would not oppose redundancy selection upon a departmental basis. 
A return to work took place on 16 April with full reinstatement 
of the NUVB shop stewards. On 18 April a redundancy procedure 
was signed by JagultU' management and all the firms unions. The 
agreement, which had 10 clauses, though it would not prevent 
redundancies occuring in the future, nor would it necessarily 
immune shop stewards from redundancy selection, was in tended 
to prevent the arbitory actions of management seeking to weaken 
the workplace organisation through their prerogative over the 
question of redundancy, or right to transfer labour, within the 
workplace. 
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"Jag~r Cars L~mited - Agreed Redundancy Procedure. 
18 April 1951 
1 The ultimate responsibility in any redundancy must 
rest with the company. Trends of employment capacity 
will be notified to the shop stewards. 
2 The redundancy list will be raised within the 
production workers as a whole, based on the trade 
of the individual at the time the redundancy occurs, 
and according to his or her length of continuous 
service with the company. 
3 The experimental and service departments to be 
treated as separate departments. 
4 A list of trade groups will be available. 
5 Representation may be made in the case of personal 
hardship for the consideration of the company. 
This hardship must be real, and capable of confirmation 
by the chief steward of the union concerned. 
6 Skill and ability within the employees trade may 
also be put forward for consideration. Here again 
the final responsibility must rest with the company. 
7 Where due to circumstances, it is necessary to 
discharge men at short notice, two days notice will 
be given if practicable, so that queries can be 
dealt with. List will be handed to secretary of 
shop stewards committee before notices are confirmed. 
8 Where a weeks notice is given, any queries and 
adjustments can be dealt with during that week. 
Lists will be handed to secretary of shop stewards 
committee at the beginning of the week in question. 
9 For the purpose of redundancy, all employees are 
treated as members of a trade group, and no individual 
shall receive preferential treatment, nor shall the 
company discriminate other than as provided above. 
10 The company will at all times consider ex-employees 
of the company together with other applicants, 
for suitable vacancies that may occur in the future".124 
The agreement compromised EEF policy towards redundancy. Redundancy 
decisions at Jaguar were not only to be subject to a procedure 
agreement, with the unions, but it acknowledged a role for both 
the secretary of the shop stewards committee, and senior shop 
stewards for the particular unions concerned. Furthermore, 
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w~nagen~nt had agreed to notify the stewards of employment 
prospects. The agreement accepted positions of seniority in 
workplace organisation, and gave commitments not to discriminate, 
in redundancy selection. The absolute discretion of management 
was being compromised, and communication between the management 
and the workforce would be upon ~~e basis of shop stewards rather 
than JPC's. More than anything previous,the agreement provided 
the basis for defending workplace organisation in a redundancy 
situation. The redundancy agreement at Jaguar went beyond federation 
policy,both in regard to shop stewards, and in terms of the control 
over the redundancy process. Within six weeks of the ending of the 
Jagu~~ strike the motor industry in the West Midlands was again 
at the centre of stoppages arising out of the redundancy of workplace 
representatives. At Carbodies, in Coventry, the whole of the 
unionised workforce stopped for three weeks in June, after the 
management had dismissed the chairman of the works committee. During 
the same month, in Birmingham, the Austin plant came to a standstill 
for four days following the redundancy of two AEU stewards. In 
both cases,the issue of the control over the process of decision 
making in a redundancy/lay behind what was perceived by the workplace 
organisations as attempts on behalf of the employers to weaken 
workplace organisation. 
The management at Carbodies had established a reputation in Coventry 
for their opposition to workplace trade unionism. Towards the end 
of 1950 the AEU DO, Billy Stokes, had approached the management 
over the question of shop steward recognition. During the course 
of these informal meetings, two members of the AEU, Woodward and 
Hudson, were transferred out of the toolroom and into the press 
shop. Woodward had only recently been elected toolroom steward, 
453 
while Hudson had taken an active interest in the union. When asked 
for an explanation. the management had informed the DO that the move 
was temporary, and due to a fall in work. It was indicated that 
their employment as setters for the press shop would be for about 
6-8 weeks, after which work would be expected to have picked up in 
125 the toolroom. In December, however, both Woodward and Hudson 
were given 34 hours notice of redundancy, as there was no longer 
enough work in the press shop for them. As a result the AEU toolroom 
workers walked out on the 13 December. The management issued 
dismissal notices to all those on strike, and then began to rebuild 
its tool room workforce. When the AEU DO contacted the employer over 
the question of reinstatement he was informed that Carbodies would 
accept all those dismissed from the toolroom,but were not willing 
to remove the 3 new recruits they had made during the period when 
126 
the toolroom workers were dismissed. These conditions for 
reinstatement were accepted, but this still left the issue of 
woodward and Hudson unresolved. The AEU put this into procedure. 
At a reconvened works conference held on the 19 March, the AEU 
delegation argued that Woodward and Hudson were unfairly dismissed, 
that they were given inadequate notice, and that Carbodies should 
reinstate them to their original poSitions in the toolroom, 
particularly as they had during the strike, recruited three 
additional workers, one of whom was doing jobs similar to their 
members who were discharged. 
The conference heard that a foreman had said to Woodward, 
" •.•• that they would get him out of the establishment 
on any pretext or other which the union could not 
contest".127 
For the AEU, Cyril Taylor, DS, stated, of the move to the press 
shop, 
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"We did express our fear that the transfer was the first 
step to these men going outside" .128 
The firms case was that they had under-estimated the decline in 
trade, and found that there had to be a redundancy in the press 
shop. They then however,went on to question the suitability of 
Woodward and Hudson for toolroom work. The conference chairman 
stated, 
" ..•. they are not exactly toolroom people in every 
instance. They have a background which does not entitle 
them really to be called toolroom workers; but they 
have trained in this particular type of job which is 
done in the toolroom, which is heavy die finishing" .129 
The employers were pointing to Woodward's previous employment as 
a taxi driver, and Hudson, who worked as a progress clerk prior 
to his job in the motor industry. Although similar points could 
be made against a significant proportion of Coventry car workers, 
the employers argument was that the discharge of the two AEU workers 
was due to a genuine redundancy, that there presently existed no 
vacancies in the toolroom, and that both workers concerned could 
only be considered for particular, rather than general positions 
in the toolroom. Five months after the redundancy, the case 
eventually reached central conference at York on 13 April. From 
the employers side it was seen as another example of shop steward 
power. The central conference chairman proclaimed, to the AEU 
national officials. 
"You have my sympathy.... From time to time your members 
put you in the invidious position of having to bring 
these shockingly weak cases up. Immediately one of your 
members gets 'shop steward' attached to his designation, 
it means he can almost push the executive around as 
he likes". 130 
Referring to the allegation by the supervisor to get rid of Woodward, 
the chairman dismissed it, 
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"He probably suffered from liver, and at sometime or 
other he may very well have used the expression which 
you suggest he used" .131 
The conference agreed that both Woodward and Hudson should be paid 
44 hours, instead of the 34 hours, they had received, in lieu of 
notice, but were not willing to conceed that either had been 
wrongfully dismissed. The firm were however prepared to consider 
them for re-employment. It was clear from the works conference 
that this offer was restricted to one particular job. Rejecting 
these terms, and registering failure to agree, Openshaw, from the 
AEU EC, remarked, 
" •.•.. we cannot accept this finding. There is no guarantee 
that the men will be re-employed. The firm have only said 
that these men will be considered for re-employment and 
if they are considered and not employed, they (the firm) 
will have carried out the obligations of this finding".132 
The conference findings did not call for 'reinstatement' but rather 
'consideration' for re-employment. It consequently left the whole 
th 1 d ' ,of h question entirely at e emp oyers 1scretlon, w at course of 
action would be taken;neither Woodward or Hudson were found employment 
at Carbodies. At the beginning of June, however, a conflict over 
the issue of redundancy again appeared at Carbodies. This time 
it involved the sheet metal shop. 
Shortly after the signing of the Jaguar redundancy procedure 
agreement, the sheet metal unions, during a period of falling 
trade approached the Carbodies management with a view to establishing 
a similar agreement. In the course of the period in which the 
discussions were being held with the employer, a worker in the sheet 
metal shop was declared redundant, due to the shortage of work. 
The sheet metal shop immediately stopped work. The company refused 
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to negotiate until the~e had been a return to work. The shop 
committee persuaded the men to recommence so discussions could 
take place. Before the meeting got under way, however, the management 
discharged the SMW senior shop steward and chairman of the works 
133 
committee on grounds that he was a "trouble-maker". He was 
escorted off the firms premises without being allowed to collect 
his own tools. All 54 of the firms sheet metal workers went out 
on strike. 
This dismissal of the senior steward had come after a recruiting 
campaign by the unions. That evening, 6 June, the NUVB monthly 
meeting heard a report of the events which stated, 
"A drive by members of all unions to organise this firm 
had led to the firms sacking of the chief steward of 
the sheet metal workers. All the members of that union 
were on strike and there was a very strong feeling that 
other unions would soon be out in support of them".134 
The Cov NUVB agreed, 
" •.•• that on no account must we touch any work normally 
done by sheet metal workers ••.• any action taken b~ our 
members at Carbodies will have our full support".l 5 
The dismissal of the SMW senior steward had arisen directly out 
of the managements redundancy of a worker from the metal shop; 
the dismissal of the senior steward was considered to be a direct 
attack upon workplace organisation. Five days later, 11 June, 
14 vehicle builders, from the paint shop were dismissed because of 
incidents associated with the strike of metal workers. This 
resulted in all but a few of the firms 450 strong workforce walking 
out to attend a meeting arranged at the AEU Hall. The approach 
of management to both the issue of redundancy and its attitude 
towards workplace organisation in general,not only unified the 
shop floor but brought about a common approach from within the 
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coventry union officials. It was the Cov CSEU, of which Jack Jones, 
the TGWU local official, was secretary, rather than the workplace 
organisation,which was to play the decisive leadership role. 
At the AEU Hall~lthough the workforce elected their strike committee, 
and made arrangements for pickets, it wa.s the local full time 
officials who addressed the meeting, and who agreed to append their 
names to the financial appeal to support the strike. The Cov 
CSEU reaffirmed its support for the action taken outside procedure, 
at its DC meeting it unanimously agreed, 
"that this meeting considers the stoppage of work at 
Carbodies is fully justified and strongly recommends 
affiliated unions to give official support to it".136 
The CSEU officials then took a collection for the strike fund. 
When the Cov AEU learned that some of the toolroom workers had not 
come out on strike, the AEU DO, along wi th the OS, went to the 
works and persuaded all but two of the membership to join the strike. 
Furthermore, on the 18 June the 460 workers on strike staged a 
march to the factory to collect their oustanding wages. The 
demonstration, which was accompanied by motor cycles, and cycles, 
colourfully decorated with posters proclaiming "We want fair 
organisation not victimisation", and "We want full trade union 
recognition", was led by 3 of the local full time union officials. l37 
Faced with such a unified force of union officials and workforce, 
engaged in an unconstitutional action it was the Cov EEA which took 
the initiative to enter into informal talks with the CSEU to secure 
a return to work. The association had been prepared to recommend 
that the firm should take the whole of the workforce back, including 
the senior steward from the sheet metal workers, in addition to 
the 14 employees from the paint shop, when it was discovered that 
the management had engaged 3 non-union metal workers as part of 
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their attempt to break the strike. Discussions immediately broke 
down. On the 19 June; the AEU DC lent considerable weight to this 
unconstitutional dispute. The night before an arranged mass 
meeting of the Carbodies employees. It agreed. 
"l This DC congratulates the full-time officials 
on their stand against Carbodies. 
2 This DC endorses the action of our members at 
Carbodies in ceasing work, pledges full support 
and asks the EC to declare the strike official. 
3 This DC instructs our members not to resume work 
whilst any labour engaged by Carbodies after the 
dispute had commenced remains in their employ, as 
this action on the part of the company is predjucial 
to any settlement. 
4 This DC instructs the secretary to put in hand the 
machinery necessary to conduct a District Levy 
through the Branches in accordance with Rule. 
5 The DC instructs our shop stewards to endeavour 
to organise weekly contributions or levies in the 
factories. 
6 This DC instructs the secretary to inform the 
CSEU of the action we are taking in the Carbodies 
dispute, and advise the affiliated unions to 'black ' 
work which is to be supplied to Carbodies or which is 
produced by this firm. 
7 This DC recommend that every effort be made by the 
CSEU officials to obtain a case against Carbodies 
with a view to prosecution under Order 1305. 
8 This DC instruct the OS to summon the members who 
remained at work in the toolroom of Carbodies to 
attend the next General Purpose Committee. 
9 This DC reports the DO to conduct an organiSing 
meeting at Carbodies with a view to making new 
members".l38 
The day after the mass meeting which supported the officials 
leadershipfit was reported that 4 of the 8 unions involved had made 
the strike official. On the 25 June, the management gave in. The 
Cov EEA, when confronted with such a clear demonstration of unity 
across unions, and between memberships and officials in the district, 
in addition to the endorsement of the actions by the national union 
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leadership, the employers association informally arranged for a 
settlement which conced ~ed the full reinstatement of all those 
in dispute, including the senior steward of the sheet metal workers. 
The terms of the return to work were that a conference between 
the Cov EEA, and the Cov CSEU, would consider a procedure for 
redundancy at Carbodies. 
On the 28 June the sheet metal officials proposed to the employers 
association that Carbodies management accept a redundancy procedure 
139 based upon the one recently established at Jaguar. For the 
Carbodies employees this appeared as a considerable gain for 
workplace organisation. As with the Jaguar agreement it legitimated 
the role of works convenor and senior stewards in the redundancy 
process. At the conference, however, it became clear that while 
it was the actions of the trade union movement in Coventry which 
had brought about this victory, for the engineering federation, 
though they insisted upon the formal right of managerial prerogative 
over redundancY,they were willing to allow trade union involvement 
in a redundancy procedure in order to seek to contain workplace 
behaviour within constitutionally define actions. The Cov EEA 
was mainly concerned to gain assurances that in constitutional 
action would not be resorted to in future redundancy situations. 
The association secretary asked, in Conference, 
"Will the procedure laid down in the agreement between 
the federated and the trade unions be honoured in future? 
I am concerned with the recent loss of production. It is 
obvious that if a redundancy procedure was agreed there 
might be at some time in the future differences of opinion 
and regard to its operation. Such differences must be 
settled constitutionally if happy working relations are 
to be achieved".140 
For the union side, it was stated that any future differences 
resulting from the operation of the redundancy agreement would be 
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taken through "the proper procedure". However they, 
" ....• suggested regular meetings between the representatives 
of higher management of the company and the stewards .•.. 
which would go a long way to achieving managements desire 
for better relations between the Carbodies workers and the 
management". 141 
The two week Carbodies dispute had challenged the right of a single 
employer discretion in cases of redundancy. Not only did the 
agreement permit a role for the workplace organisation in the 
redundancy process/but the acknowledgement of such a role not 
only bestowed a legitimacy upon workplace representatives, but in 
Carbodies it brought about shop steward recognition. 
In July the West Midlands NOVB organiser, C Elsworth, could report, 
some initial success for workplace organisation at Carbodies, 
"In regard to organisation, we have continued our efforts 
here, and with the help of our loyal members, have reached 
a much better position, with representatives in all 
departments" .142 
This apparent success in June, came into doubt during August. 
On the 22 August/the AEU DC heard from their senior steward from 
Carbodies toolroom, 
" •.• that it is apparent the managemen t are not going 
to co-operate at all with the trade union movement. 
They had declared their intention of operating the 
Redundancy Procedure to suit themselves •••. his co-steward 
in the toolroom •••• resigned for domestic reasons, and 
that it appeared management were endeavouring to drive a 
wedge between the shop floor and the AEU stewards" .143 
The AEU DC decided that there was little future for their membership 
at Carbodies. It agreed, 
"That due to the dogmatic attitude of the management, any 
further effort to organise this factory would appear to 
be abortive, and we therefore request EC to authorise the 
wi thdrawal of all AEU members from this factory and place 
them in fresh jobs" .144 
461 
At Carbodies and Jaguar~management attempts to undermine workplace 
representation was strongly implicated in their repeated attempts 
to assert unilateral control over the redundancy process. The 
redundancy agreement, while acknowledging the formal rights of 
management, also provided a role for workplace representation 
in order to confine the exercise of workplace power to within the 
workings of procedure. Workplace recognition in the redundancy 
procedure did not mean control over the redundancy process. The 
strategy deployed by the Coventry employers association was one of 
acknowledging the legitimacy of works convenors and senior stewards 
in the redundancy procedure, while retaining a managerial control 
over redundancy decisions. Workplace power was to be harnessed 
to constitutional actions and this activity would be underwritten 
by a commitment on the part of the local full time officials and 
the CSEU, to operate the procedure. Individual employers, however, 
had resorted to exercising managerial discretion, when confronted 
with an increasing presence of workplace organisation. This had 
been the case at Jag~ar where the management were convinced that 
the growth of workplace power in their assembly plant, among the 
vehicle builders, was closely related to a militant shop steward 
leadership whose actions were in some way the outcome of communist 
party influence. In the exercise of employer discretion at Carbodies, 
the works management appeared to take every opportunity which a 
period of recession offered, to seek to reduce the effectiveness 
of workplace representation. During the final days of the Carbodies 
conflict the management at Austin, Longbridge, during a period of 
extensive short time working and redundancy, sought also to challenge 
what it saw as a not insignificant level of communist party activity, 
in the increasingly effective presence of its workplace organisation. 
The approach of the Austin management had developed from their long 
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held opposition to workplace organisation. 
For the Austin workplace organisation, 1950 seemed a year of 
considerable advance. After the completion of the modernisation 
of the factory,employment had risen by over 3,000 in three 
successive years to reach 17,758 in 1950. 145 Union membership had 
grown rapidly. By the beginning of 1951,the works committee were 
claiming that they were approaching their main post war objective, 
. . 0.' 146 100 per cent un~on~sa on. A more co-operative attitude appeared 
to be emerging, at least within the workplace organisation to the 
problems of inter union friction. The AEU, minute book, for example 
on the 26 January, reported that, 
"Difficulties being experienced by certain of our members 
working in various shops where mixed membership was in 
being. Emphasisalthat though we should be prepared to 
protect members the most sensible solution was to achieve 
an understanding with other unions on the question of 
demarcation ll • 147 
An important step in paving this way towards understanding was 
taken by the decision of the works committee to broaden union 
representation. Though the AEU had held a commanding influence 
in the Austin shop stewards committee, 1950, saw the election of an 
eleven man committee which had representatives from the NUVB, 
TGWU, Woodcutting machinists, Pattern makers, the Foundry union, 
ETU, the ASW, the Boilermakers, in addition to the AEU. 148 
In the Autumn of 1950, however, the question of the steel shortage 
resulted in the introduction of short time working and the threat 
of redundancy. In December 19501 the managing director of Austin, 
J R Edwards, gave an understanding to the CSEU local offiCials, at 
the onset of the steel crisis, over jobs. 
" •••• as far as possible old employees of the Austin Motor 
Company would have preference when reorganisation took 
9 1 aCe thromw redundance" J 49 
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In a works as large as Longbridge,the transferring of workers between 
sections in order to avoid redundancy, or the offer of priority 
in future job vacancies following a redundancy, all required an 
acceptance of an inter union movement of labour across the works. 
It was workplace organisation which was to providethe·basis for 
such an acceptance. It was the workplace leadership which addressed 
itself to the ending of the feuding over sectional and demarcation 
claims. A unity among the workplace leadership at the Austin, 
however, arose primarily from the emergence of a common political 
identification among the senior shop stewards. This basis of 
unity was itself developed within a context of a managerial 
strategy which was directed at restricting the power from a 
proliferation, in the number of shop stewards. 
Throughout the final quarter of 1950, the most frequent item in the 
daily notes of the convenor, was his arranging for shop steward 
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elections. By the end of 1950, such was the growth in the 
number of stewards, that there was a steward for every 51 manual 
workers, compared to the position in 1946 where there had been 
151 
one steward for every 400, manual workers. Despite this growth 
the Austin management still held to its policy of not recognising, 
nor making provision for senior stewards of individual unions in 
the plant. They continued to communicate with the workplace 
organisation only through the works convenor. He was the only 
representative on the shop floor to be granted time off by the works 
management. Such was his importance that the management even 
installed a telephone next to his machine, so that he could be 
152 
reached at short notice. The Austin management even insisted 
on treating the deputy convenor, George Varnom, as they would any 
other steward. He was not even allowed to substitute for the convenor, 
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when the works convenor was indisposed. 
The strategy of the works management towards the growth in workplace 
organisation was largely based upon curbing tllG activities of all 
shop stewards primarily though denying them acceSfl to managerial 
decision making, and by ignoring the status of senior or chief 
stewards for individual unions. Wherever possible, the 1\usti n 
manc\<jl:ment pH'fer-red to deal exclusively wiUI ,t.llo local fnl] tilJJ(~ 
officials, the l3irmingham CSEU. Even Etheridge was denied access 
to these meetings. This managerial approach to workplace organisation 
. encouraged a reliance of the workplace orgunisati.on 
upon the activity of the local officials. But ln the workplace, 
over the more mundane, routine decisions, the position of the shop 
floor wlions was heavily dependent upon the role of Etheridge, the 
works convenor. Although the widening of the basis of union 
represen tation on the JSSC enabled individual unJ.ons, through their 
senior shop stm'1ards, a voice in the policy of workplace organisation" 
this attempt to unify organised labour at Longbr.idge was still 
dependent upon the strategic position held by the works convenor" 
Managerial attempts to curb a proliferation of shop ste\'lard power I 
was heavily dependent upon its circumscribing channels of 
communication to higher management. It was the works convenor 
and not the works committee which had recognition at Longbridge. 
A consequence of this approach to workplace orilanisation by the 
l\us ti n IlJ;:lBilgCIiK'n 1: ,,,as thil t <my .i II f1 UI'nc"E~ over 1llCl11<lgemen t in i ndlls tri.al 
relations in the workplace, was centralised around the position of 
works convenor. This fon! of nmt.ru.lisation, however, also <lssisted 
the influence of t.he communist. party in \'lorkplace organisation. 
In 195o,the three most important positions held on the Austin works 
committee were occupied by members of the communist party. Besides 
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Etheridge, the conve~or which was clearly the most important, 
Varnom, held the post of chairman and deputy convenor, while John 
McHugh was elected to the position of secretary. Etheridge and 
Varnom were both members of the AEU, McHugh was the chief steward 
of the NUVB. This party influence in these workplace positions was 
out of proportion to the small, though significant number of Longbridge 
stewards who were considered to be either members of the CP, or 
were viewed as party sympathisers. In June 1951, McHugh suggested 
that no more than 50 of the 350 strong Austin stewards were members 
th o 153 or sympa ~sers. The influence of the communist party, however, 
was particularly evident among the senior stewards of the AEU, NUVB 
and the SMW. This common allegiance among the steward leadership 
was initially a force for unity on the works committee. The party 
members sought to strengthen the position of the commdttee in the 
workplace and were therefore strong advocates of widening the basis 
of union representation. l54 That the works committee should become 
a genuine joint committee/as opposed to one which had hitherto 
been largely the exclusive reserve of the AEU,was partly a reflection 
of the changing balance of union membership in the plant,but it was 
also an acknowledgement of a workable unity on the works committee 
between the different unions,in order to attempt to overcome the 
destructive tendencies towards inter union strife which arose in 
the workplace. It could be said, therefore, that in 1950 it was 
the influence of the CP in a number of unions, and more particularly 
among the union workplace leaderships, rather than the basic 
influence of individual trade unions, which was at the forefront 
far more open representation of different unions onthe works 
committee. That such a workable unification appeared possible was 
itself also a factor arising from common political affiliations 
emerging in the regular meetings of senior stewards through the 
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works committee, and that committee's dependence upon the role of 
the works convenor for relations with the management. 
While the liberalisation of union membership on the works committee 
was partly an attempt to generally strengthen organisation in the 
workplace, these changes in 1950 also strengthened the position of 
the communist membership. There, however, existed sources of 
opposition to these developments. Firstly the TGWU, though it 
did not have the largest number of elected shop stewards, was, 
after 1950, becoming the second largest union membership in the 
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works. It contained, both in the workplace, and more particularly 
among the sentiments of its local full time office~ strong anti-
. d 156 communist party att~tu es. Moreover, noneof its stewards actually 
held an office on the works committee. Secondly, the NUVB,despite the 
position of McHugq retained a frequent capacity to act independently, 
and sometimes in opposition to the works committee. ls7 This was 
partly a reflection of the activities of its local full time 
officials,who had all previously worked at Austin and retained the 
single mindedness of the society's craft tradition. ISS 
At the Austin works, during 1951, the prospect of job security 
appeared threatened by the crisis in materials. The fall in 
production had placed a third of the plant's manual workforce on 
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short time. Overall employment fell by 1,000 during the course 
160 
of the year. It was on the 20 June that a first all out strike 
at Longbridge, over redundancy,took place. The strike was called 
at the initiative of the full body of Austin stewards, and without 
the consent of the local full time officials. The issue was a 
redundancy of 7 employees in No 5 machine shop, all of whom were 
members of the AEU. Two, Pegg and Bills, were shop stewards. Pegg, 
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however was a member of the communist party. During the same week, 
the management gave redundancy notices to 44 sheet metal worJcers. 
This list also included a shop steward, who was a party member. 
For the works committee the redundancies were seen as a clear breach 
the 
of the understanding given by managing director, to J T Bolas, 
the secretary of the Birmingham CSEU, in December, regarding 
re-employment of existing employees in the event of a redundancy, 
at Longbridge. The workplace leadership took the view that the 
action on the part of management, was an attack upon shop steward 
organisation. The dispute, however, could not be entirely separated 
from the influence of the communist party, in the workplace 
organisation. 
The origins of the 'Pegg and Bills' dispute dated back to the 
beginnings of the steel shortages in August 1950. An alteration 
in the design of a component in the Axle shop reduced the requirement 
of labour in No 5 machine shop. This, in addition to the fall in 
production in the motor industry resulted in the shop workforce 
. k' 161 being put on short t~me wor ~ng. In April 1951, after regular 
periods of short time working over 6 months, the management were 
approached to secure a more permanent solution to the shortage of 
work. The stewards in the machine shop were asking for a gradual 
transfer of the surplus labour to other sections to enable a return 
back to a full working week. The management refused. They maintained 
that there was sufficient work available in the works which could 
be brought into No 5 shop. During May the shop was fully employed, 
but by the beginning of June it was back on short time. On the 17 
June the management issued redundancy notices 7 workers in No 5 
shop. They were all given a week's notice in lieu of notice, and 
instructed them to immediately leave the works. The two stewards 
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refused to accept the notice and reported events to the works 
committee. A meeting of all 350 Austin stewards was arranged. 
Meanwhile a further redundancy of 44 sheet metal workers was 
announced. 162 This list also included a shop steward. 
At the mass meeting of stewards,the central question concerned 
the managing directors undertaking concerning a preference to 
existing employees to future employment. The meeting of stewards 
heard a report from Etheridge that/during the previous 3 months 
163 504 new employees had been recruited by the firm, while No 5 
machine shop had spent most of this period working short time. 
The stewards called for the withdrawal of the redundancy notices 
and requested negotiations with the management for the redeployment 
of the 7 workers redundant from the machine shop. This was refused. 
On the 20 June a further meeting of all the stewards voted for a 
"stay in strike". They elected a strike committee comprising 27 
stewards. Production stopped on the day shift, and the night shift 
on arrival at the works refused to start and returned home. At 
9.30 on the 22 June/members of the works committee addressed a 
mass meeting of some 7,000, of the 10,500 on strike. Etheridge, 
the works convenor, set out the issue as the stewards saw it. 
He was quoted as saying in the Birmingham Mail, 
"At the time of the steel shortage management met the 
shop stewards and came to an understanding that in the 
event of redundancy they would give consideration to the 
people at present working here rather than encourage 
new labour". 164 
He went on, 
"We are not silly over redundancy. Shop stewards have 
not said that they will not accept redundancy in any 
circumstances. A case carne up recently when 44 sheet 
metal workers were made redundant and they have gone out 
of the factory because they are a craft union and other 
jobs could not be found for them" .165 
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In an oblique reference to the immigration question in the West 
Midlands, Etheridge went on to state, 
"They (management) are starting coloured labour here 
and we have never been approached. We have no 
objection to coloured people but we don't want any fresh 
labour when they are Austin workers having the sack -
we don't care if they are black, white or red".166 
The question of race, however, was not ti1e central issue in the 
actual dispute. The works committee attempted to confine the 
dispute to an industrial matter of trade union rights, and the 
right to negotiate over the understanding surrounding preference 
for re-employment. In the Birmingham press, however, the strike 
was seen as being political. ·As the management refused to negotiate 
with the works committee, the steward leadership began to view the 
dispute as an attack upon workplace organisation. A leaflet issued 
by the Austin JSSC to the mass meeting stated, 
"The works committee •••• convinced this is an attempt 
by the management to victimise two of our shop stewards 
and are using the other six as a cloak in the guise of 
redundancy. • •••• This is not a political issue~!~ 
.••• The issue at stake is the livelihood of trade union 
members, the continuance of the shop steward movement, 
and the right to negotiate" .167 
Etheridge at the mass meeting at Coften Hackett, went out of his 
way to assure the workforce that the strike was not political. 
" .••• there is no red plot behind the strike ••. the shop 
stewards were trade unionists first and foremost".168 
The mass meeting supported the works committee call to continue 
the stoppage, and for official backing to the issue from the national 
executives. Less than a 100 were reported to have voted against. 
The local press, however, continued to imply that the strike was 
political. The Birmingham post quoted a member of the maintenance 
departmen t, 
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"This trouble was bound to come. Mr Pegg is a communist 
but an excellent shop steward. There is another excellent 
shop steward, also a communist among the 44 sheet metal 
workers redundant".169 
On Friday, 23 June, the front page story of the dispute in the 
Birmingham Mail portrayed the strike as a political struggle between 
the management and the shop steward organisation. The works 
committee decided to call a mass meeting for Monday morning, 
largley to answer the way the press were presenting their case. 
Etheridge was quoted as saying, on Saturday, 
"We are not prepared to let the press break-up our strike. 
We will give the answers to the headlines on Monday" .170 
During the course of the weekend the first intervention by a 
full time union official took place just prior to the mass meeting 
called by the shop stewards. He was openly critical of the shop 
stewards action in calling the strike without first consulting 
, ff" I 171 with un~on 0 ~c~a s. The TGWU meeting was to determine whether 
their membership, almost as large as the AEU, wanted a return to 
work. Its stewards did not have the influence of either the AEU 
or the NUVB in the workplace organisation. 
At the mass meeting called by the works committee the 6,000 workers 
in attendance voted, during a "noisy" meeting to return to work. 
The meeting was reported to have ended in "uproar" after, R Nester, 
the Chairman, of No 5 machine shop stewards criticised the 
" •••• communist propaganda which went out daily ••• during 
the last 18 months" .172 
Coming as it did, after the mounting reports in the press, from 
the chairman of the shop where the redundancy took place, this 
speech, along with the dissent among the TGWU completely split the 
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support for the works committee. After two attempts to take the 
vote the chairman of the works committee had to ask for the vote 
to be segregated. Eventually a clear majority of those who had 
moved to the left of the platform, which indicated a vote for a 
return to work,emerged. The leadership of the works committee, 
after a four day strike of 10,400 of the Longbridge workforce 
had been rejected over support for workplace negotiation for 
redundancy. While the influence of the leadership, despite their 
political affiliations, had been able to make remarkable progress 
in bringing about a general basis for unity on the works committee, 
which over the issue of 'Pegg and Bills' had been fully supported 
initially by the full body of the shop stewards, the support from 
the workforce appeared less certain. There was considerable 
backing for the workplace leadership when the issue was seen as one 
of redeployment in the works, but as the press began to define the 
issue as a straight political conflict between the workplace 
organisation and the management, support began to fall away. The 
works committee decided to call upon the full time officials to 
request a works conference to pursue their case through procedure. 
The Pegg and Bills dispute was a considerable set back for the 
workplace organisation at Longbridge. Progress towards unity was 
almost reversed. Management continued to exercise discretion in 
regard to redundancy. On the 27 August/management put two AEU 
shop stewards on the guaranteed week, on the grounds that insufficient 
work existed. The management refused requests for them to be 
absorbed in other parts of the plant. After 3 weeks on the guaranteed 
173 
week they Were made redundant. The works committee, asked AEU 
to take it up. On 3 September the management refused access for the 
Night shop steward to enter the works to contact the convenor, on 
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. 174 trade union bus~ness. 
The immediate aftermath of the Pegg and Bills dispute was not 
confined to the works management seeking to restrict the influence 
of shop stewards,but there was also the affect which the experience 
had upon workplace organisation. The works committee became not 
just concerned to re-establish the support of the shop stewards 
for the joint committee, but they were also aware of the need to 
strengthen the relationship between the membership and the 
involvement of their stewards in the JSSC. On the 20 August Etheridge 
suggested that monthly reports be introduced by members of the JSSC 
for report backs to the membership. He argued at the works committee, 
"This should be of utmost value and would help strengthen 
the bond between the joint shop stewards organisation and 
the rest of the factory workers". 175 
The commitment of the shop stewards to the JSSC, and the relationship 
of the steward to the membership were viewed as the central relationships 
upon which workplace unity could overcome the traditions of 
sectionalism, and the pride of individual union independence, which 
appeared as a potential threat to a leadership of joint authority. 
Following the Pegg and Bills strike attendance at JSSC had fallen. 
In August, the minutes of the works committee state, 
"It was decided that the convenor meet with leading 
shop stewards of all unions with the view to increasing 
attendances at meetings held on Monday night because it 
was felt that until we get increased attendances shop 
stewards could not express satisfactorily what the workers 
wanted". 176 
At Austin the vital link between the leadership of the works 
committee and the membership was through the meeting of the JSSC 
rather than the mass meeting. On the 3 September the convenor 
reported that all the leading stewards, including the TGWU and the 
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SMW, had agreed to pledge their unions support for the JSSC. The 
demoralisation, following the Pegg and Bills dispute had been 
registered in an apathy towards joint organisation. This threatened 
to isolate the works committee from the workplace organisation; 
its source of communication with the membership. 
Over the pursuit of reinstatement of Pegg and Bills through Procedure, 
a works conference held on the 24 September ended in failure to 
agree. l77 This was followed on 3 January 1952 by a local conference. 
Here the BW EEA representatives maintained that redundancy was a 
National issue over which agreement could only be arrived at between 
the Federation and the National union leaderships. It could not be 
imposed upon individual managements. The general works manager, 
J R Edwards, however, restated that Austin would comply with its 
practice of transferring redundant workers to other employment in 
the works, and, as far as possible, would seek to re-employ ex-Austin 
workers. He further suggested to the CSEU officials present that 
should a large scale redundancy arise the confederation would be 
informed. l78 Out of the strike the workplace organisation felt 
it had made some progress over the question of job security. Of the 
7 redundant workers, however, only Pegg and Bills were never offered 
employment again at Longbridge. 
During 1950-51, attempts by management to exercise their discretion 
over redundancy selection led to a series of lengthy disputes where 
leading stewards were involved. The refusal of the Federation to 
accept an agreement over the process of redundancy with the National 
union leaderships, and the inability of union officials to formulate 
a common policy left the defence of workplace organisation being 
determined by the actions in the workplace. At Duples, Jaguer, 
and Carbodies works managements were forced to accept the 
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re-instatement of leading figures in the workplace organisation 
following a series of costly strikes. Management, by accepting 
some form of local arrangement to govern the implementation of 
redundancies were acknowledging a level of restriction upon their 
powers of arbitrary discretion in the determination of their 
workforces. At Crossley Motors and Duples this defence of workplace 
organisation led to a wider interplant contact across the motor 
industry, but in Jagu~ the vehicle builders fought the redundancy 
issue in isolation of union support, within the CSEU, and without 
much evidence of sympathy from other union memberships in the 
workplace. Though Communist Party influence was implicated by 
management in the Jaguar, Austin, and Duples disputes, this appeared 
as such a move to discredit the position of workplace leadership 
and help undermine membership support, then a genuine cause for the 
stoppages. At Austin where the influence of Communist shop stewards 
had been most felt in their encouragement of a broader union 
representation on the works committee, the committee, and its 
Communist leadership, repeatedly valued their industrial union 
activity above political interest. The critical factor shaping 
industrial action remained the workplace membership. The workplace 
leadership/with a dependence upon an industrial response among the 
membership/was continually open to divisions and rejection arising 
out of sectional interests and political antipathy which formed 
the very bases for an industrial response. A broader based works 
committee which may have enabled the development of common policies 
between the senior stewards of the main unions/still had to win and 
retain the support of a diversified workforce at Longbridge. During 
the Pegg and Bills redundancy it was the collapse of such support 
for the leadership that paved the way for the dismissal of two AEU 
stewards. 
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This question of policy and action between workplace organisation 
and membership was not just a phenomenon associated with joint 
committees and political influences. It could appear within a 
single union where no political differences were apparent. While 
the Pegg and Bills redundancy was taking place in Birmingham/over 
in the Morris Bodies plant in Coventry both the works management 
and the NUva BC, plus the union's organisation in the workplace, 
accepted that all the membership in the paint shop should work in 
one gang so as to avoid a redundancy. On the 4 July the NUVB BC 
criticised their workplace organisation. 
A report to the Branch found, 
"1 Shop stewards did not sufficiently put the policy 
of the Branch in respect of redundancy. 
2 A serious mistake was made in failing to call 
a shop meeting to discuss the question. 
3 We also feel that the best interests of the 
membership at Morris Bodies would be served by 
amalgamating small gangs and we desire to emphasise 
the importance of more shop meetings on other 
questions of interest to our members". 179 
On the 13 August, the chief NUVB steward reported to the Branch that, 
after a series of meetings held in different shops to present Branch 
policY,both the question of re-organising small gangs and the 
redundancy policy were being resisted. In protest against the 
attitude of the workforce all the NUVB stewards had offered to 
180 
resign, but the membership refused to accept this. At Morris 
Bodies the sectionalism of the workgroup in small gangs was 
reinforcing the position of the steward but weakening the authority 
of the chief steward to carry out Branch policy. Eventually the 
Branch officials had to visit the plant to address the whole 
membership to gain acceptance of Branch policy on redundancy. At 
Daimler, the vehicle builders, had along with other unions 
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in the CSEU signed a pr~cedure agreement for redundancy in April 
1951. It was similar to that of Jaguar. Again the Cov BC charged 
their chief steward with not upholding Branch policy. It was, 
however, the body shop at Daimler who were arguing that they had 
never accepted such an agreement. It was craft values rather than 
seniority over jobs which they were defending. They maintained, 
"A very poor tradesman who was also a very poor trade 
unionist could be kept on while a real first class man in 
every respect had to go because he had been with a firm 
a few months less time than the other". 181 
On the 15 October the Cov BC exonerated the role of their chief 
steward. If found that, however, 
"1 The body shop was wrong in not carrying out 
advice given by Branch Committee. 
2 That the Branch Committee instructs our members 
at Daimler Co to set up a NUVB committee consisting 
of stewards from all shops. When this is done the 
body shop be again informed of redundancy procedure. 
If they do not agree to it we must again look 
into the question". 182 
Sectional interests within unions did not remove divisions between 
unions. At Morris Motors in Oxford it was the TGWU, who though 
accepting the principle of a jOint union committee, were also seeking 
to retain the right to act independently of joint authority. A T 
Penn and NUVB Do reported in July 1951, 
"Several joint meetings have been held at Morris, Oxford, 
on the new proposals of a working agreement for shop 
stewards. The craft organisations have reached agreement, 
but we cannot get the officials of the TGWU to agree. 
They want to be a joint movement but claim the right to 
function as a separate organisation on any question".183 
It was during the final quarter of 1951, in a period of growing job 
insecurity/that there developed two inter plant combine committees 
which undertook the task of establishing unity between workplace 
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organisations in ~~e motor industry. In both committees it was a 
common approach/from within a left wing workplace leadership/which 
sought to overcome the failure of the union leadership to formulate 
a policy of opposition to redundancy. 
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3 REDUNDANCY AND THE ORIGIN OF THE BMC COMBINE COMMITTEE 
In October 1951, the Conservative administration won a general 
election. The Chancellor of the Exchequer, R A Butler, introduced 
a series of policy measures which did little to restore job security 
in the motor industry. Bank rate increased during November, while 
stiffer hire purchase terms, along with directives to the banks, 
in February, placed restrictions upon personal loans and credit. 
These moves, designed to reduce liquidity in the money markets, 
were part of the new Governments programme for increased expenditure 
on arms. This priority towards military expenditure, at the 
beginning of 1952, accompanied reductions in quotas for the 
manufacture of cars. As a result, mass short ,time working and 
redundancy spread throughout the motor industry. In November,the 
announcement that the Nuffield organisation was to merge with Austin, 
to form the British Motor Corporation, raised fears of rationalisation. 
Government Economic policy, in conjunction with industrial re-organisation 
across the British owned sector of the federated motor industry, 
had significant implications not just for employment, but also for 
the development of workplace organisation. It was out of the 
conditions of widespread job insecurity that two interplant combine 
committees arose in the motor industry. Both these committees, whose 
leading figures were closely associated with membership of the 
Communist Party, sought to not only unify the leadership of workplace 
organisation, but also to provide an organisational framework for 
overcoming sectionalism in the workplace and divisions between the 
unions. During the course of 1952-3, it became apparent that the 
development of a uniform workplace policy required more than an 
agreement to set up a combine committee. Though the establishment 
of combine committees/both across the motor industry and within B~C 
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did not immediately capture the imagination of the shop floo~ they 
certainly encouraged a more confident and assertive workplace 
leadership. The discretionary rights being exercised by management 
over redundancy decisions could not be overcome through the formation 
of joint committees. Workplace organisation not only struggled 
to confront the power of management, it also came to recognise that 
the independent actions of the shop floor and workplace unity were 
not always identical activities. Sectional interests frequently 
appeared to undermine the pursuit of a central policy. It was, 
however, the political character of the workplace leadership, 
which sought to unify the shop steward organisations, that became 
open to challenge by both management and certain trade union officials, 
during a period when the power of workplace organisation appeared 
to be on the advance. It was the issue of redundancy which provided 
both the inspiration for inter-plant committees but which also 
became the major focus for conflict between workplace organisation 
and managemen t. 
On the 26 November 1951, the Austin works committee met to hear a 
report on the steel crisis, and to discuss the Nuffield-Austin 
merger. The minute records that, 
"After discussion members expressed opinions that it 
was necessary that the two shop stewards committeesset 
up liaison with each other. It was recommended to the 
full body of shop stewards that the secretary write to 
the Nuffield Shop Stewards to discuss joint consultation".184 
The initiative had in fact already been taken. On the day the 
merger was announced Dick Etheridge met Les GUrl, the Secretary of 
the Nuffield Combine Committee at an arranged meeting place, a 
railway bridge half way between Birmingham and Oxford. They had 
both agreed that a common association should be formed. On 17 
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December, the Austin JSS~ heard a report from a factory delegation, 
which had met members of Parliament to discuss the affects of the 
steel shortage. The meeting went to discuss an invitation to set 
up a combine committee to cover the workplace organisations in 
the industry. The minutes record, 
"Agreed to set up a committee of all shop steward 
organisations in the motor industry for the purpose 
of co-ordinating. Affiliation fee being £1 per year".l85 
In a period of two months when job security became the central 
question for the workforce in the motor industry, the Austin JSSC 
had agreed to establish organisational links with two workplace 
organisations; the Nuffield organisation and the Motor Shop Stewards 
Committee (MSSC). The first meeting of these combine committees 
in February 1952, took place amid growing concern over the question 
of redundancy. From the beginning of the year motor manufacturers 
began laying off workers. At Morris Motors, in Oxford 1,300 were 
put on short time. In Coventry over 5,000 of the City's car workers 
were on a short week. The Rootes Group, on the 4 Februar~ issued 
900 redundancy notices in their Coventry plants, Ryton and Stoke. 
Morris engines in the same week announced the discharge of 114 
production workers. This was followed by 300 job losses at Singer, 
450 from Fisher Ludlow, and the preparing of 250 notices at Standard186 
The inaugural meeting between the Nuffield and Austin shop stewards 
took place at Transport House, in Birmingham, on Saturday, 2 February.; 
Though the immensity of redundancy and the fear of rationalisation 
within BMC gave added importance to the establishment of a joint 
committee/the main business which preoccupied the delegates were 
matters of organisation. The meeting agreed a name; The British 
Motor Corporation Joint Shop Stewards Committee (BMC JSSC). It 
wrote a constitution, outlined a set of objectives, and an agreed 
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standing orders. Unde~ the constitution an equal division of voting 
power would exist between both organisations. The total voting 
power would comprise two factory delegates nominated by the workplace 
organisation in each of the Nuffield factories affiliated to the 
combine committee and an equivalent number of votes allocated to the 
Austin delegation. The chairman and secret3ry would be elected 
annually, though both were eligible for re-election. They were to 
attend meetings as ex-officier members, the chairman having the 
power of the casting vote. A Steering Committee was set up, 
comprising of two members from each of the main BMC locations -
Birmingham, Oxford, and Coventry. The combine would meet on a 
bi-monthly basis and rotate between the three centres. All stewards 
in the corporation were encouraged to attend the meetings, but only 
the delegation possessed the power to vote. At the first meeting, 
Etheridge suggested that the Austin works committee would form the 
. 187 Longbridge delegat~on. 
Though the objectives centred upon providing an organisational 
expression for creating a unity between the shop stewards and the 
memberships of the different unions in BMC, in seeking to strengthen 
union membership the committee went out of its way to avoid possible 
allegations, that the combine possessed political objectives. Its 
status as an a-political organisation was formally written into 
its constitutional objectives. 
"Objectives of this Committee 
A To promote friendly relations between the shop 
stewards and members of the various trade unions 
operating throughout the Corporation. 
B To safeguard, mantain and ff possible improve 
wages and conditions of its members. 
C To exchange and impart information in furtherance 
of Clause (B). 
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D To maintain and improve where possible the trade 
union membership in the respective factories. 
E The functions of the Committee to be strictly 
non-political and the committee should not be 
used for the furtherance of political objectives, 
but confine itself to the domestic interests of 
its members within the factories represented by 
the Committee" .188 
The combine, though accepting the pursuit of workplace unity, 
based upon the "domestic interests of its members", was seeking to 
avoid a political sectarian organisation, but it was equally 
seeking to avoid the experiences of political motives which had 
been repeatedly raised against the Austin workplace organisation 
throughout the Pegg and Bills strike. 
During this early period,the ex-officio positions were held by the 
Nuffield Organisation. Alf Franklin, as Chairman, and Les Gurl, 
the Secretary, both from Morris Cars, in Oxford, were returned 
unopposed. Franklin was AEU convenor as well as the Branch 
, 
Secretary of the Citys largest AEU branch. He remained chairman of 
the combine until 1954 when he resigned all union posts to stand 
for the AEU DS. Though he was defeated, the disagreements within 
the AEU over his nomination, led him to believe that his own 
union would not support him if management chose to dismiss him. 
He did not seek re-election as a Cowley steward, and consequently 
k f th t · th mbi . 189 too no ur er par 1n· e co ne comm1ttee. Gllrl, on the 
other hand remained secretary until the 14 June 1978. Though 
Gurl and Franklin provided considerable continuity and stability 
during this early period, from the beginning the BMC JSSC remained 
dominated by AEU convenors and senior stewards. Even the Longbridge 
delegation remained predominantly AEU. In January 1953, for example, 
19 of the delegates with voting rights were from the AEU. There was 
only one representative from the TGWU, plus one senior steward from 
483 
190 the SMW. Though McHugh had been party to the initial negotiations, 
he had been unable to establish a combine of NUVB stewards in BMC. 19l 
Both McHugh and his union appeared to have played little part in 
the combine after the first meeting. Longbridge was the power base 
of the vehicle builders. In the Nuffield organisation their 
workplace organisation either retained its independence for joint 
committees, like Morris Bodies in Coventry, or, as in the Oxford 
area, the body and trim were largely dominated by the TGWU. The 
TGWU on the other hand, though it was the fastest growing union 
membership across the whole of the BMC,tended to have a lower ratio 
of stewards to membership, and, as at Longbridge, showed less 
enthusiasm for joint committees, or in the case of Oxford was often 
in antagnnism with the AEU whose early recruitment practices had 
been hostile to the semi skilled worker. 
Furthermore, the Oxford TGWU Branch was exclusively based upon the 
semi skilled car worker. The local officials, consequently, were 
able to acquire not just an intimate knowledge of activities in the 
workplace, but were able to devote most of their time to the industry. 
That the TGWU was not party to a joint committee at Morris Motors, 
reinforced ties with the union branch and the local full time 
officials rather than with the workplace organisation. At Longbridge, 
on the other hand, though the local officials had responsibilities 
for a mass 0 f diverse engineering establishments it was prinCipally 
the AEU rather than the TGWU which possessed a commitment to 
workplace organisation. The early combine committee,consequently 
designed to overcome such divisions/was from the beginning also a 
product of sectionalism and inter union rivalry both within the 
workplace and between union organisations. During its first yea~ 
though it compnssd of five plants in the Nuffield organisation -
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Metal Products, S U Carburettors, Tractor and Transmissions, Morris 
Motors and Morris Engines - plus Austin, it was mainly an organisational 
unity forged upon an AEU workplace leadership. During the first 
month of the combine's existence, however, the motor industry 
appeared on the brink of mass redundancies. It was the newly formed 
MSSC, meeting for the first time in Coventry, which elected a Main 
Committee comprising of leading convenors across the motor industr~ 
rather than the BMC combine which sought to develop both a political 
critique of the crisis in the industry and a policy of workplace 
resistence to redundancy, to overcome the failure of the union 
leadership to defend job security. The first meeting of this body 
was held at the Labour Party offices at Coundan Road, in Coventry, 
on the 9 February, three days after over 1,000 of the City's workforce 
had received redundancy notices. Stewards delegations representing 
21 plants in the motor industry were in attendance. l92 This included 
Crossley Motors and Duples, who had both been in conflict over 
redundancy. In addition to Austin, the meeting attracted delegations 
from Morris Motors, and both the ~rris body and Engine plants, 
from within the BMC combine. 
The crisis of employment in Coventry merely illustrated the failure 
of trade union organisation to effectively respond. Union response 
was divided. In the Rootes redundancy, 120 vehicle builders refused 
to accept the redundancy of 16 of their colleagues in the paint Shop.193 
Their 4 day strike typically in isolation and supported by the Coventry 
Branch, laid off 1,500 other assembly workers. This action in 
defence of their own membership at the Ryton plant contrasted with 
the reaction of the AEU membership in the Stoke Engine plant. Here, 
the day workers objected to the proposals for short time working, 
to avoid redundancies. 194 The AEU DC then called a special meeting 
485 
of all 28 of its Coventry convenors to discuss the redundancy crisis. 
On the 10 February this meeting could only agree on the cause of , 
the redundancy - government policy. It could not agree on how to 
resist it. 195 The Cov CSEU officials who had been able at Carbodies 
and Jaguar, to sign local agreements designed to overcome workplace 
victimisation responded to large scale redundancy by calling a mass 
meeting of all the Citys stewards to hear an address by the 3 Labour 
Party MPls. This meeting of the 23 February, and attended by over 
500 shop stewards invited the MOS. He did not turn up. After 
hearing speeches and factory reports from the floor, many of which 
196 
urged resistence in the workplace, the meeting passed a lengthy 
composite resolution condemning Government policy and agreeing to 
set up a Joint Conference between the Birmingham and Coventry CSEU 
DCls and Midland MPls. 
On the day following this steward meeting, Bill Warm~, the chairman 
of the Standard JSSC,circulated a letter to all shop steward organisations 
affiliated to the MSSC. It invited them to attend a Conference in 
coventry on the 1 March. Part of the letter stated, 
"The Shop stewards conference in Coventry on the 23 February 
has made it quite clear that if we are to get any effective 
action quickly on the question of redundancy it will have 
to be led by the shop stewards unofficially".197 
He went on to outline a workplace position in relation to union 
officials, 
"This does not necessarily mean that our officials are 
against such a demonstration, on the contrary, many of them 
are prepared to give their personal backing as long as 
their organisations are not committed. It is one of the 
penalties we must pay while we have so many different 
organisations, covering the industry, but we cannot wait 
for amalgamations the attack on the working class standards 
are here and now and we must have courage to take the only 
immediate method open to us".198 
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Though the question of jobs was directly related to Government policy, 
the defence of jobs, it was being maintained, could not be guaranteed 
by the actions of national trade union leaders. OWing to inter 
union differences/it was upon common policies in the workplace that 
resistence to redundancy would have to begin. The MSSC was organised 
through four areas, where the motor industry was located. 
Each affiliated workplace organisation in the Coventry, Birmingham, 
Oxford and London areas would elect their own delegate to their 
area committee. The area committee would in turn each elect one 
representative for the area onto the main committee. Provision was 
made, however, for the right of representation on the Main 
Committee for any car plant sited outside the jurisdiction of one 
of the area committees. The scope of the motor stewards combine, 
though adopting the area influence in the BMC combine,sought to 
organise the whole of the workplace organisation in the car industry. 
Beyond representations for the BMC group, it included Pressed Steel 
from Oxford, the Ford and two Briggs plants at Dagenham, in addition 
to a subsidiary at Doncaster. In addition there were the Standard, 
Rover, Humber, and Singer plants, as well as the body building 
and components manufacturers like Fisher Ludlow, Dunlop, Ones, 
Meadows, plus firms who had been the centre of redundancy struggles, 
199 Duples and Carbodies. 
The motor stewards combine posses~ed a far less elaborate set of 
objectives. Its statement of principle remained one of unity among 
the unions within the industry. The first conference stated, 
"The main object to be the regular discussion of common 
problems of the industry to ensure the unity of purpose 
in all unions on motor industry problems".200 
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Its first elected main committee excluded any BML representatives. 
It was Peter Nicholas (Rover), Les Buck, (Ouples), T O'Keefe (Fords) 
Eddie McGarrY(Standard) and the chairman Bill Warman (Standard~ 
Nicholas and O'Keefe were members of the AEU. Buck and Warman were 
SMW and McGar;ywas for the TGWU. All were convenors and leading 
figures in their workplace organisation. All but McGarry were 
membersof the Communist Party. 
The perspective of the M5SC developed from a political as well as 
an industrial opposition, not just to the issue of redundancy but 
from what was considered the major cause of the job loss in the 
industry, the arms economy. In a period when a Conservative Government 
announced a El,5000 mill increase in defence expenditure. the left 
wing steward leadership developed its position out of the British 
201 Communist Party programme, "Fight the cuts - Fight for Peace" 
which was issued in March 1952. A document which circulated among 
the committee of the Motor Stewards Combine, and written by Bill 
Warman, argued that the military programme meant not just job loss 
for car workers, but posed a threat to the futUre competitiveness 
of the whole industry. The document criticised both employers and 
union leaders for failing to appreciate what it saw as the ultimate 
consequences for areas like the Midlands. It stated, 
"Certain manufacturers and short sighted trade union 
leaders looked for arms contracts to swell jobs and dividends. 
Grisly hopes are looking a bit thin now. War for war 
is suicidal for the Midlands - atomic targets ..... 
It is not only military suicide in which the arms race is 
bound to leave the industry ruined for peacetime, but lost 
markets won't come back in a world dominated by the US. 
and her stooges in Germany and Japan. German car exports 
are already overtaking us in European markets •... there are 
signs that the workers will not accept the path charted 
for them and their industry by the Yanks. But to win motor 
workers need growing understanding of the forces and policy 
opposed to them" .202 
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Accordingly, defence of jobs could not be just an industrial struggle 
against redundancy, rather industrial opposition itself would have 
to rise out of a political understanding of the cause of job loss. 
The document concluded by setting out a view of "the way forward". 
"1 Workers to refuse to bear arms burdens. Defend 
living standards and jobs. Absolute unity and 
solidarity against sackings. 
2 Mass action to defend our industry. The whole 
trade union and labour movement to be drawn into 
a campaign to demand supplies for a vital peace 
time industry. 
3 War means ruin - but peace possible. Fight for 
a peace pact between the great powers, open the 
door to normal trade and security". 203 
The Motor Shop Stewards contribution towards this programme was 
to endorse resolution supporting opposition to redundancy in the 
workplace and to arrange a demonstration and lobby of Parliament 
on the 13 March. At Duples, where Buck was chairman of the JSSC, 
a 1,000 workers were reported to have finished work at 4pm to attend 
a factory gate meeting at which Buck was the main speaker, before 
204 going to Parliament. Across in Dagenham 2,500 at the Briggs 
Body Plant attended lunch time meetings, and later boarded coaches 
for Westminster. 20S Smaller delegations left for the West Midlands. 
This was the first indication that a combine leadership could 
commend workplace support for factory stoppages and demonstrations 
across plants. Demonstrations aside, however, a unity through 
combine policies of a left wing leadership would always ultimately, 
if policies were to have affect, have to be realised through actions 
in the workplace. At Austin,redundancy, and the growing power of 
shop floor organisation towards the final quarter of 1952 resulted 
in a major confrontation between workplace organisation and managerial 
power. Once again/the issue of redundancy proved to be a central 
cause of power conflict,through which management sought to exercise 
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its discretion over employment to challenge the growing influence 
of the workplace leadership by attempting to discredit the politics 
of that leadership. The BMC combine appeared to the management to 
confirm a growth in workplace power. 
At Austin, throughout 1952 the control by management over redundancy 
could not be separated from the challenge by the workplace 
organisation. Despite the understanding given by management after 
the Pegg and Bills dispute over re-employment, preference to ex 
Austin employees, and the suggestion of consultation with the union 
officials ,the works management frequently sought to demonstrate 
that it possessed discretion over the interpretation of these 
undertakings. On the 14 January, for example, the works committee 
which had met to hear a report of the BMC combine meeting were 
informed by the covenor, that management at Longbridge had declared 
a redundancy. They had offered all but 4 workers on the redundancy 
list alternative work, but had excluded from the list altogethe~ 
workers on a different section but within the same department, who 
had only recently been employed at the works. 206 On the West Works, 
in the Press Shop, 7 out of 10 AEU members were reprieved from a 
redundancy but the remaining three workers were put on the guaranteed 
week, and eventually discharged. 207 It was during this period of 
involvement with inter plant committee~ that the Austin works 
committee began to adapt a much bolder attitude towards the anomalies 
in managerial decision making where redundancy selection was concerned. 
On the 6 March, within a week of attendance at the Motor Stewards 
Conference the Austin management declared 38 workers redundant in 
the finishing shop. No conSUltation with officials took place. 
The convenor called in the 3 full time officials whose membership 
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was involved, to bqth address the workforce then approach the works 
management. An informal meeting was arranged at which Beard (TGWU~ 
Evans (NUVB) and Summers (AEU) were to take pait. The senior 
stewards from all three of these unions, which included McHugh 
(NUVB)/ varnom (AEU) and Etheridge, the convenor, insisted on being 
I 
present at the meeting. The employers association representations 
made a strong objection, but allowed the meeting to proceed. The 
meeting had to be reconvened on the following Monday. Again the 
stewards insisted on being present. The management refused to begin 
the meeting, and threatened to call a works conference over it. 
208 The officials withdrew and left the factory. The works 
committee, however, decided to summon a meeting of all the Longbridge 
stewards and turned the issue into a straight question of workplace 
recognition in redundancy decisions. On the 11 March, the meeting 
of all stewards agreed, 
"I That all shop stewards report the full facts back 
to their members. 
2 That we recommend to all members that they refuse 
to accept any new labour on their respective sections 
and departments until all redundant labour has been 
absorbed. 
3 That we request an early meeting with the CSEU 
for the purpose of what action we desire to be 
taken in the matter" .209 
It was the \'1orkplace organisation which was forcing the issue of 
recognition for both the stewards and the membership, while 
introducing sanctions. On the 19 March,a resolution went before the 
CSEU DC, 
"That this body of shop stewards requests the CSEU to 
apply for a works conference for the purpose of establishing 
the rights of shop stewards to be in attendance at informal 
conferences, further that the CSEU shop stewards be in 
attendance at works conferences, also that no new labour be 
started while employees are being declared redundant".210 
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The local full time officials only agreed to "continue" the matter. 
The works committee, however, had the endorsement of the Longbridge 
stewards for seeking recognition of their joint committee, and their 
senior stewards. 
By the middle of 1952, the Austin works committee appeared rejuvenated 
by the organisational progress in the BMC combine, and through their 
contacts with Motor Stewards Combine. But as they seemed to have 
recovered from the Pegg and Bills setback, redundancies re-appeared. 
In the middle of July the works management began to run down the 
production of the A90, due to falling orders. A redundancy of 43 
body builders was announced at the Kings Norton section of the works. 
The list included McHugh, the chief NUVB steward, and former secretary 
of the works committee. Management, however, agreed to re-deployment 
All 43, including McHugh,were transferred, on the 16 JUly.2ll At 
the same time 58 sheet metal workers were given redundancy notices 
in the West works. The convenor, when challenged by at a meeting 
of the JSSC on why no action had been taken, informed the stewards 
that no report for his involvement had come from the sheet metal 
212 stewards. The metal workers had decided to act alone, disregarding 
the workplace leadership. This tendency towards sectionalism was 
not confined to the workplace. During the remaining part of the 
year the dimissal of a senior steward became the centre of a 
conflict between the vehicle builders and the Austin management. 
The redundancy of McHugh became a major confrontation between union 
and management, which completely split the JSSC at Longbridge. 
The Austin works management envisaging a large scale redundancy, 
and fearing a possible strike, decided to consult with the CSEU 
local officials. They held an informal meeting in the works on the 
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14 August and even a~lowed five senior stewards to attend, including 
h 'd 213 h 1 k McHugh and Et er1 gee T e Genera Wor s Manager, J R Edwards, 
said all production on the AgO would stop. There would be 250 
direct redundancies arising from this, but also a number of pockets 
of redundancy across the works. In total 800, of which 700 would 
be manual workers,would lose their jobs. All those working on the 
AgO would be dismissed section by section, while the remaining 
pockets of redundancy would be done on a 'last in - first out' 
basis. By Christmas the new Austin Seven would be in production, 
employment would then pick up. The first notices would go out the 
next day, but the majority would be placed over the following 3-4 
weeks. Confronted with the union reaction,the management again 
stated that preference would be given to ex-Austin employees in 
future recruitment, that the personnel department would in the 
meantime stop all recruitment of new labour. The MOL would be 
brought into assist those losing their jobs, and during the period 
of notice there were possibilities for transfer and re-deployment 
in the works. As a procedure for handling redundancy, this went 
beyond any previous approach undertaken by the Austin management. 
The management, however, would not agree to an overtime ban across 
the works. On the 25 August, the works committee called for a ban 
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on overtime. On the 30 August,they summoned a special meeting 
of the BMC combine committee to get their support and to try and 
215 
spread the ban throughout the Corporation. In Longbridge, 
however, some sections refused to implement it. 2l6 Across the 
combine the response was more patchy. 
Meanwhile, the redundancy process was underway. On the 15 August, 
the first 71 workers on the AgO line were given notice. This included 
two stewards. Davis of the NUVB and Jones from the SMW. 217 By the 
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4 September some 430.had been discharged and 130 were either 
re-engaged or transferred. On the 5 September only 32 workers were 
left on the A90 line. These included 3 stewards, Hart and Flynn 
of the SMW, and McHugh from the NUVB, their senior steward and 
president of the Bromsgrove Branch. The management declared all 
32 redundant, and·. unlike all the previous 768 redundancies, this 
group was not given a weeks notice, so as to be available for 
re-deployment. They were all given payment in lieu of notice. 
The day the McHugh redundancy was announced, Geo. Evans, the NUVB 
Do, happened to be at Longbridge, he immediately went to see the 
works manager and suggested McHugh should be offered one of the two 
Body jobs vacant in the Partridge building. The management refused 
claiming this was paramount to preferential treatment. The 
management which did not recognise senior stewards claimed McHugh 
was like any other redundant worker. He should apply for re-
218 
employment. The two jobs in the Partridge building, though 
219 traditionally NUVB work/went to two woodcutting machinists. Four 
days later Evans called a mass meeting of all the NUVB membership, 
for 2pm on the 9 September. The employers immediately protested 
to the stopping of work to hold a meeting. Halliwell, the 
General Secretary, was informed by telephone by the EEF, and asked 
. t 220 to stop ~ • He was informed by Evans that it was too late to 
stop the meeting. The vehicle builders clocked out. Evans maintained 
that due to the shift system, and the distances which his members 
travelled to work, there was no other time but during working hours 
to hold the meeting. 
Evans was reported to have said to the membership that the dismissal 
of McHugh was victimisation. He was quoted, 
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"I am prepared to ask for preferential treatment for 
shop stewards because their duties place them in a very 
awkward situation. Anything they have done for their 
trade union is a bar to their future employment".221 
At no point prior to this event is it entirely certain whether 
McHugh would have been eventually offered some kind of job. After 
the walk-out of the membership at the instigation of the local 
officia~ it was clear in management circles that he would not be 
employed again by Austin. After the meeting, Edwards, the works 
manage~ issued an instruction to the personnel that McHugh was 
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not to be re-engaged without reference to him. 
Right from the very announcement of McHugh's redundancy, it was 
the NUVB local officials, principally Evans, rather than the Austin 
workplace organisation, which took control of the dispute over the 
dismissal of a leading figure on the works committee. Between the 
22 September and the 17 February, with the exception of one other 
unconstitutional stoppage by vehicle builders to hold a mass 
meeting clled by their local officials, the union exhaustively sought 
reinstatement by putting their case in Procedure. In their three 
cases put to Central Conference, however, though this gave the 
full time union officials control over the handling of the case, it 
effectively neutralised any response in the workplace. The issue 
became/McHugh the chief steward of the NUVB,rather tha~ McHugh a 
member of the works committee. For four months in Procedure the 
dismissal became subjudice. The works committee were left on the 
sidelines, while the Combine Committee, lacking the active involvement 
of the NUVB, and the vehicle builders themselves, not as well 
organised in other parts of the Corporation, were left merely voicing 
moral support. Such diVisions, however, were not apparent on the 
management side. The BW EEA, and the Austin management, saw 
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themselves pioneering a major assault on the growing power of 
workplace organisation, which they associated with a growing influence 
of Communist Party membership, among the shop steward leadership. 
In the period since 1951, 12 unofficial disputes had been recorded 
in the motor industry. The Austin management associated this 
development with Communist influence. 223 
It was on the 22 September that a Works Conference was held, 
"To enquire into the circumstances surrounding the 
dismissal of Mr J McHugh on 5 September 1952, with a 
view to securing his reinstatement". 224 
At the conference the management side maintained that there was no 
suggestion of "misconduct" or "bad workmanship" involved in McHugh's 
redundancy. In what was described as a "tense" and "hostile" 
conference/the union side claimed that McHugh's redundancy was for 
reasons other than the non availability of work. His transfer in 
July left him "tied around a redundant job". His dismissal was 
left until the very end of the 3 week of redundancies. Both NUVB 
officials in attendance, Evans and Morris, a member of the Executive, 
were former employees at Austin, and both had been dismissed for 
what they considered their trade union activities. Evans summarising 
the attitude of the Austin management towards shop stewards claimed, 
in conference, 
"If you were to take a cross section of the people who 
still work at the Austin company and you ask the first 
fellow who came out of the gate what would happen to a 
shop steward eventually, he would tell you quite 
definitely that the firm would get him sooner or later, 
and he would lose his job". 225 
The management case was that there was nothing unusual about the 
method by which McHugh had been declared redundant, and that he 
could apply for employment at Austin in the future. On the 1 
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October, however, the Secretary of the employers association wrote 
to the Federation calling for a tough line to be taken against 
the NUVB on this issue. 
"The Federation are, I know, well aware of the 
of Mr~Evans, but the time has come when we can no longer 
endure such deliberate flouting of our National 
agreements. Mr Evans sticks to agreements when it suits 
him and breaks them when it suits him. At the last 
meeting of our management board I made a full report 
of the case. It was the general opinion of the Board 
that drastic action of some sort was called for". 226 
From an early date the Midlands association seemed firmly behind 
a showdown. They were wanting the Federation to pressurise 
Halliwell into disciplining his local official, and had even 
contemplated taking their own case against the NUVB, over the 
stoppage to hold a workplace meeting, through Procedure. 
227 On the 10 Octobe~ the McHugh case was heard at York. The union 
side maintained that their senior steward at Longbridge, had, 
during July, been transferred to the A90 line when the management 
were aware that production would soon stop. 
The union rejected McHugh being compared to the majority of redundant 
workers George Smith, for the NUVB Ee, argued, 
"800 people have been mentioned. A very small proportion 
of these 800 can be measured up to McHugh. His ability 
as a craftsman can be narrowed down to say 70 or 80 
people, which gives a different picture. The majority of 
those 70 or 80, probably the whole of the remainder, have 
been placed in alternative employment since McHugh had 
been given this supposed chance to get alternative 
employment - a man with 15 years service with the firm". 228 
The NUVB abandoned their case on the question of victimisation over 
selection, and began to concentrate upon the failure of management 
to undertake their general understanding on the re-engagement of 
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ex-Austin workers. But as the union restrained its membership and 
chose to fight the case constitutionally, it did so in isolation 
of both the \Iorkplace organisation, and the unions in the CSEU. 
Increasingly they began to emphasise McHugh, a member of the NUVB, 
who \.,ras differentiated from other redundant workers, as opposed to 
his position as chief steward, member of the works committee, 
and CSEU steward. At the Central Conference, the chairman, sought 
to avoid a "failure to agree" verdict, as the consequences would 
be an immediate strike, but resisted pressure from the union for 
a reference back for settlement in the workplace, as this would 
appear to put some pressure on the management to settle. It was 
agreed only to hold the question at Conference while certain 
evidence regarding the extent of re-employment was established. 
Having conce.ded over the issue of victimisation the finding read, 
"The employers in Central Conference were satisfied that 
the dismissal of Mr J McHugh had taken place quite 
properly in accordance with the normal custom and practice 
in the company when the redundancy occurred. They were, 
however, cognisant with the undertaking which had been 
given by the company to the confederation that with the 
exception of specialist workers preference would be given 
to redundant workers when the company were engaging new 
starts. On an assurance from the Employers that the 
company had every intention of honouring this undertaking 
the union representatives agreed that the question should 
be retained in the hands of the Central Authorities".229 
This Conference disclosed that the redundancy had involved 8 shop 
stewards 1 one from the TGWU, two SMW, and five from the NUVB. 
230 There had been no complaints over any of these selections. Of 
the vehicle builders stewards, two had left the union and found other 
jobs, one went to Fisher Ludlow, and another had been redeployed at 
Longbridge. The fifth was McHugh. Among the final 32 redundancies, 
however, only McHugh had not been offered a job interview. Austin, 
however, were now beginning to recruit production workers for the 
new Austin Seven. 
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The Conference decision allowed the Austin management further time. 
The NUVB1 not wishing to inflame the local situation/decided not 
to raise the issue within the workplace. The onus now lay entirely 
with the works management. As recruitment of new labour took place, 
the works management would have little excuse for not re-engaging 
McHugh. On the 9 January 1953, however, the NUVB were again back 
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at York. A further 50 new starts had been made in the body 
shop, to which the NUVB membership had withheld their objections. 
But in November, the management placed a requisition with the 
Solihull labour exchange for more body builders and finishers -
McHugh's line of work. The NUVB local officials raised this with 
the employers association/only to be informed that any outstanding 
redundant employees must now be considered upon an equal basis 
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with those registered unemployed. A policy of preference for 
eX-Austin employees, redundant the previous August, had been 
terminated. Throughout the period,McHugh had never registered 
unemployed. He had been paid victimisation money by his union. 
Itis clear that a division of opinion existed between a section 
of the Federation, the BW EEA and the Austin management, over the , 
Conference findings. In correspondence with the association,Ramsey, 
the assistant secretary of the Federation, had taken the view that, 
"all things being equal •••• sooner or later McHugh would be 
233 
engaged". The firm WAS beginning to stall the issue by claiming 
that 270 of the original 700 manual redundancies had not been 
re-employed. Many of these were likely to have found other jobs, 
but few unemployed were vehicle builders. At local level the 
employers association was justly claiming that McHugh could never 
be taken back, for; 
499 
" ..... reasons which could not be brought before the 
central conference". 234 
On the 14 Februar~ these reasons were presented in a letter to the 
EEF by the local association secretary. The letter stated, 
"The union (NUVB) are openly asking for preferential 
treatment for McHugh because he was a shop steward. 
If the company were to give way on this point, a very 
dangerous precedent would be established. I understand 
that since the last hearing of this case at central 
conference, Halliwell requested an interview with Sir 
Alexander Ramsey (EEF Director). The interview, quite 
rightly in my opinion, was refused. It would have been 
wrong for the Director to have discussed the matter either 
formally or informally. The matter can be re-opened only 
by the direction of the central conference committee. 
On reading the notes I get the impression that Mr Bruce 
Ramsey (EEF Assistant Secretary) is a little uneasy with 
regard to this case. I understand that, at any rate at one 
time, he felt that the company would be wise to re-engage 
McHugh. On the other hand, in Mr Bruce Ramsey's letter 
of the 2 February to Mr Hope (BW EEA) he appears to take 
substantially the same view of the case as I have taken 
throughout. He says in his letter that 'all other things 
being equal' the company had given an undertaking to 
re-engage their redundant employees in preference to taking 
on new starts. I entirely agree with this and would point 
out that in the case of McHugh 'all other things'are very 
far from equal. Therefore the company is under no obligation 
whatever to re-engage him, nor is the company under any 
obligation to give their reasons as to why they will not 
re-engage this man, nor should any pressure be brought to 
bear by central conference committee or the Federation to 
induce the company to change their view. On the contrary, 
central conference and the Federation should give the 
company all possible support in the stand which the company 
have taken. 
If, after reading the above notes, anyone is in any doubt 
as to the right line to take in this matter, it is necessary 
only to consider the repercussions which would result if 
McHugh were tobe re-engaged. MCHugh is a Communist and a 
very troublesome one. He belongs to a union which is 
Communist controlled - a union which hAbitually flouts 
National agreements wherever it suits them to do so. This 
case has had a great deal of publicity. Any sign of weakness 
on the employers' side would have disastrous results and 
could not fail to boost the prestige of this very undesirable 
union. The repercussions which would result from this would 
be more far reaching and more harmful in the long run than 
the action taken by the Company". 235 
soo 
Three days before the actual start of the strike there appeared to 
be no second thoughts on the part of the management side in Birmingham. 
They were maintaining pressure upon the Federation to support their 
view. On the 19 January, Halliwell had tried to get informal talks 
1 d h " 236 with the Federation ea ers ~p. On the 26 Januar~ the Longbridge 
members of the union stopped work to hold a meeting called by 
Evans. They agreed to support their leadership attempts to gain 
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re-instatement of McHugh. With no response from the management 
side, the NUVB EC met to give the Birmingham DC the, 
"full authority to take action to secure the management 
undertaking of the 14 August" .238 
After 14 days notice, 2,278 vehicle builders began an indefinite 
strike on the 17 February/ for the re-instatement of McHugh. The 
239 EC declared the dispute official at its meeting on the 27 February. 
The dispute placed the works committee in an entirely ambivalent 
position. McHugh, and the NUVB stewards, had given support to the 
JSSC in which the AEU had long provided the stability and workplace 
leadership at Austin. Until 1951 McHugh had been secretary, this 
position had more recently been taken by George Mar~n, also from 
the vehicle builders. The Works Committee, however, had been kept 
on the sidelines as the union officials spent five months taking 
the case through Procedure. Strike action by the NUVB would inevitably 
result in widespread lay-offs affecting the other unions in the works. 
Thus the workplace leadership found itself in a pOSition of trying 
to maintain support for McHugh's reinstatement,while maintaining 
unity within the JSSC, when many stewards and their memberships, 
were being put out of work. Their situation was not helped by a 
decision of the CSEU National leaderships to remain neutral. 
Management, on the other hand, sought to maximise their own pOSition 
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by selecting all the ~u stewards for lay-off and, under the threat 
of lay-off exhorting, the workforce to 'blackleg' on NUVB jobs, 
following a re-organisation of work. The Works Committee dispute 
holding regular meetings/became isolated from the daily contact 
with the workforce. It became increasingly powerless to influence 
a course of events over which it had considerable sympathy. but 
which it could not gain the overwhelming support either from the 
JSSC, or, more importantly, the membership. The progress of the 
dispute merely reinforced the isolation of the NUVB and eventually 
led to a move on the part of the TGWU to set up a breakaway JSSC. 
Both the arguments for a new joint committee and the projection 
of the issue by management, centred around a criticism of the 
political views associated with the workplace leadership. It was 
the affect of this attack upon a confused and divided JSSC which 
helped to isolate·. and then eventually inflict a serious defect 
upon the NUVB, and the Works Committee, in general. 
The Works Committee summond a special meeting on the first day of 
the strike. The immediate steps it took were, 
"1 That there should be no 'blacklegging' on jobs 
involved in the dispute. 
2 That we reaffirm our support to the NUVB. 
3 That a press statement be drawn up by the EC 
of Works Committee for insertion in the local 
press advising members what to do if laid off 
through the strike. 
4 That a full meeting of shop stewards be called 
for Thursday, 19 February at 12 pm". 240 
By the end of the first week of the strike, only the works committee 
and the 120 strong AEU stewards had held meetings and given clear 
support to the NUVB. 241 The JSSC meeting on 19 February. after , 
hearing an address by Etheridge, voted first for the convenor to 
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approach the works ~anagement on the reinstatement of McHugh. The 
minute states that this produced "an emphatic No,,242 from Edwards, 
the General Manager. The meeting resumed but passed no clear 
resolution of support. Instead it agreed to set up a liaison 
committee between the JSSC and the NUVB strike committee. It 
published a leaflet outlining the case, and applied for the convenor, 
" .... to have access to the works at all times to carry 
out his duties". 243 
On the Friday, when many of the Longbridge workforce were collecting 
their last wage packet, Etheridge made repeated statements over a 
public address system outlining the importance of the issue at 
stake. 244 During the whole of the dispute, policy and discussions 
were confined to meetings held by the works committee and the J5SC. 
No mass meeting of the workforce was ever called. The NUVB. were 
-
the only organisation to hold a regular weekly meeting, at the 
Digbeth Institute, of its membership. The solid expressions of unity 
retained within the vehicle builders,contrasted with the fragmentations 
and divisions emerging within the membership and workplace organisation. 
The BW EEA had received a letter from the economic league, on the 
20 February, the third day of the strike which claimed, 
"The inside story of the Austin strike is that there is 
not the slightest doubt it is a cleverly concealed 
Communist attempt to hold up production in this important 
plant". 245 
It then went on to identify Etheridge, McHugh, Varnon, and Mcran, 
as being either members of the party or its sympathisers. The only 
conclusive evidence really related to Etheridge. Not only did he 
publically state his membership, but actually stood as a party 
candidate for Northfield during the 1950 General Election. Coverage 
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of the strike in the press largely centred upon the politics of the 
workplace leadership. Evans, on the 24 February, issued a strong 
statement, denying that the dispute was either political or being 
run by the Communist Party. His statement read, 
"The dispute has nothing to do with the Communist Party. 
It is solely under the control of our union EC which has 
had the circumstances of the case before it since last 
August. The strikers had unanimously given their support 
to the EC". 246 
The Works Committee throughout tried to retain support for the issue 
and preserve unity within the JSSC. At a JSSC meeting held on the 
24 February, addressed by Evans, the leadership of the Works 
Committee took the authority to issue press statements, and agreed 
that it should be the body to liaise with the NUVB strike committee. 247 
It was not, however, until the 28 February that the JSSC took a 
position on the dispute. It did so by firstly rejecting a motion, 
"That the EC (of the Works Committee) approach the management 
and request the re-engagement of Bra MCHugh within 2 days, 
failing this the shop stewards would extend the dispute".248 
Instead it passed an amendment which called for the trade unions 
to orchestrate support, 
"That this body of shop stewards are of the opinion that 
the full weight of the trade unions should be put behind 
this dispute to bring it to a speedy and satisfactory 
conclusion". 249 
Although this resolution drew attention to the seriousness with 
which the workplace leadership viewed the dispute, the fact that 
it was relying upon the union organisations at National leadership, 
rather than workplace organisation, was itself an indication of the 
divisions within the JSSC. On the 27 Februar~ the CSEU National 
officials meeting to discuss the dispute showed no sign of wishing 
to be directly involved. Instead they agreed that, 
504 
"No action to pr.ejudice the position of the NUVB". 250 
rather than collective action, would be the basis from which they 
would proceed. In response to the Austin JSSC call for trade union 
support, the CSEU EC declared, 
" ..... the dispute is one in which the Confederation has 
no standing as the matter is being dealt with by the EC 
of the union with the membership concerned". 251 
The Federation interpreted this as a sign of the failure of the 
vehicle builders to get support from other unions. The NUVB 
had become isolated. This isolation of the union within the CSEU, 
was shortly met by a move on the part of the TGWU to discredit 
the support in principle which the Works Committee had been able to 
get agreed in the JSSC. On the 2 March/the local officials of the 
union called a meeting of all its Longbridge stewards with the 
intention of withdrawing its stewards from the JSSC. Their meeting 
issued a statement saying, 
"We hope our decision will lead to the formation of a new 
shop stewards committee that will give a positive lead 
that will develop trade unionism that will be concerned 
with wages, hours of work and working conditions". 252 
Representing a quarter of the Longbridge unionised membershi~ 
this was a clear move on the part of the TGWU local officials to 
confront the leadership of the Works Committee. James Leas~, the 
area engineering trade group secretary, addressing the unions 
annual meeting of stewards at Transport House on the 5 March said, 
"Many other unions will join us... we hope there will 
arise from it a new spirit of determination to ensure 
that industrial grievances are dealt with in a true trade 
union manner". 253 
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Even the Birmingham Trade Council appeared hyper-sensitive towards 
the allegations of political motives, being voiced in the press. 
In arrangements for a delegate conference of trade union~ all shop 
stewards, drawn from five Midland Counties, its invitation to discuss 
redundancy and short time read, 
"It will be a non political fact finding conference 
and we hope that out of the discussion we will get some 
concrete suggestions for remedies for redundancy and 
short time working". 254 
The McHugh dispute/in the context of the emergence of a workplace 
organisation, and combine committees with the objective of unifying 
union memberships and stewards in the workplace/was not merely 
having to confront the established sectional divisions but an 
additional political division between workplace leadership and 
members, as well as workplace organisation and individual unions. 
The TGWU's local officials were seeking to establish the leadership 
of a breakaway JSSC,based upon their own increasing membership 
in the works in conjunction with a number of smaller unions. This 
realignment would, if successful, have polarised the membership 
between such a new group and the current position in which the 
existing leadership returned the strong support of the AEU, NUVB, 
ETU, and the Foundry Workers union. This intervention on the part 
of the TGWU reinforced the isolation and independent character of 
the NUVB and considerably weakened the credibility and authority 
of the JSSC. On 10 March, the weekly meeting of the vehicle builders 
which re-stated their intention to continue the strike, resulted 
in Evans being quoted as saying, 
"With or without, the support from the other unions 
our members at Longbridge are determined to carry on until 
the management concede our demand". 255 
The JSSC widened the divisions among the stewards. On 4 March, 
it agreed, 
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"That this JSSC deplore the action of the TGWU in issuing 
the recent misleading press statement at a period when the 
members were present at a shop stewards meeting where 
decisions arrived at received their full support. 
Furthermore being of the opinion that this action is a 
repudiation of promises made at National level that no 
union would take any action that would prejudice the NUVB 
cause, and we request the Confederation to take steps 
to discipline them". 256 
The meeting concluded by thanking those members of the TGWU for 
their presence. By the 10 March, such was the growing acrimony 
that the workplace leadership had to stave off an attempt, from 
within the JSSC, to refuse admittance to the TGWU stewards. THis 
was defeated by a counter motion which would leave the question to 
be debated by the full body of stewards after the NUVB dispute 
was over. The two meetings of the BMC combine committee held 
during the McHugh dispute did little more than provide "moral 
and financial" support. At its meeting in Oxford on the 14 March 
the JSSC heard a report from a delegation of NUVB stewards and then 
adopted a resolution not dissimilar to that taken by the Longbridge 
JSSC. It read, 
"That this body of shop stewards support the principle 
for which the NUVB are fighting and call upon Mr Lord 
(Chairman and Managing Director, SMC) to honour the agreement 
made by his company on the 14 August 1952. We call for 
support both morally and finanCially, and call upon all 
our members not to blackleg or handle work declared black. 
Furthermore, we are of the opinion that officials at 
Confederation level should give their full support and 
make a statement to this effect". 257 
The strength of the combine during this early period lay in its 
organisation among the leading AEU stewards. Discussion of 
anomalies, inequities, and variations in prices and conditions 
between the same sections in different plants were the most positive 
258 
aspect of its existence. As a f.rum for the exchange of 
information among the workplace leadershi~ it provided considerable 
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insight into the operation of management. Its collective weakness 
apart from its over dependence in the AEU, was that it lacked 
authority among the membership in the workplace. The management 
at Austin acted to diminish further the influence of shop stewards 
in the workplace during the course of the dispute. The action of 
the NUVB resulted in 6,750 other workers being laid off. Having 
included all the AEU stewards, and the majority of the remaining 
stewards, with the exception of the TGWU, not only were the 
workplace stewards divorced from the workplace, they were unable 
to oversee the adherence of decisions taken at JSSC meetings. 
The workforce without the immediacy of representation were being 
subjected to the exercise of managerial pressure. On the 10 
March,the JSSC heard reports that chargehands and apprentices were 
'blacklegging' in the East Works. 259 By the 16 Marc~ the convenor 
had to report that 'blacklegging' was been undertaken by the AEU, 
in the East Works. 
"This matter had been raised with the company who had 
stated the question of members working on work that had 
been reorganised was entirely voluntary. The AEU members 
had been instructed to confine their work to that they 
normally did". 260 
But in view of the threat of lay of~ it was becoming apparent that 
the practice was widespread, particularly among the T~dU, the 
majority of whose stewards were no longer in attendance at JSSC 
meetings. It had even been reported that 35 NUVB members in the 
experimental department had not joined the strike. 26l The 
increasing weakness of the JSSC in the face of an evaporation of 
its influence focussed attention upon the activity of the National 
officials. The meeting on the 16 March, recognising the possible 
consequences for workplace trade unionism called for official 
intervention. The resolution put by the AEU membership in the West 
Press was adapted by the JSSC. 
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"We the personnel of the West Press view with concern 
the apparent disinterested attitude of our officials 
at National level with regard to the Austin dispute. 
Therefore we request the said officials to make an 
approach to the Austin management to try and end the 
deadlock which now exists. Many of our brothers are 
unemployed and in financial distress and we consider that 
if officials insist on their no statement attitude 
they will undermine the confidence in the unions as a whole, 
and this could cause widespread resignations". 262 
The 16 March also produced an announcement by the firm that 500 
workers had retired. The implication being that many of those 
were vehicle builders. This news was accompanied by a further attack 
upon the NUVB by Leash, of the TGWU. He was quoted as saying, 
"The full truth of the strike and subsequent developments 
have never been told ••• No doubt it is a severe 
disappointment for those who want to continue the strike 
to learn that several hundred men have been invited to 
resume work tomorrow. Mr Evans is clutching at any 
excuse to give him the opportunity to claim that the 
strike has been prolonged. What evidence can he offer 
that he has tried to settle it?" 263 
That the works management had acted to re-engage some of those 
laid off/was seen as a sign that the impact of the dispute was 
beginning to decline. Speaking of the decision to re-engage TGWU 
members Leash went on, 
"Our members welcome the opportunity to return to their 
former jobs. The management is to be complemented on 
the step it has taken to open the works as it will mean 
that the distress which has been caused to many families 
can never be resolved ll • 264 
Pressure was building up after a month of strike and layof~ for 
some form of intervention. Though the NUVB were in receipt of 
dispute pa~ many of those laid off were ineligible for registering 
unemployed. During the four week period there had been no informal 
contact between the NUVB leadership and the Federation. On the 18 
March this leadership began looking for a way out of a dispute 
I 
509 
which was having widespread affects on other unions, and which the 
vehicle builders could possibly lose. Pressure on the NUVB began 
to be exerted from the CSEU National officials. On the 12 March 
meeting at York, they suggested that the union call for a court 
i . 265 of nqUl.ry. The NUVB EC met on the 16 March, decided instead 
265 to hand the matter over to the TUC. At the weekly meeting of 
the membership in dispute the NUVB President, General Secretary, 
and 5 members of the EC appeared at the Digbeth Institute in 
Birmingham, to put the case for an inquiry. The meeting gave 
its support to its National officials. It passed a four point 
course of action. 
"l To endorse the decision of the EC to call on the 
TUC to intervene. 
2 To calion members in other parts of the Country 
that work contributing to the manufacture of 
Austin bodies or vehicles to black that work. 
3 To authorise the EC to urgently press the TGWU 
to instruct members at Austin not to do work 
covered by NUVB workers. 
4 To issue a further appeal to all branches of the 
NUVB to continue their support to the strike 
fund". 267 
The NUVB were to proceed by seeking an inquiry but also by increasing 
sanctions. The NUVB, however, were not really in a particularly 
strong position to affect the flow of outside supplies to Longbridge. 
They were able to get their membership to stop work from Morris 
Bodies in Coventry, but in Oxford they could not prevent the TGWU 
continuing to undertake their jobs on the A40 body at Morris Motors. 
FUrthermore, the TGWU rather than the NUVB controlled the semi 
skilled work at the more important body plant, Pressed Steel. It was 
therefor~ the search for an inquiry rather than an intensification 
of sanctions which took precedence in the leaderships activities. 
It soon became evident that the management, unlike the union were 
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seeking humiliation as the price for victory. 
The day the TUe agreed to approach the MOL to discuss the basis 
for a Court of Inquiry, to which the vehicle builders had stated 
they would accept the findings, the Austin management issued an 
ultimatum to the 2,000 remaining workers on strike. The company 
published the following notice on the 23 March, 
"During this strike hardship and inconvenience have been 
caused thousands who have been thrown out of work in 
consequence. Surely by now most people realise that 
nothing can be gained by prolonging the strike, but in 
case anyone is in any doubt the management states 
emphatically that it has not the slightest intention 
of giving way to the strikers and there can be no 
compromises. 
Up to now the factory has been kept fully open and any 
strikers who wished to do so has been free to resume work 
at anytime, but obviously these arrangements cannot 
continue indefinitely. That being so, let it be understood 
that if a general return to work does not take place 
during this week any person still on strike on Friday, 27 
March will be recorded as having left the company employ".268 
This no compromise position was a clear attempt to sustain a managerial 
unity for enforcing a defeat/not just on the NUVB, but on the 
influence of the workplace organisation. The move/coming as it 
did on the day of the TOe announcement to seek intervention, was 
also in part a means of trying to circumvent the earlier unease 
within the federation leadership over the company's re-engagement 
policy. In the workplace,managerial pressure also increased on 
union members. The convenor reported to the JSSC, on 30 March, that, 
1t ••••• AEU members working on various tasks were meeting 
with pressure from shop supervision to do work which was 
black. Our members had contacted the OS who instructed 
them to confine themselves to their own particular jobs".269 
This managerial pressure began following 1,583 NUVB members who did 
not return to work. The works management had began to recognise 
production. The union's EC failed to persuade the Austin management 
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to delay the notices to enable a mass meeting of members to occurr. 
The dismissals put the union in a particularly weak position from 
which to continue their fight. Fifty seven of the vehicle builders, 
89 stewards in the BMC Corporation, were from Longbridge. On the 1 
April, the EC called a meeting of their remaining 32 stewards in 
270 BMC to organise the blacking of supplies to Austin. The management 
announced that the 4,000 workers previously laid off would be 
re-engaged on the guaranteed 34 hour week. Only 350 of the firms 
2,000 vehicle builders had retu.D1QJ despi te the general depression 
271 in the motor trade. On the 2 April, the Foundry workers, NC, 
at a meeting of the 10 principle union leaderships with a membership 
at Austin cal~dfor, 
" •.••• the formulation of a positive policy withdrawal 
of all labour employed at the Austin group to bring the 
dispute to a successful conclusion". 272 
Meanwhile the vehicle builders leafleted Birmingham factories with 
a message saying, 
"A deliberate planned attack upon trade unionism and 
shop steward organisations which effects every active 
trade unionist and every worker in the engineering industry 
is taking place at Birmingham in Austin Motors .••• 
it is not the fate of one man but wages and working 
conditions of thousands of workers are at stake in this 
struggle". 273 
On the 2 Apri~ the MOL under the Industrial Courts Act of 1919, 
274 
ordered an official Court of Inquiry to be set up. The management 
refused an offer of a return to work pending the decision of the 
Court. The Court sat for two weeks. Though the management were 
criticised for not disclosing their reasons for the non-engagement 
of McHugh, and for their refusal to delay their ultimatum until 
the NUVB EC had time to hold a meeting of its membershi~ the main 
conclusions went all against the union. It found that McHugh had 
not been unfairly dismissed, that Evans was seeking preferential 
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treatment, that the actual strike decision was technically in breach 
of the unions rule, and that both the company and the NUVB "adopted 
a regrettably inflexible attitude and neglected reasonable 
. ,,275 possibilities of comprom~se 
The emergence of combine committees in the motor industry had been 
closely associated with the issue of redundancy, recession, and the 
election of a Conservative Government possessing a priority towards 
the expansion of the arms economy at the expense of job security 
among car workers. The policies advocated by the workplace 
leadership to resist redundancy, had increasingly encouraged 
workplace organisation to seek a greater influence in the way 
redundancy decisions were taken by managements. This progressive 
involvement of the workplace organisation was seen by the Austin 
management as an expression of Communist influence in both the 
combine and workplace leaderships. In a period of recession in the 
motor trade, in which other Federated employers under the prosperity 
of arms contracts were accepting national wage increases, the motor 
employers began to face up to the challenge of workplace power. 
It became evident that in the showdown over the redundancy of McHugh, 
it was the employers rather than the unions which retained a unified 
poSition to defend their traditional rights over questions of dismissal. 
Although the combines committees had provided the possibilities for 
an organisational unification of senior stewards drawn from workplace 
committees, in the BMC combine such organisational unity did not 
possess authority over the workplace membership. The most important 
source of support from within the combine workplace organisations 
was financial. Standard, Duples, and the BMC Combine firms all 
provided substantial funds payable to the members of all unions laid 
. 276 
off in the dispute. In the McHugh dispute, the control over the 
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issue exercised by the NUVB, not only violated its struggle for 
the support of both National and local full-time officials, in the 
workplace the conflict had split the membership from the credibility 
of the JSSC. The JSSC in turn lost the support of a major union, 
the TGWU. The Works Committee faced with a break up of its power 
base was, through the layoff of the mass of stewards unable to 
influence the daily course of events in the workplace. 
Over the McHugh issue, the Austin works management ably assisted by 
the employers association, were prepared to take an uncompromising 
stand over the dismissal of a chief steward and member of the works 
committee, and to demonstrate their authority in the workplace by 
removing the whole of the works committee for the period of the 
dispute. 
The Court of Inquiry did little to heal the right between management 
and workplace. The NUVB membership were given their jobs back, 
but on managements terms. They were only gradually offered employment. 
The effect of the dispute upon workplace organisation however was / 
catastrophic. 
On the 22 June/the JSSC were informed that the Austin management 
had issued a statement saying that under no circumstances would 
MCHugh be offered his job back. 277 The meeting heard that no NUVB 
steward who had been involved in the dispute was in work. 278 In 
Jul~Evans stated that of the 28 stewards who had served on the NUVB 
strike committee in the course of the dispute, only 6 had been 
reinstated, 15 others were still unemployed. A further 9 stewards, 
not members of the committee, were also not recalled. 279 Recrimination 
was rife. Attendance at the JSSC slumped. During March there were 
over 75 stewards regularly in attendance by June it was down to 38. 280 
I 
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The meeting voted to call in the local Confederation officials as 
fi ' tr' t b 'ld th' " . 281 a rst step ~n y~ng 0 re U~ e~r Jo~nt comm~ttee. 
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PART 8 
POST WAR CRISIS AND THE MOTOR INDUSTRY 
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Abstract 
The year 1956 was to see an important turning point, in regard to 
both the question of redundancy and workplace organisation in the 
British owned sector of the motor industry. This change was 
precipitated by a number of events,of which the most important were 
two redundancy strikes at Standard Motors and BMC. The issue of 
redundancy and the attitude of workplace organisation began to change, 
following a new round of increased investment programmes announced 
by the 'Big Five' manufacturers, who entered into a competitive 
struggle for the domination of the home market. It was the prospect 
that such investment would result in the introduction of labour 
saving devices, which sent the fear of redundancy, because of 
automation, through the mass assembly plants. In 1955, the leading 
figures from the combine committees brought the question of 'no 
redundancy' and the 'right to work', to the centre of workplace 
relations. 
This section begins by outlining the developments in investment plans 
and the movement in both the product market and the security of 
employment in the motor industry, from the high point of prosperity 
in 1955, to the point of severe recession in 1956. In the second part, 
a close analysis of managerial strategy in Longbridge, following the 
McHugh incident, seeks to emphasise how the weakness of workplace 
organisation, following such a defeat, led to a greater dependence 
upon officialdom. This section analyses the impact of change in 
the leftward moving TGWU, following the appointment of Jack Jones 
and Les Kealey, both upon the unity of workplace organisation at 
Longbridge, and the implications for the resolution of both the 
Standard and SMC redundancy strikes. 
The final sections deal with how the acceptance of redundancy 
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procedures/based upon the position of covenors and senior stewards, 
began to change the strategy of works management to workplace 
organisation. It was, however, the rapid movement towards 100 per 
cent organisation after 1956, throughout the BMC plants, followed by 
the increase in the incidence of stoppages on the shop floor, which 
saw senior managements in the motor industry seeing a decline in 
the authority of officialdom over the memberships, became divided 
between seeking the intervention of the State to restrict unofficial 
activity and,the advice coming from the Motor Industry Joint Councill 
for the re-establishment of order in the workplace, based around a 
greater acceptance of the representative functions of senior stewards. 
Throughout the final section, the vulnerability of workplace leadership 
to managerial power is stressed. It is maintained that while the 
combine committee suffered from the limitation imposed by non-
recognition of officialdom, its leadership was also vulnerable to 
suspension and prescription by national union officials. While 
procedures may enhance the status of senior stewards in workplace 
industrial relations, their poSition in an interactive power 
relationship between the organisation of management and union 
officialdom, creates considerable pressure to act constitutionally, 
despite the spontaneous sectional disputes on the shop floor. Their 
newly acquired strategic position in the power relationships in the 
workplace, increasingly acts to weaken the basis of their authority 
over the shop floor. 
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1 THE 1956 RECESSION AND THE MOTOR INDUSTRY 
From the final quarter of 1953 until the beginning of 1956~ the 
British motor industry embarked upon a period of sustained expansion 
and not inconsiderable prosperity. At the start of 1955 the industry 
appeared to be poised for an annual output of one million cars. 
Car production and company profits had shown marked increases 
following the introduction of economic measures to expand domestic 
consumption. The affect on the industry's workforce though less 
marked than the change in production and sales turnover did reduce 
periods of short time working. In general, the expansion of 
output was largely met by utilising the existing spare capacity in 
the industry and through higher levels of productivity, rather than 
from an increase in the workforce. By the second half of 1954, 
however, the 'Big Five' manufacturers - BMC, Rootes, Standard, 
Ford and Vauxhall - began to enter into an intensive struggle for 
their share of the home market. As firms began to unveil their 
investment plans and introduce labour saving devices in their 
assembly plants, the fear of redundancy and unemployment arising 
out of the application of automation spread throughout the industry's 
labour force. In the summer of 1955, it was the workplace leadershi~ 
through the organisation of the established combine committee~ 
which sought a unified policy to overcome the threat of automation 
and the prospect of redundancy. In the spring of 1956, just as the 
influence of the workplace leaders hips appeared to be extending, 
both on the shop floor and across virtually the whole of the industry , 
the high point of industry prosperity, among the major companies, 
fell away sharply into a severe domestic recession. As export 
markets had declined, the increasing over-dependence of the industry 
upon the protected home market resulted in a profound increase in 
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short time working and redundancy. The motor industry faced a 
massive revolt in the workplace over job security, redundancy and 
automation. In the two most critical disputes during 1956, the 
non-federated Standard Motor company and the federated BMC, 
engaged in a major confrontation over the issue of redundancy and 
workplace power. These challenges were to prove a turning point 
in managerial approaches towards workplace organisation in the 
car industry. It was mass conflict in the workplace which paved 
the way towards a reappraisal of managerial strategy over workplace 
leadership. 
In September 1953, and again in May 1954, Bank Rate was reduced. l 
This was followed in July by the renewal of hire purchase restrictions. 
The resulting general increase in domestic demand brought immediate 
improvements in car sales and production. By the middle of 1955 
average weekly output from the assembly plants was double what 
it had been in 1952. 2 The annual accounts of the 'Big Five' 
manufacturers all showed significant improvements in trading profit 
in the period up to 1955. Among the British owned companies BMC , 
profits had risen by 60 per cent, to £23.7 million, in three years 
to 1955. 3 During a similar period, the medium sized Standards'return 
of trading profit of E5.8 million was 87 per cent above ~~e comparable 
1953 figure. 4 Rootes, on the other hand,had a profit increase 
amounting to 12.8 per cent for a four year period to 1955. 5 
In the British domestic market, despite the general increase in 
profitability of all the main companies, it was the American 
subsidiaries which were making the greatest gains. In terms of 
profits/Ford/with a return of £21.3 million in 195~ was 82 per cent 
above that reached for 1952, while Vauxhall, in a period of three 
years, had in its annual accounts for 1955 shown a trading profit 
520 
of £6 million,which represented a 275.7 per cent improvement. 6 
Perhaps of most concern was the changing balance of market share 
between the US and UK corporations. Although the home market saw 
an increase in the hold of the 'Big Five' manufacturers, rising 
from 90.8 per cent of the market in 1947 to 96 per cent for the 
'Big Five' by 1954, the market share of the British owned industry 
7 fell from 64.2 per cent to 60 per cent. During this same period, 
the two American firms increased their proportion of the market frcm 
26.6 per cent to 36 per cent, in the seven year period to 1954. 
With the prospect of high profits arising from a growth in the 
domestic market, but an awareness of increased market competition 
among the 'Big Five; the large firms entered into an investment 
race to expand both productivity and productive capacity in the 
second half of 1954. Ford announced the allocation of £65 million 
for a new investment programme. Vauxhall stated plans for a £36 
million expansion scheme, while BMC was reported as investing £9 
millions into expanding Austin, Morris Motors and Fisher Ludlow. 
BMC claimed to expect a 65 per cent increase in car output from 
within the group in a period of 18 months. Standard, on the other 
hand, issued a statement that over £4 million would be invested 
into the installation of the most recent automatic equipment for 
their Coventry plants. Even Rootes were reported to be doubling 
their investment plans from £4 million to £10 millions, much of 
this, however, would go into overseas operations. 8 These investment 
programmes/embarked upon towards the end of 195~ appeared to be 
both expressions of the manufacturers optimism regarding future 
markets, and an acknowledgement among all concerned of the increasing 
compentive basis upon which the assembly of cars took place. 
From early 1955, however, the industry's optimism began to look 
rather shallow. By 19S~ the motor industry was 1n the middle of 
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its sharpest post war recession. 
In the second half of 1951 nearly 30,000 new cars were being sold 
through hire purchase agreements, compared with only 14,000 for the 
same period in 1953. 9 From January 1955, Bank rate was increased. 
This was followed in February by a further increase,in addition to 
restrictions upon hire purchase. By July, the banks were asked to 
restrict loans. In Octobe~ purchase tax rates were increased by 
20 per cent, and by February 1956,this had been raised to 50 per 
cent of total purchase cost. As hire purchase had been a major 
source for increasing expenditure on new cars, the new high rates 
produced a rapid fall in both car sales and car production. By 
the end of 1956, car production had been reduced by 197,000 in a 
year. The rapid decline in home sales was only exacerbated by the 
losses in export markets. Between 1954 and 1955, British car exports 
had fallen by 21 per cent as France, Italy and Germany began to 
revive their post war motor industries in world markets. 10 In 
the first two months of 1956,the export of British cars was less 
11 than a quarter of the level reached 12 months previous. Manufacturers 
of cars in Britain had increased their dependence upon the domestic 
market during a period of expansion and stability. Their loss of 
international markets resulted in the industry, and more particularly 
its workforc~ becoming especially vulnerable in a domestic recession. 
Car production in the UK had expanded by 100 per cent between 1952 
and 1955, but the corresponding level of employment in the industry 
12 
rose by only 14.3 per cent. For the workforce, the main benefit 
during this period of expansion lay less in the number of new jobs 
but rather in a reduction in the periods of short time working. 
During 195~ this trend was reversed. The intensity and speed with 
which the domestic recession hit the industry resulted in wide 
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spread job insecurity. By the first week of April, 25,000 car workers 
13 
were unemployed. A further 38,000 were on short time of which 
31,000 were in the Midlands. 14 Among the 'Big Five' manufacturer~ 
all the British sector were on short time, while 40 per cent of the 
NUVE membership in the industry were reported as not being on a 
15 full week. Between April 1956 and the second month of 1957, 
16 
some 50,000 jobs were lost in the motor industry. In a six month 
period/l0 major redundancy strikes involving over 52,000 car workers 
17 took place. Over 120 days lost production was recorded. The 
sharpening of competition between the 'Big Five' for the domination 
of the British market and their subsequent investment in labour 
saving technology/sent the fear of automation and redundancy across 
the car plants. The combine committees in the motor industry sought 
to unite the whole of the workforce on policies to confront both 
automation and redundancy. Two major confrontations over redundancy 
arose at Standard and BMC during 1956. In June/the AEU NC voted 
for a policy of 'No redundancy' and the 'right to work'. At the 
forefront of this opposition lay the challenge of workplace 
organisation in the motor industry to the power exercised by works 
management. By 1956, it was the workplace membership which would 
play the decisive card. In the intervening period,the growing 
confidence of an emerging national workplace leadership was not 
always matched by organisational unity within the individual 
workplace. 
523 
2 MASS REDUNDANCIES AND MASS STRIKES 
Recrimination, division, and inter union strife continued to 
characterise the Austin internal workplace organisation at Longbridge 
for the remainder of 1953. The MCHugh redundancy not only divided 
the workplace organisation, produced a loss in credi. bility of the 
JSSC, promoted a fall in union membership/but it also resulted in 
a tightening up of managerial controls over both workplace 
representatives and shop floor workers. Though the works management 
continued to state that their policy towards shop stewards remained 
as it had been prior to the McHugh dispute, the activities of front 
line supervision suggested otherwise. The BMC combine committee, 
however, despite the disarray among the Austin workplace organisation, 
continued to make progress on a number of fronts. It was, however, 
during the period when the main car producers began to reinvest, 
reorganise and intensify competition in the product market,that 
automation and redundancy became issues which revitalised the 
activity within the combines. In the absence of a uniform 
leadership at National level capable of responding both in policy 
and action to a threat to jobs, it was an attempt to unite the whole 
of the motor industry membership on a scale previously unprecedented, 
which appeared to challenge both union leadership and employer. 
It was mass activity industry-wide by workplace organisation, as 
opposed to the established dependence upon CSEU DC's or reliance 
upon the MOL Advisory Council, which appeared to pose a threat 
to the authority of the unions. The left wing leadership of the 
MSSC, however, were never able/in the absence of official recognitiOIt 
to reconcile its attitude towards the confederation. 
Though the initial idea for launching two massive conferences of 
motor industry shop stewards, in 19S5,had originated from the Austin 
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JSSCthe appearance of a powerful mass inter plant movement of 
I 
workplace representatives was nft8.:r in contrast to the prevailing 
realities of the workforce/both in terms of the influence of 
domestic organisation in the workplace and allegiance of the 
memberships to workplace organisation. These conferences and 
the national attention they attracted,not only helped shape the 
issue of redundancy and automation, but appeared all the more 
remarkable that they were organised by a five man steering 
committee drawn from different regions of the industry acting 
in their own time, outside working hours. 
In Birmingham the officials of the NUVB, despite the virtual 
elimination of their shop stewards, continued to defend their actions 
over the McHugh dispute. Evans, in July 1953 wrote in the 
Birmingham Journal, 
"Our members on the job were in favour of withholding 
their labour last September but they were persuaded by 
the union officials that such action would prejudice their 
case in the eyes of all constitutionalists" .18 
Though procedure had served to reinforce the limited redress in 
~II.& (ft( .... 
cases of victimisation, that the union had been out-manoeuvred by 
a solid approach from the management side was not the end of the 
retribution over the McHugh case. Evans, in a blunt attack,accepted 
that his union expected to receive a hostile press but went on, 
"But what we did not expect and what caused some 
surprised heart burning in our ranks was the 
insidious attack launched within the movement - mainly 
a campaign of rumourmongering". 19 
Beyond the issue of MCHugh/the strike of 2,300 vehicle builders 
resultQd in 7,276 members of other unions being unemployed, generat'A~ 
considerable internal division and bitterness. Union membership 
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fell, vehicle builders were applying to join the metal unions. 20 
Though financial support for the NUVB at Longbridge totalled 
£19,000,21 much of which was organised through membership of the 
combines, the defence of McHugh proved costly both for the union, 
its membership and workplace organisation. A levy on 60,000 of 
the union's national membership,brought in £1,000 a week. The strike 
22 
was costing the union nearly £5,000 per week. At the height of 
the dispute, Halliwell, the General Secretary, announced that he would 
be taking early retirement. 23 Only Etheridge, despite the creation 
of a liaison committee between the works committee and the NUVB 
strike committee,had been allowed to attend NUVB meetings where 
McHugh's case was being discussed. 24 In June 1953, the Birmingham 
labour movement braced itself for an anticipated offensive against 
workplace organisation, following the sacking of the NUVB steward 
organisation. On the 11 June, Mr Norman Tiptaft, a former Lord 
Mayor of Birmingham, speaking at the annual luncheon of the Dudley 
area of the National union of manufacturers,stated that all those 
involved in the dispute should be denied skilled employment, or jobs 
25 
where they were able to exercise a decisive impact on production. 
During JulY,an investigation among the major Birmingham firms 
associated with the motor industry by Unit 53, found, however, that 
there was little cause for alarm among the City's trade unionists, 
with the single exception of Austin. 26 Rover, Dunlop, Lucas, Norton 
and BSA, in addition to GEC, and Guest Keen and Nettlefolds, the 
survey reported, showed no marked change in managerial attitudes 
towards workplace organisation, in the period since the sacking of 
the NUVB stewards. This was attributed, in the report, to the 
acquired level of workplace power, rather than the outcome of 
managerial benevolence or inertia. The report concluded, 
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"Those who have expected Austin's dismissal of McHugh 
would be a signal for an attack upon shop stewards 
were not guilty of oVer-estimating the desires of the 
various managements and industrialists but rather of an 
under-estimation of the strength of trade unions in 
Birmingham" .27 
While it may have been the organised power of the unions which 
inhibited management actions,the disarray within the workplace 
organisation at Longbridge did appear to present opportunities for 
front line management to enhance their position of power over the 
labour force. Unit 53 reported one Austin worker as saying 
" .•.•• in general there is that extra keenness on the part 
of foremen and superintendents allover the works".28 
This 'keenness' was expressed in the body shop on the 18 June,when 
the customary ten minute tea break was outlawed. 29 
The works management continued to state that their policy towards 
workplace organisation remained unchanged. They would still 
recognise the works convenor but not the works committee or senior 
stewards. They did not, however, appear to have re·Sinded their 
undertakings in regard to transfers, redeployment, or preference 
for ex-Austin employees for future job vacancies. 30 In practice, 
the prd.viso that management retained the right of discretion over 
such arrangements, still remained. During this period of disunity 
within the workplace organisation,management activity began to 
affect the functioning of \'1orkplace representation. The restoration 
of workplace organisation had to rely upon the intervention of the 
local CSEU full time officials. 
On the 22 June/with only 38 stewards in attendance,the JSSC 
meeting heard a statement, issued by the management that McHugh 
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would never be offered re-employment at Austin. 3l The meeting 
were also informed that only two of the NUVB strike committee were 
in employment, and at Longbridge the remaining NUVB membership 
were without workplace representation. Furthermore, the Secretary 
32 
of the works committee had resigned. No TGWU stewards were in 
attendance at the meeting. The question of organisation was the 
main issue under discussion. The meeting broke up after agreeing, 
"That this body of shop stewards welcomes the 
confederation officials visit to a meeting of the joint 
shop stewards for the purpose of assisting us to strengthen 
our organisation" .33 
By the 29 June,the works committee had agreed on the wording of 
the resolution to be forwarded to the CSEU. A meeting among the 
local full time officials resulted in J Bolas, CSEU DS, writing 
to the Austin workplace organisation. 
"Among the matters discussed was the necessity to get 
unity among the shop stewards at the firm and it was 
therefore decided to ask the Birmingham District 
Committee of the Confederation of Shipbuilding and 
Engineering unions to call a meeting of all shop 
stewards for the purpose of electing a shop stewards 
committee in accordance with the Confederation procedure" .34 
This meeting of all stewards was held on the 13 July at 'The Hut' 
in Longbridge, and was chaired by the CSEU DC Secretary. 
This meeting of all Austin steward~ revealed the seriousness of 
the decline in the shop steward orgnnisntions presen~compared to 
the meeting of all stewards held in 1951, over the Pegg and Bills 
redundancy. Of the 88 stewards in attendance, 57 were from the ABU, 
a fall of nearly a half who had been present at the ABU stewards 
meeting only two months previous. The TGWU,which with 4,000 members 
was the second largest union,was represented by just 7 stewards, 
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while the NUVB, which formerly had the second largest number of 
34 
stewards/was represented by only one steward. It was at the 
insistence of the full time officials/that the workplace organisation 
would be reconstituted under the regulations of the CSEU. The 
meeting followed previous practice and elected a broadly based 
works committee. This comprised of 2 AEU stewards and one steward 
each from the Patternmakers, NUVB, Foundry Workers, and the Sheet 
Metal union. Varnom was again returned as chairman,while Etheridge 
35 held the joint positions of Secretary and Works Convenor. The 
major source of weakness was the depleted state of the NUVB and the 
absence of the majority of TGWU stewards. Under the umbrella 
of a 'Trade Union Education Committee~ a number of TGWU stewards 
in the North works at Longbridge had formed their own breakaway 
committee. Though this emerged during the McHugh dispute. the roots , 
of the opposition within the transport union towards the works 
committee could be traced back to the union's local officials calling 
a separate meeting of their membership at the time of the Pegg and 
Bills strike. This breakaway committee did not have recognition 
of the CSEU DC/but it did mean that the second largest union was 
withholding both involvement and financial support from the JSSC. 
Furthermore, the rift with the TGWU possessed at least the acquie.sce/lce, 
if not actual support, of the union's local officials. The Education 
committee presented itself to the press as, 
"an anti-Communist Organisation". 36 
This attitude of the TGWU,led in turn to sections of the JSSC 
refusing to allow the attendance of any transport stewards in CSEU 
37 
workplace meetings. 
The newly constituted works committee held its first business 
meeting on Monday, 31 August, and agreed to meet thereafter on the 
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last Monday of each month at 5.30 pm. 38 The JSSC meetings were to 
be followed on the first Monday of every month, again at S.30, 
immediately after the end of the day shift. The intervention 
of the confederation had helped to regularise the functioning 
of the Austin workplace organisation. A budget, which included 
financial support for theConvenor to cover his lost time during 
workplace representation/was established. In addition, estimates 
and regular accounting was introduced to cover the daily costs of 
administration. 39 The committee itself, it was accepted, would 
receive an annual subscription from each union/calculated pro rata 
according to membership. The largest donation, by the AEU was 
40 £30 per annum. Smaller unions paid at least a minimum subscription 
41 
of £2 per year. The finances of the new committee would no 
longer depend upon ad hoc payments from individual unions. 
The works management, however, refused to recognise this new committee. 
It insisted upon preserving its practiced policy of recognising only 
the convenor. During the final part of 1953,as the new works 
committee began to plan a revival of membership interest,there 
appeared to be a hardening of managerial attitudes towards shop 
stewards. In December,the meeting of the JSSC heard accounts of 
four instances where management had acted to prevent the freedom 
of movement of the convenor in the works. Two of these cases had 
42 been raised through the AEU DS with the works management. 
Difficulties over the exercise of workplace representation was not 
confined only to the role of the convenor. A series of complaints 
were voiced by individual stewards. In parts of the works, special 
permission was required from the superintendent of foremen before 
stewards were allowed to contact their convenor. This invariably 
meant that stewards were having to declare the nature of their 
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business to supervisors before requests to see Etheridge were 
allowed. Part of the minute for the December meeting read, 
" .•.• when shop stewards did go to see the convenor 
they were immediately pounced upon to see whether they 
had permission from their foreman to see the convenor, 
and if they did not they were immediately dismissed from 
the shop ...• the tactless way in which this question was 
being dealt with had created much ill-feeling between 
the management and the individual shop stewards" .43 
The meeting also heard a report delivered by Etheridge/which 
set out what he saw as the implications of this managerial approach 
for his own role in the workplace. 
It, " ..•. inwolved shop stewards in much running about and time 
wasted with superintendents when asking for permission 
to come and see the convenor. It seemed to be the 
attitude that the convenor could only be contacted if 
there was trouble in the department but as everyone is 
aware the convenor should be contacted in order to 
prevent trouble and give advice. This has always been 
the practice in the past".44 
The convenor was already seeing his position in the workplace as 
in large part one of preventing 'trouble' and offering 'advice'. 
Restriction on facilities, despite recognition, would not, in 
the convenors view resolve issues. This JSSC meeting came only 
a month after the works committee had set about revitalising 
membership and workplace organisation. On 9 November/the primary 
objective of the new workplace organisation was stated as being, 
" •.•.• to force the recognition of the shop stewards 
organisation".45 
The extension of recognition to.he role of senior union stewards, 
a de facto recognition in other words via a recognition of the 
works committee, became the first policy objective of the committee 
constituted under the Confederation. In the meanwhile, the 
workplace organisation began by attempting to recruit lapsed and 
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non union workers into unions. In December 195~ the works committee 
utilised the propoganda arising out of the National engineering 
pay claim/to hold a series of shop meetings across Longbridge, 
, f' , , mb h' 46 with the intent~on 0 ~ncreas~ng un~on me ers ~p. In the same 
month, a one day stoppage called by the CSEU for the 15 per cent 
claim, though not wholly supported in Austin,was sufficient to 
prevent cars being produced. In the East works, the works 
committee estimated that some 75 per cent of the workforce had 
stopped. This included a number of non union members. Where 
there was a 100 per cent organisation on sections,support was at 
f . 47 its most e fect~ve. Following the dispute stewards began to 
record increased requests for membership forms. By February 195~ 
the works committee had embarked upon a more sustained recruiting 
campaign. Individual stewards attending the JSSC were asked to 
carry out card inspections and to complete a questionnaire on 
members and non members. A further move on the part of the committee 
to encourage interest in the workplace organisation,was its decision 
to sell copies of the Birmingham Journal in the works. From 
December 1953 onwards,the Journal produced a regular column on the 
Longbridge workplace organisation. These included reports of the 
works committee, JSSC and the BMC combine meetings. Not only did 
the paper provide an opportunity to counter the hostile press which 
the Austin workplace had experienced/but it provided a regular focus 
for discussion, debate and information about management union relation's. 
For most of 1954, the issue of reorganisation, labour transfer, 
piecework prices and the role of rate fixers, were presented. 
On the 1 March, the JSSC were again criticising the managements 
refusal to allow the sheet metal steward to contact the convenor. 
Both the convenor and the chairman of the works committee were being 
48 
restricted by management. 
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By June 1954, though the TGWU still largely existed outside the JSSC, 
the Journal reported the re·emergence of the NUVB organisation. 
In a letter published in that month's edition,Sill Nordoff, the 
newly elected NUVB chief steward, wrote, 
"We are again assuming our position inside the factory 
through the zest of our members. Twenty five stewards 
have been elected and much can be said for those men -
considering their lack of experience in the tasks they 
are performing. Our ranks have filled considerably and 
we feel that a word of appreciation should be tendered 
to the works convenor and stewards to other unions for the 
way they have worked with us. A new relationship has been 
established with the management and many of our problems 
are settled almost as soon as they arise. The word 'unity' 
has again taken shape for us and it is in this spirit 
we intend to go forward".49 
Almost 20 months after the dismissal of McHugh and 14 months since 
the mass sackings of the NUVB shop stewards, the vehicle builders 
had rebuilt their workplace organisation to half the representative 
power it possessed prior to the redundancy of McHugh. 
The re-emergence of the Austin workplace organisation after the 
McHugh issue/did not arise from a unity of union members within 
the workplace, but had to be brought about largely through the 
intervention of the CSEU DC. The decline in union membership and 
divisions between the principal unions, in addition to ~~e loss of 
NUVB steward~ increased the dependence of the workplace organisation 
on the confederation. While this had bestowed a legitimacy, under 
the rules of the CSEU, upon the Austin workplace officials and 
their organisation, it left the workplace relying, in large measure, 
on the local officials in their dealings with management. The 
policy of the Austin managemen~in refusing to recognise the committee 
and retaining their previous policy of recognising only the conveno~ 
reinforced the tie between the works committee and the role of 
the CSEU DC. In the BMC combine, however, where the Austin works 
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committee held half the actual voting powe~ it was the absence of 
recognition, not only from the management but from the confederation 
unions, which obscured the whole attitude of the combine towards the 
confederation. For the combine, reliance upon channels to the local 
CSEU districts served only to delay rather than resolve the more 
immediate issues which appeared to confront not just the BM~ but 
50 the whole of management and wage labour in the motor industry. 
Despite the evident divisions at Longbridge and the establishment 
of the works committee through the CSEU DC, the regular meetings 
within the BMC combine committee were maintained. Throughout 1954, 
this committee met regularly and even began to extend its activities. 
Initiall~ the issues considered by the combine were mainly associated 
with re-organisation within the corporation. As the BMC, along 
with the other four main car producers, began to announce the 
details of their production and investment plans, based upon the 
introduction of labour saving machinery, the attention of workplace 
leaderships again focussed outwards towards inter plant organisations. 
In the Autumn of 1954, at the instigation of the Austin stewards 
organisation, the workplace leaderships, across the motor industry, 
pursued their search for a policy to confront the growing insecurity 
in the motor industry through mass conferences of stewards. By 
the end of 1955, it was conferences of stewards rather than union 
officials which was deciding workplace policy over the issue of 
redundancy and automation. 
In the first half of 1954, the BMC combine committee discussed the 
disparities in holidays, pensions and the different management 
policies towards transfers and re-organisation in the different 
factories in the corporation. Though no individual CSEU DC could 
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itself raise any of these questions,at corporate level or with 
works managements other than those in their districts,the combine 
committee set out to find agreement amongst itself and then push 
for acceptance of their agreed policy through each of the 
Birmingham, Coventry, and Oxford DC's. For example~on the 9 
January 1954, the BMC combine meeting~held at Transport House 
in Bi~mingham,discussed an article, published in the Financial Times 
four days previously, suggesting that labour were likely to be 
51 transferred within the Corporation. The combine agreed that 
letters should be sent by individual workplace organisations to 
the secretaries of the relevant DC's,raising the issue with local 
management in the presence of shop stewards. Similarl~ on pension 
and welfare scheme~ the combine pushed for uniformity through 
official channels. The responses of works managements were often 
d h ' l' i 52 as varie as t ekr po kC es. Eventually/over pensions/it was 
agreed/on the 13 March,that BMC workplace organisation should write 
a letter to Mr L P Lord, the Chairman and Managing Director of 
the corporation. s3 On the other hand,anomalies in rates, which could 
be taken up within the individual establishments,encouraged more 
departmental contact across the combine. At the April meeting of 
the BMC JSSC,arrangements were made for the leading stewards from 
the different toolrooms to meet to exchange wage rates and details 
k ' d' i 54 of wor kng con ~t ons. This was followed in Septembe~ by a 
meeting of the BMC Press Shops to which Pressed Steel stewards were 
55 invited. By June,a full list of different toolroom rates had 
been established. The BMC JSSC, following the Austin workplace 
organisation,began to submit regular reports for publication in the 
Journal. 
In Jul~ attention began to be turned towards wider issues. The 
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Austin delegates had(following a JSSC meeting begun to raise questions 
56 
about the increasing rivalry between the 'Big Five' manufacturers. 
By the 11 Septembe~ a preliminary meeting was held to discuss the 
idea of holding a conference of stewards in the main assembly plants. 
On the 14 December 195~ a meeting was held in Birmingham attended 
by delegates from Austin, Ford, Morris, Rootes, Rover and Standard, 
h d . 57 the nucleus of the motor s op stewar s comm~ttee. A steering 
committee was forme~ comprising of one delegate from Ford, Rootes 
Rover and Standard, and three from BMe ~ a representative from 
Birmingham, Coventry and Oxford. Only two of these were members 
58 
of the Communist Party. Later, a delegate from Briggs was added. 
It was not until the 8 March 1955 following the statements of 
investment policies and announcements of automated technology, that 
the MSSC made its arrangements for a conference of stewards in the 
motor and ancillary industries, to be held in the Cambridge Restaurant 
, I 
in Birmingham. Under the title The MAS S - Motor and Ancillary 
Shop Stewards - and the chairmanship of Harry Gilmen with Les Gurl 
as Secretary, this first meeting attracted 185 delegates from over 
30 factories in the industry.59 All the big firms in the industry 
were represented. From the assembly plants were Fords, Rover, 
Austin - Morris, Wolseley, Standard, Rootes and Briggs, while among 
the component suppliers were Smiths, Fisher Ludlow,BLSP, Shardlows, 
pressed Steel and Nuffield products. 60 The delegates came from 
workplaces employing some 200,000 workers. 6l In the specially 
produced conference report,Gurl and Gllman wrote, 
"The majority •••• of the National Press gave barely 
a mention of the proceedings but it must be giving the 
200,000 of workers represented a well deserved feeling 
of self-congratulations to have noted that since the 
conference these self same press organs have discovered 
AUTOMATION for the first time, and many are now featuring 
this subject in many shapes and. forms - one year after 
the committee of the Motor Industry shop stewards had 
decided on the calling of this conference, to call 
attention to our members to the growing threat to oUr 
future prcspe'Cts of full employment. A clear case of 
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WE LEAD WHILE arHERS ARE CONTENT TO FOLLOW" 62 
The conference, however, while it raised the issue of automation, 
was a long way short of finding a clear policy with which to defend 
the interests of car workers. This was partly because it brought 
in a number of outside speakers who,in the absence of the experience 
of workplace organisation,were presenting knowledge and information 
rather than encouraging the development of policy or strategy. 
Dr Sam Lilley, of Birmingham University, gave an address on automation 
but much of his speech was devoted to examples in the Soviet' 
Union. A solicitor, Mr M Manning, spoke on legal rights of workforc~ 
in industrial accidents, while John Baird, Labour M P for Wolverhampton, 
covered questions of rearmament, anti union legislation, and reasons 
63 for the Labour Party losing the previous election. Other 
contributions debated the position of women in the motor industry, 
the prospect of anti union legislation and the need to give support 
64 to American car workers. The combination of outside speakers 
and the wide variety of topics, in addition to the absence of 
resolutions to the conference for policy debate, left the conference 
being inconclusive in regard to how workplace organisation should 
approach the problem of automation. The outside speakers appeared 
to be deflecting attention away from the direct experiences of the 
workplace representatives. The six hour conference ended by passing 
a resolution which had been hastily assembled by the Steering 
Committee, following discussions with some of the delegations from 
the large plants. The resolution was read out by the secretary 
and a vote was taken,without a debate or opportunities for amendments. 
It read, 
"That this Conference of the motor ancillary shop stewards, 
realising the problems which will arise from the increasing 
automation in the vehicle industry and the possible 
developments of peaceful uses of nuclear power, pledged 
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itself to fight for an improved standard of living for 
higher basic rates and wages, a shorter working week with 
no loss of pay, extended holidays with average earnings 
and the introduction of pension and sick schemes. 
We believe it is necessary to cut out any inter-firm 
competition and we call for the widening of the existing 
motor shop stewards committee and the development of unity 
of all unions on the shop floor in every factory".65 
The motion was carried unanimously. Even without a specific set of 
policies arising out of the floor of the meeting/the conference 
was widely experienced as a major success. Its organisational 
success alone/gave considerable stimulus to the shop stewards 
movement. 
Harry Gilman in his opening address said, 
"The trend of modern times has shown us all the need for 
much closer liaison between rank and file members on the 
shop floor, and ~~e shop stewards in the workshops 
throughout the industry, and I am pleased to say over 
twelve months ago we took the lead when we decided to 
call this conference" .66 
There could be no denying the foresight which had come from the BMC 
combine leadership and the considerable effort that went into the 
organisation of such a massive conference. But having identified 
automation as a possible crucial issue in job security, the meeting 
had developed not only no set of policies to control or oppose 
it, but there was no clear view emerging on what kind of approach 
such a rank and file organisation would take towards realising its 
objectives. In other words, there had been no serious debate on the 
relationship between workplace organisation and national union 
organisations. Speeches throughout the daY,however,repeatedly 
re-stated the central importance of the position of shop stewards. 
The only national union official/Les Ambrose (AEU), who spoke in a 
personal capacity, claimed, 
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"If we direct the industrial life of this country, we can 
make this earth'a more pleasant place to live in. We 
are the only people who can accomplish this task" .67 
and from John Baird, the M P, 
n •••• members of Parliament are no longer the spearhead 
of socialism. Its you - the shop stewards".68 
and from the correspondent of the Birmingham Journal, 
"Most impressive 
and the zip. If 
lead on Macduff! 
the launching of 
was the vigour, the vitality, the fire 
this is the mood of the movement -
We may very well have been witnessing 
something that is going to make history".69 
The Birmingham conference, despite the questions still to be 
settled over policy and workplace strategy, was, under the organisation 
of a central committee of leading factory convenors from the major 
firms in the industry, able to successfully bring together a large 
part of the rank and file leadership from virtually all sections 
of the motor industry. Under the direction of the Steering Committe~ 
the conference appeared to be instilling a spirit of rank and file 
self-confidence and a platform for the creation of a possible industry -
wide unity between the various workplace leaderships. This momentum 
was to be further sustained by the Steering Committee arranging for 
a further mass conference of delegates to be held at the Cowley 
Workers Hall, in Oxford,on 24-25 September 1955. In the intervening 
period, the question of automation became an issue of wider concern. 
It was no longer an issue confined to the workplace leadership in 
the motor industry. Automation became a subject for media comment. 
Consequently, the Oxford conference attracted considerable attention, 
journalists from a dozen national newspapers were in attendance. 70 
The number of delegations from within the motor industry substantially 
increased. At Oxford/there were some 320 delegates, compared to 
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the 180 at Birmingham,drawn from 44 factories which employed over 
71 225,000 workers. In addition/there were delegates from 7 unions 
. 72 
and four un~on branches. For the first time,a workplace delegation 
from Vauxhall appeared at a joint industry workpluce ga~lering.* 
Oxford, like Birmingham,was overwhelmingly a conference of workplace 
rather than union representatives. In the opening address, Bert 
Edwards, the London organiser of the NUVB, claimed, 
"This movement here today will determine the progress 
of the working class ••• you stewards are the only people 
who know how to fight on the question of automation" .73 
Reg Birch, the president of the London AEU, and a member of the 
unions NC, in a speech, warned the conference on the question of 
leadership, 
"Do not wait for Big Names, they would come from the 
shops. The new unionism must be used to punch home the 
existing policy". 74 
The question of policy towards union leadership, was clearly an 
important one. At the Oxford conference, however, the emphasis was 
largely upon workplace rather than union. While, unlike the 
Birmingham conference, this September conference was permeated by 
debate and resolutions, the vital question of union organisation 
and union officials was largely left in obeyance. In all, eight 
policy resolutions were passed. A constitution, drawn up by a 
delegate from the Rover works, which had already received the assent 
of the Steering Committee, at its meeting of the 2 July, was put to 
conference for approval. It contained six points: 
"I After every conference the meeting of the 'Big 
Five' the shop ste\·rards should go back to their 
shops and give a report to their members 
2 Executive Committee (ie Steering Committee) to 
be broadened to include representatives from accessory 
trade groups. 
* The conferences were sometimes referred to as the 'Big Six' after 
this point. 
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3 No permanent delegates to steering committee or 
any other 'committee, but all delegates subject to 
recall and replacement. 
4 The Steering Committee of the' Big Five' plus members 
from accessory firms, plus a number of delegates 
from the floor, preferably not members of the 
'Big Five', to be at all the Standing Orders 
Committee Conferences. 
5 The Steering Committee of the'Big Five'to function 
as a body of guidance only at Conferences. Conferences 
assisted by Standing Orders Committee to decide 
on policy. 
6 All agendas for future conferences to be circulated 
well in advance of the date of the conference. This 
would enable delegates to discuss resolutions 
with their sponsors and thus receive mandatory powers 
from them".75 
The objective of the constitution appeared to be seeking to strengthen 
the relationship between conference and the workplace/under the 
'guidance' of the steering committee leadership. Stress was being 
placed upon reporting back to the workplace and prior circulation 
of conference agenda, enabling possible mandating of workplace 
delegations. The constitution made no claim to the status of 
conference resolutions, nor did it mention either trade union 
officials or trade union organisations. 
There was, in other words, no clear account of the relationship 
between the stewards conference decisions, and the policies of the 
unions. At the Birmingham and Oxford conferences, this could perhaps 
partly be explained by the fact that there existed,on the two main 
issues of contention, automation and redundancy, no agreed policy 
within the CSEU. But this does not entirely account why, under 
the guidance of the steering committee no debate or view emerged 
as to either the status, or the approach, which the stewards 
leadership should take, for example, in relation to union leaderships, 
or, the local confederation DC's. Put another way, how were the 
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motor shop stewards conference policies to be realised? This 
question ~~as perhaps all the more important given the refusal of the 
EEF to negotiate with the confederation over the question of 
redundancy. What this actually meant,in terms of the defense of 
job security for car workers, was that, through union channels shop 
floor interests over issues like redundancy and automation were 
left to the vagaries of CSEU DC's, at local level or the often 
inconclusive tripartite discussions in the MOS Advisory Counci~ 
held between employers, government, and union, representatives at 
National level. 
Part of the explanation/no doubt/lies in the fact that the steering 
committee itself was largely composed of workplace convenors, or 
senior stewards drawn from the largest assembly plants in the motor 
industry. It was the position of these convenors, regardless, 
though in the case of communist party members, because of, their 
politics, which saw the need for an organised workplace unity to 
overcome the frequent tendencies towards sectionalism in the 
workplace. It was, however, these same convenors in their positions 
as confederation stewards,who provided an important link in the 
relations between the workplace organisation as a whole and union 
officialdom. It was they who tried to sustain both co-ordination 
within workplace organisation and liaison with the local CSEU 
officials. In the case of Longbridge,not only was it just the 
convenor who was recognised by management, but it was the confederation 
officials, in the wake of the McHugh redundancy, who \ helped to further 
consolidate the position both of the works committee and through 
it the position of Etheridge. Indeed it was the majority of CSEU 
officials in conjunction with the workplace leadership at Austin 
which had brought about the re-establishment of the works committee 
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through the constitution of the confederation. It was the union 
officials commitment to that committee, and their presence thereon 
after,at the annual elections for the positions on the works 
committee, as well as the vote for chairman, and secretary and 
convenor, which not only regularised the workplace organisation but 
which confirmed confederation status upon the workplace leadership. 
Furthermore, the appointment of Dick Pedde~ of the patternmaker~ 
as Treasurer, at Longbridge, which followed the agreement over 
union contributions to the shop steward fund,not only encouraged 
financial and administrative stabilit~but financed the activities 
of the convenor by covering his wage loss when on union business. 
Despite the criticisms which the leading workplace representatives 
may have held towards the actions of union officials/this did not, 
generally speaking, amount to the abandonment of constitutional 
activity. 
, I 
The constitution of the Motor Shop stewards, consequently was directed 
towards strengthening the tie between the workplace membership 
and the leadership in the workplace, rather than pose an alternative 
to the role or practice of union leaderships. This would again 
appear to concur with the experiences at Austin,. after McHugh. The 
confederations intervention at Longbridge to re-establish workplace 
organisation,stemmed from the decline in union membership and the 
large loss in the number of stewards. It was to arrest a sharp 
fall in membership, that confederation and the workplace leadership 
came together in common cause. As a result, the newly elected works 
commi ttee came into being to overcome the consequences of,.orcertainly 
what the NUVB had saw as the outcomes of the failure on the part 
of the CSEU to support the struggle over McHugh, rather than from 
what may have been the cause of the workplace decline; the 
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activities of union officials. Confederation intervention re-confirmed 
the position of the left wing leadership,at a time when support 
for trade unions was actually falling in the works. The~lection 
of Dick Etheridge by the decimated Austin JSSS could therefore not 
be properly said to be the outcome of mass support in the workplace. 
Though it is important to appreciate that Dick Etheridge, on a 
personal level, did actually command a substantial degree of popular 
support amongst the membership as well as the Longbridge stewards, 
which is perhaps best illustrated by the fact that the works management 
never appeared to feel sufficiently confident to dismiss him in the 
aftermath of McHugh, his, and the works committees position, did 
owe something to the role of the local union officials. 
Not rlj.similarly, the BMC combine, in which the Austin works committee 
held half the voting power and whose suggestions had initiated the 
calling of the 'Big Five' conferences, not only had direct experience 
of the problems associated with generalising combine policies, 
through different districts of trade union authority, but actually 
continued to seek to realise its policy objectives through such a 
slow and cumbersome structure. This adherence to constitutionalism, 
appears to have been cOfitingent to the pursuit of recognition on 
the part of union officialdom. Writing in the December edition 
of the 'Journal', Les Gurl in reference to the CSEU said, 
"I wish with all my heart that they (National trade union 
officials) would break with the past and bring our unions 
up-to-date so that the Joint Shop Stewards Committee 
(the 'Big Five') could be recognised. Paid officials freely 
elected by our members and paid by unions would do the work 
then, instead of a few - the few - very hard workers who 
were trying to do a good job at the moment in their 
off-duty hours". 76 
The distinction between the workplace leadership and the union 
officials was seen in terms of the time allowed to serve the interests 
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of the membership. Recognition of combines and their leadership, 
would not only bring about a constitutional legitimacy within the 
union structures but it would release the enormous administrative 
burden from the loyal, but overworked shoulders of the steering 
committee. In the absence of such recognition and short of a 
radical reform in both union structure and in the attitudes held 
among the national union leaderships, the rl:)le of the rapidly 
growing shop stewards movement in the car industry often appeared 
somewhat ambiguous, in relation to union organisation. Criticism 
and dissatisfaction co-existed with a level of dependence upon 
officialdom. This ambivalenc~became all the more evident once 
conference began to debate resolutions. 
A resolution from Briggs Bodies, to which the propose~ Jack Mitchell, 
claimed that neither the union or political leaderships represented 
the rank and file', nevertheless called for conference to, 
" •••• campaign through their respective unions for the 
NE of the confederation of shipbuilding and engineering 
unions to set up a special sub-committee to look into the 
whole question of automation •••• that the confederation 
seeks high level talks with the Government with the 
view to exerting all possible pressure on the powers -
that be - to control automation in the interests of the 
workers ••••• and to seek a meeting with MP's representing 
the constituences of Birmingham, Oxford, Luton and 
Dagenham II .77 
From Austin's, a resolution anticipating strong opposition from the 
employers called for "all JSSC's to campaign to support confederation 
demands", for a 40 hour week and 3 weeks holiday. Other resolutions, 
on the other hand/which called for an equal rate for women in the 
car industry, opposition to the employment of cheap labour, the 
lifting of East-West trade bans and nationalisation of the motor 
industry, made no reference to official union organisations. 78 
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A resolution from stan~ard,for example, calling for details of 
the introduction of automation and the collection and distribution 
of wage rates by the secretary, was directed at placing the 
responsibility upon the committee, through the work of the secretary, 
for raising workplace aspirations. 
"The aim of the shop stewards committee, should be to 
bring up wage rates to the highest level in the Industry. 
Close contact to be maintained on all these issues". 79 
The most important resolution of the Conference, however, came 
from Austin's. It was an attempt to produce a comprehensive policy 
for workplace organisation on the issue of automation. The 
formulation of the resolution itself at Longbridge, arose directly 
out of a debate within the JSSC, who had held a special meeting to 
discuss resolutions for the Oxford Conference. Furthermore, the 
main part of the resolution originated from the Roto Dip Section 
of the West Works/which had partly been automated, while the 
remainder developed out of a public debate through the columns 
, ' 80 
of The Journal,between Dick Etheridge and Derek Robinson. What 
became known as the 'Seven-Point Plan' was moved in Oxford by 
Etheridge. The full resolution. supported by the BMC, read, 
"1 Detailed consideration to be given to all 
aspects of safety of operators on automation 
systems • 
2 Full consultations between unions and management 
prior to the installation of new machines, on 
working conditions and rates of pay, with a view 
to obtaining a higher basic rate. 
3 Commencing with the campaign for a forty-hour week, 
we shall continue to fight a progressive reduction 
in hours without any loss of pay, so that our 
standard of living shall be preserved and improved. 
4 No sackings. Retaining and retraining of persons 
displaced by automation to be the managements 
financial responsibility with no loss in earnings 
for those concerned. 
5 An improved apprentice scheme to train technicians 
of both sexes who will be required in an automation 
as 
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6 Negotiations at all levels between management 
and uni~ns to get agreement embodying these 
proposals. 
7 To ensure that with the lowered cost of production 
due to the benefits of automation the cost of the 
article produced to be also lowered, thereby 
widening the market for same" .81 
The argument put to conference was that,in the absence of the 
confederation having a policy for the introduction of automation, 
which would protect the interests of workforce affected, the employers 
would not only be able to take all the profits from improved 
techniques but workers earnings, safety, and even employment, would 
be under threat. Automation/with its high capital cost was seen 
as bringing about a greater monopolisation of the industry into 
fewer hands. At this level of investment and competition in the 
82 industry, the smaller firm would be out of business. For the 
motor stewards,the main question remained the control over the 
introduction of automation rather than opposition to automation. 
Etheridge in his summing-up speech said, 
"We are not opposed to automation but our aim is to 
reap the benefits of it for the workers •..•. The 
confederation has no agreement at the moment with 
regard to the problems and it is vital that they have 
one as soon as possible if we are to gain better conditions 
from automation".83 
without recognition of works committees, and with agreements being 
made with union officials, the shop stewards movement retained 
its dependence upon the official organisation. As a Journal 
Correspondent put it, 
" ..•• the most serious task faCing the Steering Committee 
is to regularise its relationship with the confederation. 
Until this position has been straightened out, delegates 
will have the feeling that they are beating the air or 
merely assisting in a talking shop" .84 
547 
Cruel words perhaps, to those who had put so much time and effort 
into making the conferences such a succes~ but without a critique 
of the role of the Confederation, the movements strategy was in 
danger of becoming a statement of objectives but without a clear 
view of how to realise them. Les Gurl, in a f~ewArd to the 20 
page pamphlet of the conference, 'All in Favour Say Aye~', wrote, 
"When I first agreed to take over the arrangements for 
getting the motor industry shop stewards organised to 
back one central committee, I must admit that it sounded 
impossible. Yet we can, I am sure, look back on the last 
twelve months with some pride at what we have achieved 
in so short a time. For the first time in the history 
of the motor industry we can call together representatives 
from all sections : we can discuss our difficulties and 
help each other in the struggle for better conditions. 
This is a great step forward towards our final goal".85 
The workplace leadership had been able to unite the workplace 
organisation across the majority of the industrY,in a way in which 
the inter union divisions existing at national and local level 
had failed to do. The problem for the central committee was how 
would this unity become realised in policy and action. Conference 
policies remained only recommendations, acceptance of which still 
had to be won at workplace level. Other policies were clearly 
conditional upon being carried through individual union and 
confederation policy making machinery. 
The conference/in general,appeared strongly weighted in favour of 
the 'Big Five' delegates. It was not that these organisation held 
the main positions on the Steering Committee,but they also dominated 
the policy-making process. Of the 8 resolutions put to conference 
5 came from the BMC delegations, 4 of which were from Austin. 
Of the remaining 3, two were from Briggs, and one other came from 
86 Standard. The ommission of Ford is almost entirely explained 
by many of their stewards being at another union conference. Furthermore, 
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of the 31 speakers to aqdress the conference, 27 came from just 6 
delegations, 9 came from Austin stewards. Only 4 speeches were 
87 
made by representatives from the components industry. Though 
the conference was still an undoubted success, for the effort put 
in by the members of the committee, even'The Journal was moved 
to point out the undue influence being exercised over the discussions. 
In its October report it said, 
" .•.. the Standing Orders Committee must not attempt to 
have discussions and decisions tailor-made. It is vital 
for the future progress of this idea that it should be 
permitted to grow in vitality and variety quite 
spontaneously" .88 
At one point in a debate, a succession of 6 Austin stewards were 
89 " called to spe~k. In the December edition of The Journal criticism 
of the role of the Steering Committee came into the open. One 
writer claimed, 
"In my opinion the so-called Steering Committee is treating 
the delegates like a pack of children. And the sooner 
rank and file stewards get on their hind legs and stress 
their rights, the sooner WE shall be doing the 'Steering' 
and stop ourselves 'being steered' ".90 
One source of criticism was that the constitution, which had the 
approval of the Steering Committee/was not published prior to the 
Conference. Instead/it was read out before the Sunday morning 
session, unannounced, and without reference to the Conference agenda. 
A vote was called for without any opportunity for debate. 
It would, however, be unfair to overstate the criticism in terms 
of the overall success of the conference. It was a major achievement 
for the organisers/who appeared to have galvanised a movement of 
stewards across a widely dispused industry. They had placed the 
issue of automation and redundancy as the central issue in workplace 
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relations in the motor industry, and had agreed the 'Seven-Point 
Plan',by which automation could be challenged by the workforce. 
Though the conference, in the absence of union recognition of 
the steering committee,had left largely undefined its relationship 
towards afficialdom, it was always clear that even wouthout the 
support of union officials/decisions taken at conference would 
ultimately have to be realised by action in the workplace. 
On the 30 November, in keeping with the resolution from Briggs 
Bodies over raising the question of automation at Government level, 
a delegation of 22 stewards and convenors lobbied their MP's at 
Westminster. This was arranged to be held in conjunction with 
support for a Private Member Bill 'Automation and Electronics' 
and sponsored by the MP for Bilston, Bob Edwards. 9l The delegation 
of the leading workplace representative elected Dick Etheridge 
as their spokesman. A report of the days events was made by one 
of the Steering Committee. In this,he expresses his own view of 
automation. He states, 
"I would like to give a few personal ·views on automation 
and to point out that no-one is going to oppose it. 
We have already made this quite clear but also we are just 
as sure that we are not going to accept the position of 
employers installing new machinery and then making 
thousands of workers redundant. The Chancellor of the 
Exchequer has already publicly stated that the days of 
over-ripe pheasant and port wine are over. If this is so, 
it must be made just as plain that the workers are not 
prepared to carry the entire burden on their shoulders. 
Higher taxation and more people on the dole is not our 
idea of the promised 'Tory Paradise'. The Government, 
no matter what party rules, must let the workers have the 
facts. Employers must be made to take the workers into 
their confidence. If the country is in financial difficulties, 
then the workers are prepared, as always, to do their 
share". 92 
The 'Big Five' conferences revitalised an interest in workplace 
organisation in the motor industry. Under a central committee, 
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comprising the convenor~ and leading stewards drawn from the 
largest factories in the industry, the embryo of a motor industry 
shop stewards movement came into being. At these two,well supported 
conferences, while the declamations from the speakers rostrum made 
great play upon the workplace rather than the union, this heightening 
of confidence and workplace organisation,did not produce a distinctive 
workplace strategy. Under the guidance of the Steering Committee, 
the establishment of policy resolutions, while it fulfilled a vacuum 
which arose from a failure of national union leaderships to formulate 
an agreed approach by which to confront the employers on issues 
like redundancy and automation, the conferences, though not 
uncritical of the actions of union leaderships, never fully outlined 
their approach towards union Officialdom. Although the conferences 
had arisen out of the impending rationalisation, automation, and 
fear of job loss, in a period of increased competition among the 
motor manufacturers for the market share in Britain, the workplace 
leadership were fully acquainted with the weaknesses in the 
Confederation structure for coping with issues particular to the 
motor industry. It was, however, perhaps partly the strategic 
position occupied by the leading members of the main plants where 
union membership was generally weak or unevenly organised, who 
depended to some extent on the support of the confederation for 
their position, that an ambiguous attitude developed towards 
officialdom. It was the pursuit of unity among the differing 
workplace unions, in conditions of low or declining union membership 
which both reinforced a dependence upon, and encouraged a part 
allegiance to officialdom and the constitutional apparatus of the 
confederation. Evident weaknesses in the workplace could not be 
overcome by the appearance of mass unity in conferences, no more 
than the inspiration these conferences gave to motor industry 
shop stewards could disguise the inherent ambiguity which arose 
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out of the deficiences in union structures or the past performance 
of trade union leaders. The attitude of the local union leaderships, 
moreover, remained far less equivocal. Jack Jones stated,as early 
as 7 March 1955, his attitude towards the 'Big Five'. In the 
coventry Telegraph he said, 
"While desirous that members should be active the 
organised trade union movement did not welcome any 
tendency by sections or groups to make pronouncements on 
union matters which were the business of the unions 
executive cornmittees".93 
George Rowley, the Coventry AEU DS, said of the Birmingham 'Big 
five" conference, 
"The meeting was entirely unofficial" .94 
The implications of such a predicament were to become realised in 
the mass strikes at Standard and BMC during 1956. 
The Standard Automation Strike 
The two week redundancy strike/which took place at the Standard 
Motor company in Coventry, at the end of April 1956, crystalised 
many of the issues which had been generally popularised by the 
'Big Five' conferences of 1955. The Standard was not just the 
highest wage rate firm in the British motor industry, but it was 
theonly plant with a 100 per cent union membership. From 1948 
onwards, the whole of the Standard manual workforce was unionised. 
The company, under the chairmanship and personal involvement of Sir 
John Black,had built up a labour relations policy which combined 
a distinct employer paternalism with a close degree of co-operation 
with the workplace organisation. After the large redundancy 1n 1948, 
Sir John Black and Jack Jones, the Cov CSEU Secretary, entered 
into an agreement which established priority for future re-engagement 
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of those declared redundant. The basis of this agreement, unlike 
the undertaking given by ~~e Austin works management in 1950, 
was that it was the unions which were to supply labour to the 
95 Standard. This all but guaranteed future organisation at the 
works. In the workplace, these arrangements helped secure the 
position of th~ Communist Part~which had had a significant membership 
in the firm since the second world war. By March 1956, it was 
claimed that there was a 70 strong party membership in the C P 
branch at the works, in addition to a regular readership of some 
350~ the party newspape~ the 'Daily Worker'. The most notable 
figure, Bill Warman, the chairman of the JSSC and party member, was 
also co-founder of the Motor Shop Stewards Meeting of 1952. 
Gordon Wright, another leading figure at Standard,was a current 
member of the 'Big Five' steering committee. Of the 7,000 copies 
of the Oxford Conference Report on automation which w~re ~old in 
the motor industry, 2,000 had been taken up by a Standard workforce 
96 
of 12,000. 
After 1953, Standard had significantly expanded their interest in 
tractor production. The Ferguson tractor was being powered by a 
Standard engine. In addition to tractor production in the post 
war period/Standard had scrapped the manufacture of a range of car 
models and instead concentrated upon building one outstanding model 
for both home and export markets - tl1e Vanguard. Though the smallest 
of the 'Big Five' car producers in terms of a manufacturing philosoph~ 
the firm was among, . the most progressive in the industry. It 
combined relatively high investment and higher worker productivity 
through promoting a co-operative relationship with organised labour 
in the workplace. The design of its unique payments system sought 
to provide a basic level of financial security for individual 
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workers with a group i~centive scheme based upon multi-skilled 
gangs. The management recognised the position of senior steward~ 
while the mixed composition of the gangs encouraged inter-union 
co-operation on the basis of common gang membership,as opposed 
to the more generally sectional or trade divisions. By 1954, 
Standard's investment per worker remained second only to that of 
Ford in Britain. It was two and a quarter times greater than 
that of Vauxhall and one and a half times more than Rootes. 97 
Theoverall size of the company, relative to other members of the 
'Big Five', gave rise to problems associated with the regeneration 
of capital, which restricted market growth. It was particularly 
prone to the challenge arising out of the intensification of 
competition for the domestic market, but it also suffered directly 
from the BMC merger. The Corporation took over the main body 
supplier to Standard, Fisher Ludlow, in 1953. 
On the 7 January 1954, the beginnings of a new era emerged for the 
company. Sir John Black,who had personally dominated the running 
of the firm since 1930 and who had been the single influence in 
the decision to de-federate', the compan~ in order to pursue a high 
wage-high p~oductivity policy,retired as managing director. He 
was replaced by Alick Dick who,at the age of 3~ became the youngest 
executive in the British Motor industry. Standard, unlike the 
federated companies, had most closely tried to build its post war 
industrial relations policies out of the spirit of war time 
co-operation. Consequently, prior consultation with the workplace 
leadership was well established over production and redundancy 
questions, before 1956. Over worker recruitment/the firms labour 
office would circulate its list of job vacancies with the respective 
workplace convenors and senior stewards for forwarding to their 
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local union offices. T~e union concerned would then select candidates 
from their registered vacancy list for interviews with the works 
management. This method generally ensured that worker victimisation 
or arbitory management selection did not occur. Protection against 
victimisation in job selection was also protection upon grounds 
of political viewpoint. Workers who were members of the Communist 
Party were therefore largely unhindered if they were put forward 
for interviews. Such was the level of union co-operation by the 
management,that when Jack Jones complained about favouritism being 
exercised by a works manager, (it mainly concerned offering jobs 
to his relations), Sir John Black sacked the manager at half an 
. 98 hours not1ce. 
In 1955, the workplace organisation had developed a policy of 
'No redundancy'. ;,ihen nearly 1,000 workers were declared redundant 
from the firms production on area-engines, following the rundown 
of this industry in Coventry. After pressure from the JSSC,all 
those who wished to accept alternative employment at the Standard 
Car and tractor factories were found jobs. 99 By the 4 April 195~ 
this apparent growing autonomy of the Standard workplace organisation 
was becoming the subject of criticism on the AEU DC. A proposal 
from in the works to agree a constitution to form a 'Committee 
of unions to the Standard Motor Industry Agreements'/was attacked 
for being contrary to the authority of the Cov CSEU. The AEU DC 
ruled, that the, 
" ••..• Constitution of the committee, who are responsible 
only to themselves and it was resolved that the DC does 
not recognise the Committee of unions signatory to the 
Standard Motor Agreements in its present form and constitution, 
and request that it be disbanded. The Committee should 
again be set up as it is doing useful work under its 
previous constitution with the addition that it comes under 
the control and jurisdiction of the CSEU DC". 100 
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The workplace organisation at Standard not being party to Federation 
agreements was not as nearly dependent upon the role of the local 
CSEU officials, as for example was the case at Austin. That 
agreements were based upon the plant rather than the Federation, 
and that management recognised and provided facilities for senior 
stewards, as well as the labour force being fully unionised, both 
strengthened the position of the workplace leadership and helped 
create the condition for the development of attitudes independent 
of officialdom. The fact that wage rates and working conditions 
were actuatYsuperior to that of the federated car firms,merely 
fueled these tendencies, while the presence of a significant 
Communist Party membership/particularly in the workplace organisation 
reinforced the values of unity within the workplace organisation 
and discouraged the tendencies towards inter-union squabhles and 
workplace sectionalism. The latter, of course, was also discouraged 
by the particular structure of the gang system. 
The Strike which began on the 26 April had its origins both in a 
seemingly new approach on the part of the recent management to the 
problems confronting the industry and to the capacity for autonomous 
influence on the part of the workplace organisation. In February 
1956 the Standard management at a works conference presented its 
plans for the re-structuring of tractor assembly prior to the production 
of a new model. The changeover was part of their E4~ million 
investment programme which would involve the virtual complete 
retooling of the whole production process, for what was described 
as the, 
"Biggest operation of its kind ever undertaken in England" .101 
The changeover was reported to require the movement of almost every 
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machine tool in the wQrks, some 15,000 tons of plant, over 3,000 
jigs and fixtures, 1,400 machines, 22 transfer lines, in addition 
to the moving of 15,000 tons of earth. 102 It also involved the 
introduction of automation. The firm had invested in 160 rotary 
indexing machines which could carry out mi1tiple operations on 
each component and required only a single operator. The multi 
million investment programme was expected to yield an increased 
output of 100,000 units per year, or approximately 30 per cent 
th .. t t 103 more than e ex~st~ng ou pu • 
The management policy towards this extensive change-over, presented 
in February, was that the current model under construction would 
eventually be stopped as the change-over progressively got underway. 
The firm would not retain the full compliment of 11,160 workers. 
It was stated that some 2,500 would be laid off, th.ougn increases 
in car production, it was hoped,might absorb some of these workers. 
Existing production would finish on the 18 May, but by July 
employment was expected to reach 10,000, while the remainder could 
be expected back in the works by the 13 August. The management, 
through complying with the company's past reputation for workplace 
prior consultation,were,howeve~ infringing the shop stewards policy 
of 'No redundancy'. It was agreed that this February,works 
conference should stand adjourned while a sub-committee of shop 
stewards and management representatives investigated ways of avoiding 
the redundancy. 
The Standard shop stewards immediately set about finding ways of 
keeping every worker employed and met to considered a number of 
alternatives to the redundancy. On the 29 March,they presented a 
Four-Point Plan to the works management, 
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"1 That jobs common to both tractors should continue 
to run dUring the change-over 
2 That jobs which could be quickly changed over should 
be proceeded with 
3 That three-shifts should be introduced on car jobs 
4 That short time should be worked throughout the company 
factories so that the maximum number of men affected 
could be absorbed". 104 
The responses of the works management was to agree, to continue to 
recognise the principle of short time working, where practicable, 
if it did not impede efficiency. 
On the 11 April/car production began to fall and 97 workers in the 
Canley works were transferred and a further 30 were put on short 
105 time. The works management, on the 25 April/presented their view 
of the shop stewards Four Point Plan. They rejected the 3-shift 
idea on grounds that,owing to the change-over insufficient charge 
hands and setters would be available to operate it. It also fell 
outside the management criteria of efficiency, but with recession 
now hitting car production there was much less room for transferring 
workers from tractor to car assembly. Instead,there would now be a 
redundancy of 2,640 which would be issued on the 18 May, of which 
only 230 could be expected to find employment in the car plant at 
106 Canley. A clear difference emerged. The shop stewards argued 
that the change-over could be accomplished without a redundancy, 
under the plan, the management maintained that without prior 
agreement to discuss redundancy they were not prepared to talk about 
short time working. 
Beyond a concern over the apparent increasing independent attitude 
being exercised by the workplace organisation at Standard, it is 
SS8 
clear that the local un~on officials were also aware of a much wider 
mood of change among shop stewards generally during what was the most 
severest post war employment crisis in the industry. This change 
did not appear to be entirely removed from the activities of the 
MA/KH, 
'Big Five' organisation. On the 14 the AEU NE, in answer to a Branch 
resolution from within the Coventry district, which certainly with 
the tacit support of the General and Purpose Committee, had called 
for the CSEU EC to, 
" •.••• use all their powers to bring under to wing the 
'Big Five' organisation of shop stewards".l07 
The AEU EC replied, 
" .... that the CSEU had no power to convene a meeting 
of the shop stewards of the 'Big Five' organisation" .108 
During March 1956,as the momentum of the recession in the car industry 
began to have its affects in Coventry/both the AEU EC and DC were 
being subjected to criticism for their apathy towards the issue of 
automation in the industry. But when the AEU EC, perhaps partly to 
affect the impact of the 'Biq Five' conferences, itself called a 
meeting of the National EC's of the principal unions in the industry, 
to meet at the Queen's Hotel in Birmingham, to discuss redundancy 
and short time workinq, it was the Coventry AEU DC which issued 
a rebuke.. It agreed, 
and, 
"That this DC informs NE they understood that the 
conference was to be on a broad a basis as possible with 
rank and file members and local officials in attendance 
and that if only members of the EC's are in attendance it 
merely encourages members to join the 'Big Five' organisation. 
We insist therefore that local full time officials be 
invited to attend the conference" .109 
"That this DC is of the opinion that if no local 
representatives are at the conference they cannot associate 
ourselves with it as in their opinion it is not representative 
nf rhp mnt'ro,. inAner,.,," ]1("1 
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On the 23 April,a meeting of 200 delegates from the 'Big Five' 
reaffirmed much of their previous policy but approved a resolution 
which called for, 
"All possible support to members in any factory who took 
steps to shop dismissals, redundancy and short time 
working" .111 
This meeting of the 'Big Five' was followed two days later by the 
conference of the AEU NC where the left won substantial support, 
in opposition to the wishes of the EC, on the issue of automation 
and redundancy. The NC agreed to, 
"No automation without consultation".112 
The motion insisted upon the retention of displaced labour where 
automation was being introduced until new work became available. 
The committee went on to pledge support for shop stewards and 
memberships who, 
"resisted redundancy at the point of production".113 
At the Standard works in Coventry,a firm with perhaps the city's 
closest connection with the 'Big Five', committee faced the company's 
refusal to implement its Four Point Plan. The management wanted 
to continue working a full week but implement the redundancy. This 
management scheme had, however, not anticipated the decision of the 
AEU NC. Furthermore its refusal was received like a "bombshell" 
by the leadership of the Standard JSSC. Following a meeting 
among the Standard stewards, strike action was recommended. A ballot 
of the gangs was undertaken to discover the feeling on the shop floor. 
Behind the scenes, however, Jack Jones/who had now become Regional 
secretary of the TGWU and Cyril Taylor, the AEU full time official, 
whose working relationship with Jones extended back to the war period, 
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had already accepted p~ivately with the works managemen~ that the 
new Standard tractor could not be introduced without some redundancy. 
They had both agreed that compensation for job loss, an entirely 
t ' B 'ti h lab 1 t' would be pal.'d. 114 new concep 1.n rl. 5 our re a 1.0ns, Jones, 
howeve~ opposed a public announcement on this, instead he wanted this 
f th i ' l15 to appear to come out 0 e negot atl.ons. Managemen thad 
completely misread the mood of the stewards. They fully expected 
that their redundancy proposals would have resulted in the CSEU 
officials being called in,at which point compensation would become 
the means for gaining an approval for redundancy. Both the new 
Standard management and the CSEU officials were taken completely by 
surprise at the speed at which the Standard workers moved to strike. 
On the 15 May, the AEU DC records how, taken unaware) the CSEU secretary, 
Harry Urwin, had tried to stop the strike. 
"The Secretary of the JSSC at C~nley, the car assembly plant 
had telephone rl. the secretary of the CSEU informing him 
of the impending strike. The Secretary had informed him 
'keep the men at work at all costs. If they want to 
demonstrate let them sit down for an hour or even a day but 
under no circumstances should they come out'. The JSSC 
secretary had agreed with this and promised to do everything 
he could to prevent the stoppage".116 
It was too late. A complete strike of the whole workforce began 
on the 26 April. 
The Standard stewards felt that the management had actually changed 
its position; lhat for many workers the layoff would in fact become 
a permanent redundancy. The new Managing Director had, himself, 
been quoted in the press as saying, 
"We are not installing £4 million worth of equipment in 
order to employ the same number of men. We can't carry 
people for fun" .117 
For the workplace leadership,the view was that the new management 
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were now utilising auto~ation of the plant and the impending layoff 
for the change-ove~ not only to create a number of permanent 
redundancies but to weaken workplace organisation itself. No 
settlement, for example,had been agreed for the annual wage round. 
It was considered that the management/through redundancy wanted to 
be in a more powerful position to negotiate the rates for the new 
h ' 118 mac Lnery. The workplace leadership also felt that their action 
was merely endorsing what was official Cov CSEU policy. On the 21 
January, the Confederation had called a mass meeting of the city's 
1,000 shop stewards to discuss employment in the district. In the 
first five months of 1956, redundancy was being anticipated at Alvis, 
Motor Panels, Jagu~r, Daimler, Carbodies, as well as some 2,500 
redundancies from Armstrong Whitworth Aircraft. Among the resolutions 
passed by the Cov CSEU meeting were, 
"1 Shop stewards to resist indiscriminate discharges 
of labour on grounds of redundancy and to insist 
on regular consultations in relation to production 
programmes in order effectively plan to meet 
fluctations in labour loads. 
2 Wherever practicable short time working should be 
worked until suitable jobs were available for 
workers likely to be displaced. ll9 
These two resolutions had been moved by Harry Urwin the CSEU os. 
However a third resolution was moved from the floor of the meeting. 
This read, 
"3 This meeting of Coventry shop stewards considers 
that full resistence must be shown to any deliberate 
action to form a pool of unemployed as advocated in 
some industrial and financial quarters. We call 
upon the Confederation District Committee to plan 
accordingly even to the extent of advocating industrial 
action. We also call upon the Government to halt 
the 'credit squeeze' which we contend is strangling 
productive effort".l20 
At Standard,the Strike Committee on the question of automation 
followed the line adopted by the 'Big Five' Conference. 
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In addressing a mass meeting of the workforce on the 3 May, Bill 
Warman, the Secretary of the Strike Committee, was reported as 
saying, 
"The Standard workers welcome any new scientific developments 
that will improve the production efficiency of the British 
Engineering industry. But we believe that such improvements 
are of no value unless the benefits of these improvements 
are passed on to the workers as well as the shareholders 
and to the employers. We therefore will do all we can to 
assist and improve production efficiency in this County 
but in doing so we shall also stand up for the right to 
have a full share-out of the increased wealth that 
ensures from that increased efficiency."l2l 
The Standard automation strike, in the view of the workplace 
leadership,arose primarily out of the defence of jobs rather than 
opposition to automation. It was, for the Standard Strike Committee, 
a struggle over the distribution of benefits between capital and 
labour. Automation in itself was not being contested, there were 
no questions involving the defence of existing working practices 
or the protection of craft values. In a period when profits from 
the manufacture of cars had been growing substantiall~ it was 
not the workforce which should have to bear the full cost of 
change, nor should their workplace organisation be put at risk 
through redundancy. On the central point of the introduction of 
automation and the avoidance of redundancy, the Standard was 
in the front line of the 'Big Six' policies. On the management 
side, however, Standard were already in the process of planning 
the departure from their past industrial relations practices. 
Preliminary discussions for re-entry into the Employers Federation 
were underway before the automation strike. Standard, who were 
already operating a shorter working week and paying a wage rate 
above the district level,would clearly have to make adjustments 
to conform with the Federation. The nature of the settlement 
over the introduction of automation was/therefore,likely to become 
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a precedent for engineering as a whole. During the course of the 
dispute/the works management were in close but private contact 
122 
with the secretary of the Coventry Association. The advice 
of the association was not,therefore, removed from the approach 
being adopted by the new managing director at Standard. 
Though the Strike Committee, following the position adopted by 
the 'Big Five' conferences,went to great lengths to stress that 
they were not,in principal, opposed to automation,the Standard 
dispute became closely related to this aspect of the changeover. 
Sir Robert Boothby, chairman of the Industrial and Parliamentary 
Committee of the House of Commons, speaking at the Annual Festival 
Dinner of the Newspaper Press Fund held on the 5 May, said, 
"I think there is a threat to this country at the moment 
which could be lethal, if we take the wrong turning on 
this business of automation on what this Standard strike 
is about ••••• If we really embark upon a new Luddite 
movement for smashing the machines it could be absolutely 
deadly to our position and I think it is one of the most 
serious menaces that has faced this country in many 
years .••.. We are just beginning to see the beginning 
of the signs of a movement which could be a deadly 
thing to this country, we are getting it at the Standard 
works at the moment" .123 
On the 3 May, Sir Anthony Eden, the Prime Minister, called upon 
the MOL to produce a special report on the Standard strike. 
Industrialists and trade union leaders were invited to Downing 
Street to discuss automation in industry and methods for overcoming 
124 labour problems. The Department of Scientific and Industrial 
Research were asked to inquire into the likely affects of automation 
125 in British industry. The consternation which automation and 
the Standard strike had caused was not confined to Politicians. 
The dispute became a popular theme in the May Day speeches of labour 
126 leaders. In Coventry, it was the Standard workers who led the 
May Day parade. Though the dispute was widely reported as being 
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an issue of automation, the Standard management accepted the 
strike committee's view of the dispute. In a public statement 
Alick Dick said, 
"This is not a strike over the introduction of automation 
machines, the issue is simply that the workers claim we 
should introduce short time working instead of laying 
off men during the changeover. This we say is impracticable".127 
The Standard Strike Committee/while they enthusiastically set out 
to gain widespread rank and file support for their dispute, they 
were most insistent in their opposition to any attempts either 
to extend the conflict through, for example, sympathy action, 
or to allow the issue to be seen as being one of automation. This 
would appear tobe part of a play on the part of the strike 
leadership to gain official recognition for the dispute from the 
national union leaderships. 
To help gain support,the Strike Committee dispatched 3S shop 
stewards to address public meetings, trades council meetings, 
factory gate meetings, canteen meetings and shop steward meetings, 
in various parts of the Country. These stewards, however, were 
each given a number of explicit instructions,both in regard to the 
strike issue and the type of support being requested by the workplace 
organisation. BasicallYI these spokesmen were to try and raise 
financial and moral support and to request the 'blacking' of Standards 
products. They were also to ask for resolutions to be put to the 
leaderships of the engineering unions demanding official recognition. 
These stewards were informed that they should stress that the 
dispute was about the refusal of the company to discuss short 
time working and other alternatives to redundancy; u'hat the firm 
128 
were now asking for 3,500 redundancies but making no guarantees 
over future re-employment. The strike committee maintained they merely 
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the policy of the Cov CSEU over resisting redundancy and that the 
dispute was essentially a choice between the "right to work" 
or the fight for each others job. In all speeches/these Standard 
stewards were informed not to broaden theissues involved beyond 
that of 'no redundancy'. There was to be no requests for sympathy 
action. Quite the contrary. On the 3 May, Eddie McGarry who 
had been appointed press spokesmen for the strike committee ruled 
this out. Speaking for the Committee he said, 
"We feel they are (fellow workers) far more valuable 
in work where they can contribute something towards 
the struggle in Coventry. It would be disastrous if 
they came out at this stage. We want the money".l29 
It was finance, support for official backing and the 'blacking' 
of goods, rather than any expression of wider support that the 
Standard leadership sought from both within and outside the motor 
industry. 
During the first weekend,over El,ooo had been collected. l30 From 
the North East Coast, the Strike Committee heard that a guaranteed 
£2,500 per week was being collected. From Fords, the workplace 
organisation gave an initial E200 plus a weekly levy from the 
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membership which amounted to over El,Ooo per week. A meeting 
of 200 AEU shop stewards in Coventry agreed to levy 5s. per worker 
k h f th d ti f th d ' 132 per wee, or an ours pay, or e ura on 0 e ~spute. 
A similar pattern of response was being reported back to Coventry 
during the first week of the strike. Levit's in workplaces were 
ranging from 4s. to lOs. per head. The 'Big Six' circulated a 
special appeal to over 1,000 shop stewards in the motor industry. 
From the London area, a Standard steward sent a request back to 
coventry for further assistance. His report to Eddie MCGarry, 
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dated 2 May, gives an insight into the kind of support which the 
Standard cause possessed. 
"I (need assistance) to cover other meetings which are 
literally showering in. And on this point Eddie , I 
am badly in need of other speakers to assist me. There 
are about 10 firms who want to hear us state our case 
next week from Monday onwards, these 10 are all around 
Park Royal. There are many others besides including a 
lot of Dock meetings. I have already had countless 
requests to address dock gate mass meetings next week. 
Enthusiasm is terrific and increasing. We are more than 
welcome everywhere. Money will I am sure flood in now. 
Everywhere down here covering all trades resolutions are 
going in demanding full financial support and full 
official recognition".133 
Two days later,the same steward is reporting back of addressing 
meetings of over 1,000 dockers from the Royal Group. He writes, 
" •.•. wonderful reception from the whole of the part 
of London. Dockers eager to help in everyway".134 
And on the 5 May, he writes, 
"Terrific feeling now building up in London docks. 
Have had it reported tonight that the walls in that area 
have had 'Black Standard Goods' painted with whitewash".135 
By the end of the first week,he sends instructions for 2,000 
collection sheets to be sent to various workplaces in London. 
And for the docks, he states, 
"Please get big boxes for collections on the docks".l36 
Because of Standard's export markets, the docks became prime targets 
In Liverpooll ~~e Standard steward reported addressing meetings of 
500 and 600 dockers throughout the port. He was formally met 
by the Mayor of BootIe, and received by a delegation of the City's 
full-time union officials. Standard's goods were reported as 
being blacked throughout Liverpool by the 5 May,l37 
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Besides the considerabl~ financial contributions,messages of 
support were received in Coventry from over 130 labour organisations. 
These included 30 DC's 138 of the AEU, plus scores of shop steward 
committees. The only form of sympathetic action in support of the 
strike was taken by the sub-contractors working on the changeover 
at Banner Lane. With the approval of the strike committee,they 
had withdrawn their labour on the 1 May.l39 The strike committee 
hoped,by illustrating the level of support across the country, that 
the national union leadership would add its weight to the dispute. 
On the 2 MaY,all the AEU members on the strike committee lobbied 
the unions national conference, which was still in session. On 
the 6 MaY,a meeting of the NC' S , with memberships at the Standard 
works/had been arranged for York. 
In Coventry,the AEU DC had not only called for the dispute to 
be made official but had called a meeting of all its shop stewards 
and convenors in the District to arrange for a weekly levy of the 
140 
membership for the Standard strike fund. A delegation from 
the strike committee,which included, Bill Warman,left Coventry to 
lobby the CSEU meeting at York, where the leaderships decision on 
the dispute would be made. By one vote, the York meeting failed 
to give its full backing for the dispute. Instead it recommended, 
that on the basi s of an assurance that the management were prepared 
to re-open negotiations, the whole of the workforce were, after 
two weeks on strike, instructed to go back to work. ~ high level 
meeting between the Standard management and the National union 
officials was arranged for Sunday, 12 May. All unions agreed to 
pay strike pay_ This meeting with management, however, was to be 
in London. The management terms for accepting this effer. was 
that certain key workers should start on the Friday night shift 
in order to prepare the works for a full return on the Monday. 
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These proposals had to be put to a mass meeting of the Standard 
workforce at 11 am on the Friday, the day following the York 
meeting. 
The leadership of the Standard strike committee travelled overnight 
from York and held a full committee meeting at9.30, prior to the 
mass meeting. The notes of this meeting/though revealing the 
undoubted disappointment over the failure to gain official 
recogni tion, express no view for direcr.ly opposing the ECls 
decision. The main aim appeared to be that of preserving the unity 
of the workforce and prevent the spread of "gloom and pessimism". 
A 'Civil War" between the workplace and the executives was ruled 
out on grounds of being "divisive".141 It was claimed that the 
full time officials at the mass meeting would be able to influence 
a section of the workforce. 142 Harry Urwin, the Cov CSEU secretary, 
outlined the views of the confederation leadership in proposing 
a return to work at the mass meeting on Earlsden Common. Cyril 
Taylor, AEU DO, seconded. The main argument of the officials was 
that,given the seriousness of the whole question of automation 
and the implications which the Standard dispute had for its 
introduction into other plants, it would have to be handled at the 
"highest level". Bill Warman then put the position of the strike 
committee. He said that they were prepared to recommend a return 
to work, 
"On the clear understanding that there should be no 
redundancy at Standard Motors. Furthermore that within 
four days the National officers taking part in the 
negotiations take steps to report back to a mass meeting 
of workers at Standard".143 
The view of the Strike Committee was that they were in a strong 
poSition due to the support across the country to win the dispute, 
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but that they did not wish to enter into a dispute with the 
leadership of the unions. Warman went on, 
"Dispite the fact we have not got all we want we know 
what we want, and we are determined to get it. We 
cannot ignore the repercussions throughout the whole 
country arising out of the dispute" .144 
According to press reports of the meeting, a "large majority" voted 
in favour of a return, though "several hundred" were said to have 
voted against. Following the vote,Les Ambrose, one of the leading 
left wing figures on the AEU NC, who had addressed both of the 
'Big Five' conferences in 1955, was reported as welcoming the 
decision of the meeting. He claimed that they would, 
"do all in their power to see that the wishes of their 
members were carried out in their meetings with the 
management on Sunday ••••• " 145 
He went on, 
"The issues in the dispute are so big that I strongly 
support our members view that there should be no redundancy 
at the firm. The plans of the management should include 
looking after the people they mean to temporarily displace. 
The ball is now at the feet of the management and it is 
up to them to keep it in play". 146 
For the management however, the negotiations were, unlike the 
position of the strike committee, entirely unconditonal. 
In response to the decision of the mass meeting,Alick Dick said 
of his conversation with Harry Brotherton, the chairman of the 
CSEU, 
" .•••. Mr Brotherton gave further personal assurances 
that there were no conditions either asked for or agreed. 
The management of the Standard Motor Company therefore 
makes it clear that while welcoming employees back on 
Monday they do not recognise the special condition made 
by the Strike Coromi ttee at this meeting" .147 
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'No redundancy', in other words, the central position of the 
workplace organisation/was not to be the central condition in the 
negotiations with officials, even though it was perhaps the main 
demand which brought about the return to work. Harry Urwin stated 
the following day that the "clear understanding of no redundancy" 
was not part of the resolution agreed by the mass meeting, It was, 
he said, "an opinion" 148 To add to the obscurity, the meeting 
between the employers and the CSEU leadership was to be in London 
and not Coventry; the actual venue was being kept secret. The 
industrial correspondent of the Coventry Evening Telegraph reported 
on 12 May, 
"It is generally agreed in industrial circles that the 
negotiations between the management and the union leaders 
will be the most important between management and unions 
since the war. The outcome will not only concern the 
Standard workers but if a satisfactory agreement is 
reached, it may well result in industrial peace throughout 
the engineering and shipbuilding industries".149 
The meeting in fact took place a~ Standard's London office. On 
the union side/the meeting was attended by a number of the most 
significant left wing leaders in the engineering unions. Besides 
Les Ambrose and Harry Brotherton,there was Joe Scott of the AEU 
and Frank Cousins, the newly elected General Secretary of the TGWU, 
in addition to Frank Winchester/the General Secretary of the NUVB. 
The Standard negotiations were the first high level discussions Cousins 
had participated in since his election to office. The three hour 
meeting agreed to refer the matter back to local level, through 
the constitutional procedure for the company. The public responses 
from the union side were largely optimistic over the possibilities 
of an agreed settlement. Brotherton was reported as being "quite 
150 happy" Cousins regarded the discussions as being "favourable", 
while Scott was "confident the whole matter would be speedily 
resolved".lSl Even Phil Pevey, chairman of the Standard press 
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committee, was quoted a? being satisfied with the London decision. 152 
The only new element in the discussions was a suggestion from 
the union side that the workforce should be employed for four out 
of every five weeks on the 34 hour guaranteed week. From the 
management side however, came what was previously the view of 
Jack Jones and Cyril Taylor, of compensatory payments for lay-off 
during the period of the change-over. In order to allow the 
discussion in Coventry to proceed/the works management offered 
to put back by a week their planned 3,490 redundancies. The men 
returned to work on the 14 May. The TGWU and the AEU announced 
that they would be paying dispute benefit for the 14 day period 
of the strike. On the 16 May ,the works conference attended 
by the Cov CSEU full time officials and the Standard senior 
stewards ,was adjourned for one week for the company to examine 
questions of detail. 
In the meantime/the issue of the Standard automation dispute was 
debated in the House of Commons on the 17 May,153 and in Paris, 
at an eleven nation meeting of ~ational union officials in the 
motor industry; a gathering organised by the International 
Federation of Metal workers. 154 Back in Coventry, however, the 
works conference held on the 25 May was again adjourned. This 
time it was to discuss putting 6,000 of the car workers at 
Canley on a four day week and the transfer of 1,000 tractor workers 
from the Banner Lane assembly tracks to production on cars. On 
the 31 May, at the conclusion of the final negotiations, the management 
addressed a meeting of all the Standard stewards and the CSEU DC 
officials. While the announcement was being made to the offiCials 
and workplace organisation/the foremen were on the shop floor 
issuing 1,325 redundancy notices. A further 1,315 were to be 
presented in three weeks time. lSS The management were prepared to 
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accept the absorption o~ 1,200 tractor workers but were making 
2,640 redundancy. The redundant workers would each receive £15 
compensation provided they worked their full week's notice. ~vhen 
the stewards left the meeting to find the notices already served, 
they called a meeting to consider an immediate strike. The local 
officials were present and the strike resolution was replaced with, 
"That this shop stewards meeting recommends to workers 
employed by Standard Motor Company that we ask the 
National officials to take immediate steps to call an 
official strike in view of the failure of negotiations 
at local level. Furthermore, that a further shop stewards 
meeting be held at Ipm next Monday to consider the 
decision of the executives".156 
Alick Dick later recalled, 
"That night the shop floor was littered with redundancy 
notices. Chaps just tore them up. But the point had 
been made, out of 4,000 employees we had 2,000 chaps who 
knew they were going to go and the rest knowing they 
were going to stay. Able to get the vote after that".157 
The union executives were, as ever, split. The NUVB,at an emergency 
EC meeting,handed the decision over to a sub-committee which would 
make a decision on the bas~:s of a CSEU meeting to be held at York. 
On the 5 June, the TGWU GEC set out a policy for guidance of the 
national secretary of the Engineering Trade Group. 
"l . That Council is not prepared to accept the 
management of a company can issue dismissal notices 
in the middle of negotiations, this being contrary 
to established practice and procedure and likely 
to undermine good industrial relations. 
2 An approach should be made to the management for 
the reopening of negotiations 
3 If necessary the intervention of the Ministry 
of Labour should be sought. 
4 In the event of management refusing to reopen 
negotiations, or alternatively, should the 
negotiations prove abortive from the point of view 
of the introduction of sensible work sharing 
arrangements to avoid dismissals, consultation 
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to take ,place at local level on the question of 
serving strike notices. 
5 Members of this union who are displaced pending 
the difficulty being resolved be financially 
supported to the extent to grants equal to dispute 
benefit subject to review". 158 
The development of this policy was to be left with Cousins, in 
consultation with Harry Nicolas, the union's Engineering Trade 
group Secretary. 
In Coventry, the full implications of the redundancy were only just 
becoming realised. The AEU DS,George Rowley said, on the 1 June, 
"Our officials are alarmed at the fact that Mr Dick issued 
redundancy notices while the works conference was in 
session. This indicated that he had made up his mind 
before the conference started. This is an astonishing 
thing and a constitutional breach of faith". 159 
The next day a special AEU DC meeting supported the resolution 
of the Standard Stewards which called upon the full time officers 
to declare an official strike. It was becoming evident the effect 
the management action had had upon the unity within the workplace 
organisation. The issuing of the notices had clearly divided 
those redundant from the workers to be retained. The Standard 
stewards found an uneven response among the workforce. At 
Banner Lane, the tractor plant,only 13 workers had voted against 
the shop stewards resolutions, but some workers did not vote. In 
CanleY,the vote was far from unanimous, and a number of sections 
had solidly voted against the stewards resolution. On the AEU DC, 
support for the position taken by the full time officials and the 
160 
workplace leadership was carried by 18 - 6 votes, but an amendment 
calling for a national strike across the whole of the motor industry, 
to force a general policy on automation, was defeated by 13-9 votes. 161 
574 
The meeting at York saw the national leaderships both uncertain and 
divided. They were torn between the consequences of allowing the 
redundancy to go unchecked, with taking a stand on an issue which 
they could see no way to resolving. Brotherton claimed, "Nobody 
had been very anxious to start a pretty shocking dispute". No 
vote had been taken. On a resolution from the sheet metal workers, 
and seconded by the vehicle builders, which called for an official 
strike, Brotherton explained, 
"We have no constitutional authority to give instructions 
of any kind, only to make recommendations. I think in 
the circumstances it was better not to go to the vote. 
The odds are that the amendment (the SMW and NUVB 
proposition) might have been carried had we voted" .162 
The view of the leadership was that those in employment would be 
prepared to accept short time working to help save jobs. This did 
not have the approval of the Standard management. Instead, the 
national officials called for a meeting with the MOL. The main 
divide at this crucial meeting at York was between the AEU and the 
smaller craft unions who held to a position of 'no redundancy' and 
the TGWU who appeared increasingly willing to concede the 
inevitability of redundancy in certain situations. Indecision at 
national level was having consequences in the workplace. The day 
after the York meeting,Eddie McGarry,acting as spokesman for the 
JSSC from the three Standard plants in Coventry, Banner Lane, 
Fletchar.lstead, and Canley, Said the stewards had agreed to await 
the meeting with the Minister. They had called for an interim 
report from the National Executives. He went on however, 
"'o'le protest to the company at the indiscriminate method 
of the proposed sackings •.•• It doesn't matter whether 
you have one, ten, twenty or thirty years service by the 
look of things - if you are in the way of the scythe 
you are chopped down" .163 
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The meeting with. the MOL produced nothing tangible. Part of the 
public statement read the, 
"Minister said he fully understood the concern of the 
unions about the position of their members who were 
losing their employment at Standard's. He hoped this 
would be clear from the readiness to see the unions at 
once. He felt bound, however, to emphasise that where 
the demand for particular production dropped individual 
workers in the firms affected could not be expected to 
be guaranteed retention of their jobs. Whether or not 
there was sufficient work in a particular form to keep 
all its workers was for the firm to decide" .164 
Pressure from the MOL appears to have been introduced to get the 
management back in talks with the union officials. The second round 
of 1,000 redundancies was postponed for seven days to consider 
a further shop stewards proposal for putting the whole of the works 
on a 3 day week to save further redundancies. On the 26 June, 9 
national union officials,on the basis of returns from the workplace 
suggesting the acceptance of a 3 day week,entered the final stage 
of the redundancy negotiations. 
Ambrose of the AEU was saying that his union was still prepared 
to consider support for an official strike call. As the national 
leadership was preparing for this round of negotiations with the 
Standard management ,Nicholas was claiming, 
"This is the end of the road so far as talks are concerned. 
The unions had now to decide whether to accept the position 
or reject it".165 
Unemployed Standard workers lobbied the union leaders who met for 
a pre-negotiating meeting ~t the AEU District Office in coventry. 
They appeared with posters proclaiming "Don't make Standard workers 
the Vanguard of mass unemployment". "Yourvote today keeps the 
Dole away". and "Don't pull up the ladder - 1,600 are overboard" .166 
In the workplace,the Standard stewards held a ballot among the 
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remaining workforce. This showed the overwhelming majority, 
including those on the car assembly,were prepared to accept a 
three day working week. But on the question of a strike, the vote 
was divided. Based upon a show of hands from sectional meetings, 
4,000 were reported to be opposed to strike action. Some 3,000 
supported a stoppage while a further 3,000 were undecided. The 
1,350 already dismissed did not vote. 167 
on the 26 June, the final round of talks began. The following da~ 
the officials had got the Standard management to postpone the 
redundancy of a further 1,000 workers for seven days to consider 
the practical implications of a three day week. Negotiations 
were adjourned until Tuesday, 3 July, to await the managements 
decision. On the 27 June, however, came the news that BMC had 
declared a redundancy of just under 6,000 workers, the discharge 
of which would take place immediately. The following day/the 
Standard management requested Harry Urwin to attend the works. He 
was issued with a statement about to be given to the press. This 
said, 
"The Board is forced to the conclusion that it is put 
under duress by threats of strike action. Negotiations 
under duress is quite impossible. We have throughout 
the months of negotiations tried at all times to resolve 
the difficulties amicably in the interests of the company 
and its employees. It is now however abundently clear 
that management are being pressed to submit completely 
to the extravagant demands of certain minorities".168 
Less than twenty-four hours after agreeing to examine the three 
day week proposal and the day following the BMC announcement of 
mass redundancies, the Standard management broke off negotiations 
with the national union leaderships. The offer to re-examine the 
extention of short time working was withdrawn. In the course of 
the next four weeks, a further 1,000 redundancies were added to the 
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2,500 dismissals associ~ted with the changeover from tractor 
production. The recession in the car markets compounded the 
difficulties which confronted both the Standard management and 
the workplace organisation. By Augus~ an 11,500 workforce had been 
169 
cut to 7,OOQ,its lowest post war level. The 'no redundancy' 
policy of the strongest organised shop floor in the British motor 
industry was in tatters. In the implementation of the redundancy, 
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the left wing workforce leadership was virtually decimated. 
A large number of shop stewards were included in the "indiscriminate" 
redundancies. The Standard management paid E7 to EIO compensation 
to each worker redundant. On the 24 August,the company announced 
that its changeover plans were now complete. In an agreed 
statement with the unions, a three day week on car assembly was 
announced together with a further 1,000 redundancies. Part of the 
agreed statement read, 
"Discussions have taken place with the local trade union 
officials and senior shop stewards who are fully acquainted 
with the necessity for reducing manpower during the present 
si tua tion" .171 
The Standard management, in a decisive break from p.lst labour 
relations policies, had effectively prepared the way for its re-entry 
into the EEF. It overcame federated criticism of its permissive 
approach to workplace organisation. A powerful JSSC had built up, 
based upon the companies three Coventry plants,in which senior 
stewards were accorded recognition and facilities by the management. 
The positions of the senior stewards had developed as this medium 
sized firm pursued its corporate'- objective of fast self-financing 
growth,upon a strategy of product specialisation through maximiSing 
piecework earnings, productivity, and union co-operation. As 
standard expanded its commercial interests into the less volatile 
tractor markets,stability of employment provided the conditions 
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within which a left wing workplace leadership, containing a 
significant level of active communist party membership, increased 
its influence in the workplace organisation during the early post 
war period. The workplace organisation was closely connected to 
the promotion of inter plant contact. In the Coventry plants, this 
workplace leadership was able to establish a considerable level 
of workplace unity on a policy of high wages and job security in 
an industry nctorious for the absence of stability. The uniqueness 
of the large multi-plant gang system provided not only a power base 
for the senior stewards but,besides their status in their own 
union/they retained an authority over the gang memberships in general. 
This distinctive position of Standard and its isolation from the 
industrial relations approaches of the Federation,encouraged 
tendencies towards autonomy within the workplace organisation. 
It was the daily co-operation between works management and 
senior stewards,rather than the dependence upon local trade union 
officials,through which the policies encouraging flexible working 
arrangements and a high wage strategy were based. Confronted with 
recession and the continuance of high productivity through automation, 
the only 100 per cent workplace organisation in the British motor 
industry sought to defend job security through a reliance upon the 
actions of national union leaderships. It was the ascendency of the 
TGWU in the motor industry,following a number of important moves 
to the left in the unions hierarchy,which marked not only a break 
from the assortment of craft based unions which had been the main 
organisers of labour in the industry,but which paved the way for a 
conditional acceptance of redundancy in exchange for workers 
compensation at joint consultation. Standard,the highest wage 
factory in the industry,was unable to enforce the policies of the 
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'Big Five' and,in the end/paid the price through the destruction 
of its workplace organisation. It was, however, to be the resolution 
of the BMC mass redundancy which was to seal the fate of the 
workplace policy of 'no redundancy' in the domestic motor industry. 
The implications of the duality between workplace policies and the 
actions of 'officialdom' were to become more apparent. 
The BMC 1956 Redundancy Strike 
On Wednesday, the 27 June 1956, union officials from the districts 
within which eight of the BMC factories were located, were requested 
to attend a meeting at exactly 11 am with the Corporation~ works 
managements. At each of these meetings, the CSEU officials present 
were issued with a statement which had been prepared for the press. 
This statement, which was about to be released, revealed that 5,900 
of the corporations 42,700 manual workers were that afternoon to be 
given a week's wages in lieu of notice of redundancy, and would be 
finished from the company on Friday, 29 June. In all, 4,820 jobs 
were to go from the Birmingham plants of the BMC, 3,000 of these 
would be from Longbridge. A further 1,000 would be lost at Oxford, 
100 from South Wales but none from Coventry. The union officials 
were informed that the redundancies would be carried out by "last 
in - first out" on a sectional basis, though the interpretation of 
this might vary in accordance to local practice An offer of 
future employment, for those who would wish to return to the 
Corporation when trade improved, would be made on the basis of 
service. While this meeting of officials was taking place across 
the plants affected, at Longbridge,the superintendent of foremen 
was holding a similar meeting with a number of the shop stewards in 
the North works canteen. At Austin,the general works manager, 
J R Edwards, gave permission for the CSEU officials to hold a 
meeting in the works with the 230 of the plant~ shop stewards in 
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the course of the afternoon. From the very start,it was clear that 
the BMC management were most concerned to deal only through the 
full time union officials rather than through the workplace organisation. 
Their whole policy towards enacting the redundancy was clearly 
influenced by the handling of the dispute at Standard. At Longbridge, 
in explaining the arrangements for the redundancy,Edwards informed 
the local CSEU officials, that, 
"Simultaneously with the union officials being told at 
this meeting at llam, the shop stewards in the various 
factories were being told, and the news was being released 
to the press. Originally we had intended to see the 
stewards at 2.30 this afternoon. The disadvantage of this 
was that the news would have been abroad before lunch and 
before the shop stewards had been told. We felt it was 
better to do it simultaneously but there was no question 
of any discourtesy to the officials".l72 
The arrangements by the management appeared to be guided by a 
concern to offset a possible spontaneous reaction in the workplace. 
For the BMC management,there was to be no prior consultation, 
no joint working party composed of shop stewards and management to 
examine alternatives to redundancy. The notices served would 
result in 12, per cent of their labour force being removed from 
employment at little more than a day's notice. Moreover, 87~ per 
cent of the BMC manual workforce would know that they were still 
in employment. By informing the unions, the workplace organisation 
and the press all at the same time,'the BMC management were serving 
a fait accompli. Even the MOL were given information of the 
173 
redundancies two days before the unions, on Monday, 25 June. 
At a time when the BMC management had observed the divisions and 
the uncertainty within the national trade union leadership over the 
issue of redundancy in the Standard dispute and having seen how the 
'no redundancy' policy of such a well organised workplace had been 
surmounte~partly by the willingness of union officials to compromise, 
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the BMe management had decided to act quickly to pre-empt possible 
organised opposition, particularly from within the workplace. 
From the outset, unlike the experience of Standard,the control 
over the workers side would be retained throughout by the national 
trade union officials. It was the union leaderships which would 
define the issues and determine the grounds for a settlement, 
rather than the workplace organisation. Although the official BMe 
strike was to be seen as a success for organised wage labour, in 
conjunction with the outcomes of the Standard strike, the strike 
in the Corporation completely redefined the 'right to work' 
concept in British industrial relations. Under the growing ascendency 
of a left wing national trade union leadership, the traditional 
barriers of job control gave way to the acceptance of expendable 
employment in exchange for workplace recognition and a joint say 
in the process of job loss. 
At the Austin works in Longbridge, the workplace organisation had 
all but recovered from the disabling affects of the McHugh dispute 
of 1953. By the beginning of 1956, the Longbridge manual workforce 
had grown by a further 2,800 to little short of a total of 20,000 
employees. At the annual General Meeting of the Austin shop 
stewards, held on the 3 January for the election of a works 
committee and the workplace leadership, in the presence of the 
local CSEU full time officials, a total of 368 stewards cast their 
votes compared to only 88 in July 1953, the height of the McHugh 
ff ' 174 a a1r. This sharp increase in union workplace representation, 
under the guidance of the local CSEU officials, did little to alter 
the leadership of the works committee. It remained broadly based, 
with its nine places being occupied by the members of seven unions. 
Etheridge,with the highest vote on the committee,was again returned 
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as Secretary and Conven~r, while Varnom was re-elected as chairman. 
Less than a week after these elections, a four day week was 
introduced to most parts of Longbridge, as well as other plants in 
the Corporation. The initial announcement by management suggested 
the short time would last 3 to 8 weeks. In fact/it lasted in 
large part for nearly 5~ months, as the recession began to bite 
sharply into car sales and production. 
The response of the workplace organisation at Austin was to 
develop a policy towards short time working based around the policy 
demands created by the 'Big Five' Oxford Conference. On the 11 
January, a special JSSC meeting agreed to a policy recommendation 
drawn up by the Works Committee. 
"1 The shop stewards and Joint Production Committee 
shall invite the management to make a joint 
representation to the Government to 
a) remove the barriers to world trade 
b) remove the purchAse tax and remove recen t 
restrictions on hire purchase and credit loans. 
2 The management should pay good time-keeping bonus 
and cost of living bonus in full to those who 
are on short time. 
3 a) No overtime to be worked 
b) Noone to do the job of anyone else 
c) Four days work in four days not five 
d) Stewards should be consulted on any matter 
arising out of working the present four day 
week. 
4 Full support for the implementation of the 40-hour 
week and the present wage application".l75 
Writing the front page article which appeared in the February edition 
of 'The Journal I" Varncm, the chairman of the JSSC said, 
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"The stewards ~nd members at Austin do not accept the 
principle that four days is better than redundancy. 
We accept the principle that we are entitled to full 
employment and that if the Government is unable to carry 
this out, they should be replaced by one that will".l76 
This four point policy was adapted by the BMC combine committee 
as workplace policy across the Corporation. Varnom's three column 
article, however, made no reference to a demand for 'no redundancy'. 
At Longbridge, the Austin stewards held meetings on their sections 
to bring to the notice of the membership the short time policy. 
The JSSC heard managements reply at their regular February 
meeting. The minute reads, 
"The management had refused to make joint representations 
to the Government. They had agreed that no overtime 
should be worked that was not necessary. They had agreed 
to stop all fresh labour from starting except for specialised 
labour that had to be replaced. They had agreed that no 
men should do another man's job on his day off. They 
refused to pay the good time keeping bonus in full, or 
the national bonus in full or to pay the full holiday 
credits to the men on short time".l77 
Besides the establishment of a short time policy which did not have 
an entirely negative response on the part of management, the early 
part of 1956 saw the development of an important change which would 
have implications for not just removing the feuding between the 
workplace organisation and the TGWU at Longbridge, but also for 
the general conduct of the national union leaderships towards the 
issue of redundancy. The primary cause of this change, which 
brought the TGWU back into full participation in the workplace 
organisation,stemmed from a change in the personnel of the union's 
local officials. Jack Jones moved from Coventry to become the TGWU 
secretary for No 5 Region, while Les Kealey was appointed D 0 with 
particular responsibility for the union's Austin membership. Kealey 
immediately set about healing the wounds still present between his 
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union's stewards and the JSSC, which went back to both the McHugh 
and Pegg and Bills disputes. On the 28 March, Kealey wrote to 
Etheridge regarding the continued refusal of the JSSC to allow 
the attendance of a TGWU steward at JSSC meetings. His letter 
said, 
"I would be pleased if you would make it quit.e clear 
to your committee ~,at resulting from my request, 
immediately on taking over the Austin membership, a decision 
was taken to co-operate fully with the jointshop stewards 
committee on the basis of equality. This can be the only 
basis in future co-operation, which I am sure you feel is 
as important as we do" .178 
Referring to the breakaway committee, towhich his own union had been 
the central inspiration,he wrote to Etheridge. 
"I understand that at the last meeting of the Join:tShop 
Stewards Committee reference was made to an unofficial 
body of shop stewards, which I believe calls itself a 
trade union education committee, and in fact goes to the 
press describing itself as an anti-Communist organisation. 
It was informed that this body consisted of a group of 
shop stewards of this union. The Austin branch of this 
union, therefore, feel that it should be placed on record: 
1 That it is known that members of a number of unions 
meet in this body 
2 That although the two officers of the committee 
were at one time shop stewards of this union, the 
present position is that B~o.W Davis is still a 
member, but does not represent the union in any 
official capacity and Mr Sullivan is not even a 
member of this union now, and is in fact, as far 
as we know, a nonner".179 
Kealey went on to reaffirm the commitment of the TGWU towards 
workplace unity and organisation at Longbridge. 
"All TGWU shop stewards at the Austin motor company 
are being informed that they should not attend meetings 
of this disruptive organisation" .180 
This movemen,t to the left in the local TGWU hierarchy of officials, 
while it promoted unity on the CSEU constituted workplace organisation 
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at Austin, these same ~fficials sought to increase the influence 
of their union but distance it from the interplant activities of 
the shop ste\o[ards. Following the September conference of the 
'Big Five' for example, the Midland officials of the TGWU held 
their own conference in Coventry on the 23 October. This gathering 
of 50 of the unions stewards and local officials/welcomed the 
introduction of automation and other new techniques to the motor 
industry and called for urgent attention to be given towards 
establishing joint consultations between employees and the 
representatives of the workforce to enable this change to be 
181 brought about. On the other hand,the shop stewards movement 
in the motor industry was firmly wedded to the realising of its 
policies through the officially established channels. In December 
1955, Les Gurl wrote in 'The Journal' of the Oxford Conference, 
" •..•• the Conference will have served no useful purpose 
unless we can get the Seven-Point Plan agreed to by our 
members, unions and shop stewards committees. We have 
agreed to try and get the MP's to meet delegates from the 
motor industry" .182 
When it came to the strike at Standard,the 'Big Five' steering 
committee set up a sub-committee to deal with collections for a 
strike fund. It recommended a levy of 1/- per head for all plants, 
while a resolution had been telegrammed to the York meeting asking 
for official recognition of the dispute. At Austin,the works 
committee, on the 28 May,decided to send a resolution of protest 
against the failure of the national union leaderships to support 
Standard. The 'Big Five' held a conference in June at which 
the Standard redundancy was the most important issue. The conference 
called for official support. Its press release of the 25 June read, 
"following discussions of the Standard dispute a resolution 
was passed. 
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'that the National official trade union leadership 
should declare that any redundancy of this 
character will be answered by official support 
and action against 1~e employers and that 
immediate steps should be taken to remedy the 
position at Standards' 11183 
In a reference to a redundancy dispute at the Norton Motors in 
Birmingham,where 400 of the firms workers had struck over a 
redundancy of 26 AEU members, the 'Big Five' press release, 
acknowledging that the engineering union had given this strike 
official backing, said, four days before the BMC redundancy, 
"The Norton strikers are now in the vanguard of the 
fight against redundancy" .184 
Confronted by mass redundancy at BMC,it was the local officials 
who from the outset, took the initiative and even defined the issues. 
The response in the workplace remained largely spontaneous and 
generally unco-ordinated,despite the policies of the 'Big Five' 
and the organisational inter plant links established through the 
combine committee. The common feature among the workplace 
leadership lay less in independent actions but rather upon an 
agreement which called for an official dispute. Such an approach, 
consequently/did not infringe the actions of the local union 
officials even when such officials appeared to be clearly at odds 
with the basic 'Big Five' and BMC combine poliCies of 'no redundancy'. 
At Nuffield Metal Products, within 90 minutes of the official 
announcement that 700 jobs were to go in the Birmingham factory, the 
JSSC called a meeting of the whole workforce. With one of six of 
the plants jobs to go, there was considerable discontent. An 
approach was made to the works management for negotiations. This 
was refused on grounds that the decision had been a corporate one. 
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On the night shif~ where the redundancies were again the subject of 
grievance,l,OOO workers walked out. The dispute was led by Tom 
Evans the Works Convenor and the Chief Steward of the Vehicle 
Builders. Evans was the only member of the BMC Standing Order 
Committee to be engaged in unofficial industrial action. The 
following day the dispute had spread to the day shift.&efore the 
implementation of the redundancy notices, three quarters of the 
Nuffield Products workforce was out on strike. A mass meeting was 
called for Monday, 2 July, to discuss what further action should 
be taken. 
In contrast, at Longbridge, a meeting of the plants 200 stewards met 
in the presence of the local union officials. The stewards ended a 
three hour meeting by calling unanimously for an official strike. 
The announcement of the position of the Austin workplace organisation 
was made by J T Bolas,the Secretary of the Birmingham CSEU. He 
said after the meeting, 
liThe shop stewards want drastic action and the thing we 
are bitter about is that we were not informed until, 
at the most, 24 hours before the sackings that they were 
going to take place" .185 
The strike call was forwarded to the union executives. Down in 
Oxford/where 1,000 jobs were lost less than 400 workers out of a 
combined workforce of 8,500 from the Cars and Radiator plants turned 
up at a mass meeting. Unlike Austin, the vote was taken at a meeting 
of the membership rather than by the stewards, but the outcome was the 
same. Both plants called for an official dispute within seven days 
if the notices were not withdrawn. l8G In the course of the weekend 
two developments occurred. On the Saturday, the BMC Combine 
Committee met in Birmingham under the chairmanship of Dick Etheridge. 
Also in attendance/were invited delegates from the 'Big Five' motor 
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stewards. The meeting called for four measures, 
"1 That the union executives call for an official 
strike throughout the BMC if the dismissal notices 
are not withdrawn. 
2 To organise a mass lobby of the House of Commons 
by up to 10,000 motor workers on the 9 July. 
3 To arrange simultaneous mass demonstrations 
against dismissals in Birmingham, Coventry and 
Oxford on a date to be fixed. 
4 A call for the Government to set up an important 
inquiry into the workings of the motor industry, 
including its sales policy". 187 
On the same day, however, a meeting was also taking place between 
the regional officials and the senior stewards of the TGWU from the 
factories and districts of the BMC. The demands of this meeting 
were, 
"1 An immediate meeting between the union National 
Executives representatives and the BMC Board of 
Directors. 
2 Reinstatement of all dismissed workers pending 
further discussions or the payment of substantial 
compensation to the dismissed men while they were 
looking for other work. 
3 An undertaking that any further men dismissed should 
receive a months notice and financial compensation 
for the loss of work". 188 
While the BMC combine committee was calling for an official strike, 
there were no calls to take action in the workplace against redundancy. 
On the other hand, there was no call for a strike by the TGWU 
offiCials; it was reinstatement, to enable discussions to take place 
or discussion with the Corporation on compensation. Among the NUVB, 
a meeting of its r1idland Shop Stewards, which learned that Bill 
Nordoff,their relatively recently elected chief steward at Longbridge, 
was among a number of shop stewards who were made redundant, followed 
189 the position adopted by the Combine Committee. 
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At the mass meeting on the 1 Jul~ at Metal Products,it was the 
local officials who persuaded the workforce to return to work in 
order that negotiations could proceed. Though Evans,the works 
convenor,had been challenging the right of the redundancy, Jack 
Jones saw the dispute in a different light. He said after the 
meeting, 
"Those men acted under strong provocation and their actions 
emphasise the need for the fullest consultation with the 
unions before dismissals of this magnitude are made •.• "190 
He then went on, 
"We realise that the circumstances may arise in which the 
displacement of labour cannot always be avoided but we 
feel that is no excuse for employers to evade the great 
social responsibilities which they assume when employing 
labour". 191 
Beard,the TGWU DO/also at this meeting stated, 
"Trade unionists had been sensible and realise that when 
the industries market dries up there was bound to be some 
displacement of labour. When people had been brought 
into the industry on a promise of employment for years 
ahead, there was an obligation on the employers to give 
adequate notice of any displacement of labour and adequate 
compensation" .192 
Geo. Evans, however, the NUVB DO,said there were no guarantees 
of re-engagement for those dismissed. He claimed, of the return 
to work, 
"The most we can say is that consultation will take 
place". 193 
While the national trade union leadership had been split over the 
question of 'no redundancy' in the Standard dispute, all the early 
indicators in the BMC redundancy were that the TGWU officials 
appeared to be taking a clear lead in which the acceptance of 
redundancy was being seen as inevitable. Their main objections 
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were addressed more ~o the manner in which the redundancy had been 
carried out, and for a demand that compensation should be paid. 
The workplace leadership,on the other hand, showed few signs of 
allowing the feelings in the workplace to be manifest in independent 
workplace action. With the exception of Metal Products,the only 
other evidence of workplace sanctions surrounding the redundancy 
decision appeared to be a "go slow" at the Birmingham body plant 
. 194 
of F1sher Ludlow. On the 2 July, the industrial correspondent 
of The Times could report, 
"Indignation among workers at the dismissals without 
previous consultation produced immediate strikes and 
threats of strikes on Friday at several BMC factories, 
but it does not look as though the majority of the 
workers employed by firms will take matters into their own 
hands at least before the meetings to be held in the 
next few days".195 
The position of the union officials,where clear divisions on policy 
towards redundancy existed between the number of small craft unions, 
including the policy of the AEU NC and the greater willingness on 
the part of the TGWU to acquies~e over the basic question of 
principle,still left the national union officials divided and more 
uncertain than ever on how to respond to the actions of the BMC 
management. At local leve~the effectiveness of the officials 
discouraged strike activity and put the case into Procedure. On 
the 28 June,an informal conference had been held at Longbridge and 
attended by 12 local officials from 10 of the unions with a membership. 
at the plant. Etheridge was the only workplace representative in 
attendance. The works management merely restated their reasons for 
their actions/while the unions endeavoured to estabLish a clarification 
over details. Dick Etheridge/however, made the point that, 
" ••.•• relations over the past four years had been better 
at the Austin Motor Company than ever previously. This 
(the redundancy) was a retrograde step. The stewards 
had been pleasantly surprised at the understanding that they 
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had been able ~o get about short-time working. There 
had been much more notice than in the present case .... 
the stewards had been co-operative. They accepted 
transference to other factories and the principle of 
mobility of labour". 196 
On the 4 Jul~ a Works Conference was held in Birmingham at which 
seven of the BMC factories were represented. The terms of reference 
were, 
"That the trade unions desire to discuss the manner and 
method adopted when dismissal notices were given to the 
workpeople at the British Motor corporation".197 
This Conference centred upon a discussion of "The need, the method 
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and the manner". Though it was always going to be inconclusive, 
on the intervention of national union officials it was agreed to 
adjourn procedure to enable informal discussion to take place 
between national union officials and the senior management of BMC. 
Much of the argument at local level had surrounded questions of 
implementation. The local officials were claiming that the short 
period of notice and the unwillingness to allow the workforce to 
work out its weeks notice,prevented the unions from making representations 
in cases of hardship. Furthermore/the extent to which transfers 
and reorganisation had been accepted by the workforce created 
considerable anomalies in operating a "last in - first out" selection 
policy. The only stoppages at Austin were spontaneous reactions 
towards management attempts to demand transfers of workers to the jobs 
of those who had been made redundant. After an argument/50 workers 
stopped, but within a short time over 3,000 had downed tools. 199 
This, perhaps the largest, was one of many small stoppages which 
remained unco-ordinated across Longbridge. The workplace leadership, 
however, not wishing to prejudice their position,chose to settle 
these disputes in isolation rather than extend them. Their whole 
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strategy was directed at gaining official support of the national 
officials, rather than be the spearhead for independent action in 
the workplace. The position of the national officials was far from 
clear. 
The CSEU NE empowered Nicholas, (TGWU), Ambrose (AEU), Roberts (NUVB) 
and Townsend (SMW) to meet with the BMC top management in order to, 
" •.•. secure the best possible terms for the dismissed 
workers". 200 
The employers,while conce, ding to the informal meeting after 
adjourning procedure, had no intention of making concessions. 
Their acceptance of the union delegation was merely to offset 
public criticism. The Federation's advice to their local associatio~ 
on the 3 July/was for acceptance. 
"It was suggested to him (John Hope BW EEA) that there 
was great danger in refusing to meet this request, which 
was for informal discussions outside the Procedure. The 
unions would be able to make considerable use in any 
publicity of management refused this request for a meeting. 
At the same time it would be competent for the firm to 
point out that the question was in Procedure, and every 
effort should be made to avoid creating a feeling that the 
Procedure was not appropriate or that informal methods 
would be likely to achieve better resul ts". 201 
The demands put to the ~mployers, particularly the position of the 
TGWU put by Nicholas,represented the clearest shift away from 
opposition to redundancy as an end in itself. The four leaders put 
six main requests to BMC senior management in the presence of John 
Hope. 
"I Re-engaging the dismissed men so that discussion 
could proceed. 
2 A proposal for work sh'aring on a rota basis -
"Rotamation". 
3 A consideration that financial compensation be 
paid on the basis of making up the difference 
between unemployment benefit and the level of 
the Ccnsolidated Time Rate. 
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4 A redundancy procedure for future redundancies 
with adequate prior consultation and longer periods 
of notice. 
5 Assurances on the re-employment of discharged 
workers". 202 
The request for reinstatement and the demand for worksharing were 
flatly refused. The undertaking on re-employment was reiterated, 
as was the companies view of the recession. The only new dimension 
which had been raised neither by the local officials or the shop 
stewards/was the suggestion put forward by Harry Nicholas for 
financial compensation for those dismissed. Ambrose,of the AE~ 
had no mandate to discuss such a claim and neither of the craft 
unions representatives took part in the exchanges on this item. 
The main stumbling block was not the policies of the craft unions 
but the position of the Federation. Hope presented the EEF objections. 
" •••. although theoretically ex-gratia payments were matters 
for individual concerns, in practice, if a very large concern 
like the British Motor Corporation acted unilaterally it 
would be bound to prejudice the position for other 
federated concerns, some of whom might be faced with the 
same problem in the near future". 203 
Despite the fact that the union leadership now appeared prepared 
to abandon a 'no redundancy' polic~ it still did not meet with the 
consent of the BMC management. Reinstatement was refused on grounds 
that the Corporation was now operating on a reduced production 
programme. Work sharing was denounced as impractical. The view of 
the employers was, 
" •..• the only economic propositions in the interests of the 
firm and the remainder of the employees was redundancy" .204 
compensation was ruled out because of the implications it held for 
member firms in the Federation. Neither the EEF nor BEC wished 
to see a company like BMC creating a precedent for compensation, 
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where the mass of smaller firms lacking the resources of the 
Corporation would not have the same ability to pay. Even on the 
question of a redundancy procedure agreement for the future,the EEF 
wanted this left to the local Conference. Though they would encourage 
member firms to give early notification of redundancies,such decisions 
were at the discretion of individual employe~s. Even though the 
national officials did not appear to be directly challenging managerial 
prerogative, and despite the clear abandonment of a 'no redundancy' 
demand even on the part of the AEU leadership, the terms of the union 
leaderships acceptance for redundancy stood at variance to the 
positions held by both the SMC and the EEF. It was therefore the 
approach of the employers as muchathe demands from the workplace l 
which was forcing the national union leaders to take a position on 
their own somewhat unclear proposals on redundancy. A meeting 
of the union leaderships was called for the 10 July to examine what 
205 kind of "action in the factories" could be taken in response 
to the views of the employers. 
Discontent and occasional stoppages continued to be expressed during 
the week after the dismissed workers had left the works. The 
selection of redundancies,on a "last in - first out" basis across 
sections, gave rise to considerable anomalies. Workers with 20 
years service had been dismissed with little more than a days notice. 
Dick Etheridge gave an example of a man with 31 years service at 
Austin being made redundant, but the following week a woman had been 
put on his job, while others with less than a years'employment at 
& where 
Longbridge had escaped dismissal, a large number of new workers 
had been recruited on certain sections. 20G Regardless, however, 
the workplace leadership,not unaware of the disconten~ stuck to 
its central strategy - an official dispute, despite or perhaps 
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even because of,the failure of the employers to produce concessions. 
On the 6 July,after a series of sectional meetings at Longbridge, 
the JSSC restated its call for official action rather than take 
an independent initiative. Dick Etheridge said, 
"The management refusal of our demands were not 
received pleasantly but the feeling in the works is that 
this matter is of such a magnitude, that any action should 
be united and with the leadership of the officials" .207 
P Fiet, the acting chairman of the Austin stewards, in the absence 
of Varnom who was attending a conference in France, said, 
"No one wants a strike but we are all looking to our 
officials for a lead". 208 
On the 9 July,a meeting of 750 shop stewards in the motor industry 
organised by the 'Big Five',called for an official stoppage across 
the whole of the motor industry. The meeting of 14 unions NEls 
in Londen ,decided on the 10 July,.. respond to the workplace demands, and 
"This meeting recommends to all Executive Councils that 
notice be given to the British Motor Corporation that, 
in the event of their continued refusal, either to 
reinstate the 6,000 dismissed workers or to afford 
adequate compensation and to give assurances of full 
consultation in the future all labour will be withdrawn 
from British Motor Corporation factories on and from 
23 July 1956". 209 
A series of telephone conversations between the national union 
representatives and the BMC senior management had failed to move the 
approach of the Corporation. A press statement issued by the company 
said, 
"This action is yet another profoundly disturbing example 
of trade unionism at National level. We have in mind 
recent union action at Rolls Royce, Hawker Aircraft and Norton 
Motors. In all these cases, as in our own, official strikes 
have been declared before the Procedure agreed in the industry 
between the Engineering and Allied Employers Federation, 
of which the firm concerned are members, and the trade 
unions have been exhausted". 210 
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In a reference to the ~Big Five' the statement went on, 
"the Bri tish Motor Corpora tion fee 1 that the union 
executives have yielded to pressure from certain elements 
who do not represent the views of the vast majority of 
the workpeople concerned". 211 
While neither side expected the BMC strike to have 100 per cent 
support, it remained unclear to what extent the national union 
leadership could command the allegiance of the membership. The 
strike,due to begin on the 23 July was only five days away from the 
complete closure of the BMC for the now agreed annual holiday 
fortnight. It was also almost three weeks after the actual redundancies. 
Furthermore, there was considerable emphasis in the local and national 
press to the stocks of unsold cars which were the result of the 
recession in the industry. For the existing workforce,the union 
leadership was asking its union membership to begin a national all 
out strike,not only five days before their holidays but after a 
period of 5~ months short time working. Furthermore, the actual 
impact of the redundancy was unevenly experienced across the combine. 
There were 3,000 redundancies among the 20,000 Austin workers but 
none among the Corporations 5,000 employees in Coventry, where the 
highest levels of unionisation existed, whereas in Oxford,union 
membership was often low outside the craft areas. The operation 
of the "last in - first out" selection for redundancy, however, did 
not discriminate between union and non-union workers ';i t therefore 
did not offer protection to anti-union workers. The initial 
response of both the Government and the employers to the strike call 
appeared to be one of being prepared to ride-it-out on the expectation 
of it having only limited support. While there was some grounds 
for taking such a vie~both these parties became alarmed at the 
prospect of the conflict spilling over beyond the motor industry 
as support began to be expressed in other industries for the BMC 
workers 
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The managements early suggestions were that the strike would be 
212 ignored by as much as 80 per cent of workforce. On the 11 Jul~ 
nearly 900 signatures had been collected at Morris Motors, Oxford, 
'th 'k 11 213 oppos~ng e str~ e ca • Even at the Metal Products plant in 
Birmingham, 90 vehicle builders in the paint shop held a section 
meeting and opposed the strike. Across in Coventry at the Morris 
Engines plant,the AEU members from the toolroom voted against the 
strike call. In the Found~,ry section however, 550 of the TGWU 
walked out to hold a meeting to consider their position. They voted 
to strike. 2l4 This fragmented response,with the implication of a 
revolt from the rank and file against the union leadership, began 
to turn with the setting up of Central Dispute Committees. These 
were manned by the local full time officials plus delegates from:' 
the individual workplace strike committees. The most important 
central disputes committee was based on Birmingham/where 70 per 
cent of the BMC workforce was employed. Here the chairman was 
Jack Williams, the Engineering Trade Group Secretary of the TGWU. 
At Longbridge,the immediate response of the workplace organisation 
to the strike call was the establishing of a network of strike 
committees covering Transport, Information, Legal Advice, Propaganda, 
Finance, and Picket Duties. 21S In Coventry,the central disputes 
committee decided to hold a series of factory gate meetings at the 
city's BMC plants in order to generate support. On the 20 July, 
it was being reported that less than a-third of workers were attending' 
216 these addresses. In Oxford,on the Friday before the beginning 
of the strike, a meeting at Morris Radiators was attended by less' 
217 than one in ten of the factories manual workforce, while at the 
Tractor and Transmissions plant in Birmingham, the shop stewards 
in the AEU had held a ballot of their membership and discovered that 
60 per cent Were opposed to the strike in the toolroom and a five to 
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one ratio among the plants union membership, had decided against 
'k 11 218 the str~ e ca • 
The management's move to weaken support was to offer all of their 
labour force a full days wage for Monday 23 July. Since the 
redundancy plants on a four day week had not worked Mondays, this 
invite offered, 
"All men who turn up for work will be found a job and 
will be paid. If disorganisation of production means 
that they cannot do their normal work then alternative 
work will be provided for them" .219 
In what was now being described as the most important dispute in 
the post war period/the Corporations management were claiming that 
53 per cent of their labour force was working during the first day 
of the strike. Over 23,200 day shift workers out of a total of 
43,500 in 12 factories were claimed to be at work. 220 These figures 
confirmed the weaknesses in workplace organisation. At the MG 
facto~l in Abingdon, H Cook,the local secretary of the NUVB,was the 
221 
only member of the workforce on strike. Morris Radiators were 
claiming a 90 per cent attendance/while Morris Cars claimed 85 per 
222 
cent of workforce had clocked in. Support for the unions was 
stronger in the Midlands but even at Longbridge the works management 
223 
said that only one if five workers were not at work. A similar 
proportion was in at SU Carburettors. Among the other Birmingham 
plants, the management reported a-third of the Morris Commercial, two-
thirds of the Metal Products and only a quarter of the Tractor and 
224 Transmissions factories supported the stoppage. It was in Coventry 
where the loyalty towards the unions was most vividly expressed, 
dispite the fact that no redundancies had been issued among the 
cit¥~s BMC factories. Four out of five of those employed in the 
Morris Engines plant, and nine out of ten workers in the Morris 
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'k 225 h ' i Bodies factory were on str~ e. T e strike 1n fact had ts 
greatest support from the body shops where traditionally a high 
proportion of NUVB, SMW and AEU memberships were employed. Besides 
Morris Bodies,less than five per cent of the workforce in the Fisher 
Ludlow body plants at Birmingham and Coventry had crossed union 
I ' 226 picket 1nes. 
After the first da~ the strike organisers began to look towards ways 
of strengthening their position. At Longbridge, the workplace 
organisation announced plans for the stationing of 1,000 pickets 
at the Austin works. The AEU issued an instruction to all its 
members to refuse to handle work of any kind for BMC plants. The 
effect of this upon the supply of axles, cables, and other car 
accessories would begin to be felt on the assembly lines within 
days. Openshaw, the unions president,said on the opening day of the 
strike, 
"This is a major job and we are going to do everything 
to win it. The strike is strengthening in spite of 
reports of the men drifting into work. It will be so complete 
within a few days that it will not be any use anybody trying 
to work. I think that by the end of the week we shall have 
stopped all work designed for BMC ..•• Production cannot 
go on very long because work on the line depends on another 
and the difficulties will be so insurmountable that it will 
not be worth while opening the works". 227 
Meanwhile, the national leadership of the TGWU issued instructions 
to the Dock~ Road Transport, and the Railway Unions to "black" all 
movement of BMC goods and supplies. Even bus drivers on Midland 
Red and Birmingham Corporation/withdrew transport to the Longbridge 
228 
works. 
On the second day of the dispute, Morris Radiators completely stopped 
after Malcolm Young the works convenor arrived in the works. Despite 
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the fact that the works was only about 40 per cent organised, after 
a canteen meeting, 90 per cent of the workforce 
went on strike; a large number of who joined the TGW~who were making 
immediate payments of dispute benefit. 229 By the third da~ the 
effects of the strike were spreading beyond BMC. The assembly 
lines stopped at Press Steel as the workforce walked out in support 
of BMC workers. At Jensen Motors in West Bromwich,3oo walked out 
after a disagreement over the blacking of BMC work. The Coventry 
Hood and Sidescreen Company gave notice of redundancy owing to 
shortages of supplies from BMC. The Lockheed Hydraulic Brake Company 
went on a 3 day week and British Piston Ring declared a redundancy. 
More serious in its implications,12,OOO Ford workers went on strike 
over managements refusal to withdraw redundancy notices to 2,000 
workers whose jobs were affected by the shortages from Fisher Ludlow. 
Jack Mitchell, the convenor at the Briggs plant and a member of the 
'Big Five' Steering Committee was quoted as saying, 
"It is a 100 per cent strike. The men are determined to 
fight this one to the finish. There principle is 'one 
out the lot out' ft. 230 
By the end of the first week,clashes were being reported at Cowley 
and Longbridge where picket lines had been organised. But for the 
employers, in general, and the Government, the most alarming aspect 
was the rapid escalation of the area of conflict. Component 
manufacturers were having to layoff workers, Standard management 
announced the possibility of making another 1,000 redundant because 
of the loss of bodies from Fisher Ludlow. On the 31 July, the NUR 
circulated instructions to its 1,670 branches not to handle any 
goods either to or from BMC factories. A spokesman for the union, 
commenting on the union decision to back the engineering unions said, 
"This is an official dispute which could have a very decided 
affect on organised trade unionists not only in the motor 
car industry but in every sector of the industrial field". 231 
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The movement of coal and steel to the BMC foundaries had come to a 
complete halt. On the 30 July, the fear of a national dock strike, 
arising out of sympathy actions taken in support of official union 
instructions, began to loom. The National Association of Port 
Employers issued a statement describing the dockers embargo of BMC 
goods as, 
"a gross break of mutual understanding in the docks 
industry". 232 
The prospect of a stoppage arising out of disciplinary actions 
by the employers, under the provisions of the dock labour scheme, 
was only compounded by the employers in the engineering industry 
asking for advice from the EEF over the refusal of union members 
in the components industry to handle BMC orders. Within two days 
of the start of the dispute with the Corporation,the Federation 
was advising caution. On the 25 JulY,the following policy was being 
advocated by the EEF to its constituent members. 
"l Where management was notified of their workpeoples 
refusal to carry out BMC work, the firm should take 
every opportunity of questioning whether the men 
were acting wisely in view of the fact that some 50 
per cent of the BMC's own employees thought so little 
of the dispute that they were remaining at work. 
2 If, as was likely, the workers concerned stated 
that they were acting under union instructions, 
firms should as far as possible, minimise the effect 
of any action taken by their workpeople rather 
than maximise it. 
3 Thus although workpeople who refuse to carry out 
certain work would technically be on strike, they 
should wherever possible be found other work. 
Similarly workpeople laid idle in the establishment 
as a result of a refusal by other workers to carry 
out BMC work should themselves be found alternative 
work if this is practicable. 
All this assumes that the workers are reasonable 
in their attitudes. 
4 If, despite every effort, it was not found 
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possible to provide alternative work for those 
laid idle in an establishment where workplace 
were refusing to carry out BMC work, the guarantee 
\'lould be waived : a refusal to carry out work 
being tantamount to strike action".233 
caution, with the prospect of esculating the conflict within the 
engineering industry/was matched by a fear of the dispute having 
repercussions and other sectors of the economy. At the end of 
the first week/The Economist commented, 
" ..•. support for the strike grows dangerously among 
other workers such as railwaymen" .234 
Even with the divided support from the workforces in BMC, the strike 
was having a significant impact upon the employers. Apart from the 
blacking of BMC work outside the Corporation in the workplace, 
the management faced an increasing burden of finding productive 
employment for those workers who cross~d the picket lines. At 
the Morris plants in Oxford,where three quarters of the labour force 
were regularly clocking in,less than 40 per cent of normal production 
i h ' d 235 was be ng ac 1eve . At Austin, little more than a quarter of 
normal production was obtained from nearly three quarters of the 
236 labour force. 
The beginning of the two weeks annual holiday if any thing, saw the 
organisation of the strike become more effective. No essential 
maintenance work took place. The restrictions upon the movements 
of BMC imports and exports became virtually complete. The factory 
strike committees and the Central Disputes Committees held daily 
meetings to develop ways of tightening their hold over the Corporation. 
Speakers were despatched across the country to help reinforce support 
for the stoppage. From the activities of the hardship fund/it is 
clear that an increasing number of non unionists or workers whose 
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union membership had lapsed were beginning to join the dispute. 
On the third day of the strike it became apparent that the employers 
were prepared to make concessions. The Management Board of the 
Federation met on the 26 July and decided, 
"1 The British Motor Corporation are prepared to 
discuss locally the form of consultation in the 
event of redundancy. 
2 The Federation are still prepared to consider on 
a national basis any views which the Confederation 
may wish to advise on the general question of 
redundancy including the question of notice and 
other considerations of those displaced".237 
It was not until the first week of the holidays that the MOL moved 
in,to respond to what was viewed as a more conciliatory response on 
the part of the employers. For the MinistrY,the concern was that 
with the strike having started a "war of attril:fOf'lll would result 
in other sections of the labour movement becoming involved. BMC 
management were clearly under pressure over their handling of the 
redundancies. Neither Parliamentary opinion nor press comment gave 
much comfort to the Corporation, and even views among the EEF 
. 238 
appeared to be div~ded. 
On the 31 July, the Chief Industrial Commissioner, Sir Wilfred Neden, 
called in both sides for discussions. On the issue of consultation 
before redundancy,the management side were already concelding that 
the unions were "pushing at an open door". The obstacle was 
compensation. The Federation opposed this being resolved under 
duress with the BMC. For the union leadership, however, this was 
not a topic for lengthy discussions at national level. Harry 
Nicholas of the TGWU stated their case. 
"The strike is against BMC not the Federation •••• we are 
not prepared to meet the National Federation on compensation. 
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We do not want the question to be influenced by what 
the backyard fo~ndaries can pay compared with what people 
wi th the finances of BMC can pay. We maintain that the 
question of compensation for redundancy is a matter to 
be dealt with by us with the firm concerned, unless and 
until there is a national agreement. Having regard to the 
protracted negotiations which are always necessary to 
arrive at a national agreement we cannot wait that length 
of time to deal with the problem of 6,000 men dismissed 
by BMC. This dispute is about the way they should be 
dealt with".239 
Leading the union side at the MOL talks, Harry Brotherton informed 
the Commissioner that, 
" ..•. he had not formulated any exact mathematical 
ideas of what should happen". 240 
but went on to say of thel'lational leaderships commitment to the 
struggle with BMC, 
"The unions would rather go down wi th the wreckage than 
stand the horrible state of affairs that existed".24l 
The union leaderships which previously had been unwilling to agreed 
to actively support the defence of the NUVB over McHugh, who had 
been divided and uncertain at Standard/were now shaken by the poor 
state of organisation in the motor industry. To lose yet again on 
the question of redundancy,could only have catastrophic consequences 
for union membership. The BMC strike witnessed both an enforced 
unity from within both left and right wing sections of the engineering 
unions and a far more assertive position being taken by the TGWU, 
which appeared to be making a milrked br~ilk from the Arthur Deakin 
period. On Friday, the 10 August, the basis of an agreement was 
reached. The terms were, 
"It was mutually agreed between the employers and the 
unions: 
1 There shall be a resumption of work at all BMC 
factories next week, commencing Monday, 13 August 
1956. 
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2 There shall be no victimisation by either side, 
and all. employees shall return to work on the 
terms and conditions prevailing prior to the 
dispute. 
3 The BMC agreed that joint re-examination of the 
redundancies shall proceed locally at 
individual establishments. 
4 The BMC report their undertaking to offer re-
employment to their ex-employees in appropriate 
vacancies which may arise. 
5 In the special circumstances of this redundancy 
the Engineering Employers Federation have recommended, 
and the BMC have agreed to make, payments in lieu 
of longer notice to certain of the dismissed 
employees on the following basis, 
A To Employees of three years continuous service, 
a further week's pay at appropriate consolidated 
time rates. 
B To employees of ten years or more, continuous 
service, two further week's pay at appropriate 
consolidated time rates. 
6 The method of dealing with any future redundancies 
which may arise in any of the establishments of the 
BMC is referred for final settlement locally". 242 
The final negotiations lasted 15 hours. The main area of contention 
were the details surrounding compensation. The unions failed to 
gain compensation for all redundant workers,while the management 
would not discuss the final details until the decision had been made 
to call off the strike. 
These agreements saw the eclipse of the 'right to work' policies 
of the 'Big FLve' shop stewards. The unity of the CSEU leadership 
had forced the hand of the employers on the question of consultation 
over redundancy. In exchange for an involvement in job loss,the 
union leaderships had accepted compensation for jobs rather than 
'no redundancy'. It was the effectiveness of the union leaderships, 
both nationally and at local leve~which had usurped the workplace 
organisation. In contrast,the experience of Standard/the national 
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union officials were willing to engage in a national stoppage with 
one of the most important employers in the Federation despute the 
weaker state of union membership in the Corporation. Unlike the 
powerfully organised Standard possessing, for the motor industry, 
a remarkable level of internal workplace unity, at BMC it was the 
district officials rather than the workplace organisation which 
controlled the strike through the formation of the Central Disputes 
Committees, set up in Coventry, Birmingham and Oxford. Local officials 
were not only able to hold the workplace organisation in obeyance, 
but the weak position of union membership and the general state 
of organisation in the plants,placed the workplace leaders hips firmly 
under the authority of officialdom, even to the point of discouraging 
stoppages not having the authorisation of the full time officials. 
It was the local officials and not the combine committee which 
brought co-ordination to the strike. At Longbridge, the DO of the 
NOVB,Jack Gardiner/along with officials from the TGWU led the mass 
sit-down on the picket lines which prevented supplies reaching 
Longbridge. For the union side,the dispute highlighted a serious 
inbalance in organisation. The strike had been strongest in areas 
like Coventry, where despite the absence of redundancY,the membership 
had supported the national union leadership. Support was visJbly 
weaker in Oxford and Birmingham where considerable areas of non 
union labour were employed. Moreover the stoppage was most complete 
among the skilled memberships. It was in the body shops in particula~ 
where the NOVB and the SMW were the h~irs to a craft tradition, and 
in the machine shops where the apprenticed engineers displayed a 
discipline and a loyalty to union leadership. However, it was among 
the large,unorganised semi skilled track workers and among those 
indirect workers where organisational weaknesses were starkly 
revealed. It was in these areas,that the new assertive TGWU was to 
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make its biggest inroads in the post strike period. 
That the union officials had controlled the strik~did not detract 
from the work that had been put in by the workplace organisation. 
wIJrr' 
Such activities firmly subordinated to the authority of the officials. 
It was the workplace leadership which was to lead the triumphant 
return to work. On the 13 Augus~at the end of the 19 day disputel 
a mass meeting held at Grass Field in Birmingham on a wet Monday 
morning, heard Dick Etheridge present a new confident and defiant 
challenge to management. Addressing the meeting he said, 
"They (the works management) say they are going to let us 
know when to return through the medium of the press. 
That is not the way we are going to be treated. The 
terms of the agreement are quite explicit: 'to return to 
work on the normal working day which is Monday, 13 
August'. This is Monday isn't it? We will march into the 
works whether they want us to or not. Sections will 
break off at their normal working places and the works 
committee will see the management and get this sorted 
out. Agreed?" 243 
The meeting concluded by giving three cheers for the local officials. 
As the returning strikers marched through the Birmingham streets 
towards the entrance of the East Works,they sang a victory song 
which had been specially written by Arthur Burgess, a grinder from 
the machine shop and an active member of the picket committee. In 
a parody of 'Marching through Georja' they sang his lyrics, copies 
of which had been distributed by the Austin Strike Committee. 
"Now the Battle's over and victory has been won 
We'll keep alive our unity and the bosses on the run 
Let us stand together be proud of what we've won 
While are marching to victory. 
Hurrah! 
Hurrah ! 
Hurrah! 
Hurrah! 
We've beat the BMC 
We've workers and we're free"244 
As they entered the works,throughthe CAB section and marched down 
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towards the West Works, there was a constant c1anging of metal 
h h " k " ti t th i" 245 against t e mac ~nes eep~ng me 0 e mass s ng~ng. The 
hilarity continued throughout the morning as a rejuv~nated membership 
celebrated their success. 
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3 WORKPLACE RECOGNITION NJD REDUNDANCY AGREEMENTS 
Both the Standard and the BMC redundancy strikes/marked a distinctive 
break in the approach of organised labour towards redundancy in a 
market economy. This change was not without implications for 
workplace organisation in the motor industry. On the 7 July in 
/ 
a debate in the House of Commons on Government Economic policy it 
became apparent that both the main political parties had accepted 
that 'full employment' did not mean that every worker had an 
inalienable right to remain in his present job. During the course 
of the debate/Harold MacMillan, as Chancellor of the Exchequer, 
said, 
"It is clear that we should avoid under-employment 
or concealed under-employment in the industries which 
have lost their markets, when at the same time, there 
is severe labour shortage in industries which are still 
expanding" .246 
Given the acceptance of unemployment as a necessary requirement in 
a labour market,the lesson to be drawn from the Standard and BMC 
disputes lay not in a disagreement over the objective of employer 
policy, the shedding of labour, but rather from the consequences 
of the means for achieving such a reduction. The Economist, for 
example, in a critical assessment of the BMC strike argued, 
"By becoming the first motor company to let go of its 
workers promptly BMC has struck a blow for swift mobility 
but by giving notice to its men so busquely and flooding 
the labour exchanges after so little warning, when it knew 
well before hand that the dismissals could not be avoided, 
it has done real harm to the cause of confidence in 
indust:rial relations". 247 
The main danger regarding the question of redundanc~ it suggested, 
lay in the Standard. 
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"The dismissed i ... orker3 at Standard who had continued at 
their work benches for some weeks while under notice, had 
threatened to stir up strikes in resistr-\nce to the 
sackings - and the unions had done little to discourage 
them". 248 
The main achievements of the BMC dispute, however, were, 
"The unions now appear to be ready to lay rather more 
emphasis on bargaining for higher severence pay and rather 
less on demonstrations against the fact of redundancies -
a policy that they should have accepted from the start. 
This change in the unions attitude could be a significant 
turning point in the whole psychological struggle for 
labour redeployment". 249 
For the union leaderships/the price of this transformation was 
offset by the partial gains in compensation and an employer 
commitment to consultation over redundancies. The achievements from 
the strikes were even acknowledged as being modest. In his opening 
address at the 1956 Annual Conference of the CSEU, Harry Brotherton 
set out what he saw as the main implications of the BMC dispute. 
What had been achieved had come about through what he described as 
an "awareness of unity of purpose" among the 15 unions which had been 
involved. He went on to say, 
"Every reasonable step must be taken to minimise the 
difficulties which redundancy created. Consultation should 
take place with union officials on whether the problem 
would be permanent or temporary and whether it could be 
best met by short-time working or dismissals". 250 
He went on, 
"If a permanent reduction in the labour force were needed 
it might be achieved merely by halting recruitment. 
Employees and the Ministry of Labour should be given the 
largest possible notice. Governments should provide 
subsistence for those who had to take jobs in another area. 
Workers with any length of service should have the right to 
compensation. This is no revolutionary idea, for compensation 
was paid to managerial and professional employees and the 
idea was not so ambitious as American union requests for a 
guaranteed annual wage". 251 
The Journal saw the importance of the strike not so much in what 
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had been achieved but rather in what had been prevented - the 
exercise of summary dismissals and mass unemployment. 
"The greatest victory is not the question of consultation 
or the very real concessions of compensation but in what 
we prevented the employers from doing. We were fighting 
a defensive battle to stop the employers and government 
from creating a pool of unemployment which they could use 
as an instrument to attack our wages and conditons". 252 
In the workplace assessment of the strike, John Barker, a NUVB shop 
steward at Longbridge, emphasised the role of the union officials. 
Writing in The Journal he said, 
"We could not close without a word of thanks for our 
officials who achieved our joint demands. Consultation 
before redundancy. Compensation if redundancy should 
occur - all these things add up to a brighter future for 
our children when they have to go out to earn a 1iving".253 
On the 26 September 1956, almost identical procedure agreements were 
signed by the local CSEU officials and the works managements at 
Standard and all the BMC plants. 
The redundancy procedure sought to involve simultaneously both the 
senior shop stewards and the local trade union officials in the 
operations of redundancies. While the procedure, for the first tim~ 
acknowledged the status of senior stewards in the BMC workplace 
organisation/any objectives to the redundancy from within the 
workplace would have to be taken up by the local officials. The 
main content of the procedure \.,ras the time scale for dismissal 
within which management could outline their reasons for redundancies. 
Apart from enhancing the position of senior stewards, through the 
procedure operating through the leadership of the workplace 
organisation, the redress of individual workers could only be 
remedy through union representatives. Thus the procedure agreement 
itself encouraged a growth in unionisation throughout BMC. Within 
6"? .L_ 
the following 12 months/a rapid growth in union membership was being 
reported throughout BMC. In April 195~ following a growing shortage 
of components to the motor industry arising out of the Dational 
~ngineering stoppage large scale redundancies and short time working 
again threatened the motor industry. On the 2, April The Times reported 
"Hundreds of workers in the Oxford area are applying for trade union 
memberShip".254 On the 3 July, strikes broke out on various sections 
at Morris Motors against the presence of non-union labour. In a 
matter of days, 14 sections reported 100 per cent organisation and a 
1 1 '" 255 di further 8 had near y comp ete un~on~sat~on. At Morris Ra ators, 
the convenor Malcolm Young claimed, 
" ..... great strides have been made to secure a 100 per 
cent factory. Several departments and sections have secured 
100 per cent organisation whilst the majority of the 
remainder have almost reached their aim". 256 
A similar story was being revealed at Morris Commercial in Birmingham. 
A report in The Clarion, the combine paper, claimed, 
"Organisation in the factory growing very quickly, a very 
high percentage now in the union •••• attempts to get an 
'official' works committee" .257 
At Longbridge, reports from sections immediately after the big strike 
were stating a refusal of trade unionists to work with 'NGnners'. 
In the North Works, for example,the works committee heard, 
"Feelings running high against non strikers ..• averting 
victimisation according to the agreement".258 
In the West Press Shop, the management had been given until mid-day 
to put two 'scabs' on a machine of their own. The issue was settled 
by both joining a union. In the West Body Shop,vehicle builders 
who had crossed the picket lines had been suspended by the NUVB. 
The policy adopted by the Austin JSSC attempted to accord with the 
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no victimisation pledges in the strike agreement. The conduct of 
individual members during the strike were left to the authority of 
the union. For non union labour, the workplace organisation relied 
upon the consequences of non-representation. On the 5 September 1956, 
22 redundancy notices were served by the works management. Twenty 
one of these were reported to the JSSC as being "nonners", while 
the other workers involved had been a "non-strike". The Committee 
, 259 
agreed to take no action on the redundant workers behalf. By 
the Autumn of 1957 .. the Longbridge workforce had increased by 2,000. 
Towards the end of the yea~ the works was moving towards 100 per 
cent organisation. The works management, though they acknowledged 
the position of senior steward in regard to the redundancy procedure, 
increasingly found it difficult to refuse the attendance of workplace 
representatives at meetings held with local officials, when problems 
arising out of redundancy were being discussed. The interpretation 
of the redundancy procedure increasingly relied upon the knowledge 
of the senior stewards. 260 Disputes surrounding seniority, due to 
the transfer of labour between sections, queries regarding the effect 
of broken service owing to layoff, through redundancy and strike 
activity, all complicated the notion of continuous service as the 
criteria of determining seniority for redundancy selection. It 
became a highly contentious term. It was, increasingly, the senior 
stewards rather than the local officials upon which consistent and 
equitable solutions were sought. 
During 1958, the JSSC began to demand full recognition for the Works 
Committee. On being returned yet again as convenor, Dick Etheridge, 
in his address to the Annual Meeting on the 6 January 195~ concluded 
his speech by saying, 
" .•.. that we had got to develop an organisation which 
was united and authoritative. We had reached the point 
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where the management were prepared to recognise the 
\'lorks conuni ttee and this issue would be the first cormni tment 
of the incoming committee. It was obvious that the management 
would expect it to be a responsible and effective committee. 
The chairman and secretary had got to attend a meeting with 
the Confederation Committee on Thursday, 9 January, to 
outline our proposals and get the officials to agree with 
us in regard to a factory procedure". 261 
In June 1958, the Works Committee advised the membership that as the 
works was now virtually a closed shop, they should be in possession 
of an up-to-date card as sections might not accept transfered labour 
. 262 before cards had been ~nspected. This increasing organised power 
in the workplace was not unnoticed by the works management. From 
1958 onwards, the incidence of meetings between senior stewards and 
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the General Works Manager was averaging a meeting a week. 
But as the workplace leadership attempted to extend what was virtually 
de facto recognition into full recognition of the Works Committee, 
the main obstacle came from the local union officials rather than 
management itself. 
The growing voluntary relationship between the works management and 
the workplace leadership at Austin had developed not just out of 
the increasing demands which arose out of the problems of reorganisation 
of work and the transfers of labour, but it also occured in a period 
of growing sectional militancy and stoppages in a rapidly expanding 
product market. Be~~een 1956 and 1960,the annual production of cars 
doubled, to top 1.3 mi11ion. 264 This rapid growth in output was 
closely related to the development of a more aggressive form of 
sectional bargaining. During the first six months of 1959, 84 
striker were reported in the motor industry, 13 unofficial strikes 
took place at Morris Motors, Oxford. 265 At Longbridge, the works 
management turned increasingly to the convenor and the senior steward~ 
rather than the local officials, for immediate solutions. 
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On Wednesday, the 15 July 1959, however, following a spate of such 
stoppages, the chief steward of the TGWU at the Morris Motors plant 
in Oxford, Frank Horsman, was instantly dismissed following an 
accusation by the supervision, supported by two workers, that he 
had encouraged a stoppage of work in protest against overtime 
payments. The trouble had been building up for a period of time 
on a number of sections on the assembly tracks. Lost time during 
the normal shift, through mechanical breakdowns or the lack of supplies 
to the track/resulted in what the workforce saw as overtime being 
paid at the day rate until the basic hours of production had been 
fulfilled. Horsman was escorted to the gate. The dismissal caused 
a major rift in the Oxford plant. Considerable friction already 
existed between the AEU, the largest union and the TGWU. In the 
more recent period/accusations of poaching of members by the TGWU 
had become a source of conflict between the local union officials. 
In the workplace, the TGWU did not participate in the JSSC, nor was 
it consequen tly, invol ved in the BMC combine Commi t tee. The TGWU 
called for a meeting of the workplace organisation but found that 
the AEU stewards were not prepared to support them on this issue. 
The following,day Jack Longworth/the Oxford AEU DO, received a 
telephone call from Jack Thomas, the local TGWU DO, informing him 
that the dismissal would not be put into procedure as this would 
not get a reinstatement. The TGWU had called a meeting of all their 
stewards and membership and also invited AEU stewards at which they 
called for a walk out of the factory at lO.OOam on Friday, 16 July. 
That evening the AEU DC met. It decided, 
"That this District Committee views that the dismissal 
of any shop steward because of an alleged over stepping 
of his functions without a full investigation by both the 
company and the trade union officials is very provocative, 
therefore, we morally support any AEU member who decides 
to withdraw his/her labour during the present dispute".266 
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It then called on the EC to give immediate support should the 
TGWU EC make the dispute official. A series of sectional disputes 
involving the TGWU at Morris Motors, had caused a loss of earnings 
for AEU members during the previous month. As a result, the 
leaving of the decision to strike to the initiative of the individual 
workers completely split not just the support for the chief steward 
but also the membership of the AEU. 
The BMC Combine Committee/following a private meeting between Les 
Gure and Frank Cousins and Jack Jones, was called together for 
Monday, 20 July. A packed meeting of stewards met at Transport 
House in Birmingham. Before the meeting got underway, there was 
an objection from the floor to the presence of full time officials 
on the platform of a Combine meeting. The officials, contrary to the 
views of the combine leadership,took their place among the main 
267 body of the meeting. The meeting recommended, 
"That this meeting of the BMC shop stewards deplore the 
action of BMC management in sacking Bro Horsman and 
therefore pledge 100 per cent support for direct action 
in all BMC plants whenever a shop steward is victimised 
or sacked" .268 
Though this largely resulted in financial support and the blacking 
of work into Oxford from the rest of the Corporation, in Oxford 
itself, some of the AEU membership came out in support. On the 20 
JulY,a special AEU DC was held at which the Morris AEU stewards 
were invited. The EC had not made a decision. This meeting resolved, 
"The Morris Cars AEU shop stewards together with AEU 
members are placed in an invidious position in that the 
TGWU have officially withdrawn their labour from the 
factory following the dismissal of their chief shop steward 
Bro F Horsman. 
We urge EC to give urgent consideration to position with 
the view to instructJ·ng our members to withdraw their 
labour". 269 
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The AEU EC were not willing to give support to their membership 
withdrawing their labour on an issue which had not been put into 
procedure. The two most important outcomes of the Horsman case, 
apart from the fact the the chief steward never got his job bac~ 
was firstly, an attempt by workplace organisations in BMC to seek 
procedures governing a dismissal which involved a shop steward and 
secondly,a move on the part of the AEU to clamp down on the activities 
of combine committees. 
At Longbridge,as the incidence of strikes began to rise, the works 
management increasingly looked towards a committee which could 
co-ordinate activity in the workplace. It was even prepared to 
consider a three stage proposal from the Austin works committee 
which would offer protection for shop stewards from arbitory 
dismissal. Though this development had the full backing of Jack 
Jr 
Williams the TGWU, who had now become the local CSEU DS, it was 
actually turned down by the officials of the Foundry Workers, Sheet 
270 
metal ~nions, AEU, UPA, NUVB, and the woodcutting machinists. 
For the local officials of the craft union~ the opposition was based 
upon the view that their own organisations could protect their own 
memberships. Others argued issues governing stewards should be left 
to the authority and powers of the union concerned rather than upon 
a workplace organisation comprising of mixed memberships. Even the 
TGWU,though they were prepared to discuss the issue of a procedure 
for 'protection', tlley would have nothing to do with a proposal which 
had the word 'dismissal' contained in it.271 For the Austin works 
committee, the procedure being based upon the senior stewards in ~~e 
workplace would allow an issue like the dismissal of Horsman to be 
raised immediately. Thi~ it was considered might provide a greater 
possibility for finding a resolution before the case went outside the 
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factory to the local officials after the steward had been removed 
from the workplace. 
However, it was the actions of the Combine Committee in calling for 
a strike, and the behaviour of the AEU combine shop stewards at 
Cowley which, in the context of a growing number of strikes, led 
to an attempt on the part of the AEU and later the TUC itself 
to restrict the activities of inter plant contacts. On the 11 
August 1959, in the middle of the Horsman dispute, The Times devoted 
a leader to the state of industrial relations in the industry. 
"Labour relations", it claimed, "in sections of the 
motor industry are deplorable and getting worse". 272 
The response of the AEU was the circulation of all its DC's to 
instruct the shop stewards under their jurisdiction not to attend 
meetings called by bodies not under the direct authority of the 
union constitution. The circular read, 
"Your committee is hereby instructed that all AEU shop 
stewards within the area or the jurisdiction of your 
District Committee shall be instructed that they must 
not participate •••• The EXecutive Council must impress 
upon all District Committee and shop stewards their decision 
that the conference as referred to in this circular and 
all conferences of a similar character which are not 
provided for in our constitution must not be attended 
or supported in any way by our members". 273 
A copy of the letter was to be attached to all DC minutes and 
reported to every branch. The conference which was being promol'1.l.d 
as a National Conference of shop stewards and Aircraft Workers due 
I 
to be held in London on 8 November, but the ban also covered a 
conference called to discuss redundancy and the protection of shop 
stewards and sponsored by the workplace organisations from BMC, 
Fords, Briggs and Forth Brown, arranged for December in Sheffield. 
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The ban was challenged by a number of DC's/who claimed the action 
. If '. i 1 274 , 7 mb of the EC ~tse was unconst~tut ona • On the _ Nove er, 
Austin-Firth Brown called off its conference. However, both Les 
Gurl, and Geo. Caborn the convenor of Firth Brown were suspended from 
holding office for twelve months. The letter from the AEU EC 
stated, 
"Having regard to your unconstitutional conduct of 
wilfully acting contrary to the rules and the constitution 
of our union EC has decided that you are suspended from 
holding a shop stewards' position for a period of 
twelve months and the DC is being instructed accordingly".275 
Ca.:born attempted unsuccessfully to defend his position by stating 
he was acting in his capacity of ,SEU shop steward. This was 
followed by an inquiry conducted by the TUC into disputes and 
workplace representation. It specifically named both the BMC 
combine and the December 1959 conference and implicitly attacked 
the role of the Communist Party. In a reference to Combine Committees 
part of the report published in September 1960, read, 
"Whatever the motive of those primarily responsible 
.•. the effect is often a challenge to established union 
arrangements. For some years it has been a policy of 
disruptive political bodies to try and form national 
organisations of stewards. This does not mean that political 
considerations were uppermost when all the organisations 
of this type were formed : some of the sponsors and many of 
the present participants probably regard them as supplementing 
established union methods not as competing with them. 
Nonetheless, cases of muddle, duplication and even conflict 
have arisen through those bodies acting as though they were 
independent of union obligations (whether within a union, 
between unions, or between unions and employers)". 276 
The report went on to say, 
"Where disproportionate power in the workplace lies with 
the employer the worker must look to national institutions 
to redress the balance". 277 
The report warned unions to be more vigilant and be prepared to 
discipline stewards for breaches in rules or agreements which 
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resulted in "needless strikes". Throughout 1960/ the motor industry 
was hit by both a wave of disputes and increased redundancy and 
short time working. It was not so much the power of workplace 
organisation/but the actions on the shop floor which were challenging 
not just the authority of union official~ but the influence of the 
shop steward leaderships. 
On the issue of redundancy/despite holding to a policy of 'no 
redundancy' the BMC combine committee had been largely subordinate 
to the authority of the local union officials. It never, however, 
even with the joint consultation and compensation established in 
1956,came to accept redundancy as inevitable. In October 1956, 
the BMC delegates in attendance of a 'Big Five' steering committee 
meeting held in Coventry, criticised both employers and Government 
for the redundancy strikes but went on to offer on}, y a partial 
acceptance of what had been achieved at BMC. A composite resolution 
drawn up for a 'Big Five' conference said, 
"Conference welcomes the resistence to redundancy that has 
already been shown at the BMC, Briggs, Standard and the 
continuing fight at Nortons. What the conference recognises 
is that the BMC struggle established a foundation, it must 
be recognised that our objective is that every worker must 
receive full wages until suitable alternative work is 
found". 279 
This demand for work or full-maintenance appeared in a conference 
resolution to fight redundancy and short time working. Its four 
main parts were, 
"A Retention of all workers on the pay roll until 
suitable employment can be found. 
B That the traditional right of all workers to draw 
unemployment benefit while on short time be restored. 
C That the fight for the 40 hour week without loss 
of pay be stepped up and that a shorter working 
week as the situation warrants it be also fought for. 
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D And full support be given to the Confederation's 
claim for a substantial pay increase". 279 
On the 10 November 1956, the Steering Committee discussed reports 
from the factories, on how redundancy and short time were to be 
resisted; that despite procedures and prior consultation the 
committee agreed that what mattered was the power of the workplace 
organisation. The minute reads, 
" ..... it was agreed that in most cases the strength 
of the workers on the floor of the factory decided what 
policy was accepted". 280 
In 1958, redundancies at Daimler and Rover both resulted in 
compensation after a period of consultation, but in 1959 and 1960, 
there was much greater resistence to attempts by management to 
enforce redundancy or challenge workplace organisation. At Standard, 
the management/in June,dismissed 120 vehicle builders for refusing 
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to accept the rate being offered. At the body plant of Willenhall 
Motors,a six week strike by 600 NUVB members broke out over the 
282 
redundancy of 55 vehicle builders, nine of whom were shop stewards. 
In October of 1960, 1,000 workers at Carbodies in Coventry struck 
over the managements refusal to work a short week to save the jobs 
283 
of 600 declared redundant. As this strike entered its second week, 
700 NUVB workers at Thrupp and Maberly, the Rootes group plant in 
North London, walked out after the redundancy of 18 trimmers. R 
Gooding, the Secretary of the Strike Committee, was reported as saying, 
"We recognise the crisis in the car industry but we are 
asking the management to share the existing work until the 
18 sacked men find jobs". 284 
The strike quickly spread throughout the Rootes group. The management 
had issued the redundancy notices through the post while the 
discussions with the NUVB were still in progress. On the 12 October, 
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the second day of the strike, 10,500 of the compan1S workforce 
from its two Coventry plants and the BLSP plant in Acton, joined 
th . 285 in sympa y act~on. The strike/for work sharing and not redundancy 
over the jobs of 18 trimmers/had been organised through a combine 
committee established at Rootes. The response of the AEU EC was to 
calIon the unions DS's to summon meetings of all AEU shop stewards 
in Roote~ to make clear that the combine had no constitutional 
authority under the rules of the union to withdraw labour or issue 
instructions over blacking. At this summoned meeting of AEU stewards 
in Coventry, only 35 out of 78 stewards bothered to turn up to hear 
. d 286 the repr1man . 
At York/on the 13 October,a meeting of the 15 trade union executives 
involved refused to recognise the strike until all those on sympathy 
strike had returned. A meeting of the Rootes stewards in Coventry 
met to reaffirm their support for work sharing, and would return 
only if the 18 dismissed workers were reinstated. The advice of 
the CSEU,which was opposed by the stewards split the workforce. In 
coventry/the Stoke plant voted for a return/but over 2,000 ~yton 
workers/who were almost all vehicle builders voted to stay out, 
while the Acton and Cricklewood meeting accepted the stewards advice 
and rejected the proposal of the Confederation officials. 287 On 
the 19 October, all but 650 at Thrupp and M~berly went back,but 
the following daY,200 store keepers, truck drivers and material 
handlers walked out when management at Ryton claimed there was no 
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work for 12 indirect workers. The London trimmers were eventually 
given a three week extension of notice and a return to work was 
finally agreed. 
At Rootes,the old divisions had occu~d in the commitment of trade 
groups and indiVidual workplace unions to the question of 
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redundancy. At the Stoke Engine plant/it was predominantly the 
T~~U and the AEU who had been most keen to accept a return/but in 
~yton the NUVB organised large parts of the assembly while the SMW 
had their largest Coventry membership at this plant. In the two 
London plants,it was the highly organised body building work forces 
which gave the most effective support to the shop stewards opposition 
to the CSEU. Workplace unity repeatedly co-existed with factory, 
trade group and sectional interests and divisions as the workplace 
leadership across the company continually challenged the authority 
of both management and national union officials. The workplace 
stewards/under the leadership of the senior stewards/remained 
openly defiant of officialdom. The resolution for the return to 
work said, 
"Our Committee deplore the action of the CSEU making 
known their decision without prior consultation with 
the stewards concerned. 
We, the shop stewards of the combine committee of the Rootes 
group, recommend a return to work at all the establishments 
in the Rootes Group on Tuesday, 18 October, with the 
exception of Thrupp and Maberly to enable discussions to 
take place. 
We call on all our members to black all work done by Thrupp 
and Maberly and to give substantial financial support to 
our members there. 
The Senior shop stewards of the Rootes Group will have no 
hesitation in withdrawing the labour of their individual 
factories if a satisfactory settlement is not reached within 
twenty-one days. 
In accordance with the decision of the CSEU at York we call 
on trade unions concerned to make the strike at Thrupp 
and Maberly official". 289 
Though the Frnak Horsman case saw the first real demonstration of 
combine action undertaken in opposition to the authority of a 
l~tional trade union leadership, the complete stoppage at Rootes 
in opposition to redundancy appeared as a challeng~ not just to 
employer prerogative, but to the authority of the whole CSEU national 
) ~" 
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leadership. During the 1960 recession, however, redundancy conflict 
was being contained less by the restraining influence of national 
trade union officials and more by the actions of IITorks managements. 
As the recession deepened during the final quarter of 1960, the 
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annual production of carS tumbled by just over 350,0001 actual 
job loss through redundancies remained remarkably light. It was 
noticeable that in the well organised workplaces of the industry 
I 
it was work sharing rather than redundancy which was being forced 
upon employers. While the number of jobs across the industry did 
fall by some 50,000 with only a few notable exceptions, this loss 
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was largely accounted for in the component industry. In the 
assembly plants,it was at the ailing Standard where a 50 per cent 
cut in production took place/that 1,700 redundancies were declared 
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out of a 8,000 workforce. Employment for the remainder was 
saved through working a three day week. Again,it was the poorer 
organised Vauxhall plant at Luton that 1,100 workers were made 
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redundant from a 20,000 workforce, who worked a 4 day week. 
But among the leading workplace organisation,employers largely chose 
work sharing rather than confront the shop floor over redundancy. 
In Coventry for example, 30,000 of the cit.V's car workers were on 
short time, all factories but JaguA~whose sales were less volatile 
to recession/had adopted work sharing. 294 This included over 6,000 
workers at Rootes. Across in Birmingham,l,OOO Rover workers were 
on a 4 day week but at SU carburettors/ though ISO T.GWU members were 
on short time, an afternoon shift of women were made redundant. 295 
But perhaps most significant,in regard'to the increased power of 
workplace organisation, was that at the BMC Birmingham and Oxford 
plants, though output had been cut by 12~ per cent, there was no 
d d . 296 mass re un anc~es. Instead, 23,000 of the Corporations 50,000 
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manual workers were on a 3 or 4 day week. It was not that the 
workplace organisation or their memberships were entirely satisfied 
with such a situation, but their preference for work sharing as 
opposed to redundancy appeared sufficient to deter the employer. 
At the Tractor and Transmissions plant for example, the JSSC issued 
a leaflet encouraging the workforce to, 
"Spread work over a FULL week, not three or even two 
days. Demand your rights - the Right to Work. The 
old-fashioned idea of 'If the Gaffer has no work for us 
what else can he do but lay us off, MUST BE EXPLODED. Even 
now on short time working more vehicles are being produced 
than were produced 12 months ago in BMe. Therefore planned 
production is the obvious answer. This is your Country 
that we have fought for and many died for, therefore our 
Rights as Human Beings MUST and shall be the right to a 
decent standard of living that can only be achieved by the 
Right to Work and the Right to a Job. When a worker 
reports for work at the beginning of the day or night shift, 
it is a grave injustice for him to be sent out after an hour 
or so after being told NO WORK TODAY. That becomes casual 
labour, which is a step backwards into the dark past". 298 
But if the SMC management were having to concede upon their basic 
prerogative on the determination of the level of their workforce 
when confronted by power in the workplace, they were also facing a 
sustained worker offensive. In a period of mass short time, 
sharply fluctuating earnings, the motor industry employers began to 
be faced with an alarming increase in stoppages. In 196~ there 
were 100 strikes of which 67 occurred in LOngbridge,299 By 1965, 
115 stoppages were recorded in Longbridge 300 while in the first 
six months alone in 1966, 142 strikes had arose at the Morris Motors 
301 plant in Oxford. It was not so much the power of workplace 
organisation which had become the primary concern of the employers 
and the national trade union leaderships,but rather the frequent lack 
of authority which even the leadership in the workplace appeared 
to have over the membership. With the evident decline of the 
authority of local union offiCials, not so much over the workplace 
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leadership but over the behaviour of the membership on the shop 
floor,workplace managements in the motor industry increasingly 
looked towards the role of the senior shop stewards to control the 
power being exercised by the shop floor. At Longbridge,on the 7 
January 1963, the works committee was accorded official recognition 
by the management with the approval of the local CSEU full time 
ff ' , 1 302 o ~c~a s. This gave legitimate status to the positions of 
convenor and senior stewards in the national agreements for the 
operation of procedure. A seven man elected delegation,plus the 
elected chairman and secretary,would form the negotiating committee 
for the entire workforce. The agreement stated, 
itA problem raised in accordance with the terms of the 
National agreement dealing with the provisions for the 
avoidance of disputes which is passed to the shop stewards 
and not resolved should then be dealt with the chief 
shop steward of the union concerned. The chief steward shall 
inform the secretary of the works committee of the nature 
of the problem and the steps proposed for dealing with it. 
The chief steward of the union may request the assistance 
of the secretary of the works committee in negotiations 
wi th the management". 303 
Under the overall constitutional authority of the CSEU, the works 
committee agreement for Longbridge was an attempt to both strengthen 
and unify the authority of the workplace leadership in the midst, 
of growing shop floor dissent. The agreement outlined the basis 
upon which legitimate access to management was established. It 
gave the workplace leadership the right to co-opt sectional stewards 
on to negotiating committees where necessary. Not only did the 
agreement provide facilities for holding both the monthly meetings of 
the work committee and the subsequent JSSC in works time, but it 
established the practice for regular meetings to be held between 
management and the workplace organisation. By 1965/ in the Austin 
work~ meetings between the senior stewards and senior work management 
were occurring twice a week, a year later it was three meetings a 
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week. More than half of all these meetings involved issues 
arising out of the body and finishing sections. 305 Down at Morris 
Motors, the crisis in plant industrial relations saw a sharp increase 
in contact between senior management and the senior stewards. In 
1964, there had been on average of three meetings a fortnight. 
. . t " t d f ti 306 The fol1ow~ng year ~ was averag~ng JUs un er our mee ngs a week. 
At works supervision level, meetings with the workplace leadership 
reach 240 for 1965, a twenty five per cent increase upon the previous 
year. 307 In the two years to 1966, the time being spent on industrial 
relations matters by the senior stewards had increased four-fold 
as they struggled to resolve mass discontent in the workplace. 308 
It was estimated that the Morris Motors stewards spent 1,827 hours 
in works time on industrial relations questions during 1965. 309 
Provision was made in the plant for a senior steward to be brought 
into an urgent issue within thirty minutes of it arising. The 
senior stewards/having been given an increased status in the decision-
making process within the overall operation of the procedure agreements, 
found themselves in an invidious position. Possessing increased 
influence and acceptance by management,they were being drawn into 
the role of resolving sectional conflicts. In 1965, ninety per cent 
of the stoppages at Morris Motors arose before the extended procedural 
machinery could be put into operation. 310 Of the 297 strikes, 256 
broke out before a senior steward had arrived in .the Shop.3ll 
By 1967, one in five disputes never entered into procedure at all, 
92 per cent of strikes arose before an issue went above the first 
stage in procedure while in a number of instances the basis of 
settlements negotiated by full-time officials, resulted in workplace 
rejection and strike action. 3l2 
628 
The crisis in labour relations in the motor industry and the 
increasing militancy among shop floor workers which arose/in the 
main,during, but continued after, the 1960 recession, did not so 
much follow the increased position of authority which was beginning 
to be bestowed upon the workplace leadership, rather it was already 
developing in a period when union officialdom itself, exampled by 
the AEU Ee, and media opinion,had begun to attack the very credibility 
of workplace organisation. It was however, the nature of these 
revolts, a multiplicity of spontaneous independent actions at the 
point of production by various groups of workers, which disclosed 
not just the inability of works managements to exercise control over 
labour discipline, but also the very inability of union officialdom 
itself to maintain order without enhancing the authority of senior 
stewards. The strategic dilemma which began to confront the 
management of the motor industrY,lay in accepting the particular 
advice coming from bodies like the Motor Industry Joint Labour 
Council, under the chairmanship of Jack Scamp, which looked to 
strengthen the pOSition of representative leadership within the 
workplace/while advocating a series of reforms which would effectively 
remove power, but not necessarily representation, from shop stewards 
on individual sections on the shop floor. This approach was beginning 
to develop a currancy in academic quarters and was to become 
elaborated more fully as a general solution to the whole of the 
malaise considered to be afflicting British industrial relations, 
as later diagnosed by the Donovan Commission. This approach 
contrasted with the responses of senior managements in the motor 
industr~ who began to look for more immediate solutions to the 
question of worker indiscipline. 
The elevation of workplace leadership on the part of works 
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management, however, was already underway and can generally be 
traced back to the events of 1956, if not before. So while attention 
of considered observers was being directed at emphasising change 
in the sources upon which discontent appeared to be expressed 
mainly the operation of pieceworking, the procedures established 
for the handling of redundancy, shop steward 'protection' and the 
recognition of works comndttees and senior stewards/was already not 
without consequence for both the role of workplace leadership and 
the attitudes being generated in the workplace. 
From the 26 August 1956, onwards, for example, the minutes of the 
Works Committee and the JSSC began to be typed into a pre-planned 
format. After 1960, such a traditional institution as the NUVB 
Cov BC began to adopt a similar streamlining and standardisation 
in its approach to union business. This should not merely to be 
accounted for by the inevitable outcome of progress overtaking a 
customary idiosyncracy in branch and workplace life, it was more 
to do with a rationalisation which grew from the general increasing 
burdens and responsibilities for workplace leadership. Before 
1956, for example, the notes of the Longbridge convenor were 
invariably to be found on near to hand scraps of paper, or on the 
backs of discarded cigarette packets. By 1962, this basis of the 
oral presentation of the convenor's report to the JSSC had a pre-typed 
list of no less than 43 different items. 3l3 Of equal significance 
in the transformation of workplace leadership in the rise of 
discontent, was that while the workplace leaderships remained remarkably 
stable with a high level of continuity in personnel, this contrasted 
to the position of the sectional stewards, who still spent the 
majority of their time at their work benches. At Morris Cowley in 
1966, there was a reported annual turnover of some so per cent 
among stewards. 314 Despite the fact that shop steward numbers were 
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rapidly increasing in all BMC plants at this time, less than a 
quarter ever attended a meeting outside of works time. 3l5 This 
cannot be adequately explained/for example by a lull in workplace 
activity. Quite the contrary. At Cowley at this time, there were 
some 350 industrial relations issues a month, it was estimated, 
316 being raised with foremen. These changes are perhaps better 
explained by a greater disenchantment with the external influences 
of union organisations. On the 2 February 1967, for instance, Lord 
Rootes in his capacity as chairman and managing director of his 
motor empire, in a confidential letter to Ray Gunter, the then MOL 
in the Labour Government, raised the question of the new attitude 
towards union organisation by the motor industry workforce. 
"Much of the criticism appeared by trade union witnesses", 
he claimed, "in explanation of this unhappy situation 
did not bear very close examination. In particular 
suggestions that trouble stems from the mens own lack of 
confidence in supervision must be set against the evident 
fact that the men have little regard for their own elected 
representatives or for advice or instructions issued by 
them". 317 
It was the concern in senior management that union officialdom had 
lost control over the membership. Increasingl~ the rather fragile 
link between the local union officials and the shop floor worker was 
through the senior stewards, in their regular contacts with the 
union branch, district committees, and works conference attendances, 
rather than the sectional steward. In a place like Austin, the main 
link between the membership and the increasingly absorbed workplace 
leadership depended upon the far from regular appearancies of 
sectional stewards at the monthly JSSC meetings. It was in these 
conditions that in 1970, following the election of a Conservative 
Government, a letter appeared in The Times on the 24 September, 
signed by the chairman and managing directors of Ford, Vauxhall, 
Rootes and the newly formed British Leyland Corporation which 
f'"r, 
called legal remedies for breach of contracts in labour relations. 31B 
The approach of senior management however, did not preclude other 
changes which would have more long term consequences than what 
could be achieved by labour legislation. This was particularly 
so over the question of job security. Between 1968 and 1972, 
throughout the Rootes and BL plants, comprehensive procedure 
agreements had been introduced which changed the basis for wage 
determination. Within four years of the merging of BMC with 
Leyland, at the 77 UK factories which employed a total of 167,670 
workers, a restructuring of managerial control with the progressive 
rationalisation of workplace industrial relations supported by 
large inputs of public finance/saw the role of the senior stewards 
and factories convenors increasingly emerging as a lay workplace 
elite whose activities had become central to both change and the 
preservation of order in the workplace. It was upon the activities 
of the workplace leadership that the-elaborate procedures for 
handling the introduction of 'productivity', 'job evaluation', 
'job amalgamation', 'job redeployment', 'mobility of labour', 
'job mobility', 'grade mobility', 'job transfer', 'disputed manning 
schedules' and redundancy, now called 'security of employment', 
were b 319 • . ased. 
The most obvious change to result from this programme of rationalisation 
has been job loss and the workplace response to redundancy. In 
1965, the newly elected Labour Government introduced as one of its 
first pieces of labour legislation, the Redundancy Payments Act 
providing for a statutory payment of compensation of individual 
workers who lost their jobs through redundancy. In 1966, 10,000 
redundancies were declared across BMC, and 30,000 of the Corporations 
workforce were put on a 4 day week, but only two stoppages took 
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place. Both were sectional protests. At the Tractor and 
Transmissions plant, 500 workers struck for three days, while down 
in oxford, 222 workers at the Morris Radiator plant endured a 17 
day strike to retain their jobs, but without wider support. In 
the first year of trading, the newly formed BL spent £3.3 million 
in extra-gratia payments to encourage voluntary redundancy. By 
1975, following the publication of the Ryder Report, BL adopted 
the recommendations to establish a framework for 'Employee 
Participation' based upon the shop steward organisation/through 
which the leadership of the workplace,who were also the membership 
of the BL combine committee, became involved and were expected to 
share corporate responsibility for widespread change. As recession 
and crisis hit the motor industry and following the appointment 
of Michael Edwards as chairman of BL in 1978, a more rapid programme 
of rationalisation and plant closure was undertaken. Between 1978 
and 1981, 68,000 BL workers were made redundant and £200 million 
of public money was spent on factory closures and extra-gratia 
redundancy payments. Following the publication of opposition to 
the unpublished 1980 Corporate Plan, which involved the total or 
partial closure of 13 factories and a further 25,000 redundancies, 
the leading workplace representative, Derek Robinson, chairman of 
the BL combine committee, and a leading advocate of the Employee 
participation scheme, who had replaced the most important post war 
convenor in the British Motor industry, Dick Etheridge, and like 
Etheridge had spent the whole of his working life at the Austin plant 
in Longbridge was sacked, following 30 years service, for his alleged 
role in the combine committee, but not for his activity as works 
convenor. The sacking was to be a prelude to a management offensive 
against shop steward activity working conditions and wage rates, 
prior to the opening of a £275 million investment in robotic 
engineering. This sharply reduced the number of production workers 
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and paved the way for a series of declining wage awards to help 
finance expenditure on labour saving devices. With the installation 
of a more abrasive kind of management, the increasing association 
of the workplace leadership with the problem of management efficiency 
and rationalisation had, in a more centrally controlled 
organisation, increased the distance of the senior shop steward 
leadership from a traditional identification with the expectations 
of shop floor workers. In the growing antipathy and increased 
credibility gap between workplace workers and workplace leadership, 
demoralisation and vulnerability, in the face of economic recession, 
have become once again a major feature in the crisis of workplace 
power. The 1980's have become the decade for urgent rethinking 
of the question of workplace power. 
634 
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In recent years, what may be generally described as the problematic 
of workplace power has, at a number of levels, become the subject 
for much debate, discussion and scrutiny in British industrial 
relations. If anything, the impact of the current recession upon 
the responses of the labour movement, both at an institutional and 
workplace level, has tended to fuel not just debate, but also 
division, confusion, and uncertainty. What may be perhaps properly 
described as a major strategic crisis within organised wage labour 
in Britain, has not only generated both arguments between and 
within trade union leaderships, as well as activists and 
representatives in the workplace, and not least actual membership, 
but it has encouraged disarray concerning future action and 
increasingly lead to a reappraisal of the past. For the moment 
at least, economic crisis has, with only a few min:).r exceptions, 
not really opened up a vision of an alternative future within which 
democratic power exercised in industry will be radically transformed. 
On the contrary, crisis itself has induced an internal crisis of 
confidence in both workplace and union leadership, which, with the 
rising levels of unemployment and job insecurity, is in danger of 
diminishing aspiration, engendering demoralisation and incurring 
fatalism and despair. Hence the focus upon power. 
There is some evidence that organised labour now perceives the 
transformation which,it has been suggested, has taken place, in the 
balance of power between organised wage labour and the power and 
control of management. Though not an absolute guide to actual events, 
in August 1977, a poll carried out by Market Opinion and Research 
International found that the number of trade unionists who thought 
that their own union organisation had'too much power', declined 
from a figure of 68 per cent to 58 per cent in less than three 
I 
years, while those who 'strongly agreed' that their unions had too 
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much power revealed a more significant fall from 41 to 28 per cent 
in the same period. But beyond evidence of this kind, there has 
also been a more considered appraisal about why change, if any, 
has actually taken place. In what is now a widely quoted starting 
point, Eric Hobstawm argues that the real advances for the British 
labour movement ceased at the beginning of the 1950's. In the period 
since,the activity of the labour movement has been essentially 
quantitative rather than qualitative, being based upon sectional and 
3 
economistic demands, rather than political change. Others point 
to the view that the demands for quautitative change grew outside 
~e organised labour movement, but some maintain that struggles 
against coercive labour laws or the ~xpansion of the social wage 
were themselves indicators of the increasing influence of organised 
labour during the late 1960'S and early 1970's.4 But an important 
question throughout such considerations ,raised in recent times, 
has been the role of workplace organisation and the character of 
industrial militancy. While it has been widely accepted that in 
the course of the past thirty years, power has shifted to the 
workplace, it is now being repeatedly asked 'upon what basis did 
this shift in power actually rest?'. In other words, what kind 
of power was it and in whose hands was it being exercised and for 
what purposes? 
A variety of explanations have been put forward for what might be 
regarded in a number of circles as a regressive movement of power 
away from an indigenoas repository of rank and file control. This 
has been generally associated with the role of shop stewards. In 
1970, for example, Cliff,in what otherwise was not an entirely 
uncritical view of workplace organisation could argue, 
"And who leads the struggle at plant level for improved 
pay and conditions? Who spearheads wage drift (or wage 
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drive) movement? Who acts as the main organiser of the 
unofficial stri~e? Who really worries the management? 
Above all, the shop stewards committees and similar rank 
and file committees". 5 
Much of the evidence for ~his interpretation remained statistical. 
And again,in 1975,in a period of increasing crisis the same author 
could maintain, 
"Inflation plus employment bring the class struggle 
to the centre of political life, at a time when workers 
are better organised and more self-confident than ever 
before. Inflation, unemployment to the accompaniment of 
the 'social contract', will raise for millions of workers 
the question of who gets what and why. But of the coming 
struggles a new leadership will emerge from below. 
Socialism will come in from the cold". 6 
In the forward to a recent pamphlet discussing trade union strategy, 
in the face of developing corporate power, the authors state, 
"With a deepening recession, with the more insidious 
means of control available to management through new 
technologies, and with the viciously anti-trade union 
government, things can only get worse, with our plant 
organisations becoming more and more vulnerable. Unless, 
that is, we strengthen the shop stewards movement at a 
company and industry level : and develop alternative 
policies with which to win the argument against management 
wi th the trade union membership". 7 
Other authors on the left, however, have displayed a far greater 
degree of scepticism about uncritical assertions surrounding either 
the base of workplace power or its future role. Hyman, for example, 
has,far from viewing workplace organisation as an unambiguous 
centre of opposition to management control, suggested that the 
role of workplace leadership is not necessarily immune from what 
might be seen as a structural incorporation with the interests of 
management and union officialdom. 8 More latterlY,Lane has ventured 
the point that the workplace leadership,by its increasing accumulation 
of the comforts associated with power compromise,appears to be 
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coming subject to a moral critique on the part of workforces. 
Furthermore, structural changes in both the composition and dispersal 
of industry may be breaking up the traditional order upon which 
workplace militancy and opposition have become based. 9 But while 
this debate has developed concerning the shift in credibility of 
workplace representatives on the management side of the fence, 
a report from the CBI presents the decline in the authority of 
unicn officialdom over the membership as the central weakness 
which confronts management in their workplace relations. lO 
In general, this more rigorous critique of workplace organisation 
is clearly a healthy development/for it is surely inadequate to 
merely cite what might be regarded as objective indices by which to 
measure or assert changes in power or power relations in regard 
to wage labour, and its organisations. Use of statistical trends, 
in union membership, union density, changes in the number of shop 
stewards or alterations in the ratio of workplace representation 
to total membership, or data on the willingness of employers to 
extend collective bargaining rights, union recognition, or shop 
stewards facilities, or descriptions of workplace procedures, are 
of limited value in deducing or attempting to assess power in the 
workplace. Furthermore, a quantitative analysis of strike behaviour 
is no comprehensive guide to the power of collective unity, or power 
in workplace organisation. The approach of this study has been to 
maintain that while power remains a central concept in workplace 
relations, an approach which is of value in seeking to analyse the 
concept of power has been to explore the interactions of the 
principRI parties engaged in power struggles,through the study of 
issues upon which there exists a clear division of interest. The 
selection of redundancy as an issue of power conflict, has enabled 
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an account of the question of power to be examined in conditions 
which are likely, not only to reveal the reasons for the strengths 
of workplace organisation, but just as importantly the basis of 
its weaknesses. 
In order to draw together the threads of the findings which appear 
to emerge from this study of redundancy and workplace relations as 
a key issue of power conflict in the British motor industry, in the 
context of the current debate over the character of workplace power, 
it might serve a useful purpose if the three original questions 
with which the study set out to consider are viewed in the light 
of a common assertion regarding consciousness and action in a market 
economy. This is the line that crisis and recession in the workings 
of market economies not only crystalise a dichotomy of interest 
between wage labour and capital, but provide conditions for a 
radicalisation in the consciousness of sellers of wage labour which 
develops from the experiences of bearing the burden of a crisis over 
which it has little control. In order to discuss this in the light 
of the motor industry, it is perhaps important to give some 
consideration to the structure of decision making, the extent to 
which workplace organisation appears to act autonomously, in addition 
to the influence the politics of a left wing workplace leadership 
has had upon shaping the direction of workplace power. 
The extent to which a workplace independence and autonomy can be 
considered to have existed independently of institutional forces, 
was largely a phenomenon of the inter war period. From the late 
1920's, through the 1930'S, workplace action was largely spontaneous 
and independent of union offiCialdom, and often given an organisational 
discipline by activists in the Communist Party. Before the 1934 
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Pressed Steel strike, there were no local union officials 
to build an organisation among the semi skilled in areas like 
Coventry and Oxford. These disputes arose out of a increasingly 
contradictory labour relations policies. This combined a regionally 
based employer paternalism common among the small scale Midland 
manufacturers, which stressed employer co-operation, with a growing 
reliance upon cash nexus relationships, as a means for intensifying 
work on assembly lines. It was not until the 1960's, that this type 
of spontaneous workplace protest re-appeared in the motor industry, 
and like the 1930's it was closely associated with a condition of 
fluctuating earnings and high levels of job insecurity. But while 
the inter war conflicts were independent of union officialdom and 
rarely produced a permanent organisation, the conflicts in the 
1960's were largely beyond the authority of a generally left wing 
workplace leadership. Why was this so? 
It is unquestionably true that the political orientation of the post 
war shop stewards movement in the motor industry has been closely 
associated with the left and that members of the Communist party 
have been well represented on both workplace organisations and more 
especially in the leadership of combine committees. What also is 
of some significance, has been the quite remarkable stability and 
political continuity of the workplace leadership in the motor industry. 
At the country's largest plant, Longbridge, over a 37 year period, 
there has been only three convenors,all of whom were members of the 
Party. Turnover among factory convenors, even though they are 
subject to annual election, has, in the motor industry, been 
considerably lower than that for national trade union officials Who 
are normally elected to office for a longer duration, while it 
is considerably lower then the very high turnover found among 
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sectional or departmental stewards. It is not just ,t~ArCp leadership 
has stood the test of time, but that it has held office and been 
returned to office repeatedly through some pretty unpopular periods 
of communism. For example, the cold war in 1951, Hungry 1956, 
czechoslovakia 1968, and Poland in 1972 and 1982. In 1958, for 
instance, the Longbridge workplace organisation received a Soviet 
delegation at one of their meetings, though management refused to 
allow them to tour the works. Many individual members of the BMC 
combine committee undertook invited visits to East European Countries. 
Many motor industry workplace organisations with CP members among 
their leadership sent delegations to the Communist backed World 
Federation of Trade union,s. While it is usually considered that 
the second world war marked the high point of C P membership in 
Britain, it was also the period which provided party members, who 
invariably had some previous organisational experience, to offer 
themselves as stewards to the influx of new workers in the munitions 
factories. This period also marks the point of collaboration in 
workplace relations. It was the CP which was at the forefront of 
the campaign for JPC' s ,as it was the CP convenors t'lho were among those signing 
the redundancy lists in 1945. 
While 1939 to 1945 saw such a rapid growth in trade union membership, 
the re-establishment of workplace organisation took place in conditions 
of national unity between the interests of capital and labour, 
for the national emergency. It was also the case that this period 
saw what emerged as the ideal war time model for workplace 
organisation. This was basically a version of what had already been 
in existence at AWA just before the war, but had been extended to 
the Coventry Shadow factories and became the basis upon which 
organisation at Standard Motors developed after 1945, under a CP 
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workplace leadership. What was novel about Standard, was the 
inger.ious adoption of a large gang system operating in the aircraft 
industry, to the assembly of cars and tractors. By 1956, before 
the big strike, approximately one worker in every thirty among the 
works 11,000 labour force read the Daily Worker. The power base 
of what was the highest paid car factory in the UK, and possibly 
also in engineering, however, arose not just from the autonomy of 
workplace organisation, it was also dependent upon agreements Which 
had been signed by the local CSEU officials after the firm went 
outside the Federation. It was an arrang,/Vl'ent with Jack Jones, the OS 
to ~~e CSEU to supply labour to the firm by the unions which 
protected the CP base and which was unlikely to arise in other 
workplaces where a more prudent selection of workforces by 
management/like,for example ,at Austin, was likely to take place. 
But while the standard model for workplace organisation was clearly 
an 'organisational' success, in its approach to establish a 100 
per cent organisation and in overcoming the inter union strife and 
sectional divisions so common to the industry, it also involved the 
centralisation of the workplace leadership around senior stewards 
who undertook a level of responsibility for seeing that production 
targets they had agreed with production management, were being met 
by the workforce. Therefore, before 1956, the particular form of 
workplace organisation that existed was still to some extent 
dependent upon both local officials and the general attitudes of the' 
works management. It was, however, following a change in management 
personnel, and a consequent change in managerial strategy, that the 
adoption of a combine 'no redundancy' policy met with a head-on 
conflict with the Standard management. The two week unofficial 
strike was perhaps the most important job security strike in the 
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whole post war motor industry. The Standard had become the vanguard 
not jusc for the combine policies of 'no redundancy', but also for 
the wider demand for the 'right to work', which went far beyond, 
in its implications, than merely the motor industry. It was a 
political struggle in the sense that it was, in the face of a 
Conservative Government, defending the 1944 political cornmi. tment 
to full employment. Consequently, the unofficial workplace action 
not only caused such a flurry in political circles, being discussed 
in cabinet the Prime Minister, commissioning research into the 
social effects of automation. but it saw massive widespread support 
from workforces outside the motor industry. That such support 
coming in the main from what were lower paid workers, contributing 
to some of the highest paid workers in British industry of that 
period, and car workers at that, is perhaps inconceivable in the 
current period. But as the workplace leadership openly discouraged 
sympathy action and relinquished control over the dispute to a 
divided national leadership, the works management took a defi :ant 
stand against the principle of I no redundancy'. It not only issued 
redundancy notices in order to divide the workforce, who were 
becoming less sure of their position, following the evident confusion 
among the NC's, but in the process it had dismissed half the shop 
stewards, through redundancy. This was a severe defeat for the 
only 100 per cent organised factory in the motor industry, with 
perhaps the strongest left wing workplace leadership anywhere in 
the country. The dispute was a vivid illustration that the 
independent self activity of workplace organisation was also 
contingent upon the complicity of a particular managerial strategy. 
When this changed I a cohesive left wing workplace organisation became 
vulnerable, half of its stewards being wiped out. It was in exchange 
for a commitment towards higher productivity and flexible working 
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practices upon the pr:servation of labour discipline by a workplace 
leadership/that a works management outside the Federation gave 
tacit support for a left wing stewards organisation. 
At Austin, on the other hand,the dependence of the workplace 
organisation on officialdom was far greater. It was not merely 
the question of the size of the Longbridge plant, but, as the works 
was not just an assembler of cars, also manufacturing some components 
its own, it contained a diverse body of trades and unions. With 
much higher levels of non-unionism than at Standard, the two primary 
problems faced by its left wing workplace leadership was the basic 
question of union recruitment and the equally important unity 
between the workplace unions. The most important affect of the CP 
influence within the trade union leaderships was that it provided 
a common ground for establishing an organised unity among the senior 
stewards. The broadl\~S~ of union representation on the works 
committee was ~ore representative of the number of plant unions , 
but it was less representative of the distribution of union 
membership. Given the disquiet in the AEU, and given the traditional 
attitudes held by a union like the NUVB, it is difficult to 
conceive any individual union foregoing part of its influence in 
the works. It was the common political affiliations among the senior 
stewards that provided for an administrative workplace unity. THis 
was a crucial development,because it was only from within a unified 
workplace leadership that many of the inter union, inter work group 
squabbles which beset Longbridge, could be settled amicably, 
particularly in periods of union growth or the effect of changing 
technology upon skills, materials used and the workers who claimed 
jurisdiction over them. 
It is, however, not entirely possible to say that the influence 
of the CP leadership was primarily responsible for the organisational 
dependence upon local afficialdom. On the contrary, it was more the 
evident weakness of organisations in general and the distance of 
the works committee from the workforce/which contributed to the 
increased dependence of such a large and diversified workplace 
organisation upon local officialdom. This dependence was further 
reinforced by the strategy adopted by the works management to 
refuse to recognise the works committee and senior stewards in the 
period before 1956. Not only were the workplace leadership solely 
dependent upon local officials for access to management on important 
I 
decisions, but managements policy of only recognising Dick Etheridge, 
restricted the independence of the workplace organisation and 
perhaps ironically from the management~ point of view, reinforced 
the influence of centralism and the position of the CP. This process 
of dependence upon officialdom, in the context of a general hostility 
on the part of management towards workplace influence, not only 
discouraged independent action, but also made the workplace 
organisation particularly exposed to the actions of both management 
and officials when it did act independently o~'er the defence of 
workplace organisation. 
Dependence upon officialdom meant dependence upon inter union 
division among officials. This was most evident in the Pegg and 
Bills dispute, where the TGWU called a separate meeting of their 
membership to oppose the JSSC decision to defend workplace organisation. 
The consequences of divisions among officialdom not only locally, 
but nationally, over the question of redundancy and the defence of 
workplace organisation, was most clearly seen in the McHugh dispute 
which must rank along with the sacking of Derek Robinson of how important are 
limits to official support for workplace organisation. Though 
the strike was recognised by the NUVB, it nearly financially broke 
the union. The outcome was not just the removal of a chief steward, 
I but the extinction of the vehicle builders workplace organisation. 
The weaknesses in the Longbridge workplace organisation in the early 
1950's, arising from the existence of non union members and the 
actions of management, served to increase the dependence of the 
workplace upon the CSEU officials, but it was the vulnerability 
to union divisions that not only weakened the independence of 
workplace organisation, but enabled the works management to remove 
elected left wing representatives and engage in a policy ,of 
restriction and obstruction towards the workings of workplace 
representation. Oddly enough, these measures only reinforced the 
dependence of workplace organisation on offiCials. After both the 
Pegg and Bills and the McHugh dispute, it was the CSEU officials 
who stepped in to revive workplace organisation and leadership. 
The officials not only witnessed the annual elections, but drew up 
the workplace constitution. It,was, however, the increasing 
involvement of the workplace leadership in the practical arrangements 
for recognition, transfer, mobility and the operation of the 
redundancy procedure agreements, after 1956, which led to a growing 
acceptance of their presence on behalf of management at Longbridge, 
though it was some time before they, were prepared to formally 
acknowledge this in recognition .'lgreements, and procedures 'protecting' 
the position of shop stewards. 
On the role of combine committees,where CP influence was' strongly 
represented, particularly on the important main committee and 
steering committees for both the MSSC and the BMC combine committee, 
they had a clear opportunity to influence policy and action. 
Although the position of Bill Warman appeared to be more ambivalent 
in his attitude towards union officials, it was certainly not the 
intention of the BMC combine to challenge either the position 
of the union leaderships or to generally contemplate action, 
independent of union authority. This distinction between the 
Standard leadership and that of the Austin and Nuffield organisations, 
could of course be explained again by the unusual conditions which 
framed the particular type of dependent relations upon both management 
and union officialdom, compared to the experiences of low unionisation 
and hostile management in the BMC plants which increased a more 
obvious dependence on the official organisations. From the 
constitution of the BMC and its actions, it is evident that they 
saw the building of union memberships,rather than the reform or 
displacement of union organisation,as being central to their 
realisation of policy. Hence much of their actions were undertaken 
through policy resolution through the local branches. Again, given 
the weaknesses of workplace organisation in BMC, and the dependence 
upon officials in their domestic organisation, this may not have 
been an unrealistic strategy. After all, it was after combine 
support for unofficial action over the sacking of Frank Horsma~ 
which saw the AEU EC issue suspensions and prescriptions against 
leading stewards. Weak organisations may not be the best grounds 
~rp~ which to fight an internal battle with union officials, 
particularly with a hostile management in the wings. 
While strategically, in the given circumstances of the distribution 
of power in the motor industry, the positions adopted by the 
workplace leadership could be justified on pragmatic grounds. 
But where criticism is probably more justified is in the area of 
policy, and more importantly, the consequences of allowing 
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officialdom the initiative to settle conflicts. This was especially 
so on the issue of redundancy. 
It could be maintained that the 'no redundancy' policies adopted 
by the 'Big Five' conferences saw the spectre of workplace combine 
committees at their height. It appeared no longer merely as an 
administrative organisation of a select workplace leadership, 
but attracted wide involvement of rank and file stewards across 
the whole of the industry, covering a wide range of unions. But 
there were some basic limitations in their policy. Firstly, the 
'Big Five' meetings fully accepted the introduction of automation 
and technical change as being a progressive force, provided the 
surplus created was shared with the workforce, in terms of wages 
rather thagn!lstributed in profits. Secondly, the combine committees 
saw opposition to redundancy largely in terms of work sharing. 
ie. more flexible working arrangements, transferring of workers 
within plants, but largely short time working. In other words/it 
was based upon 'sharing the misery' rathp-r than posing an alternative 
basis of control over the defence of jobs, or the opposition to 
de-skilling techniques. There was no radical proposals for a 
qualitative change in control over the conditions under which labour 
power was to be exchanged. The most important outcome of this was 
that the combine committees were actually accepting a policy towards 
redundancy and the 'right of work', in a framework which could be 
relatively easily undermined by redundancy agreements offering 
compensation, and dividing worker rights to employment in terms 
of security, trade, skill and section, was not just 'sharing the 
failing to provide 
misery' but/an alternative critique in which job control would form 
a basis for existing and future employment. 'Sharing the misery' 
created the prospect of relieving the poverty of short time,through 
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the payment of financial inducements to leave. 
Such an alternative critique would have had to be fought for/not 
just against employer prerogative, but also against union officialdom 
and ultimately the State. There was perhaps just the semblance that 
such a basis could have developed in the values, attitudes and 'job 
culture' of the NUVB, whose historic origins predated the motor 
industry and generally lay in a craft tradition which had existed 
outside the engineering industry. But its strong workplace 
allegiences merely served to provide a somewhat insular collective 
independence which was confined to the body shops and trim sections 
of certain Coventry and Birmingham plants. While it jealously 
guarded the independence of the society, and the virtues of the skilled 
men in what had become largely a de-skilled workplace, despite the 
desire of its left wing NE to extend its influence in the motor 
industry in a period of union growth, it was largely local influences 
of members which prevented this breaking out beyond its traditional 
spheres of organisation. The longstanding employer offensive against 
the vehicle builders eventually came to an end in 1970, when they were 
taken over by the TGWU, qiving this union some 80 per. cent of total 
union membership in the motor industry. 
The claim that crisis and recession provide workers with a fundamental 
lesson in the workings of political economy of market societies, has 
in the experience of the motor industry generally produced defensive 
confrontations, rather than provide a school for alternatives to the 
terms under which wage labour is exchanged. Not only did redundancy 
at Crossley Motors, Standard, Carbodies, Daimler, Rover, Armstrong-
siddeley and Austin all result in the removal of important members 
of the workplace leadership, but works management invariably acted 
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in this way prior to the introduction of new car models, which would 
otherwise have increased the prospects for wage bargaining. Furthermore, 
the virtual elimination of the NUVB, one of the strongest organised 
sections of the Austin labourforce, after the MCHugh strike, the 
removal of half the Standard shop stewards and even the dismissal of 
Frank Horsman, and later Derek Robinson, all paved the way for an 
attack upon rates and conditions. Important though the lessons in 
power conflict may have been, where victimisation through redundancy 
was actually resisted, notably at Duples, Carbodies, and Jaguar, 
at the beginning of the 1950's, it was the union local officials who 
signed redundancy procedure agreements. While these were intended to 
reduce the more blantent forms of victimisation, they actually 
elevated the position of senior stewards in the actual operation of 
these procedures. 
Redundancy procedures, however, while they brought about an increased 
acceptance on the part of managements of the senior positions in the 
workplace leaderships, they also contained an important, but subtle 
change. They did not forego the right of managerial prerogative, but 
under the growing influence of the left in the national leadership 
of the TGWU, not only was there a strengthening of the positions of 
senior stewards in procedures for the workplace, but there was a 
simul taneous acceptance upon the part of union officialdom in the merits 
of JSSC's. This is perhaps most clearly shown by the iffect of the 
appointment of Jack Jones and Les Kealey in the No 5 Region on the 
Austin Works Committee. The price of acceptance was increased pressure 
to act constitutionally, though adherence to procedures, the operation 
of which, however, over redundancy, would transform the collective 
concept of 'the right to work' and 'no redundancy'. Importantly, it 
was acceptance of senior stewards in their domestic workplace role. 
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There was to be no acceptance of such stewards in the positions on 
combine committees. The ploy of union officialdom was therefore based 
upon retaining their control and dependence over workplace organisation. 
It is possible to see that the origin of redundancy procedures, which 
under the EWO's were attempts to stratify the workforce by skills and 
experience for directing essential labour for the war effor~had 
gained considerable acceptance through the involvement of workplace 
representatives. It had been these principles, which were endorsed 
in the Special Redundancy Procedure for the rundown of the munitions 
industries, which were being applied in Coventry following the 1951 
redundancy strike at Jaguar. But whereas the wartime measures gave 
stewards a right of veto and were basically concerned for a more 
efficient distribution of labour to important war work, at Jaguar 
procedures were established to give individual entitlements to a job. 
This devisive effect was extended following the Standard and BMC 
redundancy agreements in 1956, to include a differential right to 
compensation for the loss of a job. It was among the NUVB members 
at Jaguar and Morris Bodies in Coventry, that this criteria was 
resisted before 1956, while the creation of the type of private 
employer compensation did not appear to have much affect at removing 
resistence to redundancy in the 1960-61 recession. It was therefore 
as a result of collective opposition where management had to face 
retaining labour on short time, or for example, at Rootes, where it 
had to confront a company-wide revolt organised through an unofficial 
combine committee, that one of the first pieces of industrial relations 
legislation introduced by a newly elected Labour Government in 1964, 
was the creation of the right to universal compensation for workers 
made redundant. Compensation, in terms of the act, were to be 
calculated upon the accumulating monetary assessment of individual 
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seniority. The private arrangements before this point by individual 
companies, were largely based upon the seniority of broad groups of 
workers, rather than the position of isolated individuals. The scale 
of compensation, for example, which was agreed following the 1956 
BMC strike, and which became the model for such private arrangements 
among federated employers, was based upon only one week's extra pay 
for all those redundant with between 3-10 years service, and only two 
weeks extra pay for all those with 10 or more years service. While 
this clearly was a divisive move, it did retain common grounds of 
interest among those broad categories of workers. It was statutory 
entitlements which in an attempt to break grounds for collective 
opposition, introduced the notion of individually differentiated rights 
to redundancy compensation. 
This investigation of redundancy as a key issue in power conflict 
in workplace relations, has reinforced the view that procedures and 
institutional arrangements through which decisions are taken by 
those engaged in an interactive relationship, cannot be viewed as being 
inconsequential to the exercise of power, and to the outcomes of power 
conflict in workplace industrial relations. The exercise of power and 
authority in organised production relationships, are structured by 
irreversible roles, in which workplace organisations occupy a subordinate 
position in relation to the authority of management. The power of 
workplace organisation however, or changes in the balance of that power· 
in relation to management authority, should not under-estimate the 
continuing influence of management or trade union officialdom. An 
analysis of workplace power cannot be satisfactorily understood, 
merely by accounts which seek to only stress the importance of worker 
self activity. Rather,workplace organisation must be considered from 
within the complexities of a continuous dynamic interactive relationship, 
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which involves the interests and actions, not just of organised wage 
labour, but also that of management and their organisations, the 
State, as well as both the structure and actions of various unions 
and union officialdom. In this process, set within a wider framework 
of prevailing economic and political circumstances, the effect of the 
realisation of interests through strategy and policy, became critical 
points for evaluation of the outcomes of power relationships in which 
workplace power is situated. Here, it has been disclosed how workplace 
organisation, occupying a subordinate pOSition in terms of managerial 
organisation and union officialdom, that even the most effectively 
organised workplace leaderships,are constantly vulnerable in times 
of recession, to the challenge of management. The limits of workplace 
organisation are both determined by its inability to transcend the 
workings of a market economy, while its representation of workplace 
interest cannot be expressed entirely independently of the interests 
of management or union officialdom. 
Both a failure to support the actions of workplace organisation by 
individual unions or their local officials, can not only weaken the 
ability of workplace organisation to command the support of the rank 
and file, but such actions can provide opportunities for management 
to curtail the activities of workplace organisation, and even lead 
to attacks upon rates and conditions. But even among strongly organised 
workplaces, the workplace leadership is never entirely free to act 
independently of management. The greater acceptance of workplace 
leadership, on the part of management, has invariably been contingent 
upon some other requirement, like production responsibilities, 
co-operation over working arrangements, mobility of labour, the 
operation of procedures, or the restraining of rank and file revolts. 
Such managerial support, however, has itself usually been conditional 
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upon a rigorous acceptance of the workings of procedure, and the 
constitutional settlement of grievances. Workplace leaderships have 
inevitably been faced with choices ~~ich emphasise accommodations 
with managements/or pursue a course of conflict in which either a 
failure to receive official support from officialdom or a reaction 
for management may, particularly in a period of recession, make representative 
leaderships vulnerable. Where however, workplace leaderships are 
drawn into adopting accommodatory positions, they may find themselves 
confronting spontaneous outbreaks of workgroup or sectional dissent. 
The strategies and actions of workplace organisation are/therefore, 
inevitably actions which involve a considerable level of political 
discretion. In the motor industry, workplace leaderships have sought 
to establish a unity within the workplace by forming joint committees 
to overcome sectional divisions, which arise out of the division of 
labour and from the independent character of different workplace 
unions, but on the other hand, cannot be indifferent to the influence 
of union officials or inter union conflict on the behaviour of 
workplace membership. We have seen also, that within the realm of 
having to act 'politically', in terms of judgements surrounding power 
conflicts, the politics of action in terms of the ideologies and values 
of workplace leaderships have not been without affect in decisionS on 
whether to lead policies independently of union officials, or pursue 
them through the course of union channels. Despite the influence 
of the CP,it has been seen that the maintenance of unity in the 
workplace, and the continued dependence of workplace organisation upon 
local officials, has resulted in a generally strong commitment to 
constitutional action on the part of workplace leaderships, even through 
their own combine organisations. The central problematic of workplace 
power has been that in the daily enstrangements with managements and 
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union officialdom, workplace organisation continues to be tied to 
relationships of subordination and dependence. In a market economy, 
it therefore remains constantly vulnerable to conditions of 
uncertainty and the ultimate exercise of managerial power. 
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be dealt ~ith on a. dos e ntic basis in the factory c onceIT. ~ C. . If the ShoT) 
Stewards have evidence tha.t local factory rna n~ge~e nts arc no t cQ~plyi n ~ . 
with the ter2S of the procedure as laid do~n belrnl , th ey shall c cn s ul ~ 
the local Trade Union Officials nho will be 9npo'llered to r~i5e th e c:J.i:ter 
~ith B.ll.C. top Man~6eDent. 
2. In the first insta.nce, the ~anase~ent of the f~ctory concerned ~ill 
notify the Senior Shop Ste·.7ard~, and. at the SC- ::le dr.:o c.d.d.se the loca l 
officia.ls of the cppropri!lta Tre.de Union. Sir.lul taneously th3 ~ocn.l office 
of the Hinistr'J of Labour idll ba aa.vised that rcdunda.ncy is ur.d.e r 
considerC'..tion and ',1il1 be informed of the u::,proxim:. te nu.;:lber cf 
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Ste'i'~[lrds, T:-nde UniO ',1 Of'ficids unci. !:~inis 'cry of Labour, :lnd it is e.r.; r eed 
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pre'/iously t a.ken to r.void r ,::;dund~nc:r, the re D. sons \ih,y r cl tmc.:..ncy i~ r. ') 
inevitable, th3 nU!:b oS;:"s ~_nvolved, c.n1 thz ruo t h cd s to be uso;; J. in 
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Du:cin6 the s(?eonc "jook, nny individu::-.l c~sc ,~~n, if r.eCElS 5ary , be 
i nv c!) ti (',11 t (3 , 
.' 
/Cont 0" ,,,> ? • • •• "· 0'" • • I • • 
P~ e; o •••• 2. 
4. Th a t t he Cor.1pn ny c oul d not :.1.[;ree to th r:; Union' s propo ~) .~ l:3 on 
co ~p8 n s ~ tion, but indic at cJ th ~ t it ~ n5 th eir int e ntion t o 
oper:\t a th e follo-,;in5 until such tine s as a n L1tionr.l 
settle~ent is re ~ched. 
( a) To eoployoei of thre e years continuous s e rvic e , nn~ up t o te n 
years of such s c r 'lic e - ona further '/oe k' s ' p~ at ~ppropri at c 
consolid~ted tiDe rate. 
To eDployc€) s of t en ye~rs' or ~.10ro conti nuous se rvice - t-;;oo 
further r:eeks' p~'y at. nppropri a to cons olic.a t cd ti r.1C r~t e • 
. Yours faithfully,. 
Sgd. G. F{. HlJUUUAN, . 
DEPlJrY CHAIRI.tJ;'N, BRITISH l:iOTOR CORPORATION. 
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APPENDIX 2 
THE BRITISH HOTOR CORPORATION JOINT SHOP STE:1AJtDSf COHNITTEE ::.:..... 
CONSTITUTION, OB.JECTS AND STANDING ORDERS 
CONSTITUTION 
1. The Committee to be called. the British l-Iotor Corporation 
Jo:iJ:lt Shop Stewarcis' Committee. 
2. Representation: Two acredited representative Shop Stewards 
from each factory wi thin the NUffield group with an equiValent 
number from the Austin Wo:rlcs with voting powers. 
3. The Chair.nan, Secretary and Treasurer to be elected annually 
who shall retire :iJ:l July of each year. They shall be eligible 
fer re-election.. 1hey will attend Illeetings as ex-officio 
members, the Chairman to have a casting vete only. 
4. A Stand:iJ:lg Orders Committee of six to eight members, i.e. two 
members fran each of the principal towns, shall be elected 
annually. 
5. '!he Secretary shall attend all meetings of the main Committee 
and, the Standing Orders Committee. 
6. Any expense incurred by the Standing Orders Committee shall 
be bome by the central fund. ' 
7. Those factories not participating in the fund raising competitions 
shall contribute an a:anual sum of £1.0 to the central £\md. 
8. Meetings will be held. bi-monthly in Binningham, Coventry and 
Oxford in strict rotation, tmless otherwise agreed upon. 
liQ!!: Clause 7 - It was agreed that if a Committee had insufficient 
fUnd.s they could make a donation accordingly. 
OBJECTS OF THE COI-J}II'I'l'EE 
B. 
C. 
D. 
E. 
To promote friendly relations between the Shop Stewards and 
members of the various Trade Unions operating throughout the 
Corporation. 
To safeguard, maintain and improve the wages and conditions 
of its members. 
To exchange and impart ir.fonnation in furtherance of Cla~se B. 
To maintain and improve, where possible, the Trado Union 
membership in the various factories. 
The functions of the Committee to be strictly non-poii tical 
and the Commi ~tee should not be used for the fu.rtheranc~ of 
political objects, but confine itself to the domestio interests 
of its members within the factories represented by the 
Comnittee. 
Contd •••••• 
STANDING ORDERS 
1. Quorum: Twel va- members shall constitute a Q)..uJrum. If, wi thin 
half an hour of the t:ime appointed for a meeting to commence, a 
quorum is not present, the meeting shall be dissolved. 
2. . An Agenda shall be prepared by the Chainnan and Secretary and, 
time pe~ tting, circulated to all factories prior to the 
meeting. 
3. Items for the Agenda shall take precedence over all other 
business unless at least two thirds of those present decide 
othenrise. 
4. Items for the Agenda to be submitted to the Secretary in 
wri ting prior to the Neeting and placed on the Agenda in 
sequence as received. . 
5. All discussions shall confonn to the usual rules of debate. 
6. No suspension of these Standing Orders shall take place 
except by a two thirds majority vote of the members present. 
APPENDIX 3 
CONFEDERATION OF SHIPBUILDING &: ENGINEERING UNIONS 
BIBMINGHAM DISTRICT COlvIHITTEE 
AUSTm }iOroR CO·~~" , 
Informal Meeting held on 19th Janua.ry, 1960, to discuss 
Dismissal of Shop Stewards 
The arrangement which I am about to suggest for your agreement is in 
no way intended to conflict with the present understanding and agreements 
be't"..reen the Employers I Federation and the Confederation of Trade 'Unions, ( 
part of which deals with the General Procedure between Management and 
Workpeople Representatives. 
On a domestic basis however and bearing in mind that we nonnill'y 'warn 
any employee of objectionable conduct before discharging him, we are 
prepared to put the following suggestion where a Shop Steward is 
principally concerned:- ' 
. 1. He will be warned of his conduct and a communication sent 
to his Union. Ths Chief Shop Steward will also be infonned. 
2. If subsequently there is still cause for compla.:i..nt he Will' 
again be warned and suspended for a short period. 'llle 
l1Dion will be infonned together with the Chief Shop Steward. 
3. Further complaints will result in dismissal. 
NOTES (a) Facili ties for domestic discussion "ri th Union 
representation if required, will be afforded in 
connection with the foregOing warnings. 
(b) There are obvious exceptions" to the above arrangements 
included in which are the following: 
1. Drunkenness. 
2. Pilfering or theft. 
3. Fighting or offensive behaviour. 
4. Breach of car purchase regulations. 
c 
G()jrr.,,!:!)1~ATIOH OF SHIffiUII,DTITG ~I: E~ j(-: ' ,:,mSRTIJG 1;;rIOtI3 
BIR HIlTGHA d D I !:jTRICT C01,n':il'1"l'!':C 
1. The Armual trea ting at: Shop Stewards to bo hol~ in J ,.4ULII.ll'Y slllil l 
eleat -
(a) Cb..airr.nn and Secretary who sho.ll be r8co ,' ~n l:J (;J. b:r L't1a 
Coniedl3ra clon in accordanoo '.vi til tho COll;;l; i t.; t tI :lul"l ... 
(b) Sa·1on delegato3 to the Worlc:s Ccmmitt ,) u. Tho ChfJ. l rllllln 
~nd S~oratary aihll1 be includu~ in th~ 30v~n d~la ~atas . 
(o) A Hinute 80 cretary. 
2. The Works Committoe shall consi~t o f tl l.u El luct ,;,'l <.1I':h: ~~: l t0;:l and 
the Chiei' Shop St13ward3 of thcl Dnlen::! w1th rnl ', l~bl_ r;;i ~ i ['l ::it tho W01''''!). 
The seven alolJtGd reprosentativos !Jllull con::rtlttlt, ; tillJ 
Negotiating CO~llitte o. 
,When mueting the nfana.gemont, tho l!,;gotlut i:'l"', (:u iIU lli t.; !; v u ~h; , ll incl'ldo 
the Chief , Shop Stewnrds of the Unions invcl·,) ... ,li 11'1 t :,u l ' I'otl.um unJ0r 
discussion. Shop Stowo.rds of th6 I.ll"GIlO 11 ;'J0 lVud lIluy II.; lJO-0p~ .:,;c.l. 
a.s and when nucos:Jury. 
3. Procedure s 
( a.) 
~ 
A problem rni~ed in o.ccorduncu W Ith th,', t ' , I'm:.l of tllo Natlol1:.ll 
Agreement douling with thQ n'ovL.:iOrl.:J 1'01' 1:110 A'/ o.L rt .. ll'lC U of 
Di SDut0 s wni eh ia pn::Z:3ed to tb,; Sllop ;"jt.::'MU1'll :..: nd no t 1"'0 :.l 01 vod 
should than bo doalt with by th.u Chiof S1l0p :]t;,) ·.I :,L r'U of: thu 
Union concerned ... The Chief Shop Stewu.rd ~h;,.ll inform ttll) 
Secretary of tho Works COnlItlittOd of thu liat U1"'u of tl'lu pl'ob.lom 
and tho steps propo::zod for duuling wittl it. ~rh' J Chiui' SllOP 
Steward of tho Union may roqu(;~t tho o. ::l;Jl Jt Cl n Gu 01' l~ho 
Socretary of the Works CoIIll1l1ttuu in n .-l goclt1.tiol1:J wittl ttlu 
Ho.nagoment. 
(b) , If tho problem raisod aff.:::cta moro tllL.lI one Union it ~hull bu 
roforrod directly to thu ,socrutilry or' ttl\.) Wol'l(~ COl11l1littou. 
( c) 
(d) 
If the Workz Committoe docidos to prOC().H.l wi Lll an:r ( . :I.:~ ttGt' 
placod befero thom they ohall do ::)0 o.cCOl'Cl:ing t~ o tl10 
esto.blished procedure agr~omont. 
Problems doalt with by tho Worlea COll!l1IittUll wlll. ;ll r"' :,JUl t ln 
:Jubaoqllont nogctlo.tlona with tho i', hn.:l~:) I , : '; nt h t wl Ll.utl tiiO 
t:ull-ti r'le Official :) of tho Union/s Cl' U l'!' ,J;;uut, till) ::3ucr0tc.. r :r 
of tho Works Comnt1. t 'teu abnll be ir.vi tod to Q tt v llLl . 
(0) At 0. Joint Works Confor ::nce lnvol vin2; U l1LUoll1 , , ! ' u L' UlIll..lna, t 110 
'Norks Conunittu;J sholl bo in uttondunco. 
4. Hectings: , 
ThG Company will grant filcilitiu 3 for u monthly !du'Jt lnt,; o f tho 
worlts Comra1tteo a.nd a monthly I".Get1ng of all Sllop ;:)t (; w~.L.'do, to bo 
held during worlcing hours. 
Tho Compon7{ will hnvo rugulnr r::ontlll;r r.l.:,') t.tl W :; 'Id.I:I) t.!I " :J-.lf ' \ ', I 
(':1 111111. t t.~~ ,~~~, '," !,,~,.~jl~l1 ~ ,.~u ~~&1fSU O'l,i' '\I ,Ltlw u • 
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"Graph 1 Annual job loss in UK 
Vehicle industry 
1950-1980 
Source: DE. 
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